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Abstract 
The recent and rapid expansion of commercial free range chicken farms in Australia has caused 
concern among industry experts that the potential for contact between wildlife and commercial 
chicken flocks will increase along with the potential for pathogen transmission and disease 
occurrence in the Australian commercial chicken industry. Of particular concern is avian 
influenza (AI) which is a global threat to poultry industries; Australia being no exception 
having experienced seven high pathogenic AI (HPAI) outbreaks, all of which caused 
substantial production and economic losses and severe impacts on animal welfare. All 
Australian HPAI outbreaks involved commercial chicken flocks which resulted from initial 
exposure to low pathogenic AI (LPAI) virus from wild birds and subsequent mutation within 
the domestic chicken flocks. LPAI is endemic in wild birds in Australia where the overall 
proportion of birds that test positive is approximately 2%; highest in waterfowl and shorebirds 
at 2.5% and 0.6% respectively. A unique feature of Australian waterfowl is that they are 
nomadic; the majority of species stay within the continent and movements are less predictable; 
usually in response to environmental factors such as climate and food availability.  The 
probabilities involved with chickens being exposed to LPAI virus and the occurrence of 
subsequent spread of both LPAI and HPAI are largely unknown. In particular, it is not known 
if free range commercial chicken farms are at more risk compared to other farm types, and if 
so, what features or practices lead to a greater risk that could be potentially mitigated by 
changes on farm. Risk assessment modelling and sensitivity analysis are tools that can be used 
to evaluate these probabilities. This thesis describes the conduct of a farm survey and wildlife 
camera trapping to describe features related to farm design, management practices, biosecurity 
practices and wildlife visits on Australian commercial chicken farms; non-free range meat 
chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer and free range layer. It then describes 
the development, evaluation and sensitivity analysis of scenario tree risk assessment models 
using inputs from the farm survey, scientific literature and expert opinion to assess and compare 
the risk of exposure and spread of LPAI and HPAI among these commercial chicken farm types 
in the Australian context. 
The farm survey involved conducting interviews on commercial layer and meat chicken farms, 
defined as having more than 1,000 birds and 25,000 birds on the farm respectively. Commercial 
chicken farms were the focus of this thesis as the index farms of all past Australian HPAI 
iii 
 
outbreaks were commercial chicken farm types. Non-commercial farms are not regarded a 
threat to the Australian poultry industry due to their limited contact with commercial farms and 
the comparatively small consequences associated with outbreaks on these farms. The 
commercial chicken farms surveyed from June 2015 to February 2016 were; 15 non-free range 
meat chicken farms, 15 free range meat chicken farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer 
farms and 25 free range layer farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. 
Results on aspects related to farm design and management practices include details on shed 
information such as shed size, environmental control methods and stocking densities, as well 
as information on chicken breed, vaccinations and health records. Additional information for 
free range farms was also collected for this emergent sector and results from the survey 
included range size, range characteristics and conditions for range access for the chickens. The 
farm survey also provided results on biosecurity aspects of the farms. Results from the survey 
found a high level of water treatment (the removal and deactivation of contaminants and 
pathogenic microorganisms) across all farm types and approximately half of all farm types 
reported wild birds inside sheds; these were all small bird types such as sparrows and finches. 
In general, meat chicken farms had a higher level of adoption of biosecurity practices than layer 
farms, with the lowest levels of biosecurity practice reported for cage layer farms in this survey. 
A logistic regression analysis was also performed and revealed that in most cases, performing 
a biosecurity practice was significantly associated with a higher perceived farmer importance 
of that practice.  
An extension of the farm survey was the conduct of wildlife camera trapping on a subset of the 
surveyed farms, specifically five non-free range meat chicken farms, six free range meat 
chicken farms, three cage layer farms, two barn layer farms and 14 free range layer farms. The 
cameras were infrared and motion-sensing and were placed for one week on each farm during 
the Australian spring (September to October) in the Sydney basin region and the Australian 
summer (February) in South East Queensland. Wildlife visits were identified on every farm 
type, with the most frequent visits observed on cage layer farms (73% across all farm types 
with consideration of the number of farms per farm type that cameras were placed on) followed 
by free range layer farms (15%). The results suggest that the level of biosecurity on the farm 
impacts the frequency of wildlife visits more so than the farm type per se. Wild birds were the 
most common wildlife type to visit the farms, where the common mynah, Acridotheres tristis, 
was the most frequent wildlife visitor (23.9%), followed by corvid (22.9%) and pigeon (7.5%) 
bird types. Waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes), the bird types with the 
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highest prevalence of LPAI virus in Australia, were rare visitors in this study. In addition, most 
wildlife visits occurred during the day from 6am to 6pm (85%) and only 30% of visits on free 
range farms had a chicken present in the same image and no physical interactions between a 
live chicken and wildlife were captured. This suggests the most likely route of pathogen 
transmission between wildlife and commercial chickens is the indirect route i.e. exposure to 
pathogens from faecal-oral contamination of food, water, fomites or vectors. 
As well as results from the farm survey, the risk assessment modelling work used input values 
from the scientific literature along with surveillance data of LPAI in Australian wild birds, 
branching process modelling work, and expert opinion. The risk assessment models developed 
consisted of an exposure risk assessment model which evaluated the probability of LPAI 
exposure to Australian commercial chickens and a partial consequence risk assessment model 
that evaluated the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread within and between Australian 
commercial chicken farms. 
Specifically, the exposure risk assessment model investigated the pathways of exposure of 
Australian commercial chicken farms to LPAI virus from Australian wild birds and estimated 
the probability of exposure occurring using scenario trees and a stochastic modelling approach. 
The model revealed that at any point in time, the probability of the first LPAI virus exposure 
to a chicken on a Australian commercial chicken farms from one wild bird is extremely low 
for all farm types, irrespective of the pathway of exposure given wild birds are present on the 
farm. Across the five farm types, free range layer farms had the highest probability of exposure 
(median, 0.00075; 5 - 95%, 0.00057 – 0.0001). Sensitivity analysis was also conducted and 
revealed that the most influential parameters on the probability of LPAI exposure was the 
proportion of wild birds that are waterfowl on the farm, the presence of waterfowl on the range 
and feed storage areas of the farm, and the prevalence of LPAI in the wild birds visiting the 
farm. Binomial distributions using these probabilities also indicated that 1,000 wild birds 
visiting a farm over an undefined time period would lead to LPAI exposure on only 5 of 100 
farms (or scenarios), indicating that on 94.9% of farms, exposure would not occur. This applied 
to all commercial chicken farm types except free range layer farms, where only 100 wild birds 
are required to visit to result in a similar proportion of exposed farms. 
The partial consequence assessment performed following the exposure risk assessment model 
investigated the likelihood of spread of LPAI and HPAI but did not quantify the impact of the 
consequences of spread within and between Australian commercial chicken farms. The model 
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revealed that after exposure and infection of LPAI in one chicken on a commercial chicken 
farm, it is most likely that the virus dies out and that no establishment of infection occurs. If 
LPAI infection does become established in the shed however, the LPAI virus is more likely to 
spread to other sheds and beyond the index farm compared to HPAI. This is due to a low 
probability of detection and reporting of LPAI infected chickens by the farmers compared to 
HPAI, as the latter is associated with a greater visible impact and mortality. The longer 
production cycle length of layer birds leads to a higher probability of mutation and hence a 
higher median probability for HPAI spread from an infected layer farm (0.0019, 0.0016 and 
0.0031 for cage, barn and free range layer respectively) than an infected meat chicken farm 
(and 0.00025 and 0.00043 for non-free range and free range meat chicken respectively). Due 
to the high level of equipment sharing and low level of disinfection of equipment between 
sheds, the pathway with the highest average median probability for LPAI spread between sheds 
was via equipment (0.015; 5 - 95%, 0.0058 – 0.036), followed by vermin (0.010; 0.0028 – 
0.023). The pathway of spread between farms with the highest average median probability of 
HPAI spread farm-to-farm was via egg trays (3.70 × 10-5; 5 - 95%, 1.47 × 10-6 – 0.00034) but 
applied to layer farms only. Across all farm types, bird pick up systems (1.57 × 10-5; 5 - 95%, 
4.83 × 10-7 – 0.00019) had the highest average median probability of HPAI spread between 
farms. There was no explicit consideration of the volume and frequency of the spread pathways, 
and thus the results provide a comparative analysis of the probabilities between pathways. 
Specifically, shed-to-shed spread was assumed to have similar volume and frequency for each 
pathway. The parameters for farm-to-farm spread were informed by expert opinion and thus 
the variation between pathways in volume and frequency and in virus survival was considered 
by experts. 
The research presented in this thesis has greatly increased current understanding about the 
design and management and biosecurity practices of commercial chicken farms in the 
Australian context via a farm survey and wildlife camera trapping in the Sydney basin region 
and South East Queensland. This knowledge was previously limited in the literature 
particularly in relation to free range commercial chicken farms as most have only been 
established in the last decade in response to the increase in consumer demand for free range 
chicken products. Obtaining this knowledge was prudent especially given the current growing 
concerns associated with free range poultry production, particularly related to the threat of AI 
to the Australian poultry industry. There is a need for improvement in some aspects of 
biosecurity practices across all farm types. Layer farms, particularly cage layer farms, can be 
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targeted to improve general biosecurity and in relation to AI as these were the farm types 
identified to have the lowest levels of biosecurity adoption. Waterfowl presence on farms and 
poor biosecurity associated with equipment use between sheds, bird pick up vehicles, and egg 
trays and pallets are the pathways and parameters that have the greatest influence on the 
probabilities of exposure and spread respectively. Biosecurity practices specific to these should 
therefore be targeted at the farm level. Industry and government level action are also integral 
to minimising the threat of AI and these include; continued LPAI surveillance in wild birds, 
considering AI surveillance in domestic chicken flocks, revisions to generic and industry-
specific biosecurity manuals for poultry production, and conduct of training programs or 
workshops targeting farm staff to improve the level of adoption and compliance of biosecurity 
practices on farms. The risk assessment models can also be updated and extended to other 
poultry species and regions of Australia and as new information arises especially for aspects 
where limited information was available during the conduct of this study. These include the 
volume and frequency of spread pathways that occur in the Australian commercial chicken 
industry and the behaviour and mechanisms of the AI virus.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) virus have caused devastating economic losses in poultry 
industries across the globe. Very high rates of mortality and morbidity in gallinaceous poultry 
are associated with the most virulent form of the virus; high pathogenic AI (HPAI). Only the 
subtypes H5 and H7 have been shown to mutate from low pathogenic AI (LPAI) to HPAI. 
Outbreaks of HPAI have occurred in all inhabited continents with major intercontinental waves 
of HPAI H5 outbreaks occurring since 2003. These outbreaks spread from Asia to Europe and 
Africa, with the latest major wave of intercontinental outbreaks occurring in 2016 to 2017, 
leading to the death and destruction of hundreds of millions of poultry (Sims et al., 2017). 
HPAI is classed as a category 2 Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) in Australia under the 
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) as it has the potential to cause 
significant national market disruptions, severe production losses on poultry farms and the 
potential to affect human health (AHA, 2015). Australia has had seven HPAI outbreaks in 
poultry since 1976; the latest occurring in 2013 and all involved commercial chicken farm 
operations. These were effectively eliminated through quarantine, isolation and depopulation 
procedures but were associated with significant economic costs and damages (Bashiruddin et 
al., 1991, Westbury, 1997, Barr et al., 1986, Forsyth et al., 1993, Sims and Turner, 2009, Roth, 
2014, Moloney et al., 2013). 
Wild birds, specifically waterfowl and shorebirds, constitute the major natural reservoir of AI 
virus globally. Surveillance efforts of Australian wild birds have revealed that LPAI is endemic 
in the country; data from the National Avian Influenza Wild Bird Surveillance Program over a 
five year period (July 2007–June 2012) demonstrated that the overall proportion of birds that 
tested positive for the virus was 1.9 ± 0.1%, with proportions highest in waterfowl and 
shorebirds; at 2.5% and 0.6% respectively (Grillo, 2015). All HPAI outbreaks that have 
occurred in Australia so far were viruses of Australian-lineages and were most likely to have 
occurred from the introduction of LPAI virus from a wild bird that subsequently mutated to 
HPAI in the domestic poultry (Bashiruddin et al., 1991, Westbury, 1997, Barr et al., 1986, 
Forsyth et al., 1993, Sims and Turner, 2009, Roth, 2014, Moloney et al., 2013). HPAI virus 
has never been detected in Australian wild birds, except in a wild Eurasian starling (Sturnus 
vulgaris) trapped in a farm shed during a HPAI outbreak; it was likely to have acquired 
infection from the HPAI infected chickens (Grillo et al., 2015, Hansbro et al., 2010, 
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Nestorowicz et al., 1987). It has been assessed that the greatest risk of HPAI outbreaks 
occurring in Australian commercial chicken farms is most likely from the introduction of LPAI 
from local waterfowl with subsequent mutation to HPAI, rather than the incursion of an exotic 
HPAI virus (East et al., 2008b, East et al., 2008a). This is related to the unique nomadic nature 
of Australian waterfowl where most species stay within the continent and move in response to 
food and climatic conditions, rather than undergoing annual long-distance migrations as 
performed by waterfowl in the northern hemisphere (Dingle, 2004, Tracey et al., 2004). 
Transmission of AI to domestic poultry occurs mainly via the faecal-oral route, where the risk 
of AI infection is thought to be higher on domestic poultry farms that have frequent wild bird 
visits (Alexander, 2007, Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009).  
There is concern among industry experts that the risk of AI infection and outbreaks in Australia 
will increase as a consequence of the recent consumer driven-expansion of Australian free 
range chicken production of both eggs and chicken meat. Industry figures reveal that the 
Australian retail turnover of free range eggs has surpassed that of cage, barn and specialty eggs 
since 2012. The latest percentages in 2017 are 51%, 37%, 9% and 3% respectively. In terms of 
volume of eggs produced, cage eggs still surpass free range eggs with current industry figures 
at 49% and 41% respectively. Similarly, the Australian free range meat chicken production has 
grown to at least 15% of the total market from being regarded as a ‘cottage industry’ in 2006 
(Australian Eggs, 2017, ACMF, 2011). This concern led to industry recognition of the need to 
quantify the change in risk of LPAI introduction into commercial chicken farms and the 
associated changes in the risk of HPAI outbreaks. This is within the context of a changing 
industry structure and higher proportions of commercial chickens with outdoor access on free 
range farms, which may therefore lead to a greater potential to interact with wildlife.  
The aim of this thesis is to quantify the risk of AI exposure and spread among Australian 
commercial chicken farms. The development of risk assessment models, using methodology 
provided by The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), can provide a transparent, 
evidence-based approach for assessing the risk of disease and evaluating options for risk 
mitigation. In the context of this thesis, quantifying the risk of AI exposure and spread among 
Australian commercial chicken farms involves identifying the pathways that lead to AI 
exposure and spread and then quantifying the associated probabilities of these pathways 
occurring. Specifically, the pathways and associated probabilities of LPAI exposure from wild 
birds to Australian commercial chicken farms, as well as LPAI and HPAI spread within and 
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between Australian commercial chicken farms following exposure to LPAI were assessed. In 
addition, sensitivity analysis allows identification of the most influential pathways and thus 
helps indicate which on-farm actions can be performed to mitigate the risk of AI exposure and 
spread. Current information about Australian commercial chicken farms related to their design, 
features, wildlife visits, and management and biosecurity practices is needed to inform input 
values related to these potential pathways for the development of the risk assessment models. 
In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, research was undertaken to meet the following specific 
objectives: to capture current information about farm design, management and biosecurity 
practices of Australian commercial chicken farms particularly with the recent, rapid expansion 
of free range commercial chicken farms in Australia; to capture information on the types of 
wildlife as well as their frequency of visits and any interactions with chickens on Australian 
commercial chicken farms using camera trapping; to identify the potential pathways for LPAI 
exposure from wild birds to chickens on Australian commercial chicken farms, to estimate the 
probabilities of each pathway, and to identify the most influential pathways; and to identify the 
pathways of LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds and farms on Australian commercial 
chicken farms, to estimate the probabilities of these pathways, and to recognise the most 
influential pathways. 
Following this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews the literature of the 
Australian chicken industry, AI virus, and provides justification for the conduct of this study. 
The chapters that follow are the research chapters that investigate the situation on farm in 
selected regions of Australia and the conduct of risk assessments, and are then followed by a 
general discussion and conclusion in the final chapter. Information provided in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 was obtained from a farm survey which involved on-farm interviews and camera 
surveillance on commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and 
South East Queensland of Australia. The main purpose of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 was to inform 
the risk assessment models conducted in Chapters 6 and 7. Specifically, Chapter 3 provides 
information obtained on the current unique management practices, farm design and housing 
characteristics of commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Australian context. Chapter 
4 describes information on the current level of adoption of biosecurity practices performed on 
commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Australian context and farmer-perceived 
importance of these practices. Chapter 5 assesses the types and frequency of wildlife visiting 
commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Australian context from the use of motion 
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sensor cameras. Chapters 6 and 7 describe the development of quantitative risk assessment 
models to identify the pathways of both exposure and spread of AI virus to commercial layer 
and meat chicken farms in an Australian context and the associated probabilities of these 
pathways occurring using the methodological framework provided by the OIE. The final 
chapter, Chapter 8, provides a discussion of the new knowledge, drawn from the research 
results presented in Chapters 3 to 7 and complemented by discussions generated with industry 
representatives that participated in a national forum and regional workshops, where these 
results were presented. Conclusions and recommendations to the Australian commercial 
chicken industry to mitigate AI exposure and spread risk, including areas identified as needing 
continued or further research, are also provided in this final chapter.  
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
Prologue 
Chapter 2 presents an extensive literature review on the thesis topic. 
A section of this literature review on the history of AI cases in Australian poultry has been 
submitted for publication in the Australian Veterinary Journal. 
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2.1 The Australian chicken industry 
Chicken production in Australia began initially with numerous small populations of free range 
birds commonly found in suburban areas. In the mid-20th century, a significant egg and meat 
industry developed and as the intensification of chicken production occurred there was a large 
shift from free range to indoor housing. The total number of farms across the nation became 
fewer but more individual farms became large-scale (Scott et al., 2009). For the context of this 
thesis, large-scale farms are defined as commercial farms, with each farm containing at least 
1,000 and 25,000 chickens for layer and meat chicken farms respectively.  
The Australian commercial chicken meat industry is predominantly vertically integrated, 
where all aspects of production, including breeding farms, hatcheries, feed mills, and 
processing plants, are owned by large companies. Over 95% of the chicken meat grown and 
eaten in Australia is produced by seven privately owned Australian chicken meat processing 
companies. The two largest companies supply more than 70% of Australia’s meat chicken 
chickens, and the remaining companies each supply between 3-9% of the market. Growing 
meat chickens is generally contracted out by processing companies to contract growers. 
Contract growers own the farm and provide the management, labour and other inputs to rear 
chickens. The companies provide the chickens, feed, and technical advice. At present, there are 
approximately 800 contract growers in Australia with New South Wales (NSW) being the 
leading state for the volume of chicken meat produced, followed by Victoria, Queensland, 
South Australia (SA), Western Australia (WA) and Tasmania at 34%, 24%, 19%, 13%, 9% and 
1% respectively (ACMF, 2011). The Australian chicken meat industry typically locates 
operations such as farms, hatcheries and processing plants in close proximity to each other; 
major distributions are present in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. The major distributions of chicken meat production localities in Australia. Sourced 
from ACMF (2011). 
There are approximately 300 commercial chicken egg farms in Australia. NSW is also the 
largest egg producing state with approximately 120 commercial layer farms that produce 32% 
of the national egg volume. The latest state flock percentages are 32%, 28%, 27% 8%, 3%, and 
2% for NSW and Australian Capital Territory combined, Queensland, SA, WA, Victoria and 
Tasmania respectively. There are no commercially operated poultry farms in the Northern 
Territory (NT) (Australian Eggs, 2017). Australian egg farms remain concentrated within 100 
kilometres of large population centres, as shown in Figure 2.2, but have dispersed in recent 
years due to improvements in transport, convenience in establishing farms close to grain 
sources, and the ability of farms to market eggs locally or pack and grade eggs on farm. The 
highest concentrations of egg farms are in the Greater Sydney (31%) and Hunter regions (20%) 
of NSW (Australian Eggs, 2017, NSW DPI, 2015). The Australian egg industry, unlike the 
chicken meat industry, has a high proportion of private ownership. Farms vary greatly in size, 
with commercial flock sizes ranging from a couple thousand to tens of thousands of birds per 
farm. The high degree of private ownership is challenging in terms of assuring farms comply 
with best industry practice. Some states are formally identifying all commercial poultry farms 
by the use of property identification codes, however, this does not mean they will have the 
legislative power to act on non-compliance issues related to biosecurity (Scott et al., 2009). 
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Figure 2.2. The major distributions of chicken layer farms in Australia. Modified from NSW 
DPI (2015). 
2.1.1 Free range expansion 
From the mid-20th century, intensive, indoor commercial farm types became the most popular 
farm type in Australia due to the great production efficiency achievable from highly controlled 
environments (Scott et al., 2009). However, free range chicken production has made a 
comeback in Australia in recent years because of consumer demand. This has led to the 
establishment of commercial free range chicken farms, which are more intensive than farms 
prior to the mid-20th century; flock numbers are larger in size with greater stocking densities 
both inside sheds and outside on the range areas (Scott et al., 2009). Since 2012, the Australian 
retail turnover of free range eggs has surpassed that of cage, barn and specialty eggs; with the 
latest percentages at 51%, 37%, 9% and 3% recorded in 2017, respectively. Cage eggs still 
surpass free range eggs in terms of volume of eggs produced; at 49% and 41%, respectively; 
these extra cage eggs are used for non-retail purposes such as in hospitals, restaurants and 
further processing  (Australian Eggs, 2017, Scott et al., 2009). Similarly, Australian 
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commercial free range meat chicken production has also grown to at least 15% of the total 
market from being regarded as a ‘cottage industry’ in 2006. Farms also generally keep only 
one breed of chicken on the farm, and thus all individual chickens on the farm are genetically 
similar to each other.  
There has also been a comeback of non-commercial or ‘backyard flock’ free range farm types 
in Australia. These farm types intend to fill market gaps that have arisen from consumer 
concerns of the intensiveness of commercial free range chicken farms. These concerns relate 
to the perception that non-commercial, semi-intensive free range farms have superior poultry 
welfare, product quality and food safety compared to commercial free range farms (Singh et 
al., 2017a). However, these non-commercial farm types usually have poor biosecurity and 
greater incidence of disease compared to commercial farms. This is commonly due to 
inadequate education and training of farm owners and staff, as the farm business typically stems 
from hobby work (Scott et al., 2009, Singh et al., 2017a). These farm types could therefore be 
seen as a threat to the emergence and spread of disease for the commercial poultry industry. 
However, there is limited contact between non-commercial and commercial farm types (Scott 
et al., 2009). In addition, non-commercial farms are dispersed across Australia and usually 
located in regional areas, in contrast to commercial farm types which tend to concentrate 
operations around large population centres (Singh et al., 2017a). Therefore the threat of non-
commercial farms to the commercial poultry industry is perceived as low; any outbreaks of 
disease that do occur on non-commercial farms will also have little impact to the industry 
overall due to the relatively small number of birds present on these farms (AHA, 2011). 
The increase in commercial free range chicken production in Australia is not without 
challenges. Such challenges include increased exposure to predators and other wildlife, greater 
parasitic burdens, and nutritional dilution; all of which lead to greater mortalities and 
production losses compared to indoor farm types. Predators can be a major cause of mortalities 
on Australian free range chicken farms, the major culprits usually being foxes and hawks 
(Durali et al., 2012, Singh et al., 2017a). Nutritional dilution occurs from chickens consuming 
pasture on the range. Other problems associated with this include grass impaction in the gut 
and dietary electrolyte imbalances (Singh and Cowieson, 2013). There were a number of 
diseases experienced in free range flocks in the mid-20th century that ceased to be of concern 
with the change to indoor housing. However, these are now re-emerging in modern free range 
farms. These include avian tuberculosis, chlamydiosis, spotty liver disease and high burdens 
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of internal and external parasitism, all of which are likely caused from increased exposure to 
wildlife associated with the outdoors (Scott et al., 2009).  
2.2 Pathogens transmissible from wildlife to commercial chickens in 
Australia 
There are a range of pathogens transmissible from wildlife to commercial chickens and there 
is concern amongst industry experts that the frequency and potential of transmission will 
increase with the expansion of free range farms (DAFF, 2009a, Scott et al., 2009). Bacterial 
pathogens in Australia capable of being transmitted from wild birds to chickens include 
Salmonella spp., Camplyobacter spp., Mycobacterium spp., Pasteurella multocida, and 
Chlamydia psittaci (Connolly et al., 2006, Feizabadi et al., 1996, Sangster, 2012, Barnes, 2009, 
Griekspoor et al., 2013, Zhang, 2009, Singh et al., 2013, Robertson and Noormohammadi, 2011, 
Saggese et al., 2008, Converse, 2007). Salmonella Pullorum and Salmonella Gallinarum, which 
cause Pullorum disease and Fowl typhoid respectively, have been responsible for serious 
economic losses to poultry producers worldwide (Shivaprasad and Barrow, 2009). These 
serovars have been eradicated in Australia but other Salmonella serotypes remain ubiquitous 
in wild animals. These ubiquitous Salmonella serotypes, along with Campylobacter spp., 
seldom cause disease in chickens except in susceptible birds in stressful conditions. Both 
bacteria are principally a concern in relation to food-borne disease in humans (Connolly et al., 
2006, Griekspoor et al., 2013, Zhang, 2009). Mycobacterium avium subspecies avium and 
Mycobacterium genavense can cause avian tuberculosis in chickens and a wide range of 
wildlife species can act as potential reservoirs. Cases of mycobacterial infections 
predominantly occur in backyard flocks where poultry are raised outdoors. Cases declined with 
the development of intensive poultry farming but the recent expansion of free range poultry 
production could see a re-emergence of the disease in Australia (Barnes, 2009, Ikonomopoulos 
et al., 2009). Pasteurella multocida, and Chlamydia psittaci which cause pasteurellosis and 
avian chlamydiosis respectively have the potential to cause significant morbidity and mortality 
in poultry especially when involved in secondary infections (Barnes, 2009). A large range of 
bird species have been reported with pasteurellosis. However, waterfowl are the species most 
commonly involved with mass mortality events including in Australia (Whiteley, 2013, Samuel 
et al., 2007). Similarly, surveillance efforts suggest that the prevalence of avian chlamydiosis 
in Australian wild bird populations is low but all bird species can become infected. Depending 
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on the genotype, common host species include psittacine birds, pigeons, turkeys, ratites and 
waterfowl (Amery-Gale, 2016, Yvonne Pannekoek et al., 2010). 
The fungal pathogen Macrorhabdus ornithogaster is relatively common in psittacine birds and 
some species of passerine birds in Australia. Macrorhabdus ornithogaster has been reported 
as a cause of morbidity and mortality in a backyard chicken flock in Australia (Phalen et al., 
2007). With the expansion of free range farms, exposure to this fungal pathogen may be 
significantly increased. A range of external and internal parasites can also transmit from 
wildlife to chickens. An example is the red mite, Dermanyssus gallinae, and is poorly host-
specific. Internal parasite examples include nematodes such as Ascaridia galli, where its eggs 
may also be ingested by insects and remain infective to chickens, and cestodes such as 
Raillietina spp. (McLaughlin, 2008, Glatz and Ru, 2004, Hinkle and Hickle, 2009, Yazwinkski 
and Tucker, 2009). 
Significant viral pathogens potentially transmissible from wild birds to chickens include avian 
paramyxoviruses (APMV), avian adenoviruses (AAs), and avian influenza (AI) (Fitzgerald, 
2009, Alexander and Senne, 2009, McLeod and Hinrichs, 2016). APMV-1, a serotype of 
APMV, is commonly called Newcastle disease (ND) when it is virulent and found in poultry. 
ND occurs from the mutation of avirulent APMV-1 in poultry; mutation has not been reported 
to occur in wild birds in Australia. Surveillance efforts of APMV in Australia have revealed 
that avirulent APMV-1 is widespread in wild birds with a reported prevalence varying from 
0.04% in non-aquatic birds to 7% in aquatic birds (Hoque et al., 2012). Pigeon paramyxovirus-
1 (PPMV-1), a strain of APMV-1 and an exotic introduction in 2012, has spread and caused 
disease in Australian wild pigeon populations but does not appear to cause disease in chickens 
(Hoque et al., 2012, QLD DAFF, 2012). Egg Drop Syndrome (EDS) is a group III AA and can 
cause significant production losses in layer flocks as it causes weak or absent egg shells. There 
is serological evidence to suggest that waterfowl in particular can act as reservoirs of EDS in 
Australia (Wilcox et al., 1983). Of the two pathotypes of the AI virus; low pathogenic AI 
(LPAI) is endemic in Australian wild waterfowl and the outbreaks in Australian domestic 
poultry discussed later in this review support the hypothesis that transmission of virus from 
wild birds to domestic poultry can occur. 
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2.3 Emergency animal diseases in Australia 
LPAI of subtypes H5 or H7 are classed as a category 3 emergency animal disease (EAD) as 
these subtypes have the potential to cause generally moderate national socio-economic 
consequences but most importantly, have the ability to mutate to high pathogenic AI (HPAI). 
HPAI and ND are classed as category 2 EAD in Australia as they have the potential to cause 
severe production losses and severely impact the national economy, and may or may not impact 
human health and/or the environment  (AHA, 2015). Australia has had a number of both 
clustered and isolated ND outbreaks that have been reported since 1930, with the latest 
outbreaks occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These latest outbreaks were a surprise 
to industry experts as there had been no reports of ND in Australia for over 60 years prior to 
these (Cowan et al., 2014, Hoque et al., 2012). There have been seven HPAI outbreaks recorded 
since 1976; the latest HPAI outbreak occurred in the state of New South Wales (NSW) in 2013 
which alone cost up to $4 million to eradicate (Bashiruddin et al., 1991, Westbury, 1997, Barr 
et al., 1986, Forsyth et al., 1993, Sims and Turner, 2009, Roth, 2014, Moloney et al., 2013, 
CFFR, 2014a). To respond to such significant diseases, cooperation between Commonwealth, 
state and territory governments with livestock industry groups in Australia lead to the 
development of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA). This 
agreement is a contractual arrangement between Australian governments and industry groups 
to collaboratively reduce the risk of disease occurrences and prepare and manage a response if 
an outbreak occurs. The costs incurred when responding to an outbreak are also stated in the 
agreement where responses to category 3 EADs are funded 50% by the government and 50% 
by the industry, and for category 2 EADs are funded 80% by government and 20% by industry 
(AHA, 2015). The development of biosecurity manuals are a component of preparedness and 
are under regular revision. Depending on the type of EAD, there is a preferred approach to an 
outbreak. These approaches have been developed and agreed upon by the governments and 
relevant industries and are written in the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan 
(AUSVETPLAN) disease strategies and response policy briefs (AHA, 2011). 
For HPAI specifically, most outbreaks worldwide have been eradicated via the stamping out 
procedure without vaccination and it is the recommended eradication procedure of AI by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (FAO, 2013, OIE, 2015). When AI is suspected 
on-farm; cloacal and tracheal swabs should be taken from live, clinically affected birds and 
tissues from the alimentary and respiratory tracts of recently mortalities. In Australia, these 
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should to be sent initially to the state or territory diagnostic laboratory where real-time 
polymerase-chain reaction (PCR) tests are conducted to rapidly detect H5 or H7 Influenza A 
viruses in less than 24 hours. Positive detections then lead to necessary clearance from the chief 
veterinary officer (CVO) of the state or territory of the outbreak and informing the CVO of 
Victoria to forward samples to the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong, Victoria. 
Further testing for virus characterisation are available at this laboratory but are slow in 
comparison to real-time PCR; these include pathogenicity testing, virus isolation, and 
identification of surface glycoproteins (AHA, 2011, Hamilton, 2011). Initial positive detection 
at the state or territory diagnostic laboratories via real-time PCR prompts the stamping out 
procedure; this involves rapid isolation of infected premises (IPs), rapid tracing and 
surveillance to ensure that all sources and the extent of infection are detected, rapid culling of 
all birds on IPs, decontamination and disinfection of the site, and efforts to reduce spread via 
the restriction of movements of potentially contaminated materials and the implementation of 
strict biosecurity practices. All past HPAI outbreaks in Australia have been eradicated via this 
procedure (AHA, 2011). 
2.4 Avian influenza 
2.4.1 Aetiology 
The AI virus belongs to the Orthomyxoviridae family of segmented negative-sense enveloped 
ribonucleic acid (RNA) viruses in the influenza type A genus. As a typical feature of RNA 
viruses, AI viruses have a high mutation rate, generating a high degree of genetic diversity. 
This high degree of genetic diversity is also achieved via reassortment, which is the blending 
of gene segments between different strains and lineages during concomitant infections 
(Spackman, 2008). 
Influenza type A viruses are further classified by their surface glycoproteins haemagglutinin 
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA). The HA has 16 subtypes (H1 to H16) and the NA has nine 
subtypes (N1 to N9). Each virus has one HA and one NA antigen and any combination of these 
subtypes seems possible. Many of the 144 possible combinations have been found in natural 
reservoir species. Some combinations are more common than others (Spackman, 2008). 
The differentiation between the two pathotypes of AI; LPAI and HPAI, is based on the results 
of laboratory tests standardised by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). According 
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to the OIE, a HPAI virus is any influenza type A virus with an intravenous pathogenicity index 
(IVPI) greater than 1.2 or alternatively, is lethal to at least 75% of four to eight week old 
susceptible chickens within ten days following intravenous inoculation of infective allantoic 
fluid. The IVPI is the mean score of observations of ten six-week old chickens injected 
intravenously with infective allantoic fluid. The chickens are examined daily for ten days and 
are scored zero if normal, one if sick, two if severely sick and three if dead (OIE, 2015). 
2.4.2 Virus persistence in the environment 
AI viruses are enveloped RNA viruses, a feature of which is that they are fragile in the 
environment and therefore generally do not persist in the environment for long. However, 
temperature has been found to be the most influential variable on AI virus persistence, where 
AI viruses can persist for long periods of time in cold climates (Dalziel et al., 2016). There is 
anecdotal evidence that in countries with cold winters, AI viruses may persist over the winter 
period and then remain as a source of infection for waterfowl in the spring (Alexander, 2007). 
AI viruses were found to be very stable in water at 4°C, with survival ranging from 45 to 100 
days. At 17°C, survival ranged from approximately 20 to 40 days and at 28°C and above, 
survival was below 20 days. Salinity and pH are also important factors on AI virus persistence, 
where viruses were found to be most stable at fresh to brackish salinities (0-20,000 parts per 
million (ppm) and slightly basic pH (7.4-8.2). They were least persistent in acidic conditions 
(pH< 6.6) and high salinity (>25,000ppm) (Brown et al., 2009, Dalziel et al., 2016). The 
persistence of AI virus has also been studied on various surfaces common in poultry farms; 
including fabric, gumboots, tires, latex and cardboard egg trays. In general, virus persistence 
was less on porous surfaces than nonporous ones and did not persist for more than a week on 
any of the surfaces (Tiwari et al., 2006). 
2.4.3 Clinical signs 
The clinical signs of avian influenza virus are influenced by factors including the strain of virus, 
the host species, the host age, the immune status of the host against the virus, and the presence 
of other infections, deficiency conditions and environmental factors such as excess ammonia 
and dust (Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). In gallinaceous species, including domestic 
chickens and turkeys, the most frequent clinical signs of LPAI virus infection include mild to 
severe respiratory signs such as coughing, sneezing and excessive lacrimation. Hens may 
exhibit increased broodiness and decreased egg production. In addition, generalised clinical 
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signs including huddling, ruffled feathers, depression and occasionally diarrhoea may be seen. 
High morbidity and low mortality is seen with LPAI virus infection and experimental studies 
have shown 20 to 50% of chickens inoculated with LPAI H5 and H7 viruses display clinical 
signs (Spackman et al., 2010, Mo et al., 1997). Mortality rates are usually less than 5% unless 
accompanied by secondary pathogens or if the disease is in young birds (Swayne and 
Halvorson, 2009).  
Clinical signs of HPAI virus infection reflect damage to major organ systems including the 
cardiovascular system, nervous system and the integument. The signs vary depending on the 
extent of damage to the specific organs and tissue (Swayne and Halvorson, 2009, Swayne and 
Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). However, in most cases of HPAI virus infection in gallinaceous 
species, birds are found dead prior to the observation of any clinical signs (Swayne and 
Halvorson, 2009). Closer observations of remaining birds have revealed depression, 
dehydration and decreased feed and water intake that rapidly progresses to severe listlessness 
and death (Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). If birds survive for three to seven days, 
individual birds may exhibit nervous disorders such as tremors of the head and neck, inability 
to stand and torticollis. Respiratory signs are less prominent but may be observed; these signs 
include rales, coughing and sneezing. Sinusitis, cyanosis of the combs, wattle and shanks and 
oedema of the head can also be seen. Morbidity and mortality rates are very high (50-89%) and 
can reach 100% in some flocks  (AHA, 2011, Swayne and Halvorson, 2009). 
2.4.4 Host range 
LPAI viruses have been isolated from at least 105 wild bird species of 26 different taxonomic 
families worldwide. Birds in the taxonomic orders Anseriformes (waterfowl including ducks, 
geese) and Charadriiformes (shorebirds including gulls, waders, auks) constitute the major 
natural reservoir of influenza A viruses of all subtype combinations and few clinical signs are 
seen with infection in these birds. It is unclear whether LPAI viruses found in other wild bird 
species are endemic or a temporary pathogen (Olsen et al., 2006). Birds of the family Anatidae, 
order Anseriformes, constitute the greatest number, variety and distribution of virus isolations 
out of all wild bird species (Alexander and Capua, 2008). 
Factors contributing to the infection of AI virus include the host’s environment, behaviour and 
age. Many of the bird species in which AI viruses are an endemic pathogen are from wetlands 
and aquatic environments. Better survival of AI viruses in water than in solid material may be 
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a reason for the high prevalence of the virus among waterfowl and shorebirds compared to 
other species as these birds congregate in large numbers in wetlands. Bird species occupying 
fresh water have a higher AI prevalence than those exploiting saline water environments 
(Garamszegi and Møller, 2007, Hansbro et al., 2010). Species migrating long distances tend to 
have higher AI virus prevalence than short distance migrants likely from the stress of long-
distance travel leading to weakened immune systems. Moreover, juvenile birds appear to have 
a higher prevalence of AI compared to adult birds likely attributed to their less developed 
immune system (Garamszegi and Møller, 2007). 
In addition to birds, there have also been naturally occurring and/or experimentally induced 
cases of AI infection in the mammalian orders Artiodactyla, Carnivora, Lagomorpha, Primates 
and Rodentia. Clinical disease can be severe in mammals, especially in the orders Carnivora 
and Primates (Cardona et al., 2009). In meat-eating species, transmission primarily occurs from 
the consumption of uncooked, infected poultry and has led to the deaths of tigers, leopards and 
dogs (Keawcharoen et al., 2004, Song et al., 2008). Close proximity with infected poultry can 
lead to faecal material and/or respiratory secretions being inadvertently inhaled or ingested 
thereby increasing the potential for infection. The eyes, and possibly other mucous membranes 
of the body, can serve as additional entry portals for the AI virus (Belser et al., 2013). 
2.4.5 Zoonosis 
AI viruses of the subtypes H5, H6, H7, H9 and H10 have managed to cross the species barrier 
from birds to infect humans. Transmission directly from wild birds to humans is rare because 
of limited exposure of humans to wild birds. Instead, zoonotic transmissions have mainly 
resulted from infection of the virus from wild birds to intermediate species that humans have 
more frequent contact with, such as in pigs and poultry, before subsequent transmission to 
humans. AI outbreaks of poultry increase the chances of infection from poultry to humans. The 
clinical symptoms in humans are diverse and range from conjunctivitis to influenza-like 
symptoms, pneumonia associated with acute respiratory distress syndrome, and encephalitis 
(Richard et al., 2014). 
Influenza A pandemics occur when zoonotic Influenza A viruses gain the ability, by mutation 
or re-assortment, to spread via human to human transmission. Only four influenza A viruses in 
the last century have gained this ability; the Spanish H1N1 pandemic in 1918, the Asian H2N2 
pandemic in 1957, the Hong Kong H3N2 pandemic in 1968 and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009. 
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Currently, the subtypes H5 and H7 are of greatest concern in relation to pandemic potential as 
several hundred human deaths were caused by the H5N1 and H7N9 AI viruses in the past two 
decades (Richard et al., 2014). Transmission of H5N1 from birds to humans was first 
documented in 1997 in Hong Kong. As of 2017, there have been more than 800 laboratory-
confirmed human cases of H5N1 infection of which more than 400 were fatal. In 2013, human 
infection with a novel H7N9 virus occurred in Hong Kong and has since caused more than 
1500 laboratory-confirmed human cases and almost 600 deaths (WHO, 2017b). Unlike the 
H5N1 virus which was highly pathogenic to poultry, the H7N9 virus showed low pathogenicity 
to poultry, and therefore remained hidden until it caused human infection. Although suspected, 
no human to human transmission of H5N1 or H7N9 has been reported (Lui and Gao, 2014, 
Richard et al., 2014). The concern about H5 and H7 viruses potential contribution to a 
pandemic is an important driver of the investment in AI control and the category 2 EAD 
classification of HPAI in Australia (AHA, 2015). 
2.4.5 Incubation, infectious and latent periods 
The incubation period is the time from exposure to a pathogen to the onset of clinical signs. 
Death may be the only clinical sign in per-acute cases and experimental studies of HPAI 
infection have demonstrated a minimum incubation period of a few hours (Swayne and Pantin-
Jackwood, 2009). The OIE states that the maximum incubation period for notifiable avian 
influenza is 21 days (OIE, 2015). 
The latent period is the period between infection and shedding of the pathogen and is usually 
shorter than the incubation period (Martin et al., 1987). A review of several studies of LPAI 
and HPAI of various subtypes revealed a latent period of zero to two days (Hamilton, 2011). 
Chickens inoculated with LPAI H7N7 were all found to be positive on day one post infection, 
indicating a latent period of less than one day (Gonzales et al., 2012a). Two studies published 
in 2009 and 2011 quantified the latent period for chickens infected with HPAI H5N1 virus as 
0.20 to 0.44 days and 0.88 days respectively (Bouma et al., 2009, Poetri et al., 2011). 
The infectious period is the time when the virus is first detected to the time when it is no longer 
detected in the oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs. In other words it is the duration of 
infectiveness of an individual (Martin et al., 1987). The infectious periods of LPAI and HPAI 
of all subtypes vary between one to seven days. It seems LPAI strains do not necessarily have 
a greater or smaller infectious period than HPAI strains. Experimental studies showed an 
18 
 
infectious period of one to four days for LPAI H5N7 and two days for HPAI H5N1 and H7N1 
(Gonzales et al., 2012b, Bouma et al., 2009, Hamilton, 2011). The mean infectious periods in 
experimental studies of LPAI H7 subtypes were found to be longer than seven days. 
Specifically, the mean infectious periods for LPAI H7N1, H7N3 and H7N7 were 8 days, 10 to 
13 days and 7 days respectively (Gonzales et al., 2011, Gonzales et al., 2012b). 
2.4.6 Mutation of LPAI to HPAI 
Unlike LPAI which is endemic in wild bird populations, HPAI viruses are rarely isolated from 
clinically healthy wild birds. The source of HPAI virus during an outbreak in domestic poultry 
is most likely from LPAI virus introduction from wild birds which have mutated to HPAI in 
the poultry population. LPAI viruses have sometimes been detected in domestic poultry weeks 
or months prior to the subsequent HPAI virus outbreaks and the viruses were found to be 
closely related. Such detections occurred during the 1983 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in 
Pennsylvania, the 1999 HPAI H7N1 outbreak in Italy, the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in The 
Netherlands and the 2002 HPAI H7N3 outbreak in Chile (Stech and Mettenleiter, 2013).  
One study performed experimental mutation of a LPAI H5N3 wild-swan virus to HPAI. After 
24 consecutive passages by air sac inoculation followed by five passages in chicken brain, the 
virus became highly pathogenic in chickens, producing a 100% mortality rate. The study 
suggested brain passages are a requirement for mutation from LPAI to HPAI as the LPAI virus 
is placed under selective pressure to replicate in the brain. The inoculation process performed 
in the study is not natural but there is natural potential for LPAI viruses to enter the brain 
through the process of viremia, especially in immunocompromised chickens (Ito et al., 2001). 
This suggests factors causing weakened immune systems, such as stress or secondary infections 
may increase the likelihood of mutation from LPAI to HPAI (Ito et al., 2001, Swayne and 
Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). 
It is suggested by virologists that in the Australian context, infection of LPAI in commercial 
chicken flocks leads to rapid subsequent mutation to HPAI (within weeks), based on 
experiences from previous Australian HPAI outbreaks. In the 1997 H7N4 outbreak in 
Tamworth, NSW, antibody titre levels in emu chicks on the third infected premise of the 
outbreak indicated the emu chicks had been infected with LPAI for at least seven to ten days. 
This coupled with the lower IVPI of the virus isolate from the emu farm compared to the other 
two infected premises (which were commercial chicken farms) suggested that the emus were 
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infected prior to the first and second infected premises. It was hypothesised that LPAI had 
spread asymptomatically within the emu flock before spreading to the commercial chicken 
farms and becoming more virulent over a short period of time; indicated by the large, rapid 
number of mortalities in the commercial chicken farms, and an increase in pathogenicitiy 
measured by the IVPI of the emu virus  isolate when serially passaged through chickens 
(Selleck et al., 2002). However, a recent extensive review of LPAI to HPAI mutation revealed 
that the mechanisms regarding mutation are still largely unknown. The review assessed 42 
HPAI outbreaks from 1959 to 2016, most of which involved chickens and turkeys as the initial 
species, and concluded that mutations can occur at any time from ten days to years after LPAI 
infection is established. In addition, the review found that the size of the index farm, the type 
of farm management and the age of the affected poultry do not appear to play a significant role 
in the mutation event where the reasons for this are also not fully understood (Richard et al., 
2017). 
2.5 AI virus transmission 
The transmission dynamics of AI virus between birds is complex and poorly understood. 
Experimental studies have revealed varying transmissible rates between birds depending on the 
strain of virus and environmental factors (Alexander, 2007, Yuan et al., 2013, Swayne and 
Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). It is generally recognized that the main route of transmission of AI 
virus between birds is the faecal-oral route. In birds, replication of the virus predominantly 
occurs in the intestinal tract and high concentrations of infectious virus are shed in the faeces. 
Birds become infected by consuming infectious faecal material, which commonly occurs 
through the consumption of contaminated water (Swayne, 2009, Alexander, 2007).  
Additional routes of infection have been identified and these include inhalation and oral-oral 
routes, and uptake via the cloaca (Garamszegi and Møller, 2007, Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005). 
In addition to the intestinal tract, high levels of viral replication have been found in the 
respiratory tracts of birds. Infectious respiratory secretions of birds which enter the 
environment through actions such as coughing or sneezing allow other birds to become infected 
through inhalation or oral uptake of the secretions (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005). Experimental 
studies acknowledge the possibility of airborne transmission of AI virus between birds, where 
findings include dust samples testing positive for the virus. It is more relevant in the secondary 
spread of AI virus between domestic poultry flocks rather than primary introduction from wild 
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birds into poultry. The proximity of infected birds highly influences the chance of airborne 
transmission where it is generally concluded that airborne transmission over distances over 100 
meters is an unlikely route of spread (Spekreijse et al., 2011, Jonges et al., 2015). 
Evidence of vertical transmission of AI viruses is lacking. Eggs from infected hens have been 
found to harbor the virus on the eggshell surface and within the internal contents of the egg. 
However, most LPAI and HPAI viruses cause reduction or cessation, respectively, of egg 
production and thereby limit the potential for vertical transmission. In addition, HPAI viruses 
are often lethal for chicken embryos, limiting the transmission potential further (Swayne, 2009). 
2.5.1 Exposure to commercial chicken farms 
Primary introduction of AI viruses into domestic poultry flocks is mainly a result of wild bird 
activity. Specifically, it is the result of poultry coming into direct or indirect contact with 
waterfowl or shorebirds as these birds constitute the major natural reservoir of influenza A 
viruses (Olsen et al., 2006, Hansbro et al., 2010). In the context of this thesis, direct contact or 
exposure to the virus is defined as physical contact between a wild bird and a commercial 
chicken or direct contact between a commercial chicken and wild bird faeces. Indirect contact 
or exposure to the virus is defined as poultry coming into contact with the virus through a 
medium, for example, from consuming contaminated surface water or exposure to the virus via 
fomites or vectors (Singh et al., 2017b). Fomites include clothing and equipment contaminated 
with wild bird faeces that come into contact with chickens through movement (Swayne, 2009). 
Biological vectors are living beings that may become infected with the virus and shed the virus 
in the presence of chickens or be consumed by chickens. Vermin on chicken farms, most 
notably insects, mice and rats, can act as biological vectors as they may become infected with 
AI virus. Studies have shown that flies can become infected and carry the virus in their gut 
when fed meat from deceased animals that were infected with AI virus (Sawabe et al., 2009, 
Nielsen et al., 2011). In contrast, mice and rats seem less susceptible to infections in both 
experimental and outbreak studies (Nettles et al., 1985, Hiono et al., 2016) Mechanical vectors 
include animals such as dogs and cats and other insects that do not become infected with the 
virus but can present the virus to chickens through movement only (DAFF, 2009a, Swayne, 
2009). 
It is often the case that during an outbreak, the definitive wild bird source is not identified 
despite active surveillance performed in the region. Specifically, laboratory evidence revealing 
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the same virus subtype in nearby wild birds or water is generally not found. Despite this, most 
documented outbreaks have evidence of wild bird activity on or near the site (Sims and Turner, 
2009, Alexander et al., 2009). Outbreaks in which active surveillance of wild birds have shown 
that the virus subtype in the wild birds is the same as the infected poultry raises the possibility 
that transmission from poultry to the wild birds could have also occurred (Keawcharoen et al., 
2011). 
Other possibilities for influenza introductions into domestic poultry should not be ruled out. 
Transmission from infected mammals to birds is possible. The transmission of influenza A 
virus from infected pigs to turkeys has been recorded on a farm where the two species were 
housed nearby (Mohan et al., 1980). 
2.5.2 Spread within and between commercial chicken farms 
Spread between flocks and between other farms occurs mainly due to activities performed by 
man. These activities include the movement of infected birds or fomites such as equipment, 
vehicles and personnel that are contaminated with infective faeces or respiratory excretions 
(Swayne, 2009, Hamilton, 2011). It was most strongly suspected that the movements of people 
and equipment lead to the widespread nature of the H5N2 HPAI outbreak that started in 
Pennsylvania in 1983. Most of the feed delivery, vaccination crews, service personnel, egg 
processors, mechanical repairmen, and relatives who worked on other farms could be tied to 
some of the AI infected farms during this outbreak (Eckroade and Bachin, 1986). In Australia, 
a dead bird pick-up vehicle which visited multiple farms was the only identifiable link between 
infected farms in the H7N4 HPAI outbreak in Tamworth, NSW in 1997 (Sims and Turner, 
2009). Similarly, the movement of contaminated egg trays via one particular vehicle was 
suggested as the most likely route of spread between farms for the H7N2 HPAI outbreak in 
Young, NSW in 2013 (Roth, 2014). Secondary spread via contaminated water, i.e. water 
contaminated by infected poultry introduced to a naïve poultry flock, is regarded as unlikely. 
Secondary spread via airborne transmission is also regarded as unlikely but is an important 
consideration especially for nearby farms (Swayne, 2009, McCluskey, 2015). Wind increases 
the risk of dispersal of contaminated litter or ground-up carcasses which may be introduced to 
nearby farms (Bowes et al., 2004, Swayne, 2009). One study found that air samples tested 
positive for the virus up to 60 metres from some LPAI infected turkey farms (Jonges et al., 
2015). 
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Mechanical spread of the virus by different animal species is possible. During a HPAI H5N1 
outbreak in Kyoto, Japan in 2004, the virus had been isolated from blow flies (Sawabe et al., 
2006). LPAI H5 and H7 virus was also found to persist in house flies (Nielsen et al., 2011). 
Rats and mice are unlikely cause of spread due to the low prevalence of the virus within these 
animals. Rats were experimentally inoculated with LPAI H5 and H7 virus and virus isolation 
was negative for all rats. Similarly, 516 rats and mice in farms affected by the HPAI H5N2 
outbreak in Pennsylvania were all negative for the virus by virus isolation (Nettles et al., 1985, 
Achenbach and Bowen, 2011). 
2.5.3 Immunological protection and vaccination 
Previous infection with LPAI virus in chickens effectively reduces susceptibility of the host to 
HPAI virus of the same subtype (Goot et al., 2003). Protective immunity against AI viruses in 
poultry is a humoral response and is primarily the result of immune response against the HA 
glycoprotein of the AI virus. The induced response against the NA glycoprotein is less 
protective. With this knowledge, vaccines for protection against AI virus in poultry have been 
developed and used as a control strategy. The primary goals for using vaccines are to 
complement other control measures during an outbreak, reduce the amount of virus in the 
environment, and decrease the susceptibility of the birds to the virus (Spackman and Swayne, 
2013). 
Vaccines must be customised against the specific HA and/or NA subtypes as there is no 
universal vaccine which will protect against all AI viruses. For protection against HPAI, LPAI 
vaccine strains of the same HA subtype have been protective. Some HPAI viruses have been 
used as vaccine strains however there are greater biosecurity and biosafety concerns during 
manufacturing compared to LPAI viruses. Immunity against other AI virus strains within the 
same subtype of the AI virus vaccine does occur and is dependent on the degree of antigenic 
relatedness between the vaccine strain and the field strain (Swayne et al., 2011, Swayne and 
Kapczynski, 2009). 
Effective vaccines reduce morbidity, mortality, susceptibility and infectiousness of poultry 
from the AI virus. However current vaccines do not completely prevent infection or virus 
replication and shedding (Hamilton, 2011, Swayne and Kapczynski, 2009). Disadvantages to 
vaccination include the requirement of handling and injection of individual birds and the high 
labour costs associated with this in some countries. In addition, the use of vaccination results 
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in a loss of earnings from export of poultry and poultry products (AHA, 2011, Swayne, 2013). 
Furthermore, if not thoroughly conducted or applied inconsistently, vaccination programs for 
both LPAI and HPAI can produce faster antigenic drifts of and the AI viruses (Cattoli et al., 
2011). This is problematic for countries which use vaccination as a method of AI control as it 
can result in sporadic failures of vaccination due to poor antigenic match between the vaccine 
and field strains of the virus (Escorcia et al., 2008). For the control and eradication of AI in 
poultry, it is prudent that vaccination for AI is conducted thoroughly and in combination with 
surveillance and good biosecurity on farms (Cattoli et al., 2011). Vaccine strains therefore 
sometimes need to be changed to maintain efficacy in the field. Ongoing surveillance of virus 
strains in the field and conducting challenge studies on a biannual basis are recommendations 
for countries with long-term vaccine use (Swayne, 2013). 
In Australia, the National Avian Influenza Vaccination Expert (NAIVE) Group was established 
to provide advice on vaccinations as a form of control for AI outbreaks, based on expert 
knowledge and current research (DAFF, 2010). Members of the group concluded that the use 
of emergency vaccination as a control strategy for a HPAI outbreak in Australia would not be 
useful compared to the current, effective eradication procedure; stamping out. This conclusion 
is based on HPAI modelling work conducted by the NAIVE group and overseas experience 
that revealed that vaccination has never been successfully used to assist the stamping out 
procedure. There are also issues in Australia relating to the use of AI vaccine; including limited 
production companies and potentially sporadic availability in the future, short shelf-life and the 
need for frequent stockpiling of vaccines, potential difficulties in registering and importing 
vaccines to meet Australian standards, and logistical demands and constraints with 
administering the vaccine. However, the NAIVE group recognise that the AI vaccine may be 
useful to protect rare or valuable birds or genetic stock, and may be used to control LPAI 
epidemics in poultry depending on the circumstances of the LPAI outbreak (DAFF, 2010). 
2.6 AI virus occurrence 
2.6.1 HPAI outbreaks globally  
The first known description of AI occurred in northern Italy in 1878 when a contagious disease 
of poultry associated with high mortality was termed fowl plague. It was initially confused with 
fowl cholera but the two diseases were differentiated in 1880. By the mid-1900s, HPAI 
outbreaks were reported in most of Europe, Russia, North America, South America, Middle 
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East, Africa and Asia. However the lack of appropriate diagnostic tests and the concurrent 
circulation of ND made it difficult to confirm HPAI as the cause of disease. Knowledge in 
virology improved over time and the first confirmed outbreak of HPAI was reported in 
Scotland in 1959. Many outbreaks have been confirmed worldwide since then with occurrence 
in all inhabited continents. The large impact of HPAI has been demonstrated via enormous 
economic and production losses (Lupiani and Reddy, 2009). Examples include the H5N2 HPAI 
outbreak that occurred in Pennsylvania in 1983 which led to the culling of 17 million turkeys 
and chickens, and the H7N1 HPAI outbreak in Italy in 1999 which led to the culling of 14 
million chickens, turkeys, guinea-fowl, quail, ducks, pheasants and ostriches (Henzler et al., 
2003, Mannelli et al., 2006). 
Most HPAI outbreaks have had little geographical spread, but with some major exceptions. 
This includes the apparent introduction of a novel H5N8 AI virus of Eurasian origin into the 
Pacific Flyway of the Americas in 2014. The virus mixed with North American lineage viruses 
and generated new combinations such as the HPAI H5N2, which with H5N8, caused outbreaks 
in over 10 states in the USA and led to the destruction of over 30 million birds with estimated 
economy-wide losses of over $3 billion (2015, Greene, 2015). There have also been four 
intercontinental waves of HPAI H5 virus since 2003 which led to outbreaks that extended from 
Asia to Europe and Africa and caused the destruction of hundreds of millions of birds, billions 
of dollars of damage, and hundreds of human deaths. Most recently, novel strains of HPAI H5 
virus involving the subtypes H5N8, H5N5 and possibly H5N2 have been associated with the 
latest intercontinental outbreaks in 2016 and 2017. These intercontinental waves have led to 
large investments and investigations for control and prevention measures of HPAI, including 
epidemiological studies, surveillance programs, vaccination and improved biosecurity (Sims 
et al., 2017, WHO, 2017a). 
2.6.2 LPAI detections in poultry in Australia 
Reports of confirmed Australian LPAI cases in poultry are available from 1976. These 
confirmed cases are the result of passive surveillance (diagnostic submissions), active 
surveillance (primarily area surveillance during HPAI outbreaks) or incidental findings not 
associated with a disease or surveillance. From 1976 there have been a total of 15 confirmed 
LPAI cases in poultry in Australia with the latest case occurring in 2013 at the time of writing. 
Each case represents one farm where there has been positive LPAI virus isolations or 
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serological evidence of LPAI infection in any amount of poultry birds on that farm (Table 2.1). 
The true number of outbreaks is likely to be greater due to several factors including relatively 
poorer diagnostic techniques in the past, owners failing to report sick or dead poultry, and an 
absence of clinical signs especially in ducks (Arzey, 2013). 
Awareness and implementation of good biosecurity on poultry farms has increased in Australia 
over time especially after the economic impacts of various infectious disease outbreaks were 
experienced by the industry. These diseases include debilitating diseases such as infectious 
laryngotracheitis and infectious coryza, as well as EADs such as ND and HPAI (Sims and 
Turner, 2009, AHA, 2015, Agnew-Crumpton et al., 2016, Blackall et al., 1990). Despite this, 
LPAI reports seem to have increased in recent years with some occurring on farms with 
excellent biosecurity standards. This increase is most likely attributable to improved diagnostic 
techniques developed from the advancements in technology over time. Improvements include 
the ability of more rapid detections of H5 or H7 influenza A virus, along with increased 
sensitivity of new diagnostic techniques (Westbury, 1997, Arzey, 2013, AHA, 2011). 
Of the 15 confirmed LPAI reports, the highest number of incidents occurred in domestic flocks 
of ducks including combined chicken and duck farms (11/15) and all have occurred relatively 
equally on farms with free range (8/15) and barn (7/15) management systems. There were more 
LPAI reports on commercial (12/15) poultry farms than non-commercial poultry farms (3/15). 
Of the commercial poultry farms, reports were most common in meat farms (6/12), followed 
by breeder farms (4/12), with one report in a mixed breeder and meat farm and the remaining 
report on a mixed species (chickens and ducks) commercial layer farm. Virus characterisation 
to detect the NA surface glycoprotein was not obtained for the LPAI cases that occurred in 
Victoria 1992, Tasmania 2006 and NSW 2010. Only rough approximations of flock sizes could 
be obtained from available literature for LPAI cases that occurred on breeder farms. Clinical 
signs were apparent for just over half of all LPAI cases; only one duck was isolated with H6N4 
in 2006 in Queensland despite clinical signs in chickens on a mixed species free range farm. 
LPAI has never been detected on a single species commercial egg layer enterprise or on poultry 
farms in SA or NT (Table 2.1). In 2012, seven abattoir workers reported conjunctivitis and 
minor upper respiratory tract symptoms after processing clinically normal birds from the 
Queensland farm in which H10N7 occurred. Influenza virus A subtype H10 infection was then 
detected in two workers (Arzey et al., 2012). 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive characteristics of the confirmed LPAI reports in poultry in Australia 
from 1976 to 2017. Sourced from Arzey (2013), AVCO (2015), OIE (2015b) and 
Vijaykrishna et al. (2013). 
Year State Subtype Species on farm Clinical signs Farm type Flock size 
1976 Victoria H7N7 Ducks None Free range 
commercial (meat) 
16 000 
1992 Victoria H1, H4, H5, 
H7, H9 
Ducks* None Free range 
commercial (meat) 
5 700 
1994 Victoria H4N8 Ducks Sinusitis Barn commercial 
(breeders & meat) 
Large 
(>40 000) 
2006 Tasmania H5 Chickens* and 
ducks 
Serological evidence of 
LPAI, 6% mortality and 
isolation of Pasteurella 
multocida, Mannheimia 
haemolytica and 
Infectious 
laryngotracheitis in 
chicken flock only. 
Free range non-
commercial 
300 
2006a NSW H6N4 Chickens 0.5% mortality in chicken 
flock. 10% drop in egg 
production. Visceral gout. 
Barn commercial 
(breeders)*** 
Very large 
(> 60 000) 
2006 b NSW 
 
H6N4 Ducks* None Barn commercial 
(breeders) 
Large 
(>40 000) 
2006 Queensland H6N4 Chickens and 
ducks** 
Depression, respiratory 
signs and some mortality 
in chicken flock only. 
Free range, non-
commercial 
100 
2010 a NSW H10N7 Chickens Marginal mortalities. 15% 
drop in egg production. 
No respiratory signs. 
Barn commercial 
(breeders)*** 
Very large 
(> 60 000) 
2010 b NSW H1 Ducks* None Barn commercial 
(breeders) 
Large 
(>40 000) 
2012 Victoria H5N3 Ducks Leg problems, poor 
growth, lethargy. 
Free range 
commercial (meat) 
24 000 
2012 NSW H4N6 Chickens and 
ducks 
Virus isolations and 
clinical signs in ducks 
only; respiratory signs, 
some mortalities 
Free range 
commercial (meat) 
2 500 
2012 NSW H9N2 Turkeys 24% mortality. 
Respiratory signs. 
Barn commercial 
(meat) 
40 000 
2012 NSW H9N2 Turkeys None Barn commercial 
(meat) 
40 000 
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2012 Queensland H10N7 Chickens and 
ducks* 
Virus isolation only from 
chickens, serological 
evidence in ducks. 
Clinical signs in ducks 
only; ocular and nasal 
discharge. Small number 
of sudden death. 
Free range 
commercial 
(layers) 
6 100 
2013 Western 
Australia 
H5N3 Chickens and 
ducks** 
None Free range non-
commercial 
95 
* Serological evidence only 
** Isolated from one duck; no virus isolation from chickens  
*** Farms reported to have had excellent biosecurity 
a Letter donates the same farm but different incident/year of LPAI detection  
b Letter donates the same farm but different incident/year of LPAI detection 
 
2.6.3 HPAI outbreaks in poultry in Australia 
Australia has experienced seven HPAI outbreaks in poultry farms since 1976 with details 
presented in Table 2.2. The definite source/s of the outbreaks were not identified but in all 
farms there was opportunity for direct or indirect contact with waterfowl. These outbreaks have 
occurred only in the three eastern states of Australia; Victoria (three separate outbreaks), 
Queensland (one outbreak), and NSW (three separate outbreaks). The outbreaks involved 
single farms or small clusters of farms with limited spatial spread. All outbreaks involved 
commercial chicken farms with large flocks and long-lived, sexually mature birds of either 
breeder or layer bird types. All viruses were of subtype H7 and of Australian lineages. Most 
outbreaks occurred during spring and summer (October to January), with the exception of the 
outbreaks in Bendigo in 1985 and 1992 which occurred in late autumn and winter (May and 
July) respectively (Table 2.2). A brief overview on each of these outbreaks is described below. 
The first reported HPAI outbreak involved H7N7 virus in 1976 on a combined conventional 
meat chicken and caged layer farm in Keysborough, Victoria. Biosecurity on this farm was 
reported to be suboptimal where wild birds had easy access to chickens, their feed and water. 
The water used on the farm was drawn from a surface dam that was frequented by wild ducks 
in the spring of 1975 and was not treated. During the outbreak, one free range duck farm located 
across the road from the index farm was also depopulated. The duck farm kept duck breeders 
in barns and had other ducks on open range. No clinical signs of AI virus infection were present 
in the ducks but active surveillance performed during the outbreak identified low levels of 
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antibodies against the AI virus and LPAI (H7N7) was isolated on the duck farm. However, 
genes coding for the HA protein of the AI virus from the duck farm differed sufficiently from 
the AI virus isolated on the index farm to indicate that the viruses were unlikely to be derived 
from one another and that infection had occurred from separate sources (Bashiruddin et al., 
1991, Sims and Turner, 2009). 
Similar to the 1976 outbreak, the farm in Bendigo, Victoria, in which the 1985 H7N7 outbreak 
occurred, sourced untreated water from an onsite pond which attracted large numbers of wild 
birds. The farm contained meat chicken breeders, layer chickens and meat chickens. Clinical 
signs first appeared in the meat chicken breeders located in several sheds in mid-May and the 
birds were given the diagnosis of infectious coryza. Subsequent antibiotic treatment failed and 
mortality rates continued to increase for both meat chicken breeders and layer chickens with 
up to an 80% mortality rate in one shed. Meat chickens did not appear affected but the whole 
farm was depopulated.  The HPAI virus was also detected in a wild Eurasian starling (Sturnus 
vulgaris) trapped in one of the sheds during the outbreak. It was likely the bird was infected by 
the chickens rather than being the original source of infection for the farm. This has been the 
only HPAI virus detection in a wild bird in Australia thus far (Barr et al., 1986, Sims and 
Turner, 2009, Nestorowicz et al., 1987). 
The subsequent outbreak in Bendigo in 1992 involved a H7N3 virus and also a farm reported 
to have had poor biosecurity. The index farm was a meat chicken breeder farm and supplied a 
hatchery located a fair distance away. In the stamping out process after the outbreak, all fertile 
eggs at the hatchery had to be destroyed because eggs from the index farm could not be 
distinguished from other farms. Serological testing of ducks on a neighbouring duck farm also 
suggested evidence of infection in younger ducks with a H7 subtype virus, despite absent 
clinical signs and no virus being isolated. The infection with a H7 subtype virus experienced 
by the ducks was therefore most likely an LPAI virus and the mutation event from LPAI to 
HPAI in this outbreak occurred in the chicken flock. There was also serological evidence of 
infection with H1, H4, H5 and H9 subtype virus in the ducks (Table 2.1). Ducks on this farm 
had access to a small dam and it was likely that they had contact with wild waterfowl. The 
personnel on the duck property also visited the index farm. As the index farm was in close 
proximity to the duck farm a decision was made to depopulate the duck farm as well. In total, 
540,000 fertile eggs were destroyed along with the depopulated farms (Sims and Turner, 2009, 
Forsyth et al., 1993). 
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The 1994 H7N3 outbreak occurred on a multi-age layer chicken farm in Lowood, Queensland 
during a severe drought. Water was drawn from a river on the periphery of the farm, which had 
attracted a large population of wild birds (Sims and Turner, 2009). The virus was speculated to 
enter the farm from contaminated water from this river (Swayne and Suarez, 2000).  
The farm in Tamworth, NSW, in which the 1997 H7N4 outbreak occurred, also sourced water 
from a nearby river but the farm owner had installed a plant to treat the water six months earlier. 
The outbreak infected two chicken meat chicken breeder farms and a contract emu broiler farm 
and lead to the destruction of 1.2 million fertile eggs along with the depopulated farms (Sims 
and Turner, 2009). A dead bird pick-up vehicle which visited multiple farms was the only 
identifiable link between the farms and may have been the cause of spread (Selleck et al., 2002). 
There was no clinical disease identified in the emu farm but H7N4 virus was isolated from 
cloacal swabs. It was considered a HPAI virus as the IVPI was greater than 1.2; the IVPI was 
1.3 from the emu farm compared to 2.53 from the index farm and 2.90 from the second meat 
chicken breeder farm (Sims and Turner, 2009). 
The 2012 H7N7 outbreak occurred on a free range and barn layer chicken farm in Maitland, 
NSW. Frequent visits of wild waterfowl had been observed on dams located 300 metres from 
the poultry sheds. They had also been observed near poultry feed that had leaked from a grain 
auger attached to one of the poultry sheds and the free range areas of the sheds. The farm was 
not totally free range, with some sheds designed to be a barn system. However, each of the 
sheds reported escapee chickens that had access to the leaked feed consumed by the wild ducks 
(Moloney et al., 2013, Brown et al., 2016). 
The source of the 2013 H7N2 outbreak in Young, NSW was again most likely from wild ducks 
which interacted with the free range chicken flock. The outbreak spread from the combined 
free range and caged layer farm to a solely caged layer farm. Epidemiological investigation 
suggested that the most likely route of this spread was from contaminated cardboard eggs trays. 
Farm specific trays were used to transport eggs to a grading floor from both farms, but trays 
were returned without cleaning or disinfection at the end of processing within one vehicle 
(Roth, 2014). 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive characteristics of the seven HPAI outbreaks in Australia from 1976 to 
2017 
Year Month Subtype Location of 
outbreak 
Number 
of 
infected 
farms 
Description of farms Cost of 
eradication 
(AU$) 
Flock size References 
1976 01 H7N7 Keysborough, 
Victoria 
2 Index farm combined 
conventional meat 
chicken and caged layer 
chicken farm. One free 
range duck farm also 
depopulated. 
220,000 25,000 
layer 
chickens & 
17,000 meat 
chickens 
16,000 
ducks 
(Bashiruddin et 
al., 1991, Sims 
and Turner, 
2009) 
1985 05 H7N7 Bendigo, 
Victoria 
1 Combined layer 
chickens, meat chickens 
and meat chicken 
breeders on one farm. 
2 million 120 000 
chickens 
(Barr et al., 
1986, Sims and 
Turner, 2009) 
1992 07 H7N3 Bendigo, 
Victoria 
2 Index farm a meat 
chicken breeder farm. 
Neighbouring duck farm 
also infected. 
1.35 million 17 000 
chickens 
6 000 ducks 
(Forsyth et al., 
1993, 
Westbury, 
1997, Sims and 
Turner, 2009) 
1994 12 H7N3 Lowood, 
Queensland 
1 Multi-age layer chicken 
farm. 
420,000 22 000 
chickens 
(Dodet and 
Vicari, 2001, 
Sims and 
Turner, 2009) 
1997 11/12 H7N4 Tamworth, 
NSW 
3 Index farm meat chicken 
breeder farm. Another 
meat chicken breeder 
farm south of index farm 
infected. Meat emu farm 
also infected. 
4.45 million 128 000 
chickens 
32 000 
chickens 
260 emus 
(Sims and 
Turner, 2009, 
Selleck et al., 
2002) 
2012 11 H7N7 Maitland, 
NSW 
1 Semi-free range layer 
chicken farm. 
465,000 50 000 
chickens 
(Brown et al., 
2016, CFFR, 
2014b, 
Moloney et al., 
2013) 
2013 10 H7N2 Young, NSW 2 Index farm combined 
free range and caged 
chicken layer farm. 
Caged layer chicken farm 
also affected. 
3.57 million 160 000 
chickens 
275 000 
chickens 
(DAWR, 2013, 
CFFR, 2014a, 
Brown et al., 
2016) 
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2.7 AI surveillance in wild birds 
Wild bird surveillance for AI viruses was initiated in the 1970’s in Australia, Russia and the 
United States of America (Lupiani and Reddy, 2009). From 2008 to 2013, more than 119 
countries from all six inhabited continents conducted and reported some form of AI virus 
surveillance of healthy, sick or dead wild birds, mainly reported through peer-reviewed 
literature. However several factors influence the comparability of data between countries. 
Firstly, the sampling methods differ widely across surveillance programs. These include active 
versus passive surveillance, number of birds and species sampled, types of samples collected 
(cloacal, oropharyngeal, faecal, blood or tissue samples), and frequency and seasonality of 
sampling. Moreover, testing and virus characterization protocols vary widely between 
countries and programs; with some screening solely for influenza A viruses versus others that 
selectively screen for H5 and H7 virus subtypes and some screen for specific HA and NA virus 
subtypes. In addition, reporting systems have been found to be commonly deficient in critical 
data. Such data includes approximate location or date of positive and negative findings, and 
positive findings are commonly reported without denominator data. Of those countries 
conducting no wild bird surveillance, lack of funding was cited by the majority as the 
impediment. There is a need for sustained, cost-effective investments and efforts to promote 
standardized sampling, testing and reporting methods of wild bird AI surveillance globally, 
especially given the global threat of AI to animal and human health (Machalaba et al., 2015). 
Wild bird surveillance for AI viruses in Australia had only been in the form of small, historical 
studies until the early 2000’s  (Hansbro et al., 2010, Lupiani and Reddy, 2009). In 2006 
Australia established the National Avian Influenza Wild Bird (NAIWB) Steering Group to 
strengthen national coordination and collaboration of AI surveillance. Surveillance activities 
are now conducted Australia-wide with national funding provided by the Australian 
Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources and in 2011/12, from the Rural 
Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC) Chicken Meat Program. 
Significant in-kind support was also provided by participating jurisdictional agencies, 
researchers and representative’s institutions (WHA, 2018). Samples include fresh faecal 
samples from the capture of healthy, live birds and hunter-killed wild birds (pathogen-specific, 
risk-based surveillance) and sick or dead wild birds (enhanced passive surveillance) (Grillo, 
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2015, Hoinville et al., 2013).  Passive surveillance for AI is conducted during investigations of 
wild bird deaths or sickness; HPAI has not been detected in wild bird disease investigations in 
Australia; with the only exception being the detection of HPAI H7N7 in a starling (Sturnus 
vulgaris) during the 1985 HPAI outbreak in Bendigo, Victoria described previously 
(Nestorowicz et al., 1987). Surveillance generally occurs in locations previously sampled to 
obtain longitudinal data and location selections were risk-based and also dependent on practical 
considerations; factors considered include wild bird abundance, proximity to poultry farms and 
any migratory patterns (Grillo, 2015, DAFF, 2010). 
All AI viruses detected in wild birds in Australia through targeted surveillance so far have been 
classified as LPAI (Grillo et al., 2015, Grillo, 2015, Hansbro et al., 2010, Haynes et al., 2007). 
LPAI prevalence in Australia appears dependent on rainfall patterns and bird movements, 
abundance and breeding particularly in Australian waterfowl (Ferenczi et al., 2016, Tracey, 
2010). Research conducted as part of the NAIWB Surveillance Program, in NSW, Victoria and 
a small number of samples from Tasmania from 2005 to 2008, identified the highest AI 
prevalence in wild birds in autumn (March to May). Birds of the genus Numenius, specifically 
the eastern curlew, were the most common shorebird to have positive AI virus detection rates. 
Dabbling ducks, that is ducks that feed in water by splashing their bills, notably the Australian 
wood duck (Chenonetta jubata), had slightly higher detection rates compared with all other 
waterfowl. In total, detection rates of 2.4% and 0.51% were obtained from waterfowl and 
shorebirds respectively. During periods of increased detection, rates of up to 12.3%  and 6.2% 
and were found in waterfowl and shorebirds respectively (Hansbro et al., 2010). Surveillance 
in northern Australia (the northern parts of WA, NT, and Queensland) from the years 2004 to 
2009 revealed an apparent prevalence of 1% with variations in prevalence and a cyclical 
periodicity of infection (Curran et al., 2015). 
Australia-wide results of AI detections in wild birds over a five year period (between June 2007 
and June 2012) have been recently made available (Grillo et al., 2015). During this five year 
period, 50,684 swabs and 8387 serum samples were collected. Sampling is targeted for birds 
which constitute the main natural reservoir of LPAI; therefore the majority of samples were 
collected from Anseriformes, followed by Charadriiformes and then from other bird orders. 
The overall proportion of birds that tested positive for influenza A virus was 1.9 ± 0.1% (n = 
50,684). The years 2010 to 2011 and 2011 to 2012 showed a greater proportion of positive 
birds (3.0 ± 0.4% and 3.1 ± 0.4% respectively) than in other years (1.3 ± 0.1%) (Grillo et al., 
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2015). Victoria had the highest proportion of positive samples (3.1 ± 0.3%), followed by NSW 
(2.7 ± 0.3%) compared to the other states/territories (1.1 ± 0.1%). The greatest proportion of 
positive samples were from birds of the order Anseriformes (2.5 ± 0.2%), followed by 
Charadriiformes (0.6 ± 0.1%) and then other species (0.5 ± 0.5%). Subtyping was successful 
for 53% of positive samples. All but H14 and H15 HA subtypes were identified. A total of 94 
LPAI H5 subtypes were detected in NSW, SA, Tasmania, Victoria and WA. Seventeen LPAI 
H7 subtypes were detected in NSW, SA and Victoria. It is unclear why a higher detection of 
H5 LPAI subtypes have occurred in wild birds, yet all HPAI outbreaks in Australian poultry 
were caused by H7 subtypes (Grillo et al., 2015). Surveillance work also demonstrated that 
Australian AI virus subtypes H5, H7 and H9 are closely related and form Australian specific 
lineages that are divergent and distinct from the North American and Eurasian lineages. 
Moreover, the H7 subtypes were shown to be closely related to the five HPAI H7 subtypes that 
caused outbreaks in poultry in Australia from 1976 to 1992 (Hansbro et al., 2010). 
2.8 Wild bird movements 
In the northern hemisphere, waterfowl are well known for their annual migrations over long 
distances. However in Australia, movements of waterfowl are less predictable and many 
populations are nomadic in that they move in response to environmental factors such as food 
availability and rainfall. This makes waterfowl detection and deterrence challenging prospects 
on Australian poultry farms. A recent report on wild waterfowl deterrence in Australian 
commercial poultry farms states that on-farm observations are necessary for assessing the AI 
risk and justifying the costs of waterfowl control on the farm (Atzeni et al., 2016). 
In Australia, waterfowl movement is largely determined by the distribution of surface waters 
of inland Australia, and is also influenced by food resources, time of year and climatic 
conditions (Tracey et al., 2004, Atzeni et al., 2016). Australasian waterfowl confine their 
movements east of Wallace’s line; which is a faunal boundary that runs through Indonesia, 
between Borneo and Sulawesi and through the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok. 
Asiatic species are found west of the line (Dingle, 2004). 
In contrast, birds of the families Scolopacidae and Charadriidae (shorebirds and waders) 
constitute the greatest number of species that undergo annual migrations over long distances 
and visit Australasia. There are approximately 35 species of these families that undergo such 
migrations. The majority come from north-eastern Eurasia and a limited extent from far 
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northern western Alaska. Movement into Australia by these species mainly occurs into the 
north-west and along the east coast over the Pacific Ocean. They arrive in Australia during the 
Australian spring time (September to November) thereby avoiding the northern winter. Most 
species occupy coastal areas of Australia but others make extensive use of interior plains and 
wetlands (Dingle, 2004, Tracey et al., 2004). 
In total, 99 bird species are known to move between Asia and Australia. With the exception of 
the 35 species of shorebirds and waders, movements are still restricted east of the Wallace’s 
line (Tracey et al., 2004). The most likely factors restricting migration east of the Wallace’s 
line into the Australasian region are differences in climate and habitat. Arid conditions in 
Australia which lead to the growth of savannah and scrub could be seen as a deterrence to 
Eurasian migrant birds which predominate in forested or open habitats (Dingle, 2004). 
2.8.1 Risk of exotic AI introduction into Australia 
Although distinct from the North American and Eurasian lineages, Australian Influenza A 
lineages share recent common ancestry with divergent Eurasian lineages. Rare introductions of 
Eurasian and North American AI virus lineages into Australian waterfowl occur mainly from 
intercontinental migrations undertaken by Charadriiformes. Evolutionary dynamics of AI virus 
in Australia is likely to be determined by climatic changes. For instance, long term persistence 
of AI virus lineages were observed during periods of increased rainfall, whereas population 
bottlenecks and extinctions were observed during periods of drought (Vijaykrishna et al., 
2013). 
The introduction of exotic AIV lineages into Australia through the importation of poultry 
products is unlikely. This is due to Australia’s quarantine regulations which do not permit the 
importation of eggs and egg products and poultry meat without comprehensive quarantine 
precautions (East et al., 2008b, DAWR, 2017). However, fertile eggs are imported into 
Australia and form the great-grandparent stock of commercial layer and meat chickens, and 
live bird introduction is allowed for some species including the Red Junglefowl (Gallus gallus), 
wild turkey (Meleagris gallopavo) and domestic pigeon (Columba livia) (DEE, 2017, Cowan 
et al., 2014). 
Of the 99 bird species known to move between Asia and Australia, AI has been isolated from 
approximately 26 of them. Half of the species from which AI has been isolated have been 
reported to be present at various freshwater bodies in eastern Australia, including farm dams. 
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Isolated HPAI outbreaks have occurred in the Indonesian part of New Guinea at Manokwari in 
Irian Jaya Barat province and at Jayapura and Timika in Papua province. These regions are east 
of Wallace’s line and therefore a potential pathway of exotic HPAI introduction into Australia 
through the movements of nomadic waterfowl (East et al., 2008b). Moreover, the East Asian-
Australian flyway used by the 35 species of birds of the families Scolopacidae and Charadriidae 
for their annual long-distance migrations incorporates other areas where HPAI outbreaks have 
occurred (see Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The major routes of the East Asian-Australian flyway in relation to the 2003 to 
2004 epizootic of HPAI. Sourced from Tracey et al. (2004). 
It is possible for exotic HPAI to enter Australia via migratory shorebirds returning from other 
countries where HPAI outbreaks have occurred. The most likely pathway of introduction to 
commercial poultry via this route is from contact with native waterfowl that have received 
exotic HPAI from migrating shorebirds (East et al., 2008a). Native Australian waterfowl do 
not move further than 10 kilometres during the spring breeding season which is when migratory 
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shorebirds arrive in Australia, but waterfowl movements can be irregular (Tracey, 2009, 
Roshier et al., 2008, East et al., 2008a). Therefore, poultry farms within 10 kilometres of 
significant shorebird habitat are at relatively highest risk. However, a final analysis showed 
that the introduction of exotic HPAI H5N1 to Australian commercial poultry via migratory 
shorebirds returning from Asia was low risk. Only two poultry farms, one at Broome and one 
at Carnarvon, were located in the regions considered at relatively high risk (East et al., 2008a). 
It should be noted that there is ongoing evolution of HPAI viruses globally, potentially 
influencing the risk of introduction. For example, there is evidence that HPAI H5N8 is able to 
be carried over long distances by wild birds possibly due to limited physiological effect of these 
strains on wild birds compared to HPAI H5N1 (Sims et al., 2017). 
Some species of Australasian waterfowl are nomadic throughout the Australo-Paupuan region 
that includes southern areas of New Guinea. These include the Wandering whistling-duck 
(Dendrocygna arcuata), Pacific black duck (Anas superciliosa), Grey Teal (Anas gracilis), 
Green pygmy goose (Nettapus pulchellus) and Magpie goose (Anseranas semipalmata) 
(Dingle, 2004, McCallum et al., 2008). HPAI has not been established in this region to date, 
but HPAI outbreaks have occurred in the Indonesian part of New Guinea at Manokwari in Irian 
Jaya Barat province and at Jayapura and Timika in Papua province. The introduction of exotic 
HPAI from nomadic waterfowl to commercial poultry is more likely than from migratory 
shorebirds, especially if HPAI becomes established in this region. The area in Australia 
identified as at greatest risk of exotic HPAI incursion was the Atherton tableland near Cairns 
(East et al., 2008b). 
AI viruses are endemic in wild birds in Australia and thus the virus must be seen as a continuous 
low level threat to the Australian poultry industry. All HPAI outbreaks that have occurred in 
Australia to date were Australian H7 subtypes. Therefore, HPAI outbreaks caused by local 
Australian lineages seem more likely than via the introduction of exotic lineages (Hansbro et 
al., 2010, Wong and Daniels, 2013). 
2.9 The need for risk assessment for AI exposure and spread in Australia 
The recent consumer-driven expansion of free range chicken farms in Australia has caused 
concern amongst industry experts that the frequency of AI outbreaks will increase. This is due 
to concern that greater chicken access to outdoors will increase the potential for contact 
between chickens and wild birds infected with LPAI, thus increasing the risk of LPAI exposure 
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to chickens (Scott et al., 2009, Arzey and Littleton, 2007, DAFF, 2009a). In addition, as all 
Australian AI outbreaks have occurred from Australian viral lineages, there has been a 
paradigm shift regarding the source of future outbreaks amongst industry experts from exotic 
viruses to endemic LPAI virus through contact with local waterfowl (East et al., 2008a, East et 
al., 2008b, DAFF, 2009a). 
Despite concerns, the change in probability of AI outbreak occurrence with the expansion of 
free range chicken farms in Australia has not yet been quantified. There is a need to better 
understand the risk posed by free range chicken farms in Australia in terms of AI exposure, 
with comparisons to indoor chicken farm types. There is also a need to quantify the reduction 
of this risk achievable through actions that can be performed on farm by farmers. Similarly, 
there is a need to quantify the risk of spread of AI after exposure and infection in a chicken 
farm and to also quantify the reduction in risk of spread through on-farm actions. As HPAI is 
an EAD, outbreaks are associated with large costs and fear of uncontrollable disease spread. 
Thus research aimed to enhance the prevention of AI exposure and spread is warranted. 
2.10 Methodology for risk assessment 
Member governments of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ratified the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement in 1994 which allows members to protect food 
safety, animal health, and plant health whilst ensuring strict regulations are not used as a barrier 
for international trade (Horten, 2001). The OIE is recognised by the SPS Agreement as the 
relevant international organisation responsible for standards, guidelines and recommendations 
relating to the trade of live animals and animal products. The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code provides the agreed and required import risk analysis procedures and methodologies for 
importing countries to objectively assess the risks associated with the importation of animals 
and animal products; it is therefore a key part of the WTO legal framework for international 
trade (Miller et al., 1993, OIE, 2011, Horten, 2001). The applications of the OIE methodology 
for risk analysis are vast and its impact recognised; for example, the management of aquatic 
animal health has greatly improved with use of the methodology to inform decision making in 
this industry (Peeler et al., 2007). 
The conduct of risk analysis involves the whole process of understanding the nature of 
unwanted events and actions that can reduce risk, and communication of these among 
stakeholders. It provides a transparent, evidence-based approach for assessing and mitigating 
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the risk of disease and also a means to communicate risks to stakeholders. Hazard identification, 
risk assessment, risk management and communication are the components of risk analysis. 
Hazard identification involves the identification of something potentially harmful within the 
given context (Miller et al., 1993, OIE, 2011). Hazards are usually identified from the literature; 
the study by Cobb and Smith (2015) in which an import risk analysis was conducted in New 
Zealand to assess the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of chicken meat is an 
example of extensive hazard identification. Risk assessment involves the estimation of the 
likelihood and consequences of entry, establishment or spread of a hazard. Risk management 
informs decision-making and formulation of policy through the process of considering all 
options to reduce risk. Risk communication is the exchange of information between risk 
assessors and managers and those affected by the risk before decisions on management are 
final (Miller et al., 1993, OIE, 2011). 
Risk assessments may be quantitative (model inputs and outputs are expressed numerically) or 
qualitative (inputs and outputs are expressed in words e.g. negligible, low, moderate, high). 
Qualitative risk assessments usually require less time and cost to conduct compared to 
quantitative approaches and are used commonly for decision making. Qualitative approaches 
are used often in aquatic animal health assessments due to the lack of data preventing 
quantitative approaches (Peeler et al., 2007). Quantitative risk assessments are usually more 
difficult to conduct due to the large amount of information required to develop the model, but 
allow for the assessment of the impact of uncertainty and for comparison of risk-mitigation 
strategies (Martin et al., 2007, OIE, 2011). The OIE methodology for risk assessment is 
subdivided into four stages; release assessment, exposure assessment, consequence assessment 
and risk estimation. Only the risk assessment component of the risk analysis methodology, 
specifically; the exposure assessment and consequence assessment stages, were undertaken in 
this thesis. 
The release assessment describes the pathways and estimates the probability of a hazard to be 
released in the area of interest. This stage is also known as entry assessment and is of particular 
significance to exotic diseases. An example of an application of this stage is the study of a 
qualitative release assessment for the entry of H5N1 HPAI virus into Europe via migratory 
wild birds (Gale et al., 2014). For endemic diseases, prevalence studies in the area such as the 
prevalence of LPAI in Australian wild birds can be used to estimate the release assessment 
stage (OIE, 2011). The exposure assessment stage considers all the potential pathways 
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necessary for a pathogen to be exposed to a susceptible host and the risk of these pathways 
occurring (OIE, 2011). For the interest of the work conducted in this thesis, the exposure 
assessment considers all the potential pathways by which chickens situated in a commercial 
layer or meat chicken farm can be exposed to LPAI virus from wild birds and the probability 
of these pathways occurring. The consequence assessment stage describes the consequences of 
a given exposure to a hazard, or pathogen, and the probability of this occurring. This stage 
therefore includes the estimation of the risk of infection after exposure to the pathogen, and all 
the biological, environmental and economic consequences associated with establishment or 
spread of the pathogen (OIE, 2011). A partial consequence assessment was conducted in this 
thesis, where the risks of infection, establishment and spread are determined but the 
consequences following spread are not measured. The final stage of the risk assessment process, 
risk estimation, involves integration of the previous three stages to produce overall measures 
of risk associated with the hazard (Miller et al., 1993, OIE, 2011). 
Such pathways for both the exposure and consequence risk assessment stages can be portrayed 
using scenario trees. Scenario trees are graphical representations of the pathways in which a 
pathogen can be exposed to or spread, and aid in describing the pathways, identifying the 
information required to estimate the pathways, and ensure a logical chain of events in space 
and time (Martin et al., 2007). The scenario tree structure involves having each step defined by 
‘nodes’ and each node consisting of a number of ‘branches’ or pathways. Each branch has an 
input value associated with it and the sum of all branches for each node must equal to one. 
Input values can be deterministic (point estimates) or stochastic (probability distributions). The 
latter involves random sampling of values from each input probability distribution and this 
process is repeated for a determined number of times; each process is called an iteration. 
Results from all iterations produce an output probability distribution. The number of iterations 
required to gain a precise output probability distribution is dependent on the sampling strategy 
used; examples include Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modelling and Latin hypercube 
method (Martin et al., 2007). Computer programs that can be used for this methodology include 
@RISK 7.0 (Palisade Corporation, USA) (Hernández-Jover et al., 2015).  
The use of probability distributions allows consideration of any underlying biological 
variability and uncertainty associated with estimates of the input values. Variability is the 
natural heterogeneity within a biological system and cannot be reduced or eliminated by extra 
data or experiments. Uncertainty is the lack of precise knowledge of the input values associated 
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with measurement error or lack of knowledge and can be reduced by extra data or experiments. 
By performing simulations with many thousands of iterations, the effect of variability and 
uncertainty on the output values can be accounted for (Martin et al., 2007, OIE, 2011). 
The application of scenario trees in animal health has been used recently in various studies. 
Christensen and Vallières (2016) used the OIE methodology for risk assessment to estimate 
the likelihood of introduction of bovine viral diarrhoea virus in Danish dairy herds. The 
construction of scenario trees enabled evaluation of the importance of various introduction 
routes. The study found that testing of animals and improving biosecurity through disinfection 
of equipment could reduce the number of introductions expected to occur. Foddai et al. (2014) 
showed that scenario trees can be used to support a country’s claim of freedom of disease. The 
study used surveillance data sources for Aujeszky’s disease in commercial swine in Canada to 
inform parameters in the scenario tree models. The scenario trees were then used to calculate 
the probability of freedom from this disease. The study emphasised the use of scenario tree 
models as support tools, and should not be used alone for this claim. Riviere et al. (2017) used 
scenario trees to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of bovine tuberculosis surveillance programs 
in wildlife in France. Scenario trees were used to assess the probability of detecting at least one 
animal positive for a given prevalence in the population. This was performed for each of the 
different surveillance systems conducted and by the different species (including dear, wild boar 
and badgers) and risk level of becoming infected. The scenario trees were related back to the 
costs required to achieve detection for each surveillance system, and cost-effectiveness ratios 
for each system were calculated. 
Sensitivity analysis can be used to determine the effect of input values on the model outputs. 
This allows identification of the most influential steps or pathways of the scenario tree, and 
thus allows targeting of influential pathways to perform risk mitigation actions on. For 
Australian commercial chicken farms, this is useful in determining which on-farm actions are 
most significant in reducing the risk of AI exposure and spread (Martin et al., 2007, OIE, 2011). 
Sensitivity analysis also allows evaluation of uncertainty of input values on the model outputs. 
One example is the conduct of sensitivity analysis for an input value potentially influenced by 
recall bias; as conducted in a study assessing livestock-associated risk factors for human 
pneumonia in the Netherlands  (Freidl et al., 2017). 
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2.11 Discussion 
There are outstanding gaps in the literature related to the mechanisms and behaviour of the AI 
virus, as well as a recognised need to evaluate the probability of AI exposure and spread within 
free range commercial chicken farms in comparison to indoor commercial chicken farms as 
free range poultry production grows in popularity in Australia. Experimental and field studies 
are required to address the former gap, and this requires collaboration and permission from 
industry to sample Australian commercial chickens for AI. The policies and procedures that 
must be performed with positive AI H5 and H7 detections as written in the AUSVETPLAN 
currently prevent industry collaboration. However, the probability of AI exposure and spread 
among Australian commercial chicken farms can still be estimated from the development of 
quantitative risk assessments models. Such models can help determine the factors that influence 
the probability of AI exposure and spread and thus indicate the on-farm actions that can be 
performed to mitigate risk. These models require current information on the design, 
management and biosecurity practices performed on Australian commercial chicken farms to 
inform the input values. The collection of this information and the development of these models 
are discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3. Comparisons of management practices 
and farm design on Australian commercial layer 
and meat chicken farms: cage, barn and free range 
Prologue 
Chapter 3 presents results from a farm survey of management practices and farm design on 
Australian commercial chicken farms. The results of this Chapter include new knowledge that 
describes the rapidly expanding free range commercial farm sector in Australia. 
Published in PLOS ONE, 12(11). e0188505. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0188505 
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Abstract 
There are few published studies describing the unique management practices, farm design and 
housing characteristics of commercial meat chicken and layer farms in Australia. In particular, 
there has been a large expansion of free range poultry production in Australia in recent years, 
but limited information about this enterprise exists. This study aimed to describe features of 
Australian commercial chicken farms, with particular interest in free range farms, by 
conducting on-farm interviews of 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn 
layer farms, 15 free range meat chicken farms and 15 non-free range meat chicken farms in the 
Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. Comparisons between the different 
enterprises (cage, barn and free range) were explored, including stocking densities, 
depopulation procedures, environmental control methods and sources of information for 
farmers. Additional information collected for free range farms include range size, range 
characteristics and range access.  The median number of chickens per shed was greatest in free 
range meat chicken farms (31,058), followed by non-free range meat chicken (20,817), free 
range layer (10,713), barn layer (9,300) and cage layer farms (9,000). Sheds had cooling pads 
and tunnel ventilation in just over half of both barn and free range meat chicken farms (53%, 
n=8) and was least common in free range layer farms (16%, n=4). Range access in free range 
meat chicken farms was from sunrise to dark in the majority (93%, n=14) of free range meat 
chicken farms. Over half of free range layer farms (56%, n=14) granted range access at a set 
time each morning; most commonly between 9:00 to 10.00am (86%, n=12), and chickens were 
placed back inside sheds when it was dusk. 
Keywords 
Australia, commercial chicken farm, farm design, free range, layer chickens, management, 
meat chickens  
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3.1 Introduction 
Aspects of the Australian commercial poultry industry, including management practices, 
housing characteristics and range features are similar to poultry systems in other developed 
countries and others are distinctively different. Of note is the significant expansion of free range 
poultry production of both meat chicken and eggs in Australia in recent years. This expansion 
is largely due to increased demand by the Australian public, where it is perceived that products 
produced in less intensive systems are of higher welfare status compared to products produced 
in intensive systems (Singh and Cowieson, 2013). 
Since 2012, the Australian retail turnover of free range eggs has surpassed that of cage, barn 
and organic eggs; with the latest percentages recorded in 2015 at 49%, 39%, 9% and 3%, 
respectively. However, cage eggs still surpass free range eggs in terms of volume of eggs 
produced; at 52% cage eggs compared to 39% free range (AECL, 2015). The European Union 
(EU) implemented a ban on battery cages in 2012, and farms must convert to enriched cages 
or use alternative systems such as barn or free range (European Commission, 2008). In the 
United Kingdom (UK) this has lead a significant increase in free range poultry production. The 
volume of eggs produced by cage farms in the UK surpasses free range farms to a similar 
degree to Australia; at 52% and 44% in 2015 respectively (DEFRA, 2016). In the United States 
of America (USA), the majority of laying hens (approximately 95%) are housed in 
conventional cage systems. However, there are current shifts within individual states to 
implement cage bans (Zhao et al., 2015). 
Australian free range meat chicken production has also grown to at least 15% of the total market 
in 2015 from being regarded as a ‘cottage industry’ in 2006 (ACMF, 2011). This growth is 
significant compared to other developed countries. In the UK, free range chicken meat 
production appears to be on a gradual decline. The country’s total meat chickens reared on free 
range systems was 6%, 5% and 3% in 2001, 2013 and 2014 respectively (Sheppard, 2004, 
Crane and Laney, 2015, Hoyle et al., 2016). In the USA, less than 1% of the country’s total 
meat chickens were free range in 2012. However organic chicken farms are also recognized as 
free range and the organic food market has experienced strong growth since the establishment 
of the National Organic Program in 2002. In addition, organic chicken was recognized as the 
leading organic meat in terms of growth and so the total flock percentage identified as free 
range may increase in the future (NCC, 2012, Fanatico et al., 2009). In Australia, there is a 
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high degree of private ownership within the Australian egg industry, leading to great variation 
between farms. In contrast, the Australian meat chicken industry is vertically integrated. Two 
large companies supply more than 70% of Australia’s meat chicken, and they have created 
their own standards in conjunction with third-party certifiers (Scott et al., 2009). The consumer-
driven expansion of free range production in Australia has led to the conversion of older, 
conventional farms into free range systems, as well as the development of new free range farms. 
Details on management practices and farm design across Australian commercial chicken farms, 
particularly free range enterprises, is lacking in the literature. It is particularly important to 
capture this information given the significant expansion of free range enterprises; this will help 
inform decisions related to the management of animal health. 
This study reports the variations in management practices, farm design and housing 
characteristics across commercially operated Australian layer and meat chicken farms that were 
captured during on-farm visits. Comparisons between the different enterprises (cage, barn and 
free range) are explored and unique features of free range farms are described. 
3.2 Methods 
A survey was conducted on commercial chicken farms in the Sydney basin and South East 
Queensland regions of Australia from June 2015 to February 2016. Commercial layer farms 
were defined as those having more than 1,000 birds, and commercial meat chicken farms were 
defined as those having more than 25,000 birds. The survey involved farm visits by the 
researchers and face-to-face interviews and observations. The experimental procedures used 
for this study were approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Sydney, 
Australia and all results obtained were kept confidential (ethics reference number: 2015/252). 
3.2.1 Region and farm selection 
The survey was purposely conducted in the state of New South Wales as it has the highest 
levels of layer and meat chicken production in Australia. As of December 2014, approximately 
120 (48%) of the 252 commercial layer farms in Australia were located in NSW, and NSW 
was the leading state in terms of volume of meat chicken produced (34%) (AECL, 2015, NSW 
DPI, 2015). 
Within NSW, the Sydney basin bioregion was selected for the survey. Bioregions are large 
land areas defined by natural features and environmental processes. From north to south, the 
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Sydney basin bioregion extends from just north of Newcastle (latitude approximately -32.4367) 
to just north of Bateman’s Bay (latitude approximately -35.6132) and almost as far west as 
Mudgee (average longitude approximately 150.1765) (NSW OHE, 2011). The Sydney basin 
bioregion was chosen due to its high density and variety of layer and meat chicken farms and 
its history of an avian influenza (AI) outbreak in Maitland in 2011 (NSW DPI, 2012). It was 
later found that numbers of free range meat chicken farms were limited in this region and were 
all owned by one of the two large Australian meat chicken companies. Therefore permission 
was sought to visit free range meat chicken farms owned by the other large Australian meat 
chicken company in the state of Queensland.   
A comprehensive list of commercial layer and meat chicken farms and their contact 
information in these regions was created by compiling farm lists from various sources. 
Permission was sought from corporations, consultants, veterinarians and companies to provide 
such lists and sharing of this information was refused on only one occasion. It was considered 
that the final compiled list included the vast majority of layer and meat chicken farms in the 
Sydney basin bioregion and all free range meat chicken farms owned by the one company in 
the South East Queensland region. Due to logistic and budgetary constraints, the total number 
of farms that could be surveyed was 80 farms. As information in the literature on free range 
farms is lacking compared to other types of farms, a higher proportion of free range farms were 
included. In addition, information in the literature describing variation between layer farms that 
is possible with the high level of private ownership within the Australian egg industry is also 
lacking, hence supporting the decision of including a high proportion of layer farms. The target 
number set for each farm type was 25 free range layer farms, 10 cage layer farms, 10 barn layer 
farms, 15 free range meat chicken farms and 15 non-free range meat chicken farms. 
Farms from the final compiled list were sorted by farm type. Random selection of farms was 
then conducted within each farm type. Selected farms were contacted via telephone, the project 
explained to them, and their consent to participate in the project was requested. If the request 
was rejected, the next farm on the randomly selected list was contacted. If the request was 
accepted, a date and time was arranged for the farm visit. 
3.2.2 Questionnaire development 
Two questionnaires were created: a main questionnaire and a biosecurity questionnaire, both 
written in English. The main questionnaire consisted of six sections: farm information, water, 
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poultry health, range, wild birds and other wild animals, with a total of 102 questions. It 
comprised short closed, semi-closed and open questions, and was completed during a face-to-
face interview estimated to take one hour. The biosecurity questionnaire consisted of 2 
sections: communication, and biosecurity practices performed on the farm. The communication 
component consisted of questions related to where farmers source information from regarding 
poultry health and industry news and also how they receive that information. Examples of 
sources of information include poultry organisations, integrators and veterinarians. Examples 
of information delivery include newsletters, emails, social media and television/radio. The 
biosecurity questionnaire overall consisted of seven closed questions, including personal 
ratings of the importance of specified biosecurity practices, and was self-completed by the 
farmer in approximately 15 minutes. The questionnaire was pilot tested on two local farms; a 
free range layer and cage layer farm, to evaluate clarity and wording of the questions which 
were then modified appropriately. The data from these pilot tested farms was included in the 
survey. Copies of the questionnaires are available in the appendices (Appendix A and B). 
3.2.3 Farm surveys 
Each farm survey took one to two hours depending on the size and type of the farm. The farm 
survey consisted of a face-to-face interview conducted by the researchers using the main 
questionnaire, followed by the farmer filling out the biosecurity questionnaire with assistance 
available from the researchers if required. Researchers obtained measurable information such 
as number of chickens, shed size and range area from farm records and observation. After the 
interviews, researchers recorded visual observations including shed design, range design, 
topography, waterbody locations and biosecurity practices. Vegetative cover on the range areas 
was estimated by the researchers as an estimated percentage of the total range area based on 
observation during the visit. The stocking density for cage layer farms was calculated by 
dividing the number of chickens per shed by the shed area covered by cages multiplied by the 
number of tiers. This was done to avoid the falsely high stocking density on multi-tier cage 
farms which would be obtained when simply dividing the number of birds with the shed area, 
as done on all other farm types. For measurements of distances, such as between sheds, these 
were estimated using Google Maps (© 2016 Google Inc., California, USA) after the farm visit. 
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3.2.4 Data analysis 
After each farm visit, data from the questionnaires and observation records were entered in 
Microsoft Access (Microsoft, PC/Windows 7, 2010, Redmond, WA, USA) and checked for 
data entry errors. The statistical program JMP® was used (© 2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, 
USA) for all statistical analyses of the data. One-way analyses of variance1 were used to 
determine any significant statistical differences in farm design factors between the different 
farm types. P-values were used to detect any statistical significance between different factors 
and a p-value of <0.05 was considered significant. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Farm size 
The farms surveyed were all commercially operating farms. The largest farm visited was a cage 
layer farm with 467,000 birds and the smallest was a free range layer farm with 1,450 birds. 
The median number of chickens was greatest on meat chicken farms (140,600 and 88,000 
chickens for free range and non-free range meat chicken farms respectively). This was then 
followed by cage layer, free range layer and barn layer farms (40,000, 32,000 and 17,500 
chickens respectively). All meat chicken farms had at least two commercial poultry sheds on 
the farm whilst all layer farms had at least one. Meat chicken farms had a greater median 
number of sheds on the farm compared to layer farms as shown in Table 3.1. 
  
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix E for comparison with Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
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Table 3.1. The median and range for the numbers of chicken and shed attributes for non-free 
range and free range meat chicken farms, and for cage, barn and free range layer farms in the 
Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland, Australia, June 2015 until February 2016. 
Farm attribute Farm type 
 
Non-free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Free range meat 
chicken (n=15) 
Cage layer 
(n=9) 
Barn layer (n=9) 
Free range layer 
(n=25) 
Number of 
sheds on farm 
surveyed 
4 (2-10) 5 (2-12) 2 (1-12) 2 (1-10) 3 (1-16) 
Total number of 
chickens on 
farm surveyed 
88,000 
(29,000-210,000) 
140,560 
(67,000-271,000) 
40,000 
(7,500-467,000) 
17,500 
(5,000-90,000) 
32,000 
(1,450-163,000) 
Number of 
chickens per 
shed 
20,817 
(14,450-32,067) 
31,058 
(13,400-50,280) 
9,000 
(3,986-71,000) 
9,300 
(5,000-17,500) 
10,713 
(250-18,000) 
Shed area (m2) 
1,453 
(870-3,142) 
1,937 
(876-3,145) 
1,500 
(995-2,500) 
1,064 
(720-1,750) 
1,192 
(15a-1,820) 
Stocking 
density inside 
shed (birds/m2) 
13.6 (8.1-20.5) 16.0 (15.3-18.6) 8.7 (3.8-11.4) 9.0 (6.7-11.0) 10.2 (1.2-33.3a) 
a The farm with this shed area and stocking density had mobile caravan type sheds. Details are under ‘shed 
area and design’. 
3.3.2 Shed information 
Shed area and design 
The median shed area was largest in free range meat chicken farms (1,937m2) and smallest in 
barn layer farms (1,064 m2). The smallest sheds across all farm types was 15 m2 in the form of 
mobile caravans on one free range layer farm. These are roadworthy and are moved on to 
different areas of pasture when pasture is denuded. One mobile caravan type farm was visited 
in this study. Features of mobile caravan type farms involve limited space inside the caravans, 
but they are kept open for most of the day. In addition, nest boxes are provided inside but food 
and water is only available outside of the shed, thereby driving chickens to go outside.  
Variation in shed design was greatest amongst the layer farms. Some layer sheds were divided 
internally into sections by wire mesh. In this design, groups of chickens were separated 
physically in these sections but could still see and interact, to a limited extent, with other groups. 
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These shed designs were only found in 33% (n=3) and 16% (n=4) of barn and free range layer 
farms respectively. 
Features of shed flooring were similar amongst the meat chicken farms. All meat chicken farms 
used litter on the floor of the sheds, most commonly wood shavings (71%), followed by saw 
dust (23%) and rice hulls (6%). In contrast, all barn and free range layer farms used slat type 
flooring which covered 100% of the flooring in the house for the chickens. The majority of 
slats were made out of plastic (94%), followed by wire (6%). The housing of all cage layer 
farms used solid flooring. 
The median number of tiers or levels on cage farms was three, and this ranged from one to 
seven. The median number of rows was six (4-15). All cage rows were ‘back to back’ i.e. each 
row had an adjacent row attached before a space in between the rows. The median number of 
cages per row, excluding the adjacent row, was 122 (70-164). There was a median of 2,250 
cages per shed (840-11,808). The median number of chickens per cage was four (3-7). 
Capacity and stocking density 
The median number of chickens per shed was greatest in free range meat chicken farms 
(31,058), followed by non-free range meat chicken (20,817), free range layer (10,713), barn 
layer (9,300) and cage layer farms (9,000). The number of chickens per shed ranged up to 
71,000 chickens, which was found on a cage layer farm. The smallest capacity sheds were 
found on a free range layer farm, housing approximately 250 chickens (Table 3.1). 
The median stocking density was greatest in meat chicken farms (13.6 and 16.0 birds/m2 for 
non-free range and free range meat chicken farms respectively) compared to layer farms, where 
it was smallest in cage layer farms (8.7 birds/m2) (Table 3.1). A high stocking density of 33.3 
birds/m2 was found on the one mobile caravan farm. As mentioned previously, space is limited 
inside the caravans. Perches are placed on multiple levels inside, thereby providing hens with 
more roost areas. The caravans are only in full use at night time when the doors are closed for 
shelter and protection. 
Drinkers, feeders and nests 
Nipple type drinkers were used on 97% of farms. They were present on all non-free range meat 
chicken, cage layer and barn layer farms. One free range meat chicken farm used a combination 
of nipples and cup type drinkers and one free range layer farm used large bell type drinkers. 
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Taking all drinker types into account, there was a median of 9 chickens per drinker overall for 
all farm types. There was no statistically significant difference in the number of chickens per 
drinker between the different farm types (P=0.2). 
Automatic pan type feeders were used on all meat chicken farms. On barn layer farms, 
automatic pans were used on 56% (n=5) and chain feeders were used on 44% (n=4) of farms. 
Travelling hoppers were the most common feeder type on cage layer farms (44%, n=4), 
followed by manual troughs (33%, n=3). One cage layer farm used a combination of chain 
feeders and travelling hoppers, and another used manual troughs with travelling hoppers. Chain 
feeders were most commonly used on free range layer farms (52%, n=13), followed by 
automatic pans (36%, n=9), gravity pans, (8%, n=2) and then a combination of automatic pans 
with chain feeders (4%, n=1). There was a median of 54 chickens per automatic pan and 4 cm 
of chain feeder per bird overall. There was no statistically significant difference in the number 
of automatic pans and length of chain feeder per chicken between the different farm types 
(P=0.07 and P=0.44 respectively). 
Eggs were collected by conveyer belt on 90% of layer farms. Manual egg collection was 
performed on 10% of layer farms, all of which were cage layer farms. There was a median of 
79 chickens per nest across barn and free range layer farms. There was no statistically 
significant difference in the number of chickens per nest between the different farm types 
(P=0.2). 
Environmental control methods 
All meat chicken farms had heaters in the shed that were mainly used for heating brooding 
areas for new chicks. No layer farms had heaters. A variety of environmental control methods 
to cool down birds during hot weather was reported across all farm types. Cooling pads and 
tunnel ventilation were reported in just over half of both non-free range and free range meat 
chicken farms (53%, n=8) and was least common in free range layer farms (16%, n=4). Both 
foggers and stirring fans were reported in over half of every farm type. Curtains and/or shutters 
used to block or allow outside breeze was found in over half of all farm types with the exception 
of cage layer farms where these were present in only 22% (n=2). These values are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. A description of the environmental control methods used by non-free range and free 
range meat chicken farms, and cage, barn and free range layer farms inside sheds, in the Sydney 
basin bioregion and South East Queensland, Australia, June 2015 until February 2016. 
Environmental control 
method 
Farm type 
Non-free 
range meat 
chicken 
(n=15) 
Free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Cage layer 
(n=9) 
Barn layer 
(n=9) 
Free range 
layer (n=25) 
Cooling pads/ tunnel 
ventilation (% farms) 
53 (n=8) 53 (n=8) 33 (n=3) 33 (n=3) 16 (n=4) 
Foggers (% farms) 60 (n=9) 80 (n=12) 67 (n=6) 78 (n=7) 84 (n=21) 
Curtains/ shutters (% 
farms) 
67 (n=10) 100 22  (n=2) 78 (n=7) 84 (n=21) 
Sprinklers on roof (% 
farms) 
7 (n=1) 0 56 (n=5) 11 (n=1) 44 (n=11) 
Stirring fans(% farms) 93 (n=14) 100 56 (n=5) 100 88 (n=22) 
3.3.3 Chicken management and health 
Age groups 
Only one age group of birds per shed was present in all meat chicken farms. There was a median 
of one age group per shed for both barn layer and free range layer farm types, and a maximum 
of seven and four age groups respectively. Multiple ages in one shed in these farm types were 
in sheds divided internally by wire mesh as described previously. Each section was a different 
age group but each group could see and interact through the wire mesh. It was found that 78% 
(n=7) of cage layer farms had multiple age groups in one shed, with a median number of four 
age groups per shed. 
The median number of age groups per farm was one for all meat chicken farms. The maximum 
number of age groups was ten on one non-free range meat chicken farm, due to the large size 
of the farm. For cage, barn and free range layer farms, the median number of age groups per 
farm was five, three and four respectively. 
Chicken breed and rearing 
Meat chicken farms most commonly used a combination of the Ross and Cobb chicken breed 
on the one farm (53%, n=16), followed by exclusive use of the Cobb breed (27%, n=8) and 
then the Ross breed (20%, n=6). The ISA Brown breed was the most common breed on the 
layer farms (77%, n=33) and was the most common breed per layer farm type. Other layer 
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breeds used were the Hyline (30%, n=13), Lohmann (7%, n=3), Leghorn (5%, n=2), Hisex (2%, 
n=1) and Heritage breeds (2%, n=1), and some farms used a combination of different breeds 
on the one farm. A minority (14%, n=7) of layer farms had a rearing shed on the farm in which 
they rear their own birds. Therefore most layer farms relied on outside rearing farms for 
production layers. All meat chicken farms received new birds at one day old from the hatcheries. 
Health records and vaccinations 
All meat chicken farms kept written health records documenting aspects such as the number of 
mortalities per day. Written health records were kept on 89% (n=8), 67% (n=6) and 96% (n=24) 
of layer barn, cage and free range farms respectively. 
All farms vaccinated chickens against Newcastle disease virus and infectious bronchitis virus. 
Half (50%, n=15) of meat chicken farms vaccinate against Marek’s disease (MD). infectious 
laryngotracheitis (ILT) was only vaccinated when needed in meat chicken farms and had been 
performed in 17% (n=5) of farms at the time of the visits. In contrast, all layer farms were 
vaccinated routinely against ILT, as well as egg drop syndrome (EDS). Different vaccination 
protocols existed across the layer farms dependent on factors such as the company of the farm, 
the source of chickens and/or the veterinarian associated with the farm. Vaccinations are also 
performed at various stages of the commercial layer lifetime, including during the rearing stage. 
Vaccination percentages in layer farms against the following diseases were: infectious bursal 
disease 24% (n=24), fowl pox 93% (n=39), Mycoplasma gallisepticum 62% (n=26), 
Mycoplasma synoviae 40% (n=17), MD 83% (n=35), coccidiosis 12% (n=5), infectious coryza 
26% (n=11), avian encephalomyelitis 93% (n=39) and Salmonella Typhimurium 14% (n=6). 
Veterinarian contact 
Veterinarian visits for advice on farm improvements were described to occur at least annually 
and occurred in addition to disease investigation. These were reported to occur in more than 
half (57%, n=17) of meat chicken farms and in less than half (42%) of layer farms. Other farms 
reported that they contact the veterinarian only on the occasion of a health issue or disease 
investigation. 
Depopulation, dead bird and manure management 
A thinning out procedure occurs on 90% (n=27) of meat chicken farms surveyed. The process 
of thinning out generally involves a third of birds being removed at around 30 days of age, with 
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a second pick up a week after and a final third pick up a week after that. However, this varied 
considerably depending on what orders are made further in the production chain. Some birds 
were picked up as early as 21 days for spatchcock, or small bird, orders and some birds were 
left as late as 55 days for large piece orders. Ninety-two percent (n=23) of free range and 89% 
(n=8) of both, cage and barn layer farms removed all chickens of the same age group on one 
day during depopulation. In the case of multi-age cage layer farms, each row or tier was one 
age group and so only that age group was removed during depopulation. In the case of barn 
and free range layer farms with sheds that have multiple age groups in one shed separated by 
wire mesh, one age group i.e. one section of the shed, would be depopulated at the appropriate 
times.  Of those farms that do not depopulate a whole age group at one time, it either occurred 
over two to three days because of the volume of birds, birds are kept until they die naturally  or 
were sold individually to different customers for meat. 
Dead birds were most commonly placed in dead bird freezers across all farm types (44%, n=32). 
Dead bird collectors emptied these freezers once full. Freezing dead birds was followed by 
composting dead birds on or nearby the farm (32%, n=23) and burial on farm (12%, n=9). Less 
common answers included incineration, placing dead birds in bio-bins and sending dead birds 
to the tip. Some farms performed a combination of methods. Manure was most commonly 
removed and given to an off-site user across all chicken farms (86%, n=63). Less common 
answers included composting on farm, stockpiling on farm and spreading on paddocks.  
3.3.4 Sources and delivery of information to farmers on poultry industry and poultry 
health 
For the communication section of the biosecurity questionnaires, although researchers were 
present to discuss and explain the questionnaire to the farmers, some farmers chose to leave 
some questions blank even after discussion. Of those that answered, most farmers (73%, 
n=46/63) across all farm types stated that they communicate with other poultry farmers for 
information regarding poultry health and industry news. Overall, farmers rated other poultry 
farmers as a ‘moderately reliable’ source of information. 
The majority (86%, n=50/58) of farmers used poultry organisations for news about the poultry 
industry and this received a mean rating of ‘very reliable’. Organisations used include the NSW 
Farmers Association, the Australian Chicken Meat Federation, Australian Egg Corporation 
Limited (AECL), NSW Food Authority, World Poultry Science Association and the Poultry 
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Cooperative Research Centre. Poultry integrators, or companies, were also a common source 
of information for farmers (96%, n=52/54). Integrators also received an overall mean rating of 
‘very reliable’. The most reliable source of information rated by farmers which received a mean 
rating of ‘extremely reliable’ was veterinarians; where 97% (63/65) reported to use them as a 
source of information. Newsletters were a common source of information delivery, used by 
87% (n=40/46) of farmers. Less common answers include subscribed emails, social media, 
television/radio and websites. Newsletters include Poultry Digest, AECL, NSW Food 
Authority and in-house company magazines.  
3.3.5 Farm services and contractors 
For meat chicken farms, the delivery of day old chicks was usually performed by the company’s 
own specialized trucks. One private contractor was also identified. For layer farms, one private 
contractor delivered reared birds to all layer farms except for two layer farms which had a 
different private contractor each. 
Depopulation on meat chicken farms was performed by private contractors that differed 
depending on the meat chicken integrator. Integrators were found to have up to three private 
contractors. Of these, a private contractor specializing in the depopulation of spent layer hens 
was used in 86% (n=37) of layer farms.  
There were usually private contractors for the delivery of fresh litter and shed sanitization for 
meat chicken farms. Shed sanitization was performed by on-site farm staff on 84% (n=36) of 
layer farms. Across all farm types, electrical work was performed by off-site electricians (86%, 
n=63) and in other cases the farmers were electricians themselves. Plumbing work was 
performed by off-site plumbers in over half (53%, n=39) of poultry farms surveyed, where 
other poultry farmers commonly reported fixing plumbing issues themselves. 
The removal of dead birds and manure was usually performed by private contractors for all 
farm types. There were a relatively large number of different contractors for manure and dead 
bird removal across all farm types. These contractors tended to work in small local areas, where 
it was common to only collect from one or two farms. 
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3.3.6 Free range information 
Style and range size 
All commercial free range meat chicken farms surveyed had a fixed range dedicated for each 
shed of birds. All range areas were rectangular in shape, adjacent and aligned with the length 
of the shed. In comparison, over half (52%, n=13) of free range layer farms rotate birds between 
ranges. In this case parts of the range are available for ranging and others are fenced off from 
the birds to allow the pasture to recover. Rotation of ranges usually occurs between new batches 
of birds and this is performed to allow recovery of vegetation on used range areas. The shape 
of the ranges varied considerably among the free range layer farms. All free range layer sheds 
had dedicated range areas per shed. The median range area for free range meat chicken farms 
(2,476.5m2) was smaller than that of free range layer farms (18,000m2) as shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. The median and range number of stocking density on the range area and range-
related attributes for free range meat chicken and layer farms in the Sydney basin bioregion 
and South East Queensland, Australia, June 2015 until February 2016. 
Range attribute 
Farm type 
Free range meat chicken (n=15) Free range layer (n=25) 
Range area (m2) 2,476.5 (1170-5503.75) 18,000 (525-53,000) 
Stocking density on range area 
(birds/m2) 
12.8 (9.1-16) 0.7 (0.025-6.7) 
Stocking density on range area 
(birds/ha) 
127,692 (91,355-159,972) 6590.9 (250-66,666.7) 
Farmer reported proportion of 
birds in shed that use range (%) 
40 (14.3-50) 50 (12.5-100) 
Farmer reported proportion of 
range used by birds (%) 
100 (50-100) 40 (10-100) 
Shed wall covered by pop-holes 
(%) 
50 (15-100) 60 (15-100) 
Pop-holes per wall 7 (1-14) 5.5 (1-19) 
Walls with pop-holes 1 (1-2) 1.5 (1-2) 
Grass-cover on range (%) 80 (30-100) 60 (0-100) 
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Stocking density and range use 
The median stocking density of free range meat chicken farms was 12.8 birds/m2 in comparison 
to free range layer farms at 0.7 birds/m2 (Table 3.3). Farmers reported a greater proportion of 
birds on free range layer farms (50%) that went outside to use the range as compared to free 
range meat chicken farms (40%). The median proportion of range used by the birds was 100% 
for free range meat chicken farms and only 40% for free range layer farms. This appears to 
relate to the smaller range areas found on free range meat chicken farms compared to free range 
layer farms (Table 3.3). These results are at one point in time during range access and does not 
account for individual birds entering and leaving the range continuously. 
Pop-holes 
Pop-holes, which are the openings on shed walls that allow chickens to access the range, varied 
in size and shape amongst the free range farms. The median proportion of the shed wall covered 
by pop-holes in meat chicken and layer free range farms was 50% and 60% respectively. 
Among the free range farms, three meat chicken and two layer farms had one entire wall of the 
shed that could be opened up to allow range access to the birds. The median number of pop-
holes per wall on free range meat chicken farms (7) exceeded that of free range layer farms 
(5.5). Pop-holes were present on either one or two sides of the length of the shed for both farm 
types. The median number of walls covered by pop-holes for meat chicken and layer free range 
farms was 1 and 1.5 respectively (Table 3.3). 
Range access 
The majority (93%, n=14) of free range meat chicken farms granted access for the birds to the 
range from sunrise to dusk. Total time allowed outside therefore varies between seasons where 
sundown times can vary from 5pm to 8pm in winter and summer, respectively (BOM, 2016). 
Only one free range meat chicken farm opened pop-holes at a set time each morning (7:30am) 
and chickens were put back at dusk. Over half of free range layer farms (56%, n=14) opened 
pop-holes at a set time each morning; most commonly between 9:00 to 10.00am (86%, n=12) 
with one opening at 7.30am and another one at 10:30am. On all of these farms, chickens were 
placed back inside sheds when it was dusk. There were no specific times for bird range access 
on 28% (n=7) of free range layer farms; farmers simply stated the birds were let out when it 
was light to dusk. Only four free range layer farms had specific times when birds were placed 
back inside, with this being between 5:30 to 8:00pm. 
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Access to the range for both farm types was restricted in certain weather conditions. Of the free 
range meat chicken farms, approximately half (53%, n=8) did not allow birds outside when 
conditions were too cold, 87% when conditions were too hot and all of them when conditions 
were too wet. Wet conditions were defined as conditions in which pooling water was found on 
the range. For 40% (n=6) of free range meat chicken farms, birds the temperature range which 
defined too cold or hot conditions was 17 to 28oC. Other farmers would allow birds outside 
depending on their own judgment about whether or not birds could tolerate the conditions. 
Ninety-two percent (n=23) of free range layer farms did not allow birds outside during severe 
weather; the rest of farms reported chickens being allowed outside regardless of weather 
conditions. Severe weather included descriptions such as strong winds, thunderstorms and hail. 
While all free range layer farms allowed chickens out during cold conditions, two farms did 
not allow birds outside in hot conditions and 44% did not allow birds outside in wet conditions. 
Another factor to consider for birds being allowed outside is the age of the birds, with a median 
age at which meat chickens and layers being granted range access of 21 days and 22 weeks, 
respectively, limited to overall time birds have access to the range during their production cycle.  
Waterbodies on range 
All free range farms except one layer farm did not have waterbodies present on the range, with 
ranges being usually fenced off from waterbodies. Forty percent (n=6) of free range meat 
chicken farms, the edge of the range was reported to be 50 to 250m from a waterbody. In the 
majority of free range layer farms (60%, n=15), the edge of the range was <50m from a 
waterbody. Holes and drains on the range that fill up with water were reported by farmers in 
47% (n=7) and 96% (n=24) of free range meat chicken and layer farms respectively.  
Vegetation 
Vegetative cover on the range was referred to as ‘high’ if the range had at least 50% of the area 
covered by grass or trees. Based on researcher observation on the day of visit, this was found 
on 60% of free range meat chicken farms (n=9) and 68% of layer farms (n=17). No vegetative 
cover was found on one free range layer farm. Range was bare next to the shed in 92% of free 
range layer farms (n=23). The bareness usually extended to a distance that was similar to the 
width of the shed. Grass was uniformly distributed in 67% of free range meat chicken farms 
(n=10). The median percentage of range covered by grass in free range meat chicken and layer 
farms was 80% and 60% respectively (Table 3.3). 
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Trees were scattered in 60% of free range layer farms (n=15) and 87% of meat chicken farms 
(n=13). Thirty-two percent of free range layer farms (n=8) had trees surrounding the edge of 
the range only and no trees at all were seen on 13% free range meat chicken farms (n=2). 
Artificial structures and enrichment 
Artificial shades covered a moderate (10-50%) amount of range area in 76% of free range layer 
(n=19) and 80% meat chicken farms (n=12). All other free range farms had either no or minimal 
(0-10%) artificial shade. Shade structures were most commonly flat, rectangular shades for 
both free range meat chicken (80%, n=12) and layer farms (44%, n=11). This was followed by 
arched shade structures for free range meat chicken farms (33%, n=3). Flat shades built as an 
extension of the shed and arched shade structures were found in 20% (n=5) and 16% (n=4) of 
free range layer farms respectively. Artificial shade structures are located close to the sheds in 
the majority of free range layer farms (52%, n=13), followed by being uniformly distributed 
throughout the range (36%, n=9). Shade structures are uniformly distributed in the majority of 
free range meat chicken farms (67%, n=10), followed by being close to the shed (20%, n=3). 
Deliberate placement of range enrichment items was provided in 40% (n=6) of free range meat 
chicken farms and 20% (n=5) of free range layer farms. Such items were usually hay bales and 
ladders.  
Range management 
Range cleaning and maintenance was reported on all free range meat chicken farms and 
involved mowing and slashing. In contrast, 20% (n=5) of free range layer farms report 
maintenance of the range was not performed. Sixty percent (n=9) of free range meat chicken 
farms reported that birds never escape the perimeter fencing of the range, while 33% (n=5) 
reported this rarely occurs, and one farm reported it occurs often. Sixty eight percent (n=17) of 
free range layer farms reported that chickens rarely escaped the perimeter fencing, while 
frequent escapes and no escapes were both reported in 16% (n=4) of free range layer farms. 
No free range meat chicken farms provide food or water on the range as compared to 12% 
(n=3) of free range layer farms that did provide food or water on the range. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This paper improves knowledge of commercial chicken farms in Australia by documenting 
management practices, farm design and housing characteristics based on interviews and 
observation conducted on-farm, and including all types of farm enterprises in the layer sector 
and the chicken meat sector of the commercial chicken industry today. The data obtained from 
the sample of farms surveyed is likely representative of the commercial chicken egg and meat 
farms across NSW at least and possibly all of Australia. A previous Australian biosecurity 
survey also revealed relatively poorer biosecurity practices in layer farms compared to meat 
chicken farms and this has also been reported as general observations by Australian poultry 
veterinarians (East, 2007, Scott et al., 2009). Given that NSW is the leading state in both the 
number of farms and volume of product produced for meat chicken and egg farms in Australia 
(NSW DPI, 2015, ACMF, 2011, AECL, 2015), and that the surveyed farms included a large 
range of farm sizes and a range of companies, also adds to the potential representativeness of 
the data of the Australian commercial chicken industry. However, farms located in the Sydney 
basin region are generally older with not as many tunnel ventilated sheds compared to farms 
located in other states in Australia. This must be considered in this study as most farms 
interviewed were located in the Sydney basin region. 
For the layer industry in Australia, the total number of commercial farms has notably reduced 
in the last decade with approximately 600 farms recorded in 2007 compared to 252 farms at 
the time of writing; and some further reduction is expected. The on-farm interviews were 
conducted on layer farms ranging from small, independently operated farms to farms owned 
by the largest egg producing company in Australia, which produces 20% of the national market 
(NSW DPI, 2015). For meat chicken farms, permission for on-farm interviews was granted by 
three of seven Australian meat chicken processing companies, with two included being the 
largest companies in Australia that together supply more than 70% of Australia’s meat chicken 
(ACMF, 2011).  
This study focused on collecting information about commercially-operating farms as these 
produce the vast majority of chicken eggs and meat in Australia compared to backyard flocks. 
The estimated population of egg laying chickens in commercially operated farms in Australia 
is over 23 million and there is an estimated 512 million meat chickens slaughtered in Australia 
each year (ACMF, 2011, AECL, 2015). The large majority of both chicken eggs and meat is 
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purchased and consumed within Australia with minimal exports (Scott et al., 2009). The last 
census of backyard poultry ownership occurred in 1992 in Australia and it was estimated that 
7% of all households keep backyard poultry; with an estimated population of 1 million birds 
(Scott et al., 2009). This figure is likely to be higher now with the increasing popularity of 
organic and free range products (ACMF, 2011, AECL, 2015). However, the majority of birds 
in backyard flocks are used to produce eggs for the owner’s personal consumption and the 
number of backyard chickens used for poultry meat at home is insignificantly small in Australia.  
Information on management practices and design of backyard poultry production is also 
lacking in the literature but is likely to vary greatly due to private ownership. There are 
concerns from the industry that the rise in backyard poultry production could lead to more 
disease introductions in commercial poultry farms. However, there is little contact between 
commercial poultry operations and backyard poultry production (Scott et al., 2009). The 
national farm biosecurity manual for poultry production states that farm workers must not have 
any contact with avian species or pigs outside of the farm. If this occurs then workers must 
shower and change into new protective clothing prior to entering the farm (DAFF, 2009a). 
In general, management practices and farm design were found to be more similar across the 
individual meat chicken farms compared to the layer farms in this study. This is considered to 
be due to the high level of private ownership amongst layer farms, the greater number of layer 
farm types, and the vertically integrated nature of the meat chicken industry. Companies in the 
meat chicken industry own or control most aspects of the supply and production chain, 
including genetic breeding stock, parent breeders, hatcheries, grow outs, processing plants and 
feed mills (Scott et al., 2009, ACMF, 2011). This is comparable to the EU and USA, where the 
top ten companies together supply almost 30% and over 60% of the domestic markets 
respectively (Robins and Phillips, 2011). 
The median stocking density inside sheds for non-free range meat chicken and free range meat 
chicken was 13.6 and 16.0 birds/m2 respectively. One study assessed the performance of meat 
chickens at varying stocking densities in New Zealand; at 5, 10, 15 and 20 birds/m2. It was 
found that there was no linear relationship between stocking density and productivity per bird 
basis in terms of feed/weight gain, mortality or carcass characteristics (Thomas et al., 2004), 
in accordance with other studies (Feddes et al., 2002, Martrenchar et al., 1997). There are 
however some welfare implications at high stocking densities, such as over 20 birds/ birds/m2, 
related to litter quality leading to poor gait and hock and foot pad burns (Thomas et al., 2004).  
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All meat chicken farms had one age group per shed and 90% (n=27) of farms performed 
thinning out compared to all-in-all-out during depopulation. Thinning out is performed to 
satisfy market demand for light and heavy meat chickens, improve space utilization and 
increase profits for the producer. However, risks associated with thinning out include 
biosecurity breaches, gut problems after fasting the whole shed followed by re-feeding 
remaining birds, and detrimental effects on meat quality. Biosecurity breaches can occur when 
bird-catcher crew members fail to follow biosecurity protocols when visiting multiple farms 
(Bilgili, 2017, Barnes, 2009, Scott et al., 2009). Nervousness in chickens leading to excess 
wing flapping can also occur after thinning out, which would lead to deep pectoral myopathy 
in the breast tissue can result, leading to a reduction in meat quality. There is a fine balance 
that must be achieved in order to optimize the benefits of thinning out procedures (Bilgili, 
2017). 
As well as concerns regarding biosecurity breaches for bird-catcher crew members, there are 
concerns for many other farm contacts. This study revealed there are a large number of different 
contacts for all farm types, including new bird deliverers, dead bird pick-up crews and 
tradesmen that visit other farms. Such contacts can introduce and spread poultry diseases 
between sheds and between farms, especially if biosecurity protocols are not followed. It is 
prudent all farms ensure visitors follow appropriate biosecurity practices to minimize the 
potential biosecurity breaches (Scott et al., 2009, East, 2007). 
There were multiple age groups in a shed on some layer farms; particularly those sheds that 
were divided internally by wire mesh and in cage layer farms. There are health concerns 
associated with multiple age groups per shed as certain diseases are able to transfer from old 
to new age groups. Similarly, pathogens can persist inside sheds if complete depopulation of 
sheds does not occur, where there is continuous replacement of old groups with new groups. 
Such pathogens include MD and AI. One of the highest concern in relation to AI is increased 
chance of mutating from low pathogenic AI to high pathogenic AI when allowed to persist in 
a population (Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). 
There are challenges associated with the increase in popularity of free range poultry production; 
such as the greater production losses experienced compared to other farm types. A study in 
Australia found free range meat chicken performance had slower growth, higher mortalities 
and deteriorating feed conversion efficiency over time compared to non-free range chickens 
(Durali et al., 2012). Similarly, a study that reviewed the levels of mortality in hens in different 
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farm types in Great Britain found that the average on-farm mortalities during the laying period 
were 5.4%, 8.6% and 9.5% in cage, barn and free range layer farms respectively (Weeks et al., 
2012). Further research on free range chicken farms in general needs to be performed in order 
to find ways to counteract these production issues, especially given the growing significance 
of this type of production in Australia. 
Farmers in this study reported a lower proportion of birds using the range in meat chicken free 
range farms compared to layer free range farms. A higher variability was observed in responses 
from layer farms, with some indicating that 100% of birds use the range, when compared to 
meat chicken farms, with no one reporting a proportion of birds using the range higher than 
50%. This lower proportion of birds that use the range in meat chicken farms may be in part 
due to the health related problems associated with a rapid growth rate of meat chickens, which 
cause birds to spend more time sitting on the floor and less time walking (Hocking, 2014). Such 
health conditions are caused by the large body weights and include increased heart 
abnormalities, tendon degeneration, varus/valgus deformations and femoral head necrosis 
(Robins and Phillips, 2011, Hocking, 2014, Barnes, 2009). 
Range use by birds has also been shown to be affected by outside temperature, flock size, 
precipitation and season. Few studies have reported the proportion of birds accessing the range 
in commercial-sized flocks, although it is generally agreed that larger flock sizes have a lower 
use of the range (Hartcher et al., 2016). One study in Australia reported only 4% of layer hens 
in free range layer farms use the range in a flock of 16,000 hens (Singh and Cowieson, 2013), 
a much lower proportion than those reported by participant farms in this study. Certainly 
management practices limit range use by chickens on Australian meat chicken farms, as birds 
are not granted access until 21 days of age, and then access only permitted when climatic 
conditions are favourable, and depopulation begins roughly at 30 days of age. The limited time 
allowed outside with the rapid growth rates potentially poses a welfare problem. To counteract 
this welfare issue, slower-growing meat chicken breeds such as the Ross Rowan and Cobb-
Sasso, have been developed and started to be used in the EU and USA. Such breeds take 50 to 
100% longer to reach target weights compared to the fast-growing counterparts (Robins and 
Phillips, 2011). It is difficult to predict whether or not the development and use of slower-
growing meat chicken breeds will become popular among producers in the Australian industry. 
Another aspect investigated in this study was the percentage of the range being used by birds, 
with meat chicken farms reporting a higher percentage of the range being used compared to 
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layer farms. One reason of this difference could be the smaller size of ranges in meat chicken 
farms when compared to those on layer farms, with meat chickens being able to easily disperse 
over the whole range area. Another reason may be a greater uniform spread of shade on the 
ranges of meat chicken farms compared to layer farms, reported in this study. The results in 
this study revealed trees and artificial shade structures being scattered and uniformly 
distributed, respectively, on a greater proportion of meat chicken farms compared to layer 
farms. This hypothesis aligns with a previous study, which found that the addition of tree cover 
increased the number of meat chickens that used the range area (Lubac and Mirabito, 2001). 
Similarly, other studies demonstrated that the addition of shelters on the range increased the 
length of time meat chickens were on the range (Zeltner and Hirt, 2008, Dawkins et al., 2003). 
The preference of chickens to seek shaded areas is likely due to the fact that the ancestor of the 
domestic chicken is the red jungle fowl, which lived in an environment with extensive shade 
(Singh and Cowieson, 2013). 
The median range stocking density for free range layer farms in this study was found to be 
approximately 6,500 birds per hectare and varied to over 20,000 birds per hectare on some 
farms. Australia has experienced political debate on the legal definition of free range eggs in 
recent years. Shortly after the completion of the farm surveys, Australia’s consumer affairs 
minister adopted a legally binding standard that defines free range eggs from farms with a 
stocking density on the range of up to 10,000 birds per hectare in 2016 (Consumer Affairs 
Australian New Zealand, 2016). Prior to this, there was only a voluntary Model Code of 
Practice published by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO) in 2002 which recommended a maximum of 1500 layer hens per hectare (CSIRO, 
2002). The range stocking densities of some of the free range layer farms visited may have 
therefore changed since completion of the on-farm interview. During these political debates, 
pop-hole requirements for free range farms appear to have remained unchanged. These are 
required through farm assurance schemes, but all schemes appear to use the same minimum 
standards. This minimum standard has been made for free range layer farms but is also 
commonly used as the minimum standard by meat chicken farms (Egg Standards Australia, 
2012). 
Another concern linked to the expansion of free range poultry production is the increasing 
environmental damage. Free range layer farms are thought to have greater environmental 
impact than free range meat chicken farms due to the long-lived nature and greater mobility of 
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the layer bird compared to the meat chicken bird. In this study, the level of pasture on the range 
areas were, in general, lower in free range layer farms compared to meat chicken farms. In 
addition, pasture was completely bare next to the sheds in the majority (92%) of free range 
layer farms. The AECL has created environmental guidelines to assist egg producers in 
reducing their environmental impact. Such recommendations include regular rotation of range 
areas to avoid excessive nutrient accumulation (McGahan et al., 2008). More than half of free 
range layer farms performed pasture rotation in this study. A report containing 
recommendations for meat chicken farms has also been created by the Rural Industries 
Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC). Such recommendations include 
maintaining adequate vegetation in free range areas to prevent soil erosion and nutrient loss 
from surface runoff  (McGahan et al., 2014). 
In summary, this study addresses in part the lack of literature available detailing the 
descriptions of current farm designs and management practices in Australia for both layer and 
meat chicken farms of all types; cage, barn and free range. Obtaining a better understanding of 
these variations in an Australian context is useful in many aspects, including improving bird 
health and welfare management, environmental protection, disease prevention and 
preparedness, consumer education and communication with industry. 
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Chapter 4. Biosecurity practices of Australian 
commercial layer and meat chicken farms: 
performance and perceptions of farmers 
Prologue 
Chapter 4 presents results from the same farm survey reported in Chapter 3 but describes the 
biosecurity aspects of the commercial chicken farms surveyed. Results include which 
biosecurity practices are performed on farms and farmer perceptions of these practices. 
Submitted to PLOS ONE, Revised manuscript in review. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes the level of adoption of biosecurity practices performed on Australian 
commercial chicken meat and layer farms and farmer-perceived importance of these practices. 
On-farm interviews were conducted on 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine 
barn layer farms, 15 free range meat chicken farms and 15 non-free range meat chicken farms 
in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. There was a high level of treatment 
of drinking water across all farm types; town water was the most common source. In general, 
meat chicken farms had a higher level of adoption of biosecurity practices than layer farms. 
Cage layer farms had the shortest median distance between sheds (7.75m) and between sheds 
and waterbodies (30m). Equipment sharing between sheds was performed on 43% of free range 
meat chicken farms compared to 92% of free range layer farms. There was little disinfection 
of this shared equipment across all farm types. Footbaths and visitor recording books were used 
by the majority of farms for all farm types except cage layer farms (25%). Wild birds in sheds 
were most commonly reported in free range meat chicken farms (73%). Dogs and cats were 
kept across all farm types, from 56% of barn layer farms to 89% of cage layer farms, and they 
had access to the sheds in the majority (67%) of cage layer farms and on the range in some free 
range layer farms (44%). Most biosecurity practices were obtained a mean rating of ‘very 
important’ by farmers. A logistic regression analysis revealed that for most biosecurity 
practices, performing a practice was significantly associated with higher perceived farmer 
importance of that biosecurity practice. These findings help identify farm types and certain 
biosecurity practices with low adoption levels. This information can aid decision-making on 
efforts used to improve adoption levels. 
Keywords 
Australia, biosecurity, chickens, commercial, free range   
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4.1 Introduction 
Biosecurity refers to actions and measures implemented to prevent and control the introduction 
and spread of infectious diseases. Good biosecurity is vital to the successful performance of 
any poultry production system (DAFF, 2009a). Biosecurity protocols can apply to several 
sections of a poultry production system including: personnel and visitor requirements, 
restricting contact between poultry and other animals, proper shed sanitisation, equipment and 
vehicle disinfection, and thorough water treatment. Biosecurity protocols on poultry production 
systems aim firstly to reduce the potential introduction of infectious diseases on the farm. If an 
infectious disease is introduced and becomes established, the protocols aim to limit spread of 
the disease within and between farms. Proper implementation of biosecurity protocols 
maintains good health and welfare of poultry on farms and reduces financial losses by 
decreasing the frequency and magnitude of infectious disease outbreaks (Fasina et al., 2012, 
Nespeca et al., 1997, East, 2007). 
The Australian poultry industry has experienced several outbreaks of emergency animal 
diseases (EADs); namely high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and Newcastle disease (ND) 
(AHA, 2015). EADs have the potential to severely impact Australia’s economy and close the 
trade and markets of animal products. Australia has had seven HPAI outbreaks recorded since 
1976; the latest occurred in the state of New South Wales (NSW) in 2013 which alone cost up 
to $4 million to eradicate (CFFR, 2014a, Sims and Turner, 2009, Moloney et al., 2013). The 
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) was developed as a contractual 
arrangement between Australian commonwealth, state and territory governments and livestock 
industry groups to prepare for and respond to EADs. The EADRA includes a commitment from 
all groups to detect and alert suspect EADs, participate in EAD responses and minimise the 
occurrence of an EAD, particularly through the development and implementation of 
biosecurity protocols and plans. Biosecurity manuals are a component of this preparedness and 
are under regular revision (AHA, 2011). A national farm biosecurity manual exists for the 
Australian poultry industry which stipulates minimum biosecurity standards that must be 
applied on all Australian poultry farms (DAFF, 2009a). Additional biosecurity manuals exist 
for the different sectors of the Australian poultry industry to highlight specific and additional 
biosecurity standards for farms with different species (e.g. ducks and turkeys) and different 
production types (e.g. meat and eggs) (East, 2007, AHA & PHA, 2013). Adoption and 
compliance with these standards occurs at the farm level. The adoption levels of biosecurity 
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practices in the Australian poultry industry were previously assessed via phone and in-person 
surveys of farms in 2005. The adoption levels were regarded as high in the chicken meat sector 
but no assessment was made on the chicken egg sector due to a low response rate within this 
sector. The lower response rate was most likely due to the high proportion of private ownership 
in the egg sector compared to the chicken meat sector, and this greater diversity in ownership 
likely creates greater variation in management practices and farm design across the layer sector. 
In comparison, the Australian meat chicken industry is vertically integrated, and 70% of 
Australian’s chicken meat production is owned by two companies (East, 2007, Scott et al., 
2009).  
In recent years there has been a significant consumer-driven expansion of free range poultry 
production in Australia. Other developed countries have also experienced an increase in free 
range poultry production, particularly countries of the European Union (EU) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) where a ban on battery cages has been implemented since 2012. Farms in these 
countries must house chickens in enriched cages or use alternative systems such as barn or free 
range (European Commission, 2008). Australian free range meat chicken production, regarded 
as a ‘cottage industry’ in 2006, now accounts for at least 15% of the total market (ACMF, 
2011). Similarly, the retail market share of free range chicken eggs has increased from 10% in 
2000 to 40% in 2015 (AECL, 2015). There is concern amongst poultry veterinarians and 
industry experts that this growing trend will increase the occurrence of diseases in the poultry 
industry. Wild birds are known to harbor a number of bacterial, fungal, viral and parasitic 
diseases that can be transmitted to poultry, and free range production may increase the potential 
for diseases to transfer from wildlife to poultry when poultry will have access to the outdoors 
(Scott et al., 2009, Saif et al., 2009). Of particular concern to the Australian poultry industry is 
the avian influenza (AI) virus (East et al., 2008b, Scott et al., 2009). 
AI is currently circulating in Australian wild birds as low pathogenic AI (LPAI) with overall 
proportions of positive detections at approximately 2% (1.9 ± 0.1%); highest in waterfowl 
species such as ducks and geese at approximately 2.5% (2.5 ± 0.2%). In contrast to waterfowl 
in the northern hemisphere which are known to perform annual migrations over long distances, 
the movements of Australian waterfowl species are less predictable and most populations are 
nomadic where movements are confined to Australia and occur in response to rainfall events. 
All Australian HPAI outbreaks thus far were caused by the introduction and subsequent 
mutation of unique Australian lineages of LPAI virus; no exotic lineages have been detected 
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in Australia (Hansbro et al., 2010, Grillo, 2015). Globally, most historical HPAI outbreaks have 
had little geographical spread. There are major exceptions to this, such as the HPAI H5N1 
epizootic which started in 2003, extended to over 60 countries and remains endemic in 
Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Vietnam and large parts of eastern India. The 
mechanisms of spread are largely due to human movement of poultry and poultry products, 
and the role of wild birds in the introduction and spread of HPAI H5N1 is controversial (FAO, 
2013). Other major exceptions are the HPAI outbreaks that occurred in the USA in 2015. HPAI 
H5N8 was first detected in a flock of mixed poultry in Oregon in December 2014. This virus 
was of Eurasian origin, most likely introduced from intercontinental wild bird migrations and 
spread rapidly along wild bird migratory pathways. There was mixing of the H5N8 with North 
American strains which generated new HPAI combinations, such as the HPAI H5N2 detected 
afterwards (Veterinary Record, 2015, Lee et al., 2016). HPAI H5N2 was first detected in a 
backyard flock of mixed poultry in Washington State in January 2015. Outbreaks of both 
viruses affected many poultry farms in more than 15 states of the USA and continued until 
mid-2016.  
A research project was commenced in 2015 to quantify the likelihood of AI virus introduction 
and spread between different types of commercial chicken farms in Australia and to evaluate 
the reduction in likelihood of alternate on-farm mitigation actions. An on-farm survey was 
conducted involving interviews and observations during farm visits to the main types of 
Australian commercial chicken farms: non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, 
cage layer, barn layer and free range layer farms. The objective of the on-farm survey was to 
describe farm design, structure, wild animal exposure, contact with other farms and biosecurity 
practices among the farm types to inform understanding of variation between these farms that 
could impact on the risk of AI introduction and spread. This paper describes the data collection 
activities undertaken for this project and reports the results of the biosecurity components of 
the on-farm survey. These biosecurity components are relevant to limiting the introduction and 
spread of all infectious poultry diseases that can occur in Australian commercial chicken farms. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Farm survey 
A survey which included on-farm interviews was conducted on commercial chicken farms in 
the Sydney basin and South-East Queensland regions of Australia from June 2015 to February 
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2016. In total, 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer farms, 15 free 
range meat chicken farms and 15 non-free range meat chicken farms were visited. Commercial 
layer farms were defined as those having more than 1,000 birds, and commercial meat chicken 
farms were defined as those having more than 25,000 birds. Details on the general methodology 
of the survey, including the region and farm selection, questionnaire development and conduct 
of the on-farm interviews can be found in Scott et al. (2017). 
In brief, two questionnaires were created: a main questionnaire and a biosecurity questionnaire, 
both written in English and conducted on-farm via face-to-face interviews by the researchers. 
Interviewees were either farm owners or farm managers. The main questionnaire consisted of 
sections which captured data related to general farm information, water source and use, poultry 
health, range information, and farmer observations of wild birds and other wild animals. The 
minimum distance between waterbodies, between a shed and a waterbody, between farms, 
between sheds, and between a shed and a road were measured using Google Maps (© 2016 
Google Inc., California, USA) after the farm visit. 
The biosecurity questionnaire consisted of sections which captured data on biosecurity 
practices performed on the farm, farmer perceptions of the importance of specific biosecurity 
practices and the likelihood of future AI outbreaks and communication networks and 
information sources. In relation to the questions on perceptions,  farmers were asked to rate the 
importance of biosecurity practices using a scale from one to five; one being ‘not at all 
important’ and five being ‘extremely important’. In addition, farmers were asked to give a 
personal biosecurity rating of their farm. The rating was from one to five; one being ‘you do 
not believe you follow biosecurity measures at all’ and five being ‘you believe you accomplish 
all biosecurity measures thoroughly’. Farmer opinion was also obtained on the likeliness (‘not 
at all likely’, ‘unlikely’, ‘likely’, ‘very likely’ and ‘unsure’) that an AI outbreak will occur on 
their farm and the likeliness that an AI outbreak will occur in Australia within the next year. 
An open question was asked on the level of sanitisation performed after the depopulation of 
sheds. Answers which described a high level of cleaning performed between each batch were 
categorized as ‘thorough sanitisation’. All other answers were categorized into ‘partial 
sanitisation’. 
After conducting the interviews, researchers recorded visual observations of the farm including 
shed and range design, waterbody locations and biosecurity practices seen during farm walks. 
The experimental procedures used for this survey were approved by the Human Ethics 
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Committee of the University of Sydney, Australia and all results obtained were kept 
confidential. Written consent for farmer participation in the survey was obtained by the 
researchers (ethics reference number: 2015/252). 
4.2.2 Data analysis 
Data from the questionnaires and observation records were entered in Microsoft Access 
(Microsoft, PC/Windows 7, 2010, Redmond, WA, USA) after each farm visit and checked for 
data entry errors. The statistical program JMP® was used (© 2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, 
USA) for all statistical analyses of the data. One-way analyses of variance1 were used to 
determine statistically significant differences in the distances between farms, sheds and sheds 
and waterbodies amongst the different farm types, the number of waterbodies on the property, 
turnaround times, personal farm biosecurity ratings and percentage of birds affected by unusual 
signs amongst the different farm types. The Pearson’s chi-square test was used to determine 
statistically significant differences amongst the different farm types for the categorical answers, 
including water sources, depopulation and sanitisation methods, vehicle and equipment 
disinfection, and personnel biosecurity practices. A bivariate analysis was performed to 
determine any statistical association between the number of chickens on the farm and the 
personal biosecurity rating overall and per farm type. In all statistical analyses, a p-value of 
<0.05 was considered significant.  
Univariable logistic regression analyses2 were used to estimate and determine the association 
or relationship between variables. Specifically, the relationship between reported compliance 
of implementation of biosecurity practices and farmer perceived importance of these practices 
were assessed, as well as the relationship between the presence of waterfowl around feed 
storage areas and on the range and the minimum distance between sheds and a waterbody. 
‘Unsure’ answers were omitted from all analyses; these occurred when some farmers chose to 
leave some questions blank even after discussion. 
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix E for comparison with Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
2 Refer to Appendix E for comment on univariable logistic regression analysis assumptions 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Brief description of farms 
The farms surveyed were all commercially operating farms. The median number of chickens 
was greatest on meat chicken farms (140,600 and 88,000 chickens for free range and non-free 
range meat chicken farms respectively). This was then followed by cage layer, free range layer 
and barn layer farms (40,000, 32,000 and 17,500 chickens respectively). The median number 
of sheds was four and five for non-free range meat chicken and free range meat chicken farms 
respectively. The median number of sheds for layer farms was two for both cage and barn layer 
farms and three for free range layer farms. 
4.3.2 Biosecurity 
Across all farm types, all but one free range layer farm had a farm manager with some 
understanding of and could adequately define the term ‘biosecurity’. Biosecurity manuals were 
present on all meat chicken farms surveyed, and the majority of barn layer farms (89%) and 
free range layer farms (88%) and half (50%) of cage layer farms reported having a biosecurity 
manual on the farm. 
4.3.3 Waterbodies and distances between sheds and other farms 
The overall median number of dams across all farm types was one. The overall median distance 
between a study farm and the closest commercial farm in this survey was one kilometre (km); 
ranging from 0.8 km for non-free range meat chicken and cage layer farms to 1.5 km for free 
range layer farms. Cage layer farms had the shortest median distance between sheds (7.75 
metres (m)) and between sheds and waterbodies (30 m) compared to the other farm types. The 
distances between sheds was significantly different between farm types (P<0.05) (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1. Biosecurity information related to farm layout, water sources, 
shed/vehicle/equipment sanitation and personnel practices on commercial layer and meat 
chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland during 2015-2016. 
Farm feature / 
management practice 
Farm type P-value 
 Non-free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Free range meat 
chicken (n=15) 
Cage layer 
(n=9) 
Barn layer 
(n=9) 
Free range 
layer (n=25) 
 
Median distance (range)  
Between farms (km)* 0.8 (0.1-3) 1 (0.1-5) 0.8 (0.1-15) 1.2 (0.1-25) 1.5 (0.1-25) 0.59 
Between sheds (m) 9 (6-18) 15 (9-29.5) 7.8 (0-13.5) 10 (0-20) 13 (0-30) <0.05 
From shed to 
waterbody (m) 
62 (2.5-350) 60 (20-850) 30 (5.5-103) 121 (32-5000) 100 (25-370) 0.07 
Water  
Median number of 
dams (range) 
1 (0-5) 2 (0-5) 1 (0-2) 1 (0-3) 1 (0-4) 0.40 
Drinking water source (%)     <0.05 
Town water 60 (n=9) 40 (n=6) 100 (n=9) 67 (n=6) 68 (n=17)  
Farm dam 7 (n=1) 0 0 0 16 (n=4)  
Bore water 33 (n=5) 47 (n=7) 0 11 (n=1) 8 (n=2)  
River/ creek 0 13 (n=2) 0 22 (n=2) 8 (n=2)  
Drinking water not 
treated 
13 (n=2) 0 0 0 4 (n=1)  
Secondary water source used (%) 0.33 
Farm dam 0 13 (n=2) 22 (n=2) 0 4 (n=1)  
River/ creek 0 0 0 11 (n=1) 4 (n=1)  
Bore water 0 0 0 0 4 (n=1)  
Secondary water 
source not treated 
N/A 50 (n=1) 100 (n=2) 100 (n=1) 100 (n=3)  
Depopulation, shed sanitisation and turnaround times (%)  
Depopulation of birds 
occurs in one day (%) 
20 (n=3) 0 22 (n=2) 89 (n=8) 88 (n=22) <0.05 
Thorough sanitisation 
(%) 
93 (n=14) 100 (n=15) 33 (n=3) 89 (n=8) 88 (n=22) <0.05 
Mean turnaround time 
in days (range) 
10.8 (7-14) 10.6 (7-13) 10.5 (0-25)c 23.1 (0-35) 22.9 (0-35) <0.05 
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Vehicle and equipment disinfection (%)  
Disinfection of 
vehicles between farms 
85 (n=11/13) a 43 (n=6/14) a 63 (n=5) 67 (n=6) 48 (n=12) 0.24 
Sharing equipment 
between sheds 
73 60 78 78 92 0.21 
Disinfection of 
equipment between 
sheds 
45 (n=5/11)b 0 (n=0/9)b 0 (n=0/7)b 14 (n=1/7)b 9 (n=2/23)b <0.05 
Personnel biosecurity practices (%)  
Foot baths used 93 (n=14) 93 (n=14) 25 (n=2) 67 (n=6) 76 (n=19) <0.05 
Hand washing/ 
sanitation facilities 
100 (n=15) 100 (n=15) 89 (n=8) 89 (n=8) 96 (n=24) 0.40 
Visitor recording book 93 (n=14) 100 (n=15) 25 (n=2) 56 (n=5) 80 (n=20) <0.05 
Change of clothes 
between farms 
93 (n=14) 100 (n=15) 75 (n=6) 67 (n=6) 58 (n=14/24)a 0.06 
Farms provide clothing 
to workers/visitors 
62 (n=8/14) a 93 (n=14/15) a 29 (n=2/8) a 33 (n=2/6) a 24 (n=5/21) a <0.05 
Restricted contact 
between farms 
77 (n=11/14) a 100 (n=14/15) a 89 (n=8) 100 (n=8/8) a 67 (n=16/24) a 0.13 
*             Between farms refers to distance between the farm interviewed to another commercial poultry farm 
a             There is missing data for some questions on the biosecurity questionnaire. Although researchers were present to discuss 
and explain the questionnaire to the farmers; some farmers chose to leave some questions blank even after discussion. 
b             Farmers were asked if equipment was dedicated per shed or there was sharing of equipment between sheds. These 
percentages are those that share equipment between sheds only. 
c             This mean turnaround time includes the length of time cages are empty in multi-aged sheds i.e. birds are still present 
inside sheds in other cages.  
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4.3.4 Water source and treatment 
The source of the drinking water for chickens was town water for the majority of all farm types; 
the percentages for each farm type are shown in Table 4.1. Bore water was the second most 
common drinking water source and two non-free range meat chicken farms and one free range 
layer farm did not treat the drinking water which was sourced from bore water. All other farms 
treated their drinking water. Most farms used the drinking water source for all other features 
on the farm that required water such as foggers, irrigation, sprinklers and cooling pads. 
However, the use of different water sources for features on the farm other than drinking water, 
known as secondary water sources, was found on all farm types except non-free range meat 
chicken farms. All farms that used secondary water sources did not treat the water except for 
one free range meat chicken farm (Table 4.1). For farms that performed water treatment, 
chlorination was the most popular method (81%). The number of farms that perform irrigation 
and use the different environmental control methods including foggers, sprinklers and cooling 
pads can be found in Scott et al. (2017). 
4.3.5 Depopulation, shed sanitisation and turnaround times 
The percentage of farms that depopulated entire sheds in one day differed significantly by farm 
type (P<0.05) and occurred most commonly in barn layer farms (89%) and free range layer 
farms (88%) compared to other farm types (Table 4.1). Most cage layer farms (78%) had multi-
aged sheds and depopulated birds of a single tier or row simultaneously; only two cage layer 
farms (22%) depopulated entire sheds in one day. Thinning out is most commonly practiced 
on meat chicken farms where birds are depopulated over more than two weeks; few non-free 
range meat chicken farms (20%) and no free range meat chicken farms reportedly perform 
depopulation of entire sheds in one day. Performing thorough sanitisation of sheds after 
depopulation of entire sheds was also significantly different amongst the farm types (P<0.05), 
with most non-free range and free range meat chicken farms and layer farms performing this 
practice compared to only a third of cage layer farms (Table 4.1). In relation to turnaround 
times, described as the time period from when sheds are depopulated of birds to when new 
birds arrive,  meat chicken farms had lower (P<0.05) mean turnaround times (approximately 
10 days) than barn and free range layer farms (approximately 23 days) . However, there was 
one barn and one free range layer farm with no turnaround times, introducing new birds the 
same day that the previous batch was removed. For cage layer farms, the average turnaround 
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time of empty cages i.e. including multi-aged sheds where birds are still present inside the 
sheds was 10.5 days. However, the mean turnaround time was 22.8 days when only considering 
the two cage farms that depopulate the entire shed in one day (Table 4.1).  
4.3.6 Vehicle and equipment disinfection 
Types of vehicle disinfection described included wheel washes, wheel dips and whole vehicle 
washes. Information on whether or not vehicle disinfection was performed before or after 
visiting the farm was captured. The majority of non-free range meat chicken farms (85%) 
reported that disinfection of vehicles occurred before or after visiting their farm compared to a 
lower proportion of the other farm types, as described in Table 4.1. Sharing equipment between 
sheds was common in all farm types, with the highest proportion of farms conducting this 
practice being reported among non-free range meat chicken farms (92%), with the lowest being 
among free range chicken meat farms (60%).   
Farms that did not share equipment between sheds, reportedly had dedicated equipment per 
shed. Disinfection of shared equipment was reportedly low across all farm types; however, it 
differed among farm types (P< 0.05). While almost half of non-free range meat chicken farms 
would disinfect shared equipment, a very low proportion of barn and free range layer and no 
free range meat chicken or cage layer farms, would conduct this practice (Table 4.1). 
4.3.7 Personnel biosecurity 
Footbath presence on farms varied significantly from 93% on both meat chicken farm types to 
only 25% of cage layer farms (P<0.05). Hand washing/ sanitation facilities were present on 
100% of both meat chicken farm types and 96%, 89% and 88% of free range layer, barn layer 
and cage layer farms respectively. Visitor recording was present in 100% and 93% of free range 
and non-free range meat chicken farm types respectively, followed by free range layer (80%), 
barn layer (56%) and then in only 25% of cage layer farms (P<0.05). Changing clothes between 
farms when visiting farms within the same company occurred more commonly on meat chicken 
farms (93% and 100% for non-free range and free range meat chicken farms respectively) than 
layer farms (75%, 67% and 58% in cage, barn and free range layer farms respectively) (P<0.05). 
Protective clothing was provided to workers and visitors on 93 free range meat chicken farms 
as compared to 24% (n = 5/21) free range layer farms. The minimum waiting period between 
visiting poultry farms owned by different poultry companies was at least 48 hours across all 
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farm types. This restricted contact between farms applied to all visitors including trained 
depopulation, shed sanitisation and vaccination crews and was reportedly enforced in 100% of 
free range meat chicken (n = 14/15) and barn layer (n = 8/8) farms (Table 4.1). 
4.3.8 Biosecurity ratings 
Farm perceived importance of biosecurity practices 
Across the farm types, most biosecurity practices gained a mean rating of ‘very important' by 
farmers. Some practices gained a mean rating of ‘extremely important’ but only by meat 
chicken farms. Of note was the relatively low rating of importance for disinfection of 
equipment between sheds by non-free range meat chicken, cage layer and free range layer farm 
types. Visitor recording and turnaround times in sheds were also rated relatively low by cage 
layer farms (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Overall perceived importance of biosecurity practices per farm type (most biosecurity practices rated as ‘very important’ including 
those not depicted). 
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Personal farm biosecurity ratings and future risk of AI outbreaks 
Perceived level of implementation of on-farm biosecurity differed among the farm types 
(P<0.05). Cage layer farms had the lowest mean personal farm biosecurity rating (3.75, 95% 
CI 3.16-4.34), with free range meat chicken farms having the highest mean rating (4.93, 95% 
CI 4.77-5.00) (Figure 4.2). A bivariate analysis revealed no statistically significant association 
between the number of chickens on the farm and the personal farm biosecurity compliance 
rating and this was still the case when performed by farm type. 
Thirty nine percent of farmers considered it “unlikely” that an AI outbreak would occur on 
their own farm, while 33% were unsure. Forty percent of farmers across all farm types believed 
it was ‘likely’ that an AI outbreak would occur on another farm in Australia within the next 
year, while 21% believed it was ‘unlikely’. 
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Figure 4.2. Mean (and 95% confidence intervals) farmer rating of farm biosecurity compliance per farm type (P<0.05). 
 82 
 
4.3.9 Wild and domestic animal presence 
Table 4.2 describes farmer reporting of wild and domestic animal presence on farm. Most farms 
reported sighting insects and/or spiders inside sheds and similarly, small mammals, such as rats 
and mice in sheds were also reported across all farm types, being least common in non-free 
range meat chicken farms (67%). Large mammals, mainly foxes, were also reported across all 
farm types, most often on the outskirts of the shed, rarely accessing the inside. Rodent control 
was common across all farm types, being performed on 96% of farms. 
Wild birds inside sheds were most commonly reported in free range meat chicken farms (73%) 
compared to approximately half of farms for the other farm types. All wild birds reported to be 
seen inside sheds were small bird types such as sparrows and finches. Wild birds on the range 
were also commonly reported for both layer and meat chicken free range farms, with a wide 
range of species being reported, including ducks, plovers, crows and pigeons. Waterfowl were 
reported as the most common wild bird species appearing on nearby waterbodies. Species most 
commonly reported around feed storage areas were pigeons or mynahs. Fifty-eight percent of 
farmers across all farm types reported that wild birds commonly visited after feed spills. For 
the other 42%, this was prevented due to prompt cleaning of the feed spill. Wild bird proofing 
of sheds was common across farm types with 86% of farms overall reporting this to be done. 
Dogs and cats were kept by the majority of farms across all farm types (71%). This was 
followed by ruminants (45%), horses (14%), other animals (5%) and pigs (1%). The pigs were 
reported on a free range layer farm. Dog and cat access to sheds and the range were both 
significantly different amongst the farm types (P<0.05), with access to the sheds in the majority 
(67%) of cage layer farms and access to the range in 44% of free range layer farms (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2. Reported wild animal presence in sheds, feed storage or range areas, domestic 
animal presence on farm, and dog/cat access to sheds or range areas on commercial layer and 
meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland during 2015-
2016 
Animal type reported 
on farm & dog/cat 
access to areas on farm 
Farm type (%) P-
value 
Non-free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Cage layer 
(n=9) 
Barn layer 
(n=9) 
Free range 
layer (n=25) 
 
Wild animals       
Insects in sheds 93 (n=14) 87 (n=13) 100 (n=9) 100 (n=9) 100 (n=25) 0.26 
Small mammals (e.g. 
rats, mice) in sheds 
67 (n=10) 80 (n=12) 89 (n=8) 89 (n=9) 76 (n=19) 
0.65 
Large mammals (e.g. 
foxes) on farm 
27 (n=4) 40 (n=6) 67 (n=6) 44 (n=4) 36 (n=9) 
0.40 
Wild birds in sheds 47 (n=7) 73 (n=11) 56 (n=5) 56 (n=5) 52 (n=13) 0.64 
Wild birds on range  87 (n=13)   88 (n=22) 0.90 
Wild birds on 
waterbodies 
87 (n=13) 93 (n=14) 100 (n=9) 78 (n=7) 96 (n=24) 
0.37 
Wild birds on feed 
storage areas 
73 (n=11) 80 (n=12) 89 (n=8) 89 (n=8) 72 (n=18) 
0.74 
Domestic animals present on farm  
Dogs/Cats 67 (n=10) 80 (n=12) 89 (n=8) 56 (n=5) 68 (n=17) 0.51 
Ruminants 67 (n=10) 60 (n=6) 56 (n=5) 11 (n=1) 32 (n=8) <0.05 
Horses 7 (n=1) 7 (n=1) 11 (n=1) 0 28 (n=7) 0.13 
Pigs 0 0 0 0 4 (n=1) 0.75 
Dog/cat access to chicken facilities      
Access to sheds 0 7 (n=1) 67 (n=6) 11 (n=1) 8 (n=2) <0.05 
Access to range  7 (n=1)   44 (n=11) <0.05 
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4.3.10 Disease 
Detection and reporting on unusual signs in a flock 
Farmers were asked to describe the most significant unusual signs in a flock from their 
perspective. This information is presented in Table 4.3. The most commonly reported signs 
were respiratory signs for barn layer (56%) and free range meat chicken farms (40%), lethargy 
for non-free range meat chicken farms (73%), and mortalities for free range layer farms (52%). 
For cage layer farms, lethargy and reduction in egg production were equally the most common 
unusual signs (56%). 
When asked how many birds in a shed affected by unusual signs would prompt the farmer to 
contact someone, most layer farms reported taking action if up to 10 birds were affected while 
the vast majority of meat chicken farms did so when 50 or more birds in a shed were affected. 
Table 4.3 presents the median and range percentage of birds in a shed affected by unusual signs 
that would prompt the farmer to contact someone. The percentage for barn and free range layer 
farms (0.09% and 0.06% respectively) is less compared to non-free range and free range meat 
chicken farms (0.21% and 0.29% respectively). The median percentage for cage layer farms is 
the same as non-free range meat chicken farms (0.21%). 
Across all farm types, a service person was the most commonly reported person that the farmer 
would contact (44%), followed by the farm manager/owner (22%), a veterinarian (20%) and a 
company representative (15%). Answers varied depending on the ownership situation of the 
farm. Most farms surveyed were company-owned and had service people that were the first 
contact for farmers, followed by the company veterinarian. For small, individual farms, sales 
representatives who farmers bought chickens from, farm managers/owners or independent 
veterinarians would be contacted directly. 
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Table 4.3. The five most common unusual signsa perceived by farmers as most significant and 
the number and percentage of chickens in a shed affected by unusual signs that would prompt 
the farmer to contact someone on commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney 
basin bioregion and South East Queensland during 2015-2016. 
Unusual sign / 
Bird number 
Farm type (%) 
 Non-free range 
meat chicken 
(n=15) 
Free range meat 
chicken (n=15) 
Cage layer  
(n=9) 
Barn layer  
(n=9) 
Free range 
layer (n=25) 
Unusual signs 
Lethargy 73 (n= 11) 33 (n=5) 56 (n=5) 44 (n=4) 44 (n=11) 
Respiratory 53 (n=8) 40 (n=6) 56 (n=5) 56 (n=5) 36 (n=9) 
Ocular signsb 47 (n=7) 33 (n=5) 44 (n=4) 44 (n=4) - 
Abnormal gait 33 (n=5) - - - - 
Decreased feed 
consumption 
27 (n=4) 33 (n=5) 33 (n=3) 33 (n=3) - 
Decreased 
growth rate 
- 33 (n=3) - - 40 (n=10) 
Mortalities - - 33 (n=3) 44 (n=4) 52 (n=13) 
Egg production 
drop 
- -  33 (n=3) 48 (n=12) 
Number of birds affected to prompt action 
1 to 10 birds 7 (n=1) 0 56 (n=5) 44 (n=4) 48 (n=12) 
10 to 50 birds 46.5 (n=7) 40 (n=6) 33 (n=3) 44 (n=4) 44 (n=11) 
>50 birds 46.5 (n=7) 60 (n=9) 11 (n=1) 11 (n=1) 8 (n=2) 
Median 
percentage of 
birds in the shed 
affected by 
unusual signs to 
prompt action 
0.21 (0.01-10) 0.29 (0.06-5) 0.21 (0.0025-5) 
0.09 (0.01-
12.5) 
0.06 (0.01-5) 
      
a              Only the five most common unusual signs per farm type are recorded. In the case of barn layer farms, 
the fifth sign was tied between two clinical signs and therefore six entries are shown for this farm type. 
b              Ocular signs included anything abnormal with the eyes, including discharge, squinting and redness. 
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Perceptions on AI and other diseases 
Most farmers were concerned about AI and Newcastle Disease (77% and 66%, respectively. 
across all farm types). Infectious Laryngotracheitis (ILT) was another disease of concern, 
however, the level of concern differed according to farm type. This disease was listed as 
concern for most non-free range and free range meat chicken farmers (87% of farmers for both 
farm types), 67% of cage layer farms and only 32% of free range layer farms. A proportion of 
free range layer farmers (28%) were also worried about spotty liver disease. Scott et al. (2017) 
provides information on vaccines used on these farms. 
The most popular answer to describe signs in chickens that the farmers would associate with 
AI infection was mortalities for free range meat chicken and cage layer farms (53% and 33% 
respectively) and respiratory signs for non-free range meat chicken, barn layer and free range 
layer farms  (60%, 56% and 44% respectively). 
4.3.11 Relationships between wild animals, biosecurity practices, perceptions, and farm 
design 
Relationships between reported compliance and farmer perception of biosecurity practices  
Results of univariable logistic regression analysis to determine the association between 
reported compliance with a biosecurity practice on farm and farmer-perceived importance of 
the biosecurity practice are presented in Table 4.4. The model was unstable when performed 
for the biosecurity practice of hand washing, and therefore the results were omitted. There were 
significant statistical associations between reported compliance and the perceived importance 
of all biosecurity practices listed except for the practice of disinfecting equipment between 
sheds (P=0.71). Except for rodent control and wild bird proofing sheds, all significant 
associations were positive, meaning that when the practice was present, the importance rating 
was higher.  
  
87 
 
Table 4.4. Association between reported compliance with a biosecurity practice on farm 
(Yes/No) and farmer-perceived importance of the biosecurity practice (rated 1 to 5) on 73 
commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East 
Queensland during 2015-2016. 
Biosecurity practice β SE (β) Unit odds ratio (95% CI) P-value 
Restricting animal access to 
sheds and/or range 
2.38 0.91 10.81 (2.68-73.31) <0.05 
Footbaths 0.93 0.30 2.54 (1.47-4.83) <0.05 
Visitor recording 0.74 0.23 2.1 (1.35-3.42) <0.05 
Change clothes between 
farms within same company 
1.12 0.47 3.08 (1.29-8.41) <0.05 
Provide clothing to workers/ 
visitors 
1.12 0.35 3.06 (1.65-6.61) <0.05 
Restricted contact between 
farms 
3.08 0.85 21.75 (5.59-171.54) <0.05 
Disinfection of vehicles 
between farms 
1.85 0.44 6.34 (2.96-16.97) <0.05 
Disinfection of equipment 
between sheds 
-0.14 0.37 0.87 (0.38-1.73) 0.71 
Rodent control -2.18 1.01 0.11 (0.005-0.58) <0.05 
Wild bird proofing sheds -2.40 0.70 0.09 (0.01- 0.27) <0.05 
 
The significant negative association between rodent control practice and perceived importance 
of rodent control (P<0.05, OR 0.11 (Table 4.4) was reinforced by the non-significant 
association between the presence of rodents in sheds and perceived importance of control of 
rodents in sheds (P=0.18) (Table 4.5). For wild birds, there was a significant negative 
association between the presence of wild birds in sheds and perceived importance of wild bird 
control (P<0.05, OR 0.5), meaning when farmers reported wild bird presence in sheds, they 
were less likely to award a higher importance rating for wild bird control (Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5. Association between presence of wild animals in sheds (Yes/No) and farmer-
perceived importance of wild animal control in sheds (rated 1 to 5) on 73 commercial layer and 
meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South-East Queensland during 2015-
2016 
Wild animal type β SE (β) Unit odds ratio (95% CI) P-value 
Wild birds  -0.69 0.28 0.5 (0.27-0.83) <0.05 
Rodents 0.41 0.31 1.51 (0.81-2.8) 0.18 
 
Relationships between waterfowl presence and farm design factor 
Univariable logistic regression analyses between reported presence of waterfowl around feed 
storage areas (Yes/No) and on the range (Yes/No) and the minimum distance between sheds 
and a waterbody revealed p-values of 0.55 and 0.06 respectively. This indicates there is no 
statistically significant evidence that the minimum distance between sheds and a waterbody 
influences the reported presence of waterfowl around feed storage areas or on the range. 
4.4 Discussion 
This survey expands knowledge of the biosecurity practices performed on Australian 
commercial chicken meat and layer farms, and farmer-perceived importance of these practices. 
Identification of the biosecurity practices with lower compliance enables emphasis on these 
practices in educational efforts, such as biosecurity workshops and information sessions 
performed by Australian chicken egg and meat industries, and lower compliance for certain 
farm types also enables specific sectors of the industry to be targeted for participation in such 
programs. For some farmer participants in this survey, simply completing the biosecurity 
questionnaire led to realisation of gaps in their biosecurity practices. 
The data obtained from the sample of farms used in this survey is likely representative of the 
commercial chicken egg and meat farms across NSW at the least and possibly Australia. 
Relatively poorer biosecurity practices in layer farms compared to meat chicken farms have 
also been reported as general observations by poultry veterinarians and in a previous Australian 
biosecurity survey (East, 2007, Scott et al., 2009). This current survey was performed mainly 
in NSW in the Sydney basin region and a large range of farm sizes and companies were visited. 
NSW is the leading state in both the number of farms and volume of product produced for meat 
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chicken and egg farms in Australia (NSW DPI, 2015, ACMF, 2011, AECL, 2015). However, 
care should be taken when extrapolating results from this survey to areas of Australia that have 
experienced the recent establishment of new farms as farm layout and structure of farm 
buildings heavily influences biosecurity practices conducted on them (East, 2007, Scott et al., 
2009).  
Non-compliance with biosecurity practices has been previously related to inadequate training 
and education of farmers and limited communication between farmers and technical service 
providers (Scott et al., 2009). We found overall a high level of biosecurity compliance among 
the meat chicken farms, likely due to the vertical integration of this sector. The high level of 
private ownership amongst the layer farms is considered to contribute to greater variation in 
the level of biosecurity as there is no mandatory governing body to enforce adoption and 
compliance of biosecurity practices (Scott et al., 2009, East, 2007). Egg Corp Assured is a 
national quality assurance program developed to help commercial egg producers improve 
issues including food safety and biosecurity. However, while progressive, it does not cover all 
producers (Scott et al., 2009). Cage layer farms tended to rate lowest in the level of biosecurity 
amongst the farm types. The results from the farmer assessment of biosecurity compliance 
rating of their farm also reflect this; cage layer farmers gave their farms the lowest mean rating 
compared to the other farm types. This demonstrates some degree of awareness of farm 
biosecurity amongst the cage farmers and an acknowledgement of lower compliance than best 
practice. Most cage layer farms visited in this survey were old, family-run farms that had been 
passed onto the next generation and this is a particular feature of farms located in the Sydney 
basin region in general (Scott et al., 2017). This contrasts with barn and free range layer farms 
which are relatively new due to the recent expansion of cage-free egg production (Scott et al., 
2009). It is probable that the structural features of older farms to some extent limit compliance 
with current best practice, and likely that farmers with more recently established farms seek 
technical services and support more frequently than farmers with long established farms. 
However, the age of the farms as well as the level of biosecurity training received by farmers 
and other staff members was not captured in this survey. 
There was at least one dam, on average, on every farm type. Dams are generally used on farms 
as water reservoirs or catchments (Scott et al., 2009). Five farms used them as the source of 
drinking water for chickens in this survey. The majority of farms across all farm types use town 
water which is  treated with chlorine and occasionally ammonia in the Sydney basin region 
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(Sydney Water, 2014). As the presence of dams attracts wild birds, particularly waterfowl, on 
to a farm, their presence is a potential biosecurity risk due to the potential for introduction of 
pathogens to chickens on the farm. Potential pathways include contact of free range chickens 
with waterfowl on the range, or the consumption of contaminated drinking water from the dams. 
For the latter, it is especially prudent that farmers treat water sourced from dams to reduce this 
potential. A national water biosecurity manual was published in 2009 to assist Australian 
poultry producers with performing appropriate water biosecurity practices (DAFF, 2009b). 
Aligning with the recommendations of this manual, this survey found a high level of water 
treatment across all farm types. 
The majority of cage layer farms had multi-age sheds (78%) where each row or tier is a 
different age group of chickens in order to maintain the flow of egg production (Scott et al., 
2009). This generally means there are always chickens in sheds as new ones replace the old, 
and thus sheds are rarely empty. This explains why few cage layer farms (33%) perform 
thorough sanitisation of sheds between batches. From a disease view-point, this allows 
persistence and circulation of pathogens. Of note is AI, where once LPAI is introduced into a 
flock, it is generally acknowledged that persistent circulation of the virus in a population of 
poultry leads to a greater risk of mutation to HPAI (Alexander, 2007). AI was reported as the 
most worrying poultry disease to farmers but this is likely due to the survey being AI focused, 
as farmers were told about the research project. ILT was also a common concern amongst 
farmers; likely due to the ILT outbreaks occurring across the Sydney basin region at the time 
this survey was conducted (Agnew-Crumpton et al., 2016). Farmers that listed ND as a concern 
tended to be those that had experienced the ND outbreaks which occurred between 1998 and 
2002 in NSW and Victoria (East, 2007). 
The presence of dogs, cats and ruminants was common across all farm types. The majority 
(67%) of cage layer farmers allowed dog and cat access inside sheds on the chicken farm, and 
for cats this was reported to contribute to rodent control. However cats can potentially serve as 
carriers of virulent forms of Pasteurella multocida and Toxoplasma gondii infection for 
chickens (Beltramea et al., 2012, Sambeek et al., 1995). Forty-four percent of free range layer 
farms also allowed dog access to the range, mainly as a form of protection for the chickens 
from potential predators, especially foxes. Of the 12 farms that allowed dog access to the range 
in this survey, 16% (n=2) had the Maremma Italian guard dog; its use is relatively recent in 
Australia. There is evidence for this breed’s effectivity in protecting a range of livestock species 
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from several types of predators (Bommel and Johnson, 2014). One free range layer farm had 
pigs on the farm. Keeping pigs and poultry in the same premises is a major biosecurity concern. 
The national farm biosecurity manual for the Australian poultry industry states that this should 
not occur and that farm staff must not come into contact with pigs or other avian species (DAFF, 
2009a). This is because of the potential of salmonellosis in poultry flocks from pigs or vice 
versa (Andres and Davies, 2015). In addition, pigs are susceptible to infection of both avian 
and human influenza viruses; thereby they can act as “mixing vessels” where novel re-
assortment of influenza viruses can occur. There is fear this can lead to influenza viruses 
transmitted from pigs that are more readily spread between mammals (Ma et al., 2009). 
It was conjectured by the authors that larger farms would be more likely to seek technical 
support and services and therefore have improved biosecurity compared to smaller farms. This 
is because smaller farms usually develop first as hobby farms which gradually increase in size; 
hobby farmers usually have limited knowledge and experience compared to farm staff on large 
commercial chicken farms (Scott et al., 2009). However, the results of this survey revealed 
there was no significant statistical association between the number of chickens on farm and the 
farmer biosecurity compliance rating of their farm. There may be some degree of modesty in 
the results, where well-educated farmers do not rate their farm highly as they believe there is 
room for improvement on the current farm. 
The finding that reported compliance with a biosecurity practice on farm and farmer-perceived 
importance of the biosecurity practice are positively associated can guide decisions on 
biosecurity practices for inclusion in educational efforts for farmers. The results revealed that 
for most biosecurity practices, when the practice was performed, the farmer rating of 
importance was higher. Thus, encouraging biosecurity practices to be performed on farm can 
improve farmer-perceived importance of certain practices, leading to long term performance. 
In contrast, there was a significant negative association between rodent control and its farmer-
perceived importance. There was also no significant statistical association between the 
perceived importance of rodent control in sheds and the reported presence of rodents. Vermin 
control obtained a mean rating of very or extremely important across the farm types and there 
was a high percentage of rodent control performance across all farm types; 96% of farms 
overall. Farmer-perceived importance of rodent control may be clouded by failure to reduce 
rodent numbers despite implementing rodent control, due to the ideal conditions for rodent 
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presence and breeding on farms in general and the possible resistance to rodent baits (Miño et 
al., 2007). 
There was a significant negative association between compliance of wild bird proofing sheds 
and farmer-perceived importance of wild bird proofing sheds. There was also a significant 
negative association between wild bird presence in sheds and farmer-perceived importance of 
wild bird proofing sheds. This means that when farmers either performed wild bird proofing of 
sheds or reported wild birds in sheds, their perceived importance of wild bird control was lower. 
Reasons for these associations may be due to general unawareness of the significance of wild 
bird presence inside sheds in terms of pathogen transfer. These results touch on the complex 
topic of factors that influence biosecurity compliance on farms by farmers; such factors include 
the perceived threat of disease, ease and benefits of performing the practice, and personality 
traits (Morrison et al., 2008). Studies in Canada on poultry farms revealed that the personality 
traits of complexity, responsibility, work experience and education were positively correlated 
with biosecurity compliance (Racicot et al., 2012). A low perceived threat of wild bird presence 
inside sheds, due to a lack of education of the pathogens potentially transferable from wild 
birds, is likely to play a role in contributing to the low farmer-perceived importance of wild 
bird proofing sheds in this survey. Improving farmer compliance of biosecurity practices that 
reduce wild animal visits to poultry farms is important in reducing the potential of infectious 
disease introduction and spread to poultry (Scott et al., 2009). 
Although the statistical significance of the association between the minimum distance from a 
shed and a waterbody and waterfowl presence on the range in this survey was limited (P=0.06), 
this tendency suggests that the distance between sheds and waterbodies may influence the 
presence of waterfowl on range areas.  Direct contact between chickens and waterfowl on range 
areas can lead to the transmission of pathogens (Barnes, 2009). Pathogen transmission via 
aerial dispersion, although rare, is also possible such as from LPAI-infected waterfowl (Jonges 
et al., 2015, Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). If the distance between sheds and 
waterbodies does indeed influence waterfowl presence on range areas, then the location of 
waterbodies can be changed by farmers to be located further away from range areas.  The goal 
in changing the location of waterbodies being to reduce waterfowl presence and the potential 
of pathogen transmission via aerial dispersion.  Waterfowl movements and presence are also 
known to be affected by other factors such as rainfall, feed, and open spaces on-farm; and this 
can be explored through further research (Atzeni et al., 2016). 
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The purpose of conducting on-farm visits and interviews rather than telephone interviews was 
to eliminate answers which the farmer may wish to report but did not hold true. Many 
biosecurity practices could be noted as present or absent during the on-farm visits by the 
researchers, such as footbaths, hand washing facilities, visitor recording systems and domestic 
animals on the farms. However some practices, which are largely dynamic or which occurred 
only at specified times, could not be observed, such as thorough shed sanitisation between 
batches and vehicle/equipment disinfection between sheds and farms. In these instances true 
answers were dependent on accurate farmer reporting and that obsequiousness bias could be 
present. 
In summary, this survey provides further knowledge on the level of adoption of biosecurity 
practices and farmer-perceived importance of these across commercial meat and layer chicken 
farms in Australia. This knowledge helps identify practices and farm types in which biosecurity 
needs most improvement. A high level of biosecurity was found in meat chicken farm types 
compared to layer farm types, and cage layer farms have the largest room for improvement. 
Educational efforts such as workshops or information sessions can be conducted to improve 
the level of adoption and compliance of biosecurity practices. Improving the level of 
biosecurity practices will reduce the potential for introduction and spread of infectious diseases 
in Australian commercial chicken farms. 
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Chapter 5. Wildlife presence and interactions with 
chickens on Australian commercial chicken farms 
assessed by camera traps 
Prologue 
Chapter 5 presents results of on-farm camera trapping of wildlife conducted on a subset of 
Australian commercial chicken farms which were also involved in the farm survey detailed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Results include the types and frequency of wildlife which visit Australian 
commercial chicken farms and comparisons between the different commercial farm types. 
Accepted in Avian Diseases, In Press. 
  
95 
 
Abstract 
The types of wildlife and the frequency of their visits to commercial chicken farms in Australia 
were assessed using infrared and motion-sensing camera traps. Cameras were set up on 14 free 
range layer farms, three cage layer farms, two barn layer farms, five non-free range meat 
chicken farms, and six free range meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin region and South 
East Queensland. Wildlife visits were found on every farm type and were most frequent on 
cage layer farms (73%), followed by free range layer farms (15%). The common mynah 
(Acridotheres tristis ) was the most frequent wildlife visitor in the study (23.9%), followed by 
corvids (22.9%) and Columbiformes (7.5%). Most wildlife visits occurred during the day from 
6 am to 6 pm (85%). There were infrequent observations of direct contact between chickens 
and wildlife, suggesting the indirect route of pathogen transfer may be more significant. The 
level of biosecurity on the farm is suggested to impact the frequency of wildlife visits more so 
than the farm type. 
Keywords 
Australia, camera trap, commercial chickens, disease, wildlife 
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5.1 Introduction 
Interactions between wildlife and livestock are a concern for livestock industries as pathogen 
spill-over from wildlife to livestock can occur (Kukielka et al., 2013, Burns et al., 2012). For 
the Australian poultry industry, there is concern about the transmission of a range of bacterial, 
fungal, viral and parasitic pathogens from wild birds to commercial chickens (DAFF, 2009a). 
Examples of bacterial pathogens in Australia capable of being transmitted from wild birds to 
chickens include Escherichia spp., Salmonella spp., Camplyobacter spp., Mycobacterium spp., 
Pasteurella multocida, and Chlamydia psittaci (Barnes et al., 2009, Gordon and Cowling, 2003, 
Connolly et al., 2006, Feizabadi et al., 1996, Sangster, 2012, Gordon, 2011, Barnes, 2009, 
Griekspoor et al., 2013, Zhang, 2009, Singh et al., 2013, Robertson and Noormohammadi, 2011, 
Saggese et al., 2008, Converse, 2007). Macrorhabdus ornithogaster, a fungal pathogen that 
could also be transmitted to chickens, is relatively common in psittacine birds and some species 
of passerine birds in Australia and has been detected in a backyard chicken flock in Australia 
(Phalen et al., 2007). Viral pathogens that can potentially transmit from wild birds to chickens 
in Australia include avian influenza (AI), avian paramyxoviruses (APMVs) and multiple avian 
adenoviruses (AAs) (Barnes, 2009, Grillo et al., 2015, Hoque et al., 2012, Wilcox et al., 1983, 
Cowan et al., 2014). A range of parasites can also transmit from wild birds to chickens. 
Examples of include mites such as the northern fowl mite, Ornithonyssus sylviarum, which is 
poorly host-specific, nematodes such as Ascaridia galli, and cestodes such as Raillietina spp. 
(McLaughlin, 2008, Glatz and Ru, 2004, Hinkle and Hickle, 2009, Yazwinkski and Tucker, 
2009). 
Pathogen spill-over from mammals to chickens is also possible. Rodents have been implicated 
in persistently carrying and contaminating commercial poultry facilities with Salmonella spp. 
and Campylobacter spp. through faecal shedding (Umali et al., 2012, Hinkle and Hickle, 2009). 
Foxes have also been found to carry Salmonella spp. through the ingestion of Salmonella-
infected birds (Elson, 2015, Handeland et al., 2008). Foxes and rodents are common wildlife 
visitors to poultry facilities in Australia (Scott et al., 2009, Scott et al., 2018d). 
The reverse is also of concern; where there is potential for disease transmission occurring from 
poultry to wildlife. This has occurred in North America where Mycoplasma gallisepticum has 
spread to house finches (Haemorhous mexicanus) and other passerine species, high pathogenic 
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avian influenza (HPAI) has also spread from poultry to a variety of wild bird species in North 
America Asia and Europe (Ley et al., 2006, FAO, 2013). 
Poultry production in Australia, specifically chicken production, initially began as small 
populations of free range birds that would have had a high probability of direct or indirect 
contact with wildlife reservoirs of disease (Scott et al., 2009). These flocks experienced a 
number of diseases including avian tuberculosis, spotty liver and internal and external 
parasitism that may have been facilitated by contact with wild birds (Scott et al., 2009, 
Converse, 2007, Van et al., 2016). With the intensification of chicken production and the switch 
to indoor housing in the mid-20th century when a significant egg and meat industry developed, 
the incidence of these diseases dramatically reduced (Scott et al., 2009). However, free range 
chicken production has made a comeback in Australia in recent years because of consumer 
demand, creating the potential for the re-emergence of diseases that have been eliminated or 
greatly reduced as the result of indoor production (ACMF, 2011, AECL, 2015). Commercial 
chicken farms of today are also more intensive than farms of the mid-20th century; flock 
numbers are larger in size with greater stocking densities both inside sheds and outside on the 
range areas. Farms also generally keep only one breed of chicken on the farm, and thus all 
individual chickens on the farm are genetically similar to each other. Therefore there is a similar 
level of immune susceptibility and resistance to the same pathogens for each farm (Scott et al., 
2009, Hamilton et al., 2009). If pathogen transmission from wildlife to susceptible commercial 
chickens does occur, the magnitude of the disease outbreak could be immense due to the large 
flock sizes and genetic similarity of chickens within the flock.  
There are concerns from industry experts and poultry veterinarians that the rise in free range 
poultry production in Australia will lead to more diseases within chicken flocks (Arzey and 
Littleton, 2007, Scott et al., 2009). This is due to the assumption that there is a greater potential 
for contact between wildlife and chickens on free range enterprises compared to farms which 
house chickens indoors (Scott et al., 2009, Glatz and Ru, 2004). However, wildlife activity and 
any interactions between wildlife and chickens on Australian commercial chicken farms have 
not been previously assessed. 
Various methods have been used to study interactions between wildlife and livestock, such as, 
biologists undertaking a manual count of wildlife that visit farms and the use of motion sensor 
cameras (Burns et al., 2012, Kukielka et al., 2013). The advantages of motion sensor cameras 
include around the clock monitoring and the capture of normal wildlife behaviour due to human 
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absence (Kukielka et al., 2013). The aim of the present study was to use motion sensor cameras 
to capture information on the species of wildlife as well as their frequency of visits and 
interactions with chickens on Australian commercial chicken farms with consideration of the 
different layer and meat chicken farm types; cage, barn and free range. This in turn will inform 
better understanding of the potential for transmission of certain pathogens between wildlife 
and commercial chickens in an Australian context and formulate ideas on control strategies to 
reduce this. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Study region and farm selection 
This study was part of an AI risk mitigation project which involved on-farm visits and face-to-
face interviews with farmers on 73 commercial chicken farms including both meat chicken and 
layer farm types conducted in the Sydney basin region and South East Queensland in Australia 
from June 2015 to February 2016. The purpose of the project was to identify the risk of 
introduction and spread of AI to the different types of commercial chicken farms common in 
Australia. In order to achieve this, more information about current on-farm practices for each 
farm type through conduct of a survey was needed. For the purposes of this work, a commercial 
layer farm was defined as a farm with more than 1,000 birds, and a commercial meat chicken 
farm, as a farm with more than 25,000 birds. Detailed information on the methodology for 
region and farm selection is explained by Scott et al. (2017). In brief, the Sydney basin 
bioregion was chosen due to its high density and variety of layer and meat chicken farms and 
the occurrence of an AI outbreak in 2011. In the Australian context, cage and barn layer farms 
house chickens inside sheds and chickens do not have access to the outdoors. Sheds refer to 
large poultry houses which house several thousands of chickens; shed sizes vary and the 
median number of chickens housed inside ranged from 32,000 in free range layer farms to 
140,000 in free range meat chicken farms in the survey (Scott et al., 2017). In cage layer farms, 
chickens are placed inside cages within the sheds, with a median of four chickens per cage in 
the Sydney basin region (Scott et al., 2017).  In barn layer farms, chickens are cage-free but 
are confined within the shed and free to roam on the floor of the shed. The same description 
applies to chickens in non-free range meat chicken farms; of which barn layer farms are usually 
converted from (Scott et al., 2009). Free range layer and meat chicken farms are given access 
to the outdoors at certain time periods of the day. For both free range farm types, each shed has 
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its own range area; these are usually rectangle in shape, fenced, with median range areas of 
free range layer farms greater than that of meat chicken farms from a farm survey conducted 
in Australia; at 18000m2 and 2476.5m2 respectively (Scott et al., 2017). When it was found that 
the number of free range meat chicken farms in this region was limited and all were owned by 
one of two large meat chicken companies in Australia, additional free range meat chicken farms 
owned by a second large company in South East Queensland were visited. 
During the on-farm interviews, permission to set up wildlife cameras on the farms was sought. 
Farmers in the Sydney basin region that agreed were contacted again in spring (September to 
November in Australia) to organise a revisit to the farms to set up the cameras in November 
2015. Farmers in South East Queensland were contacted in summer (December to February in 
Australia) and those that agreed had cameras setup during the initial farm visits in February 
2016. These time periods were selected due to the migratory behaviours of birds of the order 
Charadriiformes which are present in Australia during their non-breeding season from 
September to March (Dingle, 2004). 
Cameras were deployed on 30 farms. Cameras were set up on different farm types to gain a 
baseline understanding of the types of wildlife that visit Australian chicken farms and to then 
allow a comparison of the types and frequency of wildlife visits amongst the different farm 
types. In the Sydney basin region, cameras were deployed on 14 free range layer farms, 3 cage 
layer farms, 2 barn layer farms and 5 non-free range meat chicken farms. In South East 
Queensland, cameras were deployed on 6 free range meat chicken farms.  
5.2.2 Camera setup 
Motion detector and infrared capability-type cameras were used (HC500 HyperfireTM, 
ReconyxTM, Holmen, Wisconsin, USA). Cameras were programed to take three sequential 
pictures after movement was detected in front of the camera with a lag period of five minutes 
between movement detections to avoid continuous image capturing during periods of high 
movement. According to the cameras’ specifications, movement can be detected up to 30.5m 
away during the day and infrared capabilities allow movement to be detected up to 15.2m away 
during the night. 
Two and three cameras were placed on non-free range and free range farms respectively. One 
camera was positioned to capture wildlife activity at a silo on the farm which may be attracted 
to any feed spills that occur. One camera was positioned to face the wall of a shed to capture 
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wildlife activity in close proximity to the shed or perched on the edge of the shed roof. For free 
range farms the third camera was positioned to capture activity on a range area within 100 
metres of the sheds that free range chickens have access to. The selection of which silo, shed 
wall and range area to record activity was largely determined by whether or not there was a 
vertical support structure nearby to attach the cameras. Cameras were placed approximately 
100 to 150 cm from the ground. All cameras were considered independent as they were facing 
different directions thus recording activity in different areas of the farm. Cameras were 
removed after one week and pictures downloaded. 
5.2.3 Data management and analysis 
All images were examined individually during construction of a database in Microsoft Excel 
(Microsoft, PC/Windows 7, 2010, Redmond, WA, USA). It was found during the examination 
of images taken from a silo camera on one cage layer farm that the images included wildlife 
activity on a nearby dam. This wildlife activity on the dam was recorded separately in its own 
category. 
The database contained details of the images with the following categories; farm identification, 
camera location (silo, shed wall, range, dam), date taken (dd/mm/yy), time taken (hh:mm 
AM/PM), wildlife species identified, and chicken present in same photograph. The time lapse 
between chicken and wildlife was also recorded by calculating the difference in the times 
between images with a wildlife appearance and with a chicken appearance afterwards from the 
same camera. The dam visits were a coincidental finding detected by one silo camera therefore 
these visits were not included in most analyses presented in this paper. A separate results 
section is presented specifically for dam visit results.  
It was apparent in some instances that a particular wild animal was the same individual present 
in a series of images. In order to estimate the number of individual wild animal visits, images 
were converted to wildlife visits where a visit was defined as a different individual wild animal. 
This was performed by using the remove duplicates feature on Microsoft Excel where 
subsequent images with the same date, time (hh:mm AM/PM) and wildlife type following one 
initial image were assumed to be the same individual wild animal. These duplicates were then 
removed so that only one image of a series of images was left. In some instances there was 
more than two wildlife species in the same image. These were still identified as a single wildlife 
visit but the type of species was tallied into the separate wildlife species categories. Images of 
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escapee chickens were also recorded and the remove duplicates feature was also performed on 
these. 
The number of wildlife visits was adjusted for each farm and camera type. This was done by 
dividing the total number of wildlife visits of each farm type by the total number of farms of 
each respective farm type for which cameras were deployed on. Adjustment per camera type 
(shed wall, silo or range) was done by dividing the number of wildlife visits per camera type 
of each farm type by the number of farms of the respective farm type. 
The identification of wildlife species was conducted by the first author of this paper and support 
for bird type determination provided when needed from second author who has had many years 
of experience with field identification of birds. Species were usually placed in their own 
category, however in some instances other species similar in appearance were placed together 
in the same category. The corvid category included all Corvidae species. Similarly, the Pacific 
Black Duck, Anas supervicilosa, comprised the majority of the duck category but other duck 
species may have been included when exact species determination was not possible from the 
image. The Pacific Black Duck could be confidently identified in approximately 90% of duck 
visits. The Columbiformes category includes all pigeon and dove species identified but mainly 
consisted of the peaceful dove (Geopelia placida) and brown cuckoo-dove (Macropygia 
phasianella). The rail category consisted of all bird species in the family Rallidae. The 
kangaroo category included species in the Macropus genus, including the eastern grey 
kangaroo, Macropus giganteus and thewallaroo, Macropus robustus robustus. The rodent 
category consisted of all rodents identified and was assumed to mainly consist of the black rat 
(Rattus rattus) and brown rat (Rattus norvegicus), because of the proximity to human habitation 
in this study (Banks and Hughes, 2012, Strahan and Dyck, 2008). However, it is possible that 
some of these rodent observations could have been bush rats, Rattus fuscipes. The unknown 
wild bird category consisted of wild birds whose bird type could not be determined. 
Descriptive analyses of wildlife images and visits were conducted in Microsoft Excel 
(Microsoft, PC/Windows 7, 2010, Redmond, WA, USA) and the statistical program JMP® (© 
2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, USA). JMP® was also used for all statistical analyses of the 
data. A one-way analysis of variance1 was performed to determine any statistical association 
between farm type and the number of wildlife visits and farms of each farm type. P-value was 
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix E for comparison with Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
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used to detect any statistical significance between different factors and a p-value of <0.05 was 
considered significant.  Outliers regarding the number of wild animal visits per farm were 
identified through box and whisker plots and included one cage layer farm and one free range 
layer farm. These were excluded from further analyses.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Total images and visits 
A total of 31,092 images were taken by the camera traps in both regions. There were 24,341 
images taken in the Sydney basin region and 6,751 images were taken in the South East 
Queensland. This equates to an average of 1058 and 1125 images taken per farm in the Sydney 
basin and South East Queensland respectively. Of the total number of images taken, 1247 
images (4%) had wildlife present in the image. Images captured in the Sydney basin region and 
South East Queensland had wildlife present in 3.8% (n=925) and 2.2% (n=151) of the images 
respectively. Conversion of images to visits revealed that there were a total of 511 wildlife 
visits in both regions; 458 and 53 visits in the Sydney basin and South East Queensland 
respectively. This gives an average of 17 (ranging from 0 to 137) wildlife visits per farm per 
week, or 2.4 (ranging from 0 to 9) wildlife visits per farm per day 
5.3.2 Visits according to camera location 
For the 458 wildlife visits in the Sydney basin region, most wildlife visits were captured by 
cameras targeted at the shed wall (45.9%, n=210), followed by the silo (40.8%, n=187), and 
range (13.3%, n=61). For the 53 wildlife visits in South East Queensland, most wildlife visits 
were captured by cameras targeted at the range (67.9%, n=36), followed by the silo (17.0%, 
n=9) and the shed wall (15.1%, n=8). For both regions, most wildlife visits were recorded by 
cameras aimed at shed wall (42.5%, n=217), followed by silo cameras (38.4%, n=196) and 
then range cameras (19%, n=97). There was a large number of visits from cameras targeted at 
the shed wall on cage layer farms (57%, n =124). For all other farm types, cameras targeted at 
the silo had the most frequent wildlife visits. Free range layer farms had the fewest number of 
wildlife visits on the range (22.4%, n=55) compared to the silo (43.7%, n=107) and shed wall 
(33.9%, n=83).  
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5.3.3 Visits according to farm type 
Using the raw data, most images were captured at free range layer farms (50.6%, n=271) 
followed by cage layer farms (33.6%, n=180). However, when the data are adjusted for the 
number of farms that cameras were placed on for each farm type, cage layer farms captured the 
most visits (71%), followed by free range layer farms (14%). Figure 5.1 shows the data further 
adjusted by accounting for the different camera types for each farm type. The one-way analysis 
of variance revealed no statistically significant association with the exclusion of one outlier 
from both free range layer and cage layer farms, implying there is no strong association 
between farm type and the number of wildlife visits that occur on the farm (p-value = 0.16). 
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Figure 5.1. The percentage of the total number of wildlife visits (n = 511) for the different farm types; displayed per camera type after adjustment 
of the data by the number of farms per farm type. 
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5.3.4 Wildlife identified 
All regions   
It was found that the common mynah, Acridotheres tristis, was the most frequent visitor (23.9%, 
n=122). This was followed by the corvid (22.9%, n=117) and Columbiformes (7.4%, n=38) 
(Figure 5.2). There were seven unknown wild bird visits (1.4%). Mammals and marsupials 
comprised 13% (n=78) of the wildlife visits. The most common mammal was the fox (Vulpes 
vulpes) (4.5%, n=23) and most fox visits were identified in free range layer farms (95%, n=20). 
There was only a single marsupial visit and it could not be determined if it was an eastern grey 
kangaroo or wallaroo (0.2%, n=1) (Figure 5.2). 
Sydney basin region 
The common mynah was the most frequent visitor to commercial poultry farms in the Sydney 
basin region (25.1%, n=115), followed by the corvids (24.7%, n=113) and the Columbiformes 
(6.8%, n=31). The kookaburra, black cockatoo (Calyptorhynchus spp.), falcon (Falconiformes), 
rail (Rallidae spp.), and welcome swallow (Hirundo neoxena) were all recorded to have visited 
only once (Figure 5.2). 
South East Queensland 
The most frequent visitor to commercial free range meat chicken farms in South East 
Queensland was the magpie (34%, n=18), followed by the common mynah and peewee 
(Grallina cyanoleuca), who were observed in equal numbers (13%, n = 7). Kangaroo, cattle 
egret (Bubulcus ibis), and masked lapwing (Vanellus miles) visits were identified in the South 
East Queensland but not in the Sydney basin region (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2. The types of wildlife identified as a percentage of the total number of wildlife visits identified by cameras in both the Sydney basin 
bioregion and South East Queensland (n = 511). 
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5.3.5 Wild bird orders identified 
The order Passeriformes were the most frequent visitors to commercial poultry farms in both 
the Sydney basin and South East Queensland (81.0%, n=345), followed by Columbiformes 
(8.9%, n=38) (Figure 5.2) for the combined data, and for the Sydney basin region on its own. 
In South East Queensland, Passeriformes (76%, n=38) were followed by Pelecaniiformes (14%, 
n=7) and only one visit of Anseriformes (2%) was identified. One visit of Charadriiformes 
(2%), a masked lapwing, was identified in South East Queensland, compared to none in the 
Sydney basin region (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1. The wild bird orders identified as a percentage of the total number of wild bird visits 
identified by cameras in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland (n = 426) 
Wild bird order Region 
 Sydney basin 
South East 
Queensland 
Combined regions Combined regions % 
Passeriformes 307 38 345 81.0 
Columbiformes 37 1 38 9.0 
Pelecaniiformes 23 7 30 7.1 
Anseriformes 5 1 6 1.4 
Gruiformes 1 2 3 0.7 
Coraciformes 1 0 1 0.2 
Charadriiformes 0 1 1 0.2 
Falconiformes 1 0 1 0.2 
Psittaciformes 1 0 1 0.2 
Total 376 50 426 100 
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5.3.6 Visits according to time of day 
Most wildlife visits occurred during the day where 85% (n=432) of images from all regions 
combined occurred between 6am to 6pm. Results were separated for free range and non-free 
range farms. Most visits occurred between 3 to 6pm (16%, n=80) for free range farms and 
between 12 to 3pm (13%, n=64) for non-free range farms (Figure 5.3). No wild birds were 
identified between 9pm and 5am. Wild mammals were the only wildlife identified during these 
night periods. All fox visits occurred at night. 
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Figure 5.3. The percentage of the total number of wildlife visits (n = 511) by the time of day for free range and non-free range farms. 
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5.3.7 Wildlife-domestic chicken interactions 
Escapee chickens were seen in 12 images. Ten images were from a cage layer farms and 2 
images from a barn layer farm. However there was no wildlife present in any of these images. 
Of the 52 and 271 wildlife visits identified on free range meat chicken and free range layer 
farms respectively, 96 (30%) had a chicken also present in the same image and all were from 
free range layer farms. Of these, 25 (26%) visits were captured by cameras aimed at the range 
areas. The corvid was the most common wildlife to be present in an image with the chicken 
(53%, n=51), followed by the common mynah (14%, n=13) and then the peewee (11%, n=11) 
(Figure 5.4). For free range layer farms, the time lapse between a wildlife visit and the 
appearance of chickens captured by cameras aimed at the range or shed wall area was also 
identified. The median time lapse was 9.5 hours (ranging from 26 minutes to 75 hours). No 
physical interactions between a live chicken and a wild animal were identified; therefore all 
wildlife visits identified were just in close proximity to the chickens. Two fox visits revealed a 
dead chicken in the mouth of the fox.  
5.3.8 Wildlife visits on dams 
There were also 84 wildlife visits identified on dams which were taken by a silo camera. All 
animals identified on dams were species in the duck category; these were most likely the Pacific 
Black Duck. This occurred on one cage layer farm in the Sydney basin region where the silo 
camera coincidentally had view of a dam behind the silo. 
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Figure 5.4. The percentage of wildlife visits with a chicken in the same image by the wildlife category (n = 96). 
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5.4 Discussion 
There is growing concern of an increased risk  of disease transmission from wildlife to 
commercial chickens with the recent expansion of free range chicken farms in Australia (Arzey 
and Littleton, 2007, Scott et al., 2009). The purpose of this study is to assess the types and 
frequency of wildlife visiting Australian commercial chicken farms using motion sensor 
cameras amongst the different layer (cage, barn and free range) and meat chicken (barn and 
free range) farm types. With this data we create  a general baseline understanding of the types 
of wildlife that visit Australian chicken farms and a comparison of the types and frequency of 
wildlife visits amongst the different farm types. In addition, this study provides an insight into 
the types of pathogens potentially transmissible from wildlife that pose the greatest risk for 
Australian commercial poultry flocks based on the types of wildlife seen. 
In general, the number of wildlife visits to commercial chicken farms was limited with only 17 
(range from 0 to 137) wildlife visits per farm per week, or 2.4 (range from 0 to 9) wildlife visits 
per farm per day. In addition, only 4.5% and 2.2% of the images taken in the Sydney basin 
region and South East Queensland respectively had wildlife present. These figures are small 
especially in comparison to the number of chickens on the farms, which are generally more 
than a thousand chickens per shed (Scott et al., 2017). This suggests that the potential of direct 
pathogen transmission between wildlife and commercial chickens in Australia is an infrequent 
event but can still occur. Thirty percent of visits on free range farms had a chicken present in 
the same image although no physical interactions between a live chicken and wildlife were 
captured. This suggests again that if pathogen transmission between wildlife and commercial 
chickens does occur, the most likely route of transmission is the indirect route i.e. exposure to 
pathogens occurs from faecal-oral contamination of food or water or contamination of fomites 
(Cortez and Weitz, 2013).  
When considering the number of farms per farm type on which cameras were deployed, cage 
layer farms had the greatest number of visits (73%); far surpassing the number of wildlife visits 
observed for free range layer farms (15%). Potential factors for why wildlife are not particularly 
attracted to free range operations may include the impact that free range chickens have on the 
range areas.  Range areas are rapidly degraded once chickens are released onto them often 
resulting in paddocks that contain little or no vegetation (Scott et al., 2009, McGahan et al., 
2008).  Bare ground is not likely to provide habitat to which wild birds would be attracted.  
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Also, it is conceivable that large masses of chickens would be intimidating to most wild birds 
and they would actively avoid them. 
The one-way analysis of variance revealed there was no strong association between farm type 
and the number of wildlife visits, implying farm type has little impact on the number of wildlife 
visits per farm. Outliers of the analysis suggest that the level of biosecurity on the farm 
influences the number of wildlife visits more so than the farm type. Biosecurity practices that 
can influence the frequency of wildlife visits include cleaning feed spills, keeping grass and 
weeds under control, and rodent control (DAFF, 2009a). For example, the free range layer farm 
outlier had particularly poor cleanliness; recent extermination of rodents was performed on the 
farm but bodies were not removed and were scattered over the range areas. This contributed to 
a relatively large number of wildlife visits largely consisting of crows that scavenged. The cage 
layer farm outlier was the same farm in which a large number of wildlife visits were identified 
on a dam. It is suggested waterbodies in very close proximity to farms contribute to a greater 
number of wildlife visits overall (DAFF, 2009a). 
In general, it was observed that cage layer farms were found to have poorer levels of adoption 
of biosecurity practices compared to the other farm types in the Sydney basin region. Many of 
these cage layer farms were old with worn infrastructure and build-up of debris around the 
farm; their age likely contributed to poorer levels of biosecurity compliance (Scott et al., 
2018d). Across other parts of Australia, it is known that large, modern cage layer farms have 
been developed in regional areas with excellent biosecurity (Scott et al., 2009). Further 
investigation of the impact of biosecurity on the farm has on the types and frequency of wildlife 
visits on the farm is warranted. 
Food availability on Australian commercial chicken farms is the most likely factor influencing 
the types of wildlife visiting the farms (DAFF, 2009a). The common mynah is the most 
frequent wildlife visitor in the study (23.9%), followed by corvids (22.9%) and Columbiformes 
(7.5%). Australian magpies were also common visitors to poultry farms in south eastern 
Queensland. Common mynahs, corvids and Australian magpies are omnivorous and commonly 
feed on insects and plant material including grain, whilst Columbiformes are granivorous 
(DAFF, 2009a, Menkhorst et al., 2017). The commercial chicken farm environment provides 
a plentiful food supply to these bird types especially if there is poor biosecurity on the farm. 
Feed spills near silos provide food to granivorous birds and can also increase insect burdens, 
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along with  poor litter management and partial cleaning of sheds which provides food to 
omnivorous birds (DAFF, 2009a).  
These findings suggest that passerine species, particularly the invasive common mynah and 
corvids, as well as Columbiformes, are the most likely birds to be found around commercial 
chicken farms in other parts of the world in addition to Australia and that these species would 
be most likely to transmit disease to poultry. The potential role of passerine species in initiating 
an avian influenza outbreak has been considered and the risk associated with their presence is 
considered to be low, although they might amplify the virus if an outbreak originating from 
another source occurred (Hansbro et al., 2010).  Australian magpies are sources of Escherichia 
albertii (Gordon, 2011).  This bacterium is a cause of food borne illness in humans and is a 
contaminate of chicken carcasses, so there is a potential increased risk of this disease being 
transmitted to both housed and free range poultry if Australian magpies are attracted to the 
habitat surrounding poultry sheds.  Passerines around the world are also known to be infected 
with Cryptosporidium baileyi and therefore could potentially be a source of infection for 
poultry (Ng et al., 2006, Ryan, 2009).  In the North America, Mycoplasma gallisepticum has 
become enzootic in house finches and less commonly other finch species.  If weeds, such as 
thistles (plants in the tribe Cardueae), are not controlled around sheds, increased finch activity 
and an increased risk for M. gallisepticum  transmission may occur (Ley et al., 2006). 
Perhaps the groups of species of birds not seen in this study on poultry farms are as important 
as those that were. Australia hosts the largest number of endemic species of psittacine birds in 
the world and they are widespread and abundant, yet only a single psittacine species (a black 
cockatoo) was seen and it was flying over a farm.  Given this finding, it appears that Australian 
commercial chickens are unlikely to contract organisms such as Chlamydia psittici or 
Macrorhabdus ornithogaster from them (Phalen et al., 2007, Robertson and Noormohammadi, 
2011).   
Migratory Charadriiformes species (shorebirds such as sandpipers, plovers, stints and godwits) 
are considered the main natural reservoirs of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (Hansbro 
et al., 2010, Grillo et al., 2015).  No migratory Charadriiformes were detected on poultry farms 
in this study. A single masked lapwing, which is a non-migratory Charadriiformes, was 
identified by a silo camera. It is insectivorous and so although detected by a silo camera it is 
likely it was a coincidental visit and not related to eating from feed spills (Dingle, 2004, East 
et al., 2008a). Poultry farms situated in areas in which large numbers of migratory shorebirds 
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use the surrounding wetlands, such as Fullerton Cove in New South Wales, may be at more 
risk to LPAI exposure from Charadriiformes. However, it would not be expected for these birds 
to forage on chicken farms as they are wetland birds and direct contact is unlikely (East et al., 
2008a).  Indirect transmission of LPAI from migratory shorebirds to waterfowl in the wetland 
environment and then transmission to chickens from waterfowl is another possible route of 
wildlife to poultry dissemination and could represent another risk factor for coastal poultry 
farms (East et al., 2008b).  
Australian commercial chickens are at highest risk of being exposed to low pathogenic AI 
circulating from local waterfowl (East et al., 2008a, East et al., 2008b). Feed and waterbodies 
on farms are known attractants for waterfowl (DAFF, 2009a).  One silo camera captured many 
images of waterfowl on an adjacent farm dam.  Future studies monitoring waterfowl activity 
on farm ponds and dams would be useful.  It is known that one risk factor for transmission of 
LPAI to Australian poultry farms is using untreated water from farm dams and ponds as water 
sources for poultry and current recommendations are that all water originating from ponds and 
dams be treated (Scott et al., 2009, DAFF, 2009a). Monitoring farms for longer periods may 
also result in an increase in the numbers of species of birds seen on the farms. 
Mammals identified in this study include feral goats, rats and foxes. Feral goats were 
surprisingly the fifth most commonly identified wild animal type in this study, all of which 
were identified on a cage layer farm by a silo camera and are attracted to feed spills. 
Salmonellosis outbreaks in feral goat populations has been reported in Australia, including 
serotypes such as Salmonella typhimurium, and therefore feral goats should be considered a 
potential biosecurity risk to Australian commercial chicken farms (McOrist and Miller, 1981). 
Commercial poultry farms often are often plagued by rodents (Umali et al., 2012). The results 
of this study suggest that rodent activity is limited outside of chicken sheds and that outdoor 
areas do not need to be targets of rodent control program (Miño et al., 2007). It was found that 
most fox visits (81%, n=17) in this study were identified on free range layer farms and at night 
only. Foxes can be a significant cause of flock mortality for free range chicken farms but only 
appeared to result in loss of birds that did not return to the poultry sheds at night in this study 
(Scott et al., 2009). 
There was little predator activity seen in this study overall. Birds of prey are known to predate 
on free range poultry worldwide (Scott et al., 2009). However, birds of prey in Australia are 
relatively small in size compared to birds of prey in other parts of the world. Few species exist 
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in Australia that are large enough in size to hunt chicken-sized birds; these include the wedge-
tailed eagle (Aquila audax) which is a relatively uncommon species (Burton, 1990, Scott et al., 
2009). In addition, Australia lacks other predator and scavenger species that exist in other parts 
of the world. Examples include raccoons (Procyon lotor) and opossums (Didelphidae) that are 
known to predate on poultry in North America (Kays and Parsons, 2014). Some free range 
chicken farms in this study may have also had good predator control; some farms kept 
Maremma Italian guard dogs which are used to protect livestock species from predators, 
particularly foxes (Bommel and Johnson, 2014, Scott et al., 2017). The cameras were also 
placed for limited length of time and rare interactions between predators and chickens may not 
have been captured as a result. 
Although the potential for pathogen transmission from wildlife to Australian commercial 
chickens appears infrequent from the results of this study, features of modern day commercial 
chicken farms may create a situation where once a wildlife-sourced disease is introduced into 
a farm, the consequences could be severe. Modern day commercial chicken farms are more 
intensive than farms of the mid-20th century, where over ten thousand chickens per shed are 
normal. Additionally, one breed of chicken per farm is also commonplace and thus individual 
chickens have similar levels of immune susceptibility to the same pathogens for each farm 
(Scott et al., 2009, Scott et al., 2017). Therefore, there may be a low chance of pathogen 
exposure from wildlife to modern free range farms, but once a pathogen is introduced to a flock 
from the large number of possible contacts, there may be a greater potential for disease spread 
due to the genetic similarity of all the individual chickens on a farm resulting in an outbreak. 
In contrast, modern poultry management practices may also reduce the risk of disease exposure 
(Scott et al., 2009, East, 2007, Scott et al., 2018d). For example, the provision of food and 
water on the range, commonly practised in the mid-20th century, is strongly advised against in 
commercial modern day free range systems. This reduces the attraction of wildlife to range 
areas (DAFF, 2009a, Scott et al., 2009).  
Overall, this study has informed better understanding of the types, frequency and interactions 
of wildlife on Australian commercial chicken farms using camera trapping technology, and the 
findings have implications for the chicken health and welfare on commercial farms. Wild birds, 
specifically Passeriformes, were the most common visitors and cage layer farms had the most 
wildlife visits compared to other farm types. The indirect route of pathogen transmission also 
appears to be more likely compared to the direct route between wildlife and commercial 
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chickens. This highlights the importance of biosecurity actions to reduce the attractiveness of 
commercial chicken farms to wildlife and thereby reduce the potential of indirect routes of 
transmission of disease. Further research should be considered on the impact of biosecurity on 
wildlife visits on commercial chicken farms, including which specific biosecurity practices can 
most effectively reduce the frequency of wildlife visits and of particular wildlife types.  
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Chapter 6. Low pathogenic avian influenza exposure 
risk assessment in Australian commercial chicken 
farms 
Prologue 
Chapter 6 presents the exposure component of the LPAI risk assessment study in Australian 
commercial chicken farms. It extensively uses data from the farm survey detailed in Chapters 
3 and 4, and other cited data sources such as published literature and the NAIWB Surveillance 
Program. 
Submitted to Frontiers. Revised manuscript in review. 
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Abstract 
This study investigated the pathways of exposure to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
virus among Australian commercial chicken farms, and estimated the likelihood of this 
exposure occurring using scenario trees and a stochastic modelling approach following the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) methodology for risk assessment. Input values 
for the models were sourced from scientific literature and an on-farm survey conducted during 
2015 and 2016 among Australian commercial chicken farms located in New South Wales 
(NSW) and Queensland. Outputs from the models revealed that the probability of a first LPAI 
virus exposure to a chicken in an Australian commercial chicken farms from one wild bird at 
any point in time is extremely low. A comparative assessment revealed that across the five 
farm types (non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer and 
free range layer farms), free range layer farms had the highest probability of exposure (7.5 x 
10-4; 5% and 95%, 5.7 x 10-4 – 0.001). The results indicate that the presence of a large number 
of wild birds on farm is required for exposure to occur across all farm types. The median 
probability of direct exposure was highest in free range farm types (5.6 x 10-4 and 1.6 x 10-4 
for free range layer and free range meat chicken farms respectively) and indirect exposure was 
highest in non-free range farm types (2.7 x 10-4, 2.0 x 10-4 and 1.9 x 10-4 for non-free range 
meat chicken, cage layer and barn layer farms respectively). The probability of exposure was 
found to be lowest in summer for all farm types. Sensitivity analysis revealed that the 
proportion of waterfowl among wild birds on the farm, the presence of waterfowl in the range 
and feed storage areas, and the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds are the most influential 
parameters for the probability of Australian commercial chicken farms being exposed to AI 
virus. These results highlight the importance of ensuring good biosecurity on farms to minimise 
the risk of exposure to AI virus, and the importance of continuous surveillance of LPAI 
prevalence including subtypes in wild bird populations. 
Keywords 
Avian influenza, Australia, commercial chickens, exposure assessment, H5, H7, scenario trees 
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6.1 Introduction 
Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses are naturally circulating in wild birds globally. 
Birds in the taxonomic orders Anseriformes (waterfowl including ducks, geese) and 
Charadriiformes (shorebirds including gulls, waders, auks) constitute the major natural 
reservoir of LPAI with proportions of birds that test positive for the virus at 2.5% (± 0.2%) and 
0.6% (± 0.1%) respectively in Australia (Grillo et al., 2015). Domestic gallinaceous (e.g. 
chickens and turkeys) poultry can become infected with LPAI via the faecal-oral route whereby 
poultry consume infectious faecal material from wild birds; either consuming faeces directly 
or indirectly such as through contaminated water, aerosol or fomites. Once poultry are infected 
with LPAI, the virus may then mutate to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). During 
HPAI infection, morbidity and mortality rates in gallinaceous poultry are very high (50-89%) 
and can reach 100% in some flocks (Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009).  
HPAI is classed as a category 2 emergency animal disease in Australia under the Emergency 
Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) as it has the potential to cause severe 
production losses and impact the national economy, and potentially impact human health 
and/or the environment (AHA, 2015). Australia has experienced seven HPAI outbreaks in 
poultry farms since 1976. All outbreaks were eradicated using a ‘stamping out’ strategy which 
involved quarantine and culling of all poultry on infected premises, tracing and surveillance of 
farms at risk and restriction of movement to reduce spread of the virus (Moloney et al., 2013, 
Roth, 2014, Sims and Turner, 2009). To date HPAI virus has not been detected in wild birds 
in Australia (Grillo et al., 2015). 
There is concern from experts within the Australian poultry industry about the change in 
probability of avian influenza (AI) outbreak occurrence with the recent consumer driven 
expansion of free range poultry farms. There are approximately 800 commercial contract meat 
chicken grower farms and 300 commercial chicken egg farms currently in Australia (Australian 
Eggs, 2017, ACMF, 2011). Produce from commercial chicken farms account for the large 
majority of the national market; where the top seven meat chicken companies and the top 50 
chicken egg producers supply over 95% and 80% of the national chicken meat and eggs 
consumed in Australia (ACMF, 2011, NSW DPI, 2015, Australian Eggs, 2017). Non-
commercial chicken farms are small-scale farms that are suspected or proven to have less 
adoption of biosecurity practices than commercial farms. However, there is limited contact 
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between non-commercial and commercial chicken farms and so the risk of exposure to disease 
on non-commercial farms may be higher but they do not appear to be a threat to the Australian 
chicken industry. The cost of a disease outbreak in non-commercial farms would also be less 
than commercial farms due fewer birds to destroy and a small overall impact on the industry, 
market and consumers (Singh et al., 2017a). New South Wales (NSW) is the leading state for 
both egg and chicken meat production; producing 32% and 34% of the national egg and chicken 
meat volumes, respectively. Queensland and Victoria follow, producing 28% and 27% of the 
national egg volume respectively and 19% and 24% of the national chicken meat volume 
respectively (ACMF, 2011, Australian Eggs, 2017, NSW DPI, 2015) The highest 
concentrations of egg farms in the country are in the Greater Sydney (31%) and Hunter regions 
(20%) (NSW DPI, 2015). Free range chicken meat production in Australia was regarded as a 
‘cottage industry’ in 2006 and now accounts for at least 15% of the total market (ACMF, 2011). 
Similarly, the retail market share of free range eggs has increased from 10% in 2000 to 50% in 
2017 (Australian Eggs, 2017). The concern is that the expansion of free range poultry farms 
will increase the opportunities of contact between wild birds and domestic poultry in Australia, 
thus potentially increasing the probability of LPAI exposure in Australian commercial chicken 
farms. 
There are substantial differences in farm design, management and biosecurity practices among 
the Australian commercial chicken enterprises i.e. cage, barn and free range systems of both 
layer and meat chicken farms which can influence wild bird presence on farm (Scott et al., 
2017, Scott et al., 2018d). In addition, previous work has identified differences in the type of 
wild birds present on farms of different production types and biosecurity implementation (Scott 
et al., 2018c). There is a need to quantify and compare the probability of LPAI exposure for all 
types of Australian commercial chicken enterprises considering these differences. In addition, 
there is a need to investigate the effect of on-farm preventive actions that can mitigate the risk 
and impact of future AI outbreak occurrences in Australia. The aim of this study was to 
consider the potential pathways for LPAI exposure from wild birds to chickens present on all 
types of commercial chicken enterprises in Australia (non-free range meat, free range meat, 
cage layer, barn layer, free range layer), and then to conduct a comparative assessment of how 
likely LPAI exposure from wild birds to chickens would occur via each of the considered 
pathways and overall for each farm type. The most influential pathways of exposure are also 
identified, thereby leading to recommendations about on-farm biosecurity practices that could 
be implemented to minimise these risks. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Risk assessment model 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) provides a methodological framework for 
conducting animal health risk analysis (OIE, 2011). Risk assessment is a component of the 
overall risk analysis methods, which involves an entry, exposure and consequence assessment 
and an estimation of the risk. The current study uses an exposure assessment to investigate the 
potential exposure to AI viruses of domestic chickens raised in commercial chicken properties 
in Australia. A partial consequence assessment was also conducted and is presented in a 
subsequent paper (Scott et al., 2018a). The exposure assessment considers all the potential 
pathways by which chickens located in a commercial layer or meat chicken farm can be 
exposed to AI virus from a single wild bird and the probability of these pathways occurring is 
calculated. Such pathways were portrayed using scenario trees (Martin et al., 2007) and 
developed using Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 7, 2010). The probabilities were estimated 
using Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modelling using the program @RISK 7.0 (Palisade 
Corporation, USA) implemented in Microsoft Excel. Each simulation consisted of 50,000 
iterations sampled using the Latin hypercube method with a fixed random seed of one. 
6.2.2 Data sources 
Most of the input values used in this model were parameterised using data collected from a 
survey on commercial chicken farms in Australia (Scott et al., 2017, Scott et al., 2018d). The 
survey defined commercial layer farms as those with more than 1,000 birds and commercial 
meat chicken farms as those with more than 25,000 birds. It involved a comprehensive on-farm 
interview with farmers including questions related to farm management, biosecurity practices 
and wild bird presence. Scientific literature was used to estimate input parameters when 
required.  
6.2.3 Survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin region and 
South-East Queensland 
A survey commenced in mid-2015 involving on-farm interviews with the farm manager or 
farm owner on 73 commercial chicken farms; 15 non-free range meat, 15 free range meat, nine 
cage layer, nine barn layer and 25 free range layer farms. The farms were located in the Sydney 
basin region in New South Wales (NSW) and in South East Queensland. The Sydney basin 
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region was selected due to the high concentration of both layer and meat chicken farms in this 
area. However in this region, free range meat chicken farms are all owned by one of two large 
privately owned meat chicken companies in Australia. Therefore, additional farm visits to 
South East Queensland were conducted to gain more representative data of privately owned 
meat chicken companies in Australia. The interviews involved a comprehensive questionnaire 
which asked questions to the farmers relating to biosecurity practices performed on farm, wild 
bird and animal presence, general farm information and farm management. A greater 
proportion of layer farms and of free range farms were surveyed due to the greater perceived 
risk of AI occurrence on these farm types. More details on the methodology of the survey, 
including the region and farm selection, questionnaire development and conduct of the on-farm 
interviews can be found in Scott et al. (2017). 
6.2.4 Statistical analysis 
The statistical program JMP® was used (© 2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, USA) to conduct 
one-way analysis of variance 1  (ANOVA) to analyse differences between the outcome 
probabilities for each of the different farm types. The outcome probabilities compared using 
ANOVA were the outcome probability from 1,000 iterations of the exposure scenario tree 
model simulation for each farm type, with each iteration reflecting the situation for one farm 
at a point in time. A p-value of <0.05 was used to determine statistical significance in these 
analyses. 
6.2.5 Probability of exposure 
The exposure assessment examines all potential pathways by which AI virus can be introduced 
from a wild bird into a commercial layer or meat chicken farm and estimates the probability 
that a first exposure to a chicken occurs through each of these pathways. The pathways were 
created and the assessments developed by the authors of this publication. Five exposure 
assessments were performed, one for each farm type: non-free range meat chicken farms, free 
range meat chicken farms, cage layer farms, barn layer farms and free range layer farms. Only 
LPAI viruses were considered due to the fact that HPAI viruses have never been detected from 
Australian wild birds during surveillance activities (Grillo et al., 2015). 
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix E for comparison with Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
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In addition, the models considered differences depending on the season or time of the year, 
given virus prevalence in wild birds changes during different times of the year. The probability 
of chickens accessing outdoors in free range farms also changes during different times of the 
year due to weather conditions. Therefore, three ‘seasons’ were considered in the exposure 
assessments; winter (June to August), summer (December to February) and then autumn and 
spring (March to May and September to November) were combined as one season. 
Parameters required in these exposure assessments included: 1) the probability of wild bird 
presence in different areas of the commercial chicken farm; 2) the probability of wild birds 
being infected and excreting LPAI viruses; and, 3) parameters in relation to the management 
and biosecurity practices performed on the farm that would increase or reduce the probability 
of exposure. The main pathways of exposure considered in these assessments were the 
following six pathways: 1) direct exposure in a shed; 2) direct exposure around feed storage 
areas; 3) indirect exposure through fomites or vectors; 4) indirect exposure through aerosol; 5) 
indirect exposure through contaminated water inside; 6) indirect exposure through 
contaminated water outside sheds; and, 7) direct exposure on the range. 
For the purpose of this model, direct exposure is defined as physical contact between a wild 
bird and a commercial chicken or direct contact between a commercial chicken and wild bird 
faeces. In contrast, indirect exposure is defined as a commercial chicken coming into contact 
with the virus through a medium i.e. through water, fomites or vectors. Fomites include boots 
and equipment contaminated with wild bird faeces and are subsequently in contact with 
chickens through movement. Biological vectors may become infected with the virus, most 
notably insects, mice and rats, and may shed the virus in the presence of chickens or be 
consumed by chickens. Mechanical vectors such as dogs and cats can also present the virus to 
chickens through movement only. 
The overall probability of exposure represents the probability of a first exposure to a domestic 
chicken by one wild bird in each farm type, irrespective of the pathway of exposure. This 
probability was calculated by summing the outcome probability of all the pathways that lead 
to exposure for each farm type. In addition, the overall probability of direct and indirect 
exposure was calculated by summing the outcome probabilities of the direct (pathways 1, 2 
and 7) and indirect (pathways 3, 4, 5 and 6) pathways, respectively, which lead to exposure for 
each farm type.  
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The models estimate the probability of exposure posed by a single wild bird at any point in 
time. This outcome probability of exposure is then used to estimate the expected number of 
exposures considering a range of the number of wild birds that could visit a property either 
concurrent or over time using binomial distributions. The standard proportion of positive LPAI 
detections, at approximately 2.5%, 0.6% and 0.5% for waterfowl, shorebirds and other bird 
types respectively, of which a subset are H5 and H7 subtypes, was used for these binomial 
distributions (Grillo et al., 2015). The prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl and the proportion of 
waterfowl on the farm was then also changed in the model to assess the expected number of 
exposures in potential worst case scenarios: 1) 100% probability of being waterfowl and no 
change in waterfowl LPAI prevalence; 2) 80% probability of being waterfowl and 20% 
waterfowl LPAI prevalence; 3) 100% probability of being waterfowl and 10% waterfowl LPAI 
prevalence; 4) 50% probability of being waterfowl and 20% waterfowl LPAI prevalence; and, 
5) 50% probability of being waterfowl and 10% waterfowl LPAI prevalence. The distributions 
assume that all wild birds are independent, have the same probability of being infected and 
those infected are always infective. 
Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 provide a description of the nodes and input parameters of the 
scenario trees used for the exposure assessments for non-free range meat chicken farms, free 
range meat chicken farms, cage layer farms, barn layer farms and free range layer farms, 
respectively. Cage and barn layer farms are referred to as non-free range layer farms and have 
the same scenario tree structure. Similarly, free range layer and free range meat chicken farms 
also have the same scenario tree structure. Therefore, the scenario trees used for non-free range 
layer farms, non-free range meat chicken farms, and free range layer and meat chicken farms 
are depicted in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. Nodes and input parameters related to the 
range areas are specific for free range farm types, and the nodes for pathways in which surface 
water is used are specific for layer farm types and free range meat chicken farms. The pathway 
6) indirect exposure through contaminated water outside sheds, does not exist for non-free 
range meat chicken farms, and pathway 7) direct exposure on the range, does not exist for non-
free range meat chicken and layer farms. Detailed and further descriptions of the nodes are 
provided in Appendix C.  
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Figure 6.1. Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on non-free range meat chicken 
farms to LPAI viruses from a wild bird in Australia. 
Prop_WF = Proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH = Proportion of 
shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O = Proportion of other bird types reported on 
property, Prev_WildBird_Season = Prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild bird type 
(waterfowl, shorebird or other) in the respective season (winter, summer or autumn/spring), 
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Sheds_WildBird = Proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, 
shorebird or other) inside chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird = Proportion of answers 
that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird or other) in feed storage 
areas, WB_WildBird = Proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type 
(waterfowl, shorebird or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, Escape = proportion of farms 
that reported chickens escaping from shed, Indirect = probability of the occurrence of other 
indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats or dogs), 
Aerosol_WB = Probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds 
on waterbodies, Surface_Water_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used for 
chicken farm, Water_Inside_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used inside 
sheds, Water_Outside_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used outside sheds, 
Water_Inside_Treated = Proportion of answers that treat water used inside sheds, 
Water_Outside_Treated = Proportion of answers that treat water used outside sheds. 
 
  
128 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on non-free layer farms to LPAI 
viruses from a wild bird in Australia. 
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Prop_WF = Proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH = Proportion of 
shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O = Proportion of other bird types reported on 
property, Prev_WildBird_Season = Prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild bird type 
(waterfowl, shorebird or other) in the respective season (winter, summer or autumn/spring), 
Sheds_WildBird = Proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, 
shorebird or other) inside chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird = Proportion of answers 
that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird or other) in feed storage 
areas, WB_WildBird = Proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type 
(waterfowl, shorebird or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, Escape = proportion of farms 
that reported chickens escaping from shed, Indirect = probability of the occurrence of other 
indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats or dogs), 
Aerosol_WB = Probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds 
on waterbodies, Surface_Water_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used for 
chicken farm, Water_Inside_Treated = Proportion of answers that treat water used inside 
sheds. 
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Figure 6.3. Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on free range layer and meat 
chicken farms to LPAI viruses from a wild bird in Australia 
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 (Prop_WF = Proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH = Proportion 
of shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O = Proportion of other bird types 
reported on property, Prev_WildBird_Season = Prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild 
bird type (waterfowl, shorebird or other) in the respective season (winter, summer or 
autumn/spring), Sheds_WildBird = Proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird 
type (waterfowl, shorebird or other) inside chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird = 
Proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird or 
other) in feed storage areas, WB_WildBird = Proportion of answers that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, 
R_WildBird = Proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, 
shorebird other) on the range, Escape = proportion of farms that reported chickens escaping 
from shed and from range, Indirect = probability of the occurrence of other indirect methods 
that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats or dogs), Aerosol_WB = 
Probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds on waterbodies, 
Surface_Water_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used for chicken farm, 
Water_Inside_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used inside sheds, 
Water_Outside_Used = Proportion of answers that surface water is used outside sheds, 
Water_Inside_Treated = Proportion of answers that treat water used inside sheds, 
Water_Outside_Treated = Proportion of answers that treat water used outside sheds, 
Range_Season = Probability that weather conditions are suitable for chickens to access 
range, Age = Proportion of chicken's lifetime in which they are allowed onto range, 
Use_range = Proportion of flock that actually leave shed and use range) 
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Table 6.1. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial 
chickens on non-free range meat chicken farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland) to LPAI from 
a wild bird. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property 
Waterfowl 
Shorebirds 
Other 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
reported the respective wild bird type on 
their property (Prop_WF; Prop_SH; 
Prop_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
48 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 16 
(s) answers of waterfowl; 7 (s) answers of 
shorebirds; 25 (s) answers of other wild birds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds 
Yes 
No 
Probability of the different wild bird 
types; waterfowl, shorebirds or other, 
being infected with LPAI of H5 or H7 
subtype in winter, summer and 
autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; 
Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; 
Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) multiplied by the proportion of 
H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A samples 
in NSW for the seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring 
Information on the values for waterfowl and 
shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions for 
the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be 
obtained by contacting the author of this thesis 
1552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other 
bird type sample (s); this Beta distribution used 
for all three seasons 
 
Grillo et al. 
(2015) 
Hansbro et al. 
(2010) 
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016) 
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken 
sheds on the farm. The data suggests the 
probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and therefore a 
Pert distribution is used for these wild 
bird types (Sheds_WF; Sheds_SH; 
Sheds_O) 
Sheds_WF = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_SH = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_O = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 non-free range meat chicken farms surveyed; 7 
reported seeing other wild bird types in sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm 
Waterbodies 
Feed storage 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
witnessed the respective wild bird type in 
the respective areas (WB_WF, F_WF; 
WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
16 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 13 
answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 3 answers 
of waterfowl in feed storage areas 
7 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 6 
answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 1 answer of 
shorebirds in feed storage areas 
18 answers of other wild bird types in other 
locations (n); 9 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 9 answers of other bird types in feed 
storage areas 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
5. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability of LPAI introduction via 
aerial dispersion from wild birds on 
waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
12 air samples tested at less than 100m from 83 
LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air 
samples obtained 
Jonges et al. 
(2015) 
6. Surface water is 
used for chickens 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that use surface 
water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 farms surveyed (n), 1 farm used surface water 
for farm 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
7. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water inside the chicken sheds 
(Water_Inside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
32 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 
28 answers of water treated inside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
8. Chickens have 
escaped the shed 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that have reported 
chickens unintentionally outside of the 
shed (Escape) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 farms surveyed (n), 0 farms reported chickens 
escaped shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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9. Other indirect 
routes that can lead 
to LPAI 
introduction 
Yes 
No 
Probability that chickens will be exposed 
to LPAI virus via other indirect methods; 
boots, mice/rats, insects and pets 
combined into one probability (Indirect) 
(Probability of exposure from boots + 
mice/rats + insects + pets) 
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots) 
1/25 answers did not use footbaths 
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, 
considered high probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (1/25) x (Uniform(0.7,1)) 
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice) 
10/25 answers had mice/rats in sheds 
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrMice = (10/25) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects) 
14/25 answers had insects in sheds 
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrInsects = (14/25) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets) 
0/25 answers allowed pets in sheds 
AI virus survival on faeces is 2/6 days, 
considered moderate probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (1/25) x (Uniform(0.3,0.5)) 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011)  
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. 
(2006) 
Nazir et al. 
(2011) 
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Table 6.2. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial 
chickens on free range meat chicken farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland) to LPAI from a 
wild bird. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property 
Waterfowl 
Shorebirds 
Other 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
reported the respective wild bird type on 
their property (Prop_WF; Prop_SH; 
Prop_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
36 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 12 
(s) answers of waterfowl; 2 (s) answers of 
shorebirds; 22 (s) answers of other wild birds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds 
Yes 
No 
Probability of the different wild bird 
types; waterfowl, shorebirds or other, 
being infected with LPAI of H5 or H7 
subtype in winter, summer and 
autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; 
Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; 
Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) multiplied by the proportion of 
H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A samples 
in NSW for the seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring 
Information on the values for waterfowl and 
shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions for 
the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be 
obtained by contacting the author of this thesis 
1552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other 
bird type sample (s); this Beta distribution used 
for all three seasons 
 
Grillo et al. 
(2015) 
Hansbro et al. 
(2010) 
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016) 
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken 
sheds on the farm. The data suggests the 
probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and therefore a 
Pert distribution is used for these wild 
bird types (Sheds_WF; Sheds_SH; 
Sheds_O) 
Sheds_WF = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_SH = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_O = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 farms surveyed; 11 reported seeing other wild 
bird types in sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm 
Waterbodies 
Feed storage 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
witnessed the respective wild bird type in 
the respective areas (WB_WF, F_WF; 
WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
20 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 14 
answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 2 answers 
of waterfowl in feed storage areas, 4 answers of 
waterfowl on the range 
4 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 
answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 0 answer of 
shorebirds in feed storage areas, 2 answers of 
shorebirds on the range 
37 answers of other wild bird types in other 
locations (n); 10 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 12 answers of other bird types in 
feed storage areas, 15 answers of other bird types 
on the range 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
5. Suitable weather 
conditions for 
range access 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the weather conditions 
for seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring are suitable for farmers to 
allow chickens on the range; when 
conditions are dry, between 17 and 28C 
and there is no severe weather 
(Range_Winter, Range_Summer, 
Range_AuSp) 
(Probability of suitable temperature + 
dry conditions + no severe weather) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Winter: 13248 winter hours recorded (n), 1555 
winter hours >17C; 1755 winter hours where 
precipitation >1mm; 114 severe weather 
events in NSW, 1 severe weather events in 
Sydney basin in winter 
Summer: 13248 summer hours recorded (n), 
6231.5 summer hours <28C; 8098.5 summer 
hours where precipitation >1mm; 114 severe 
weather events in NSW, 64 severe weather 
events in Sydney basin in summer 
Autumn/Spring: 26352 autumn/spring hours 
recorded (n), 9338.5 autumn/spring hours 
>17C and <28C; 3960.5 autumn/spring hours 
where precipitation >1mm; 114 severe 
weather events in NSW, 49 severe weather 
events in Sydney basin in autumn/spring 
Bureau of 
Meterology 
(BOM) (2016) 
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6. Birds are a suitable 
age for range 
access 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of the chicken’s lifetime in 
which they are allowed onto the range 
(Age) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Average age at flock depopulation 43.25 days (n), 
age allowed outside 21 days 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
7. Birds actually go 
onto the range 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of flock that actually leave 
shed and use the range as reported by 
farmers (Use_Range) 
Average of 15 Beta functions (s+1, n-s+1) 
Total flock proportion 100 (n); proportion of 
flock that use range (9 varying answers)  
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
8. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability of LPAI introduction via 
aerial dispersion from wild birds on 
waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
12 samples tested at less than 100m from 83 
LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air 
samples obtained 
Jonges et al. 
(2015) 
9. Surface water is 
used for chickens 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 farms surveyed (n), 2 answers used surface 
water for farm 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
10. Locations surface 
water is used for 
Inside shed 
Outside shed 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for inside the shed 
versus outside the shed 
(Water_Inside_Used, 
Water_Outside_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
6 answers of surface water use (n), 4 answers use 
surface water inside shed, 2 answers use surface 
water outside shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
11. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water inside the chicken sheds 
(Water_Inside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
34 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 
34 answers of water treated inside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
12. Water outside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water used outside the shed 
(Water_Outside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 
8 answers of water treated outside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
138 
 
13. Chickens have 
escaped the shed or 
range area 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that have reported 
chickens unintentionally outside of the 
shed or range area (Escape) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
15 farms surveyed (n), 0 farms reported chickens 
escaped shed or range area 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
14. Other indirect 
routes that can lead 
to LPAI 
introduction 
Yes 
No 
Probability that chickens will be exposed 
to LPAI virus via other indirect methods; 
boots, mice/rats, insects and pets 
combined into one probability (Indirect) 
(Probability of exposure from boots + 
mice/rats + insects + pets) 
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots) 
1/28 answers did not use footbaths 
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, 
considered high probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (1/28) x (Uniform(0.7,1)) 
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice) 
12/28 answers had mice/rats in sheds 
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrMice = (10/25) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects) 
13/28 answers had insects in sheds 
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrInsects = (13/28) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets) 
2/28 answers allowed pets in sheds on range 
area 
AI virus survival on faeces is 2/6 days, 
considered moderate probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (2/28) x (Uniform(0.3,0.5)) 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
Henzler et al. 
(2003) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. 
(2006) 
Nazir et al. 
(2011) 
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Table 6.3. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial 
chickens on cage layer farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland) to LPAI from a wild bird. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property 
Waterfowl 
Shorebirds 
Other 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
reported the respective wild bird type on 
their property (Prop_WF; Prop_SH; 
Prop_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
30 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 9 (s) 
answers of waterfowl; 2 (s) answers of 
shorebirds; 19 (s) answers of other wild birds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds 
Yes 
No 
Probability of the different wild bird 
types; waterfowl, shorebirds or other, 
being infected with LPAI of H5 or H7 
subtype in winter, summer and 
autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; 
Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; 
Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) multiplied by the proportion of 
H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A samples 
in NSW for the seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring 
Information on the values for waterfowl and 
shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions for 
the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be 
obtained by contacting the author of this thesis 
1552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other 
bird type sample (s); this Beta distribution used 
for all three seasons 
 
Grillo et al. 
(2015) 
Hansbro et al. 
(2010) 
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016) 
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken 
sheds on the farm. The data suggests the 
probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and therefore a 
Pert distribution is used for these wild 
bird types (Sheds_WF; Sheds_SH; 
Sheds_O) 
Sheds_WF = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_SH = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_O = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 farms surveyed; 5 reported seeing other wild 
bird types in sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm 
Waterbodies 
Feed storage 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
witnessed the respective wild bird type in 
the respective areas (WB_WF, F_WF; 
WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 9 
answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 0 answers 
of waterfowl in feed storage areas 
2 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 
answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 0 answer of 
shorebirds in feed storage areas 
14 answers of other wild bird types in other 
locations (n); 6 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 8 answers of other bird types in feed 
storage areas 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
5. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability of LPAI introduction via 
aerial dispersion from wild birds on 
waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
12 samples tested at less than 100m from 83 
LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air 
samples obtained 
Jonges et al. 
(2015) 
6. Surface water is 
used for chickens 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that use surface 
water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 farms surveyed (n), 2 farm used surface water 
for farm 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
7. Locations surface 
water is used for 
Inside shed 
Outside shed 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for inside the shed 
versus outside the shed 
(Water_Inside_Used, 
Water_Outside_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
3 answers of surface water use (n), 1 answers use 
surface water inside shed, 2 answers use surface 
water outside shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
8. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water inside the chicken sheds 
(Water_Inside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
18 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 
17 answers of water treated inside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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9. Water outside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water used outside the shed 
(Water_Outside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
5 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 
2 answers of water treated outside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
10. Chickens have 
escaped the shed 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that have reported 
chickens unintentionally outside of the 
shed (Escape) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 farms surveyed (n), 1 farms reported chickens 
escaped shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
11. Other indirect 
routes that can lead 
to LPAI 
introduction 
Yes 
No 
Probability that chickens will be exposed 
to LPAI virus via other indirect methods; 
boots, mice/rats, insects and pets 
combined into one probability (Indirect) 
(Probability of exposure from boots + 
mice/rats + insects + pets) 
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots) 
7/30 answers did not use footbaths 
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, 
considered high probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (7/30) x (Uniform(0.7,1)) 
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice) 
8/30 answers had mice/rats in sheds 
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrMice = (10/25) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects) 
9/30 answers had insects in sheds 
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrInsects = (9/30) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets) 
6/30 answers allowed pets in sheds 
AI virus survival on faeces is 2/6 days, 
considered moderate probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (6/30) x (Uniform(0.3,0.5)) 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
Henzler et al. 
(2003) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. 
(2006) 
Nazir et al. 
(2011) 
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Table 6.4. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial 
chickens on barn layer farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland) to LPAI from a wild bird. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property 
Waterfowl 
Shorebirds 
Other 
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that reported the respective wild bird 
type on their property (Prop_WF; 
Prop_SH; Prop_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
26 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 7 (s) 
answers of waterfowl; 2 (s) answers of shorebirds; 
17 (s) answers of other wild birds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds 
Yes 
No 
Probability of the different wild bird 
types; waterfowl, shorebirds or other, 
being infected with LPAI of H5 or H7 
subtype in winter, summer and 
autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; 
Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; 
Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) multiplied by the proportion of 
H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A samples in 
NSW for the seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring 
Information on the values for waterfowl and 
shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions for 
the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be 
obtained by contacting the author of this thesis 
1552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other 
bird type sample (s); this Beta distribution used for 
all three seasons 
 
Grillo et al. 
(2015) 
Hansbro et al. 
(2010) 
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016) 
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken 
sheds on the farm. The data suggests 
the probability for waterfowl and 
shorebirds inside sheds is close to 0 
and therefore a Pert distribution is used 
for these wild bird types (Sheds_WF; 
Sheds_SH; Sheds_O) 
Sheds_WF = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_SH = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_O = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 barn layer farms surveyed; 5 reported seeing other 
wild bird types in sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm 
Waterbodies 
Feed storage 
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that witnessed the respective wild bird 
type in the respective areas (WB_WF, 
F_WF; WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
7 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 7 
answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 0 answers of 
waterfowl in feed storage areas 
2 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 
answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 0 answer of 
shorebirds in feed storage areas 
12 answers of other wild bird types in other 
locations (n); 4 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 8 answers of other bird types in feed 
storage areas 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
5. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability of LPAI introduction via 
aerial dispersion from wild birds on 
waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
12 samples tested at less than 100m from 83 LPAI 
(H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air samples 
obtained 
Jonges et al. 
(2015) 
6. Surface water is 
used for chickens 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that use surface 
water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 farms surveyed (n), 3 farms used surface water 
for farm 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
7. Locations surface 
water is used for 
Inside shed 
Outside shed 
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that use surface water for inside the 
shed versus outside the shed 
(Water_Inside_Used, 
Water_Outside_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
6 total answers of surface water use water is used 
for (n), 5 answers for inside the shed, 1 answer for 
outside the shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
8. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that treat water inside the chicken 
sheds (Water_Inside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
19 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 
18 answers of water treated inside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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9. Water outside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that treat water used outside the shed 
(Water_Outside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
1 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 1 
answers of water treated outside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
10. Chickens have 
escaped the shed 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that have reported 
chickens unintentionally outside of the 
shed (Escape) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
9 farms surveyed (n), 0 farms reported chickens 
escaped shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
11. Other indirect 
routes that can lead 
to LPAI 
introduction 
Yes 
No 
Probability that chickens will be 
exposed to LPAI virus via other 
indirect methods; boots, mice/rats, 
insects and pets combined into one 
probability (Indirect) (Probability of 
exposure from boots + mice/rats + 
insects + pets) 
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots) 
3/21 answers did not use footbaths 
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, 
considered high probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (3/21) x (Uniform(0.7,1)) 
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice) 
8/21 answers had mice/rats in sheds 
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrMice = (8/21) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects) 
9/21 answers had insects in sheds 
143 insects tested (n), 114 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrInsects = (9/21) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets) 
1/21 answers allowed pets in sheds 
AI virus survival on faeces is 2/6 days, 
considered moderate probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (1/21) x (Uniform(0.3,0.5)) 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
Henzler et al. 
(2003) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. 
(2006) 
Nazir et al. 
(2011) 
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Table 6.5. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial 
chickens on free range layer farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland) to LPAI from a wild bird. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property 
Waterfowl 
Shorebirds 
Other 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
reported the respective wild bird type on 
their property (Prop_WF; Prop_SH; 
Prop_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
140 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 44 
(s) answers of waterfowl; 33 (s) answers of 
shorebirds; 63 (s) answers of other wild birds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds 
Yes 
No 
Probability of the different wild bird 
types; waterfowl, shorebirds or other, 
being infected with LPAI of H5 or H7 
subtype in winter, summer and 
autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; 
Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; 
Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) multiplied by the proportion of 
H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A samples 
in NSW for the seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring 
Information on the values for waterfowl and 
shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions for 
the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be 
obtained by contacting the author of this thesis 
1552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other 
bird type sample (s); this Beta distribution used 
for all three seasons 
 
Grillo et al. 
(2015) 
Hansbro et al. 
(2010) 
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016) 
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken 
sheds on the farm. The data suggests the 
probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and therefore a 
Pert distribution is used for these wild 
bird types (Sheds_WF; Sheds_SH; 
Sheds_O) 
Sheds_WF = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_SH = Pert (0,0,0.05) 
Sheds_O = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
25 farms surveyed; 13 reported seeing other wild 
bird types in sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm 
Waterbodies 
Feed storage 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
witnessed the respective wild bird type in 
the respective areas (WB_WF, F_WF; 
WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
44 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 23 
answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 9 answers 
of waterfowl in feed storage areas, 12 answers of 
waterfowl on the range 
33 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 12 
answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 9 answer of 
shorebirds in feed storage areas, 12 answers of 
shorebirds on the range 
50 answers of other wild bird types in other 
locations (n); 14 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 16 answers of other bird types in 
feed storage areas, 20 answers of other bird types 
on the range 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
5. Suitable weather 
conditions for 
range access 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the weather conditions 
for seasons winter, summer and 
autumn/spring are suitable for farmers to 
allow chickens on the range; when 
conditions are dry, between 17 and 28C 
and there is no severe weather 
(Range_Winter, Range_Summer, 
Range_AuSp) 
(Probability of suitable temperature + 
dry conditions + no severe weather) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Winter: 13248 winter hours recorded (n), 1555 
winter hours >17C; 1755 winter hours where 
precipitation >1mm; 114 severe weather 
events in NSW, 1 severe weather events in 
Sydney basin in winter 
Summer: 13248 summer hours recorded (n), 
6231.5 summer hours <28C; 8098.5 summer 
hours where precipitation >1mm; 114 severe 
weather events in NSW, 64 severe weather 
events in Sydney basin in summer 
Autumn/Spring: 26352 autumn/spring hours 
recorded (n), 9338.5 autumn/spring hours 
>17C and <28C; 3960.5 autumn/spring hours 
where precipitation >1mm; 114 severe 
weather events in NSW, 49 severe weather 
events in Sydney basin in autumn/spring 
Bureau of 
meteorology 
(2016) 
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6. Birds are a suitable 
age for range 
access 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of the chicken’s lifetime in 
which they are allowed onto the range 
(Age) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Average age at flock depopulation 87.32 weeks 
(n), average age allowed outside 22.94 weeks 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
7. Birds actually go 
onto the range 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of flock that actually leave 
shed and use the range as reported by 
farmers (Use_Range) 
Average of 25 Beta functions (s+1, n-s+1) 
Total flock proportion 100 (n); proportion of 
flock that use range (25 varying answers)  
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
8. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability of LPAI introduction via 
aerial dispersion from wild birds on 
waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
12 air samples tested at less than 100m from 83 
LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air 
samples obtained 
Jonges et al. 
(2015) 
9. Surface water is 
used for chickens 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
25 farms surveyed (n), 6 answers used surface 
water for farm 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
10. Locations surface 
water is used for 
Inside shed 
Outside shed 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for inside the shed 
versus outside the shed 
(Water_Inside_Used, 
Water_Outside_Used) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
22 answers of surface water use (n), 12 answers 
use surface water inside shed, 10 answers use 
surface water outside shed 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
11. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water inside the chicken sheds 
(Water_Inside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
50 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 
48 answers of water treated inside chicken sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
12. Water outside 
chicken sheds is 
treated 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water used outside the shed 
(Water_Outside_Treated) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
17 answers of water use outside chicken sheds 
(n), 14 answers of water treated outside chicken 
sheds 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
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13. Chickens have 
escaped the shed or 
range area 
Yes 
No 
Proportion of farms that have reported 
chickens unintentionally outside of the 
shed or range area (Escape) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
25 farms surveyed (n), 21 farms reported chickens 
escaped shed or range area 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
14. Other indirect 
routes that can lead 
to LPAI 
introduction 
Yes 
No 
Probability that chickens will be exposed 
to LPAI virus via other indirect methods; 
boots, mice/rats, insects and pets 
combined into one probability (Indirect) 
(Probability of exposure from boots + 
mice/rats + insects + pets) 
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots) 
6/63 answers did not use footbaths 
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, 
considered high probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (6/63) x (Uniform(0.7,1)) 
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice) 
19/63 answers had mice/rats in sheds 
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrMice = (10/25) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects) 
25/63 answers had insects in sheds 
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus 
isolation 
PrInsects = (25/63) x (Beta (s+1, n-s+1)) 
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets) 
13/63 answers allowed pets in sheds on range 
area 
AI virus survival on faeces is 2/6 days, 
considered moderate probability of exposure 
PrBoots = (13/63) x (Uniform(0.3,0.5)) 
Scott et al. 
(2017) 
Scott et al. 
(2018d) 
Henzler et al. 
(2003) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. 
(2006) 
Nazir et al. 
(2011) 
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6.2.6 Sensitivity analysis 
The Advanced Sensitivity Analysis tool of the program @RISK 7.0 (Palisade Corporation, 
USA) was used to determine the impact of changes in the input parameters on the model outputs.  
The effect of the following inputs on exposure were investigated: 1) Proportion of waterfowl 
on property (Prop_WF); 2) Proportion of waterfowl on waterbodies (WB_WF); 3) Proportion 
of waterfowl in feed storage areas (F_WF); 4) Proportion of waterfowl on the range (R_WF); 
5) Farm use of surface water (Surface_Water_Used); 6) Water inside the chicken shed is treated 
(Water_Inside_Treated); 7) Water outside the chicken shed is treated 
(Water_Outside_Treated); 8) Escapee chickens from the shed or range (Escape); 9) Indirect 
exposure to the virus (Indirect). The influence of the prevalence of LPAI (Prev_WF) in 
waterfowl was also investigated separately. 
The values for the input parameters included in the sensitivity analysis were varied from 0 to 
1 in thirds (0, 0.3, 0.6, 1), with 1,000 iterations used for each of the values included, whilst all 
other input values were fixed to their base value. The model outputs assessed were the overall 
probability of exposure to LPAI across the three seasons per farm type. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Probability of direct and indirect exposure 
The probability of a first LPAI exposure to a chicken on a commercial chicken farm being 
exposed from a wild bird present on the farm at any point in time through the pathways 
considered in this assessment was estimated to be extremely low for all farm types (Table 6.6). 
The assessment estimates a median (5 - 95%) overall probability of LPAI exposure on 
commercial free range layer farms to be 7.5 x 10-4 (5.7 x 10-4 – 1.0 x 10-4); this being the highest 
probability among all farm types. The farm type with the lowest estimated overall probability 
of LPAI exposure was the barn layer farm type (3.0 x 10-4; 1.4 x 10-4 – 5.8 x 10-4). 
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Table 6.6. Median (5 and 95 percentiles) probabilities of direct and indirect exposure of chickens on the commercial chicken farm types (non-free 
range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) to LPAI at any point in time from a wild bird in Australia 
(specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland). 
Exposure and farm type Median 5% 95% F statistic (degrees 
of freedom); 
P-value 
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect)        
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00037 0.00020 0.00064 F(4,4995) = 
1812.63; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00032 0.00018 0.00057 
Cage layer 0.00032 0.00015 0.00063 
Barn layer 0.00030 0.00014 0.00058 
Free range layer 0.00075 0.00057 0.00010 
Probability of direct exposure        
Non-free range meat chicken 8.68 × 10-5 3.153 × 10-5 0.00019 F(4,4995) = 
8927.21; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00016 8.45 × 10-5 0.00030 
Cage layer 0.00011 3.81 × 10-5 0.00025 
Barn layer 8.82 × 10-5 3.00 × 10-5 0.00022 
Free range layer 0.00056 0.00043 0.00073 
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Probability of indirect exposure        
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00027 0.00014 0.00053 F(4,4995) = 235.78; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00016 5.72 × 10-5 0.00036 
Cage layer 0.00020 7.76 × 10-5 0.00047 
Barn layer 0.00019 7.46 × 10-5 0.00045 
Free range layer 0.00017 9.38 × 10-5 0.00036 
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect - 5 sheds on the property)        
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00185 0.001 0.0032 F(4,4995) = 
1878.45;  
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.0016 0.0009 0.00285 
Cage layer 0.0016 0.00075 0.00315 
Barn layer 0.0015 0.0007 0.0029 
Free range layer 0.00375 0.00285 0.0005 
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect - 10 sheds on the property)        
Non-free range meat chicken 0.0037 0.002 0.0064 F(4,4995) = 
1878.45;  
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.0032 0.0018 0.0057 
Cage layer 0.0032 0.0015 0.0063 
Barn layer 0.003 0.0014 0.0058 
Free range layer 0.0075 0.0057 0.001 
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When the type of LPAI exposure was considered, direct exposure had the highest probability 
of causing first exposure to a domestic chicken among free range farm types, with the lowest 
being reported for barn layer farms (Table 6.6). In contrast, the probability of indirect exposure 
was highest in non-free range farm types.  
To assess the influence of flock size of the farm on the probability of exposure, the overall 
probability of exposure of each farm type was multiplied by hypothetical numbers of sheds on 
the property, as each shed can be considered independent in the exposure models. Five and ten 
sheds were used, and results are shown in Table 6.6. 
6.3.2 Estimated number of exposures according to volume of wild birds 
Binomial distributions are shown in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.4. According to the model, a 
considerable number of wild birds is required for exposure to occur across all farm types. The 
output distributions indicate that for all farm types, except free range layer farms, when 1,000 
wild birds are present at any point in time around the farm, only on 5 of 100 farms (or scenarios) 
would one exposure occur, indicating that in 94.9% of farms, exposure would not occur. For 
free range layer farms, only 100 wild birds are required to be present to expect a similar 
exposure output. In instances where 1,000 birds visit at any point in time on free range layer 
farms, on 50 out of 100 farms (or scenarios), one LPAI exposure would occur based on the 
median of one in Table 6.7. 
The number of exposures was assessed by changing the proportion of wild birds that are 
waterfowl and the LPAI prevalence of waterfowl, with some scenarios representing worst-case 
scenarios (with high proportion of waterfowl present among the wild birds on farm and with 
elevated LPAI prevalence among the wild birds on farm). Waterfowl may make up a 
considerable proportion of wild birds on the property during specific events such as drought 
and similarly, the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl may increase with population dynamics, 
such as an increase in immune-naive juvenile birds. The impact of these scenarios on the 
number of expected exposures is shown in Table 6.7. The largest number of exposures is seen 
when the proportion of waterfowl is increased to 80% and the prevalence increased to 20%. 
For all farm types, other than free range layer farms, at least one exposure would occur when 
50 wild birds are present at the property, and this would occur on 5 out of 100 farms (or 
scenarios). Only 10 wild birds are required for an exposure to occur in these circumstances for 
free range layer farms. 
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Figure 6.4. Number of LPAI virus exposures that would occur given a number of wild birds (n) and changes in the overall probability of LPAI 
exposure (p) with changes in the proportion of wild birds on the farm that are waterfowl and the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl for the 
commercial chicken farm types (non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) at any point in 
time out of 100 scenarios (or farms) using binomial distributions; WF = waterfowl. 
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Table 6.7. Number of LPAI virus exposures that would occur given a number of wild birds (n) and changes in the overall probability of LPAI 
exposure (p) with changes in the proportion of wild birds on the farm that are waterfowl and the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl for the 
commercial chicken farm types (non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) at any point in 
time out of 100 scenarios (or farms) using binomial distributions; Med = Median 
Probability of 
being waterfowl: 
Standard 100% 80% 100% 50% 50% 
Waterfowl LPAI 
prevalence: 
Standard Standard 20% 10% 20% 10% 
Farm 
type 
Number 
of wild 
birds 
Med 5% 95% Med 5% 95% Med 5% 95% Med 5% 95% Med 5% 95% Med 5% 95% 
N
o
n
-f
re
e 
ra
n
g
e 
m
ea
t 
ch
ic
k
en
 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1000 0 0 2 1 0 3 3 0 7 2 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3 
F
re
e 
ra
n
g
e 
m
ea
t 
ch
ic
k
en
 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1000 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3 
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C
a
g
e 
la
y
er
 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1000 0 0 2 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3 
B
a
rn
 l
a
y
er
 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1000 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 3 
F
re
e 
ra
n
g
e 
la
y
er
 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
100 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 
1000 1 0 2 2 0 5 6 2 11 4 1 8 4 1 8 2 0 5 
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6.3.3 Exposure assessment in the three seasons 
The estimated probabilities of a chicken on commercial chicken farms being exposed to LPAI 
virus from wild birds at any point in time during the three seasons previously defined (winter, 
autumn/spring and summer) are summarised in Table 6.8. The results show that the overall 
probability of exposure differs between the different seasons and the season influence also 
differs between farm types. While the median overall probability of exposure to LPAI virus is 
highest in winter for free range layer farms, this probability is highest in autumn/spring for 
non-free range meat chicken, cage layer and barn layer farm types. No difference between 
winter and autumn/spring was observed for free range meat chicken farms. For all farm types, 
the lowest median overall probability of LPAI virus exposure is in summer.  
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Table 6.8. Median (5 and 95 percentiles) overall probabilities of exposure (direct and indirect) of chickens on the commercial chicken farm types 
(non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) to LPAI viruses at any point in time during the 
three defined seasons; winter (June to August); summer (December to February); and autumn and spring (March to May and September to 
November); from wild birds in Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland). 
Farm type  Median 5% 95% F statistic (degrees of freedom); 
P-value 
Winter  
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00044 0.00024 0.00079 F(4,4995) = 2327.39; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00039 0.00022 0.00068 
Cage layer 0.00038 0.00017 0.00077 
Barn layer 0.00035 0.00016 0.00070 
Free range layer 0.00102 0.00076 0.0014 
Summer  
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00019 0.00010 0.00034 F(4,4995) = 403.78; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00018 9.06 × 10-5 0.00035 
Cage layer 0.00018 8.09 × 10-5 0.00036 
Barn layer 0.00017 7.56 × 10-5 0.00033 
Free range layer 0.00030 0.00020 0.00049 
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Autumn/ Spring  
Non-free range meat chicken 0.00046 0.00026 0.00082 F(4,4995) = 1525.98; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.00039 0.00023 0.00069 
Cage layer 0.00040 0.00018 0.00079 
Barn layer 0.00036 0.00017 0.00072 
Free range layer 0.00093 0.00069 0.0012 
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6.3.4 Exposure sensitivity analysis 
According to the exposure sensitivity analysis, the most influential parameters were the 
proportion of waterfowl among wild birds on the property and the probability of waterfowl 
being on the feed storage areas (Figure 6.5). When the proportion of waterfowl among wild 
birds on the property becomes 100% (base value between 0.28 and 0.34 for all farm types), 
which can occur during circumstances such as drought, there is an approximate 2.8-fold 
increase in the probability of LPAI exposure for all farm types. A similar increase in the 
probability of LPAI exposure is obtained when the probability of waterfowl being on feed 
storage areas is increased to 100%. On free range farms (Figures 6.5b and 6.5e), waterfowl on 
the range was the third most influential parameter. When the probability of waterfowl on the 
range is increased to 100% (base value 0.50 and 0.28 for free range meat chicken and layer 
farms, respectively), an approximate 1.7-fold increase in the probability of LPAI exposure 
occurs. On barn layer farm types, the treatment of water inside the shed is also an important 
influential parameter. If the probability of water inside sheds being appropriately treated is 
decreased to 0% (base value 0.92 for barn layer farms), there is an approximate 2.4-fold 
increase in the probability of LPAI exposure. For other farm types, the impact of water 
treatment is not as significant. Escapee chickens from the sheds or the range was another 
influential parameter; if the probability of this occurring is increased to 100% (base value 0.042, 
0.042, 0.45, 0.067 and 0.46 for non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage 
layer, barn layer and free range layer farms, respectively), an approximate 1.7-fold increase in 
the probability of LPAI exposure occurs for all farm types. The other indirect routes parameter 
(includes boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats or dogs) was slightly less influential, with an 
approximate 1.5-fold increase in the probability of LPAI exposure if the probability of these 
pathways occurring increases to 100% (base value 0.28 to 0.43 for all farm types). The 
proportion of waterfowl on waterbodies, the use of surface water and the treatment of water 
outside of sheds were found to be the least influential parameters in the exposure probability 
for all farm types. 
Sensitivity analysis on the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl was also conducted separately as 
this parameter has a profound influence on the probability of LPAI exposure. It was found from 
the sensitivity analysis there is an approximate 3 to 4-fold increase in the probability of LPAI 
exposure across the farm types when the LPAI prevalence in wild waterfowl is increased to 
20%. 
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Figure 6.5. Results of the sensitivity analysis on the exposure assessment depicting the change in probability (Y-axis) on the median overall  
probability of exposure (horizontal line) of a commercial poultry farm to LPAI virus from a wild bird in Australia with changes of certain input 
variables listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.5 (X-axis). Results were obtained from a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity 
Analysis. 
a = non-free range meat chicken; b = free range meat chicken; c = cage layer; d = barn layer; e = free range layer 
Prop_WF = Proportion of waterfowl reported on property, WB_WF = Proportion of responses that witnessed waterfowl in waterbodies on/near 
the farm, F_WF = Proportion of responses that witnessed waterfowl in feed storage areas, R_WF = Proportion of responses that witnessed 
waterfowl on the range, Surface_Water_Used = Proportion of responses that use surface water for the chicken farm, Water_Inside_Treated = 
Proportion of responses that treat water used inside sheds, Water_Outside_Treated = Proportion of responses that treat water used outside 
sheds, Escape = proportion of farms that reported chickens escaping from shed (and from range for b and e), Indirect = probability of the 
occurrence of other indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats or dogs.
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6.4 Discussion 
This study comparatively estimates the probability of a first exposure of a chicken to LPAI 
viruses from wild birds present on different types of commercial chicken enterprises in 
Australia. The probabilities estimated in this study can be considered representative for the 
Sydney basin region as weather information and the majority of on-farm surveys conducted 
are specific to this region. In addition, all of the LPAI wild bird prevalence data used in this 
study was from the Sydney basin region, where most samples were collected from the Lower 
Hunter region which was considered part of the Sydney basin region in the survey by Scott et 
al. (2017). Generalising these probabilities to commercial chicken farms in other regions of 
Australia, non-commercial chicken farms or farms with poultry species other than chickens 
must be done with caution as differences in farm design and management and biosecurity 
practices exist as well as differences in weather conditions and LPAI wild bird prevalence in 
different regions (Grillo et al., 2015, BOM, 2016, Scott et al., 2009). Further research is 
required to gain appropriate input data to confidently apply this model to quantify the risk of 
exposure to commercial chicken farms in other regions, to non-commercial chicken farms and 
other poultry species farm types in Australia. 
6.4.1 Probability of LPAI Exposure 
The probabilities of exposure estimated in this study apply to commercial chicken farms 
according to the definition implemented in the on-farm survey conducted by Scott et al. (2017) 
as this survey provided data that informed most input parameters. This survey included layer 
and meat chicken farm which house more than 1,000 or 25,000 chickens, respectively. Thus, 
the model outputs in this study apply to these flock sizes. There is epidemiological evidence 
that large flock sizes may be at greater risk of HPAI introduction compared to small flock sizes 
(Thomas et al., 2005). There is limited information to suggest that this is also true for LPAI 
introduction, but it is logical to acknowledge that large flock sizes have more animal contacts 
which may increase the risk of LPAI exposure. This study assessed the influence of flock size 
on the overall probability by considering the number of sheds on the property and demonstrated 
that more sheds on a property lead to greater probabilities of exposure.  
Overall, the probability of a first exposure to LPAI from a wild bird at any point in time is very 
to extremely low for all farm types according to terminology for quantitative likelihoods 
(Burgman et al., 2010). However, the highest probability of exposure is seen among free range 
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layer farms, with this probability being over two times higher than for the other farm types. 
These results are in agreement with a study conducted  by Gonzales et al. (2012c), which 
reported a rate of introduction of LPAI virus 13 times higher in outdoor layer farms when 
compared to indoor layer farms in the Netherlands. It has been indicated that the most efficient 
means of introduction of AI into commercial poultry is through direct contact with infected 
birds (Swayne, 2009). Free range farms have access to the outdoors where direct exposure to 
wild birds is more likely to occur compared to indoor farms, and this is in agreement with 
results presented here. However, during on-farm surveys it was found that Australian free range 
meat chickens are relatively restricted in their access to the outdoors, which is determined by 
their age and suitable outside weather conditions (Scott et al., 2017). Most Australian meat 
chickens are processed when they reach only 50 days, whereas layer chickens are kept in 
production until around 70 to 80 weeks (Scott et al., 2009, Scott et al., 2017). In the broader 
context, it must be reminded that this probability originates from the risk posed by a single wild 
bird and that with the likely increase of free range farm types from consumer demand, it is 
expected that the occurrence of these exposures will rise. This highlights the need to uphold 
stringent biosecurity practices on farm to reduce this probability of exposure. 
There have been a total of 15 confirmed LPAI cases in Australian poultry since 1976 (Arzey, 
2013, AVCO, 2015). These cases include LPAI detections of various subtypes, including 
outbreaks and single bird detections, in Australian poultry. These detections have been a result 
of passive surveillance (diagnostic submissions), active surveillance (during HPAI outbreaks) 
and incidental findings not associated with disease. Most have occurred in domestic flocks of 
ducks, with five incidents in combined chicken and duck farms. In addition, breeder birds were 
involved in several incidents, with two detections in breeder duck farms, two in breeder chicken 
farms and two in mixed breeder and meat duck farms. Four cases occurred in meat poultry 
farms (two turkey and two duck farms). LPAI has never been detected on a meat chicken farm 
or on a single species commercial egg layer enterprise (Arzey, 2013). The exposure model 
considers single-species commercial chicken farms only. Therefore, of all LPAI detections that 
have occurred in Australia so far, comparisons with the model results can only be made with 
the two LPAI detections that occurred in breeder chicken farms. Breeder chicken farms are 
essentially equivalent to barn layer chicken farms and usually have good biosecurity (Scott et 
al., 2009). However, the exposure model suggests barn layers have the lowest probability of 
overall LPAI exposure compared to all farm types. As well as good biosecurity, breeder 
chicken farms tend to also have close flock health monitoring, as the LPAI detections that 
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occurred were during outbreak investigation related to a drop in production performance 
(Arzey, 2013). It is very likely LPAI detections in Australia are underreported as LPAI 
infections can be non-clinical, especially in ducks (Arzey, 2013). This study found that 
information on AI virus characteristics and behaviour, especially in an Australian context, is 
extremely scarce. 
To best validate these models, routine sampling of Australian commercial chicken farms for 
LPAI should be conducted. According to the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan for Avian 
Influenza (AHA, 2011), farms with positive detections of H5 or H7 AI virus via cloacal or 
oropharyngeal swabs must be depopulated and quarantine measures put into place. Given the 
current depopulation policy, the introduction of financial incentives or encouragement from 
industry is required to convince farmers to participate in active surveillance sampling. 
Voluntary participation in routine surveillance as part of a farm accreditation program can also 
be considered (USDA, 2017b). As an alternative to this sampling approach, serological surveys 
can also be used as occurs in the Netherlands, where all poultry farms were tested for evidence 
of seroconversion at least once a year, with outdoor layer farms being tested three to four times 
per year. This data was used to estimate the introduction rates between different farm types 
(Gonzales et al., 2012c). Serological sampling has also been performed in Australia but in small, 
sentinel free-range flocks located near waterfowl habitat and far from commercial chicken 
enterprises. Results from this sampling showed an extremely low introduction rate; from 2,000 
samples collected over eight years, 0.85% (17) samples tested positive for AI antibodies and 
4.35% (87) were uncertain. The number of H5 and H7 subtypes was not determined in the 
study (East et al., 2010). Although useful, this information cannot be confidently applied to 
commercial chicken enterprises due to stark differences in the number of birds in a flock, 
management practices and farm locations. 
6.4.2 Probability of direct and indirect LPAI exposure 
The differences in the probability of direct and indirect exposure between free range and non-
free range farms are likely due to the definitions of exposures types used in this model. Direct 
exposure is more likely to occur when chickens have access to the outdoors and, as such, 
exposure to the virus in non-free range farms is more likely to occur through indirect pathways. 
Biosecurity refers to actions to prevent the introduction and spread of infectious agents. In 
relation to poultry enterprises this refers to practices such as the use of foot baths, treatment of 
water, disinfection of equipment between sheds and vermin control (DAFF, 2009a). It was 
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found during on-farm surveys that non-free range meat chicken farms were usually older farms 
with relatively poorer biosecurity compared to free range meat chicken farms (Scott et al., 
2018d). This relative lack in biosecurity contributed to the highest median probability of 
indirect exposure occurring in non-free range meat chicken farms compared to the rest of the 
farm types. This in combination with the relative restriction to the outdoors in free range meat 
chicken farms lead to the higher overall probability of LPAI exposure in non-free range meat 
chicken farms compared to free range meat chicken farms. Biosecurity was also relatively 
lacking in cage layer farms compared to other farm types, where layer chickens were reported 
to escape the sheds to the feed storage areas and wild birds reported to be inside sheds (Scott 
et al., 2017, Scott et al., 2018d). This explains the relatively high probability of both direct and 
indirect LPAI exposure in cage layer farms compared to other farm types. 
Another major introduction route implicated for LPAI is the contamination of drinking water 
for chickens with infective wild bird faeces. At least half of all Australian HPAI outbreaks so 
far are likely to have been associated with the introduction of LPAI via contaminated drinking 
water (Alexander and Capua, 2008, Sims and Turner, 2009). However, on-farm survey results 
showed a high level of water treatment across all farm types. The treatment methods identified 
in the on-farm surveys were deemed adequate to deactivate LPAI, due to the fragile nature and 
short persistence of AI viruses in the environment (Tiwari et al., 2006). Therefore, the use of 
surface water is not a highly influential parameter, also depicted in the sensitivity analyses, due 
to the high proportion of water treatment amongst all farm types. Overall, the treatment of 
water inside and outside sheds were not found to be significantly influential parameters. In 
general, it was found water treatment inside sheds was more influential in the indoor, non-free 
range farms compared to free range farms due to the limited opportunities of direct exposure 
in indoor farm types. 
The exposure sensitivity analysis revealed that the most influential parameters were related to 
waterfowl presence on the farm; particularly the proportion of waterfowl among wild birds on 
the property, waterfowl around feed storage areas and waterfowl on the range. Waterfowl on 
waterbodies was not a highly influential parameter due to the high proportion of farms that 
treat surface water, as previously mentioned, and the low probability of aerosol transmission 
of LPAI from wild waterfowl on waterbodies to commercial chickens (Jonges et al., 2015). 
However, waterbodies are an attractant for waterfowl and artificial waters, such as dams are 
used extensively by waterfowl (Read, 1999) and it is expected that waterfowl on waterbodies 
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in proximity to farms will move to feed storage areas or the range of the farm. To effectively 
reduce the probability of LPAI exposure to Australian commercial chickens, efforts must be 
considered to ethically and effectively deter waterfowl from chicken farms. However, farm 
dams play an important role in water supply and irrigation in Australian agriculture and so the 
removal of open water sources can be of a great detriment to the farmer (Tingey-Holyoak, 
2014). In addition, covering open water sources and netting ranges are cost prohibitive (Atzeni 
et al., 2016). Recommendations from a critical review on the deterrence of wild waterfowl from 
Australian poultry production areas include maintaining optimal grass height, preventing grass 
going to seed, improving drainage on range areas and around sheds, and prompt cleaning of 
feed spills around feed storage areas. Other sophisticated recommendations include the 
development of a 24/7 waterfowl monitoring system on farm and then trialling a range of cost-
effective radar-activated on-demand auditory, visual or physical deterrent systems (Atzeni et 
al., 2016). 
6.4.3 Volume of wild birds on the probability of LPAI exposure 
In addition to the presence of waterfowl in different areas of the farm, the actual number of 
waterfowl present as well as the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl are highly influential on the 
potential number of exposures occurring. The 1994 H7N2 outbreak in Lowood, Queensland is 
a classic example of both Australian waterfowl movements and the impact of the number of 
waterfowl in a property. The outbreak occurred during severe drought and a river that 
constituted one border for the farm as well as a small dam near the entrance of the chicken 
sheds had attracted a large population of wild birds prior to the subsequent outbreak. LPAI was 
speculated to be introduced to the flock through contaminated drinking water (Sims and Turner, 
2009). Currently, there is no available data that accurately estimates the number of wild birds 
that visit Australian commercial chicken farms over a certain time period. Wildlife camera 
trapping work conducted by Scott et al. (2018c) demonstrated an average of 17 wild bird 
sightings a week. This is very likely an underestimate as the cameras did not capture the whole 
farm area. However, this data can be extrapolated to a hypothetical scenario in which it can be 
said that approximately 17 wild birds a week is equivalent to approximately 1,000 wild birds a 
year. Therefore, the number of exposures estimated in this study for 1,000 wild birds present 
at one point in time could indicate the cumulative expected number of exposures that can occur 
in one year. Accurate information of wild bird numbers can be obtained from manual wild bird 
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farm surveys or the development of a 24/7 wild bird monitoring system on farm as was stated 
as a recommendation for wild waterfowl deterrence previously (Atzeni et al., 2016). 
6.4.4 The effects of season on the probability of LPAI exposure 
The probability of the first exposure to LPAI virus for a chicken on an Australian commercial 
chicken farm was found to be lowest in summer for all farm types. The highest probability was 
estimated to be in winter for chickens on free range layer farms and autumn/spring for the rest 
of the farms, except for free range meat chicken farms which reported no difference between 
winter and autumn/spring. However, there were minor differences in the probabilities of 
exposure for all farm types between winter and autumn/spring overall. Among previous HPAI 
outbreaks in Australia, one occurred in winter (July), four in autumn and spring (May, October, 
November) and two in summer (December and January). The three latest outbreaks that 
occurred in Tamworth (1997), Maitland (2012) and Young (2013) occurred in October or 
November (Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR), 2013, NSW 
Government 2012, Sims and Turner, 2009). The mechanisms of mutation from LPAI to HPAI 
are poorly understood and difficult to predict. In some overseas outbreaks, LPAI viruses have 
been detected in domestic poultry weeks or months prior to the subsequent HPAI virus 
outbreaks (Stech and Mettenleiter, 2013). It could be speculated for the Australian HPAI 
outbreaks that occurred in summer, when the probability of LPAI exposure is estimated to be 
lowest compared to the other seasons, that introduction of the virus occurred during spring, the 
virus then circulated within the flock for months and mutation subsequently occurring in 
summer (Richard et al., 2017). On the other hand, Fusaro et al. (2015) demonstrated that some 
H7 LPAI subtypes detected in Italy can mutate quickly in order to adapt to the new host species. 
The seasonal variations in the probability of exposure are influenced by the wild bird LPAI 
prevalence data and the guidelines on outside weather conditions that determine whether or not 
chickens are provided access to the range. The overall proportion of positive detections of LPAI 
in Australian wild waterfowl at any point in time is approximately 2.5% (± 0.2%). Seasonal 
effects on the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds within NSW do not appear to fluctuate as 
greatly as in the northern hemisphere (Hansbro et al., 2010). There is evidence to suggest that 
the fluctuation of wild bird LPAI prevalence in Australia is more dependent on rainfall patterns 
and bird movements, abundance and breeding particularly in Australian waterfowl (Ferenczi 
et al., 2016, Tracey, 2010). In the northern hemisphere, there is generally a low prevalence of 
LPAI in winter, an increase in viral prevalence in summer, followed by a peak in prevalence 
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in autumn (Causey and Edwards, 2008, Vandegrift et al., 2010). This contrasts with NSW data 
which reveals a high prevalence of LPAI in winter and autumn/spring and a low prevalence in 
summer (Hansbro et al., 2010). In the northern hemisphere, the increased prevalence in summer 
is thought to be due to the progressive influx of immunonaïve juvenile waterfowl to the 
population, following breeding in spring (van-Dijk et al., 2014). In Australia, the breeding 
seasons and movements of waterfowl are less predictable; many populations are nomadic, 
which contrasts with the waterfowl populations in the northern hemisphere which are well 
known for their annual migrations over long distances. Movements and breeding of Australian 
waterfowl are instead largely determined by the distribution of surface water and rainfall 
(Tracey et al., 2004, Cooper et al., 2014). A high prevalence of LPAI may occur during periods 
of waterfowl congregation, such as during droughts. A particular example that supports this 
point is the 1994 H7N3 HPAI outbreak that occurred in Queensland, Australia, which took 
place during a period of severe drought. Water used for the farm was drawn from a river on the 
periphery of the farm and had attracted a large population of wild birds. This likely greatly 
increased the probability of LPAI exposure to the farm and lead to the HPAI outbreak (Sims 
and Turner, 2009). It is important that wild bird surveillance for AI continues, to identify 
seasonal and other trends of LPAI prevalence which will provide further understanding in 
preventing and dealing with future AI outbreaks. 
Birds in the families Scolopacidae and Charadriidae (shorebirds and waders) do undergo 
annual migrations over long distances and visit Australasia (Tracey et al., 2004). In the northern 
hemisphere, the arrival of migrant birds to the resident population coincides with the peak LPAI 
prevalence in autumn. Migrating birds may be more susceptible to infection from long distance 
flights and/or relatively low immune resistance to locally circulating LPAI strains compared to 
resident birds (van-Dijk et al., 2014). These shorebirds are more likely to become infected with 
local Australian LPAI subtypes rather than bring exotic strains of the virus into Australia; the 
probability of the latter occurring was previously estimated to be extremely low (East et al., 
2008a). 
6.5 Conclusion 
There are still many uncertainties related to the mechanisms of the LPAI virus introduction and 
exposure, particularly in Australian commercial chicken farm settings. However, the results of 
this study have used the best data available at this time. The results suggest that chickens on 
commercial free range layer farms have approximately double the risk of LPAI exposure 
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compared to other farm types. The probability of direct exposure is also more likely in both 
free range layer and meat chicken farms compared to the other farm types. Moreover, the 
probability of LPAI exposure seems to be lower in summer compared to all other seasons and 
this is influenced by the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds and the weather conditions in which 
free-range chickens are allowed to go on the range. The proportion of waterfowl on the farm 
and the presence of waterfowl on the range and feed storage areas are the most influential 
parameters on the probability of exposure. These results highlight the importance of good 
biosecurity on farms, providing insight regarding the on-farm actions that can reduce the risk 
of LPAI exposure such as those related to waterfowl deterrence. In addition, the importance of 
continuous surveillance of Australian wild bird populations to monitor LPAI prevalence and 
subtypes is highlighted, as this can help predict future introductions and outbreaks. The need 
of further research in AI virus properties, particularly in an Australian context is also 
highlighted. 
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Chapter 7. Low and high pathogenic avian influenza 
H5 and H7 spread risk assessment within and 
between Australian commercial chicken farms 
Prologue 
Chapter 7 presents the spread component of the risk assessment study in Australian commercial 
chicken farms for both LPAI and HPAI. It details occurrences after initial exposure to LPAI, 
stemming from results from Chapter 6. 
Submitted to Frontiers. Revised manuscript in review. 
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Abstract 
This study quantified and compared the probability of avian influenza (AI) spread within and 
between Australian commercial chicken farms via specified spread pathways using scenario 
tree mathematical modelling. Input values for the models were sourced from scientific 
literature, expert opinion, and a farm survey conducted during 2015 and 2016 on Australian 
commercial chicken farms located in New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland. Outputs from 
the models indicate that the probability of no establishment of infection in a shed is the most 
likely end-point after exposure and infection of LPAI in one chicken for all farm types (non-
free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer and free range layer 
farms). If LPAI infection is established in a shed, LPAI is more likely to spread to other sheds 
and beyond the index farm due to a relatively low probability of detection and reporting during 
LPAI infection compared to HPAI infection. Among farm types, the median probability for 
HPAI spread between sheds and between farms is higher for layer farms (0.0019, 0.0016 and 
0.0031 for cage, barn and free range layer, respectively) than meat chicken farms (0.00025 and 
0.00043 for barn and free range meat chicken, respectively) due to a higher probability of 
mutation in layer birds, which relates to their longer production cycle length. The pathway of 
LPAI spread between sheds with the highest average median probability was spread via 
equipment (0.015; 5-95%, 0.0058 – 0.036) and for HPAI spread between farms, the pathway 
with the highest average median probability was spread via egg trays (3.70 × 10-5; 5-95%, 1.47 
× 10-6 – 0.00034). As the spread model did not explicitly consider volume and frequency of 
the spread pathways, these results provide a comparison of spread probabilities per pathway, 
which for shed-to-shed spread assumed similar volume and frequency for each pathway. These 
findings highlight the importance of performing biosecurity practices to limit spread of AI virus. 
The models can be updated as new information on the mechanisms of AI virus and on the 
volume and frequency of movements shed-to-shed and of movements between commercial 
chicken farms becomes available.  
Keywords 
Avian influenza, Australia, commercial chickens, H5, H7, partial consequence assessment, 
scenario trees, spread  
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7.1 Introduction 
The risk of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus spread in Australia is dependent 
initially on the risk of exposure of commercial chicken farms in this country to LPAI, which 
has been quantified by Scott et al. (2018b). After exposure to the virus, the risk of spread is 
then dependent on infection of the chicken with the virus and establishment of the virus within 
the flock (Yao et al., 2014, FAO EMPRES-i, 2016, Spickler et al., 2008). Once established in 
one flock, LPAI spread within farms (between sheds) and between farms can occur. LPAI 
infection can be associated with no clinical signs but a range of clinical illness in birds including 
respiratory disease can also be seen, thereby leading to production losses and decreased welfare 
(Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009, Spickler et al., 2008). For infections with H5 and H7 
LPAI viruses, with further virus spread and the subsequent increasing number of infected birds, 
there is a greater possibility of mutation of the virus to highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI). HPAI has very high morbidity and mortality rates in gallinaceous poultry (up to 100%) 
(Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). If mutation does occur, the risk of HPAI spread within 
and between farms must then be considered. 
Factors influencing the success of LPAI or HPAI spread depend heavily on biosecurity actions 
put into place on the farm. Previous modelling work suggest that bird pickup trucks and feed 
trucks that move between farms, and human movements between sheds were pathways 
associated with the highest risk of spread of AI. Emphasis to ensure good biosecurity practices 
associated with these pathways, such as vehicle disinfection and footbaths, was therefore made 
(Ssematimba et al., 2013, Dorea et al., 2010). The timeliness of detection of clinical signs of 
infected flocks by farmers also plays a significant role in limiting spread of disease. If the 
appropriate authority figures are contacted by farmers promptly, management practices can be 
put into place to limit spread of the virus both within and between farms (Scott et al., 2018d, 
Spickler et al., 2008). This is supported by several previous mathematical modelling studies 
which revealed a reduction in the probability of AI spread to other farms if detection and 
reporting occurs earlier rather than later in the outbreak and if the detection threshold is lowered 
or frequent sampling occurs on high risk farms (Gonzales et al., 2014, Weaver et al., 2012, 
Comin et al., 2012). 
All seven HPAI outbreaks in Australia to date have had only commercial chicken farms as the 
index farms; including commercial layer or meat chicken farms, with two outbreaks involving 
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meat chicken breeder farms. Four of the seven HPAI outbreaks involved spread from the index 
farm to affect nearby farms (Sims and Turner, 2009, Brown et al., 2016). In addition, 
surveillance found evidence of LPAI infection among duck farms in the vicinity for two of the 
seven HPAI outbreaks, suggesting initial LPAI spread with subsequent mutation (Arzey, 2013, 
AVCO, 2015). The focus on commercial chicken farms in this study is due to the comparatively 
small threat posed by non-commercial chicken farms to the Australian poultry industry. There 
is limited contact between non-commercial and commercial chicken farms in Australia. In 
addition, AI detection on non-commercial chicken farms, as did occur with three of the 12 
LPAI cases detected in this country to date, has little impact on the industry, market and 
consumers due to the small number of birds to destroy (Arzey, 2013, AVCO, 2015, Singh et 
al., 2017a). 
The pathways of spread in the past Australian HPAI outbreaks were suspected based on 
epidemiological investigations; examples identified include common dead bird pick up and egg 
transport vehicles amongst the affected farms (Selleck et al., 2002, Brown et al., 2016, Roth, 
2014). However, it is currently unknown for the Australian context which pathways are most 
likely to cause spread, whether particular farm types are at more risk of spread than others, and 
the influence biosecurity practices will have on spread. Thus there is a need to quantify and 
compare the probability of both LPAI and HPAI spread for all types of Australian commercial 
chicken enterprises i.e. cage, barn and free range systems of both layer and meat chicken farms. 
Further, there is a need to quantify the effect of on-farm preventive actions that can mitigate 
the risk and impact of future AI outbreak occurrences in Australia.  
In response to these needs, the aim of this study was first to estimate the probability of infection 
and establishment of LPAI virus after one chicken is exposed to the virus using results obtained 
from Scott et al. (2018b). Then, potential pathways for LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds 
and farms on all types of Australian commercial chicken enterprises were identified. A partial 
consequence assessment was then performed to estimate and compare the probabilities of LPAI 
and of HPAI spread between sheds and farms with particular focus on the differences in spread 
via the investigated pathways, without explicit consideration of pathway volume and frequency 
as insufficient information was available to incorporate consideration of these in this study. 
Comparison of study results will inform understanding of the most influential pathways of 
spread of LPAI and HPAI, and of any differences between farm types if these exist. This new 
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knowledge can direct thinking about on-farm biosecurity practices that can be put into place to 
reduce the potential for AI spread. 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Risk assessment model 
The overall study used the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE) risk analysis 
framework (OIE 2011) to conduct an exposure and partial consequence assessment in relation 
to AI for Australian commercial chicken farms. The exposure assessment considered the 
potential pathways by which chickens situated in a commercial layer or meat chicken farm can 
be exposed to avian influenza (AI) virus from wild birds. This assessment can be found in Scott 
et al. (2018b). The current study focussed on a partial consequence assessment, where the risk 
of spread was determined but the level of consequences following spread not measured. This 
assessment considered the pathways by which these viruses can spread between sheds on the 
same farm and from one farm to other farms. The probability of these pathways occurring was 
calculated. Such pathways were portrayed using scenario trees (Martin et al., 2007) and 
developed using Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 7, 2010). The probabilities were estimated 
using Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modelling using the program @RISK 7.0 (Palisade 
Corporation, USA). Each simulation consisted of 50,000 iterations sampled using the Latin 
hypercube method with a fixed random seed of one. 
7.2.2 Data sources 
Most of the input values used in this model were parameterised using data collected from a  
survey on commercial chicken farms in Australia (Scott et al., 2017, Scott et al., 2018d). This 
study defined commercial layer farms as those with more than 1,000 birds, and commercial 
meat chicken farms as those with more than 25,000 birds. It involved a comprehensive on-farm 
interview with farmers including questions related to farm management, biosecurity practices 
and wild bird presence. In addition, input values were also obtained from scientific literature. 
An expert opinion workshop was also held to obtain input values that were largely unknown 
or undescribed in the scientific literature (Singh et al., 2017b). 
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7.2.3 Survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin region and 
South-East Queensland 
A survey was conducted from mid-2015 with on-farm interviews on 73 commercial chicken 
farms; nine cage layer, nine barn layer, 25 free range layer, 15 non-free range meat chicken 
and 15 free range meat chicken farms (Scott et al., 2017, Scott et al., 2018d). The farms were 
located in the Sydney basin region in New South Wales (NSW) and in South East Queensland. 
The Sydney basin region was selected due to the high concentration of both layer and meat 
chicken farms in this area. However in this region, free range meat chicken farms are all owned 
by one of the two large privately owned meat chicken companies in Australia. Therefore, 
additional farm visits to South East Queensland were conducted to gain more representative 
data of privately owned meat chicken companies in Australia. The interviews with the farm 
manager or farm owner involved a comprehensive questionnaire with questions relating to 
biosecurity practices performed on farm, wild bird and animal presence, general farm 
information and farm management. A greater proportion of layer farms and of free range farms 
were surveyed due to the greater perceived risk of AI occurrence on these farm types. Further 
details on the survey methodology, including the region and farm selection, questionnaire 
development and conduct of the on-farm interviews can be found in Scott et al. (2017). 
7.2.4 Expert opinion 
Due to many unknowns related to the AI virus, an expert elicitation process was conducted in 
late 2015 to help inform the parameters of mutation from LPAI to HPAI and farm to farm 
spread pathways; the shed to shed spread pathways were informed from a combination of 
scientific literature and the farm survey. The elicitation process used a modified Delphi technic 
to gather the information, based on a 4-step elicitation process. The process involved the 
experts completing a questionnaire individually, followed by a discussion of the results at a 
workshop, and then a reassessment of the questionnaire answers after the workshop. A total of 
10 experts who had varying levels of expertise related to the poultry industry, wild bird 
behaviour and AI virus characteristics, participated in the process. The experts were selected 
based on their experience in the Australian poultry industries including involvement in the 
management of HPAI outbreaks in Australia or overseas as well as knowledge on the AI virus 
and wild birds. The questionnaire included 39 probability questions, and experts were asked to 
provide a most likely, minimum and maximum estimates of the probability and their level of 
confidence on their estimates. Pert distributions were used to obtain individual expert estimates 
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for each question. The second round of estimates for each question for all experts was then 
combined using a weighting factor depending on their respective level of expertise relevant to 
each question, in a discrete distribution. More details on the expert elicitation process and the 
outcomes of the study can be found in Singh et al. (2017b). 
7.2.5 Statistical analysis 
The statistical program JMP® was used (© 2012 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, USA) to conduct 
one-way analysis of variance1  (ANOVA) to analyse the differences between the outcome 
probabilities from the models for the different farm types. The outcome probabilities compared 
using ANOVA were the outcome probability from 1,000 iterations of each pathway endpoint 
of the spread scenario tree model simulation for each farm type with each iteration reflecting 
the situation for one farm at any point in time. A p-value of <0.05 was used to determine 
statistical significance in these analyses. 
7.2.6 Partial consequence assessment 
The partial consequence assessment investigates the pathways of AI virus spread after one bird 
has been exposed to the virus at any point in time. The pathways were created and the 
assessments developed by the authors of this publication. It provides a comparison of spread 
probabilities between pathways, however, the volume and frequency of each pathway 
occurring were not explicitly considered. For shed to shed spread, similar volume and 
frequency for each pathway was assumed. For farm to farm spread, it was assumed that 
variation between pathways in volume and frequency and in virus survival was considered by 
the experts. From the assumed LPAI exposure of one bird, spread depends first upon infection 
of this bird, and this probability differs between direct or indirect exposure. In addition, spread 
depends on establishment of the virus within the shed after infection of one individual, which 
is influenced by the subtype of the virus. Both LPAI and HPAI spread are assessed, where the 
probability of H5/H7 mutation from LPAI to HPAI is also considered after establishment 
within a flock. The end-points of this model are exclusive of one another and are as follows; 
1) no establishment of the infection; 2) limited LPAI spread; 3) limited HPAI spread; 4) LPAI 
spread; and, 5) HPAI spread. An assumption in this model is that once disease establishes in a 
shed, then spread is inevitable. In addition, specific potential pathways of spread of the virus 
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix E for comparison with Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
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were considered in this assessment (e.g. spread via shared equipment or feed delivery trucks). 
To estimate the overall probability that LPAI and HPAI will spread from a shed or a farm, the 
probabilities of all the independent pathways of spread leading to LPAI and HPAI spread, were 
summed, as all these pathways could occur simultaneously.  
Limited spread is defined as the spread that would occur even when infection is detected and 
reported by the farmer. In this situation, although it is assumed that control measures will be 
put into place to restrict further spread of the virus, spread prior to detection and reporting 
would be likely to occur due to the routine large volume of activities between both sheds and 
farms. Supporting this assumption, the number of days required for detection and reporting was 
estimated using an index function on Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 7, 2010), resulting in a 
time period of at least 70 days from infection of the first chicken with LPAI to establishment, 
detection and reporting by the farmer for all farm types. This estimation considered a 
reproduction number (R) of 1.35, the proportion of birds showing clinical signs, the shed size 
and the percentage threshold for LPAI detection and reporting. The calculation of R and the 
proportion of birds showing clinical signs are presented in the description of the Establishment 
of LPAI after infection in one chicken node in Appendix D. The shed size and percentage 
threshold for LPAI detection and reporting differ per farm type and are described in Scott et al. 
(2017). If there is no detection and reporting, the potential pathways by which LPAI and HPAI 
can spread between sheds and between farms are evaluated for each farm type. 
The 5 pathways for spread between sheds are shown in Figure 7.1 and the 12 pathways for 
spread between farms in Figure 7.2, following the nodes ‘LPAI spread methods’ and ‘HPAI 
spread methods’. The input parameters used are described in Table 7.1 and a detailed 
description of the nodes is provided in Appendix D. The majority of nodes apply to both LPAI 
and HPAI spread, with some specific to LPAI or HPAI spread only. The specific nodes for 
LPAI spread are: LPAI spread methods shed to shed and LPAI spread methods farm to farm. 
The specific nodes for HPAI spread are: HPAI clinical signs, detection and reporting, HPAI 
spread methods shed to shed and HPAI spread methods farm to farm. The probabilities of the 
different spread pathways were proportional to each other in the spread scenario tree models 
(e.g. the sum of the probabilities of all pathways occurring equalled one). 
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Figure 7.1. Scenario tree representing the spread pathways of low pathogenic and high 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI and HPAI) viruses between sheds for Australian commercial 
layer and meat chicken farms. 
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Prob_Indirect_Exposure = Probability of indirect exposure of LPAI virus to a commercial 
chicken; Prob_Direct_Exposure = Probability of direct exposure of LPAI virus to a 
commercial chicken; Prob_Infection_Indirect = Probability of infection of LPAI after indirect 
exposure; Prob_Infection_Direct = Probability of infection of LPAI after direct exposure; 
Prob_Subtype_Spread = Probability that the H5/H7 subtype that has infected a chicken is able 
to spread to other chickens; Prob_Establishment = Probability that the H5/H7 LPAI subtype 
will establish within the flock from one infected chicken; Prob_Subtype_CS = Probability that 
the LPAI H5/H7 subtype established within the flock is able to produce clinical signs within 
the flock; Proportion_CS = Proportion of birds infected with LPAI that will produce clinical 
signs; Prob_Mutation = Probability that LPAI established within the flock will mutate to 
HPAI; Prob_LPAI_Detection = Probability that the farmer will detect and report disease to 
appropriate officials during LPAI establishment; Prob_HPAI_Detection = Probability that 
HPAI will produce clinical signs with the assumption that the probability of detection is 
extremely high; Spread_LPAI_Boots = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur 
via the movement of boots; Spread_LPAI_Equipment = Probability that shed to shed spread 
of LPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Spread_LPAI_Vermin = Probability that 
shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of vermin such as rats and insects; 
Spread_LPAI_Aerosol = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via aerosol; 
Spread_LPAI_Animals = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via the 
movement of other animals including pets; Spread_HPAI_Boots = Probability that shed to 
shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of boots; Spread_HPAI_Equipment = 
Probability that shed to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; 
Spread_HPAI_Vermin = Probability that shed to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the 
movement of vermin such as rats and insects; Spread_HPAI_Aerosol = Probability that shed 
to shed spread of HPAI will occur via aerosol; Spread_HPAI_Animals = Probability that shed 
to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of other animals including pets. 
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Figure 7.2. Scenario tree representing the spread pathways of low pathogenic and high 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI and HPAI) viruses between farms for Australian commercial 
layer and meat chicken farms. 
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Prob_Indirect_Exposure = Probability of indirect exposure of LPAI virus to a commercial 
chicken; Prob_Direct_Exposure = Probability of direct exposure of LPAI virus to a 
commercial chicken; Prob_Infection_Indirect = Probability of infection of LPAI after indirect 
exposure; Prob_Infection_Direct = Probability of infection of LPAI after direct exposure; 
Prob_Subtype_Spread = Probability that the H5/H7 subtype that has infected a chicken is able 
to spread to other chickens; Prob_Establishment = Probability that the H5/H7 LPAI subtype 
will establish within the flock from one infected chicken; Prob_Subtype_CS = Probability that 
the LPAI H5/H7 subtype established within the flock is able to produce clinical signs within 
the flock; Proportion_CS = Proportion of birds infected with LPAI that will produce clinical 
signs; Prob_Mutation = Probability that LPAI established within the flock will mutate to 
HPAI; Prob_LPAI_Detection = Probability that the farmer will detect and report disease to 
appropriate officials during LPAI establishment; Prob_HPAI_Detection = Probability that 
HPAI will produce clinical signs with the assumption that the probability of detection is 
extremely high; Farm_LPAI_Equipment = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will 
occur via the movement of equipment; Farm_LPAI_Aerosol = Probability that farm to farm 
spread of LPAI will occur via aerosol; Farm_LPAI_Animals = Probability that farm to farm 
spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of animals including both farm cats and dogs and 
vermin; Farm_LPAI_WB = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the 
movement of wild birds; Farm_LPAI_Delivery= Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI 
will occur via the movement of bird delivery transport vehicles; Farm_LPAI_Pickup = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of dead and live bird 
pick up vehicles; Farm_LPAI_Feed = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur 
via the movement of feed delivery vehicles; Farm_LPAI_Manure = Probability that farm to 
farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of manure collection systems; 
Farm_LPAI_Workers = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the 
movement of farm workers; Farm_LPAI_Tradesmen = Probability that farm to farm spread of 
LPAI will occur via the movement of tradesmen such as plumbers and electricians; 
Farm_LPAI_Eggtray = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the 
movement of egg trays; Farm_LPAI_Eggpallet= Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI 
will occur via the movement of egg pallets; Farm_HPAI_Equipment = Probability that farm 
to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Farm_HPAI_Aerosol = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via aerosol; Farm_HPAI_Animals = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of animals including 
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both farm cats and dogs and vermin; Farm_HPAI_WB = Probability that farm to farm spread 
of HPAI will occur via the movement of wild birds; Farm_HPAI_Delivery= Probability that 
farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of bird delivery transport vehicles; 
Farm_HPAI_Pickup = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the 
movement of dead and live bird pick up vehicles; Farm_HPAI_Feed = Probability that farm 
to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of feed delivery vehicles; 
Farm_HPAI_Manure = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the 
movement of manure collection systems; Farm_HPAI_Workers = Probability that farm to farm 
spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of farm workers; Farm_HPAI_Tradesmen = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of tradesmen such 
as plumbers and electricians; Farm_HPAI_Eggtray = Probability that farm to farm spread of 
HPAI will occur via the movement of egg trays; Farm_HPAI_Eggpallet= Probability that farm 
to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of egg pallets 
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Table 7.1. Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the partial consequence assessment estimating the probability of spread of Avian 
Influenza (AI) viruses from flocks on both layer and meat commercial chicken farms in Australia. 
Node Branch of node Parameter estimates Input values Data sources 
Parameters that apply to both LPAI and HPAI spread 
1. Type of exposure Direct 
Indirect 
Probability that exposure to the 
virus is direct or indirect exposure 
based on results from the exposure 
scenario tree 
(Prob_Direct_Exposure; 
Prob_Indirect_Exposure) 
Prob_Direct_Exposure 
Average of all direct exposure outputs from the three seasons of 
the respective farm typea exposure scenario trees. The 
following values (median; 5-95%) of Prob_Direct_Exposure for 
each farm type were: 
Non-free range meat chicken (0.24; 0.095 – 0.47) 
Free range meat chicken (0.52; 0.28 – 0.76) 
Cage layer (0.36; 0.14 – 0.60) 
Barn layer (0.32; 0.10 – 0.59) 
Free range layer (0.77; 0.60 – 0.86) 
 
Prob_Indirect_Exposure 
1- Prob_Direct_Exposure 
 
Exposure section of 
this study (Scott et 
al., 2018b) 
2. Infection from 
direct exposure 
Yes 
No 
Probability of infection from direct 
exposure to AI virus in one chicken 
(Prob_Infection_Direct) 
Average of (Probability of infection 
from intranasal inoculation + 
Probability of infection from 
gastrointestinal inoculation + 
Probability of infection as a direct 
in-contact animal) 
Probability of infection from intranasal inoculation (PrIntranasal) 
Average LPAI H5N2 viral titres in tracheal swabs of Mallard 
ducks was 103.8 EID50/ml over 6 days post inoculation 
26/26 chickens inoculated via intranasal route with 104.69 
TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
16/18 chickens inoculated via intranasal route with 103.69 
TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
Yao et al. (2014) 
Selleck (2015) 
Webster et al. 
(1976) 
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Therefore 42 (s) of 46 (n) chickens become infected when 
inoculated via intranasal route with virus concentration similar 
to what is naturally excreted from upper respiratory tract from 
ducks 
PrIntranasal = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Probability of infection from gastrointestinal inoculation (PrGIT) 
Average LPAI H5N2 viral titres in cloacal swabs of Mallard 
ducks was 102.04 EID50/ml over 5 days post inoculation 
1/22 chickens inoculated via gastrointestinal route with 102.69 
TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
In natural setting viral titres in duck faeces will range 
considerably, therefore pert distribution used 
PrGIT = Pert (0, 1/22, 1) 
Probability of infection as a direct in-contact animal (PrContact) 
2 in-contact chickens placed directly in-contact with H5N2 
LPAI infected chickens (n), 2 became infected (s) 
PrContact = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Prob_Infection_Direct = average (PrIntranasal; PrGIT; PrContact) 
 
3. Infection from 
indirect exposure 
Yes 
No 
Probability of infection from 
indirect exposure to AI virus in one 
chicken (Prob_Infection_Indirect) 
(Relative likelihood of aerosol 
exposure x Probability of infection 
from aerosol + Relative likelihood 
of all other indirect exposure x 
Probability of infection from 
diluted gastrointestinal inoculation) 
Relative proportions of the following are taken by summing the two 
values and dividing each value by the sum: 
Average of all indirect exposure outputs via aerosol from the 
three seasons of the respective farm typea exposure scenario 
tree (PropAerosol) 
Average of all other indirect exposure outputs from the three 
seasons of the respective farm typea exposure scenario tree 
(PropIndirect) 
Probability of infection from aerosol (PrAerosol) 
Assume virus concentration in air in realistic scenarios is very 
low from wild birds 
Exposure section on 
this study (Scott et 
al., 2018b) 
Yao et al. (2014) 
Jonges et al. (2015) 
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0 (s) of 10 (n) chickens exposed to aerosol virus concentration 
of 102.69 TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
PrAerosol = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Probability of infection from gastrointestinal inoculation (PrGIT) 
1/22 chickens inoculated via gastrointestinal route with 102.69 
TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
0/31 chickens inoculated via gastrointestinal route with 101.69 
TCID50/ml H9N2 LPAI became infected 
Therefore 1 (s) of 53 (n) chickens become infected when 
inoculated via gastrointestinal route with diluted virus 
concentration 
PrGIT = Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Prob_Infection_Indirect = (PropAerosol x PrAerosol) + 
(PropIndirect x PrGIT) 
 
4. Low pathogenic 
avian influenza 
(LPAI) subtype can 
spread among 
chickens 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the H5/H7 subtype 
is a particular subtype that can 
spread among chickens once 
infected in an individual chicken 
(Prob_Subtype_Spread) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
18 H5/H7 subtypes exist (n), 9 have been recorded as AI outbreaks 
in chickens across the globe and therefore have the ability to spread 
(s) 
 
FAO EMPRES-i 
(2016) 
5. Establishment of 
LPAI after infection 
in one chicken 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the virus will 
establish within the flock after 
infection in one chicken 
(Prob_Establishment) 
Uniform (0.423,0.511) 
Derived from (1- Probability of extinction) 
Probability of extinction of infection calculated with a Poisson 
branching process using a range of reproduction numbers (R) using 
real outbreak data 
 
Barnes and Glass 
(2018) 
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6. LPAI subtype leads 
to clinical signs in 
chickens after 
infection 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the LPAI subtype 
infected within the flock is a 
subtype that produces clinical signs 
in chickens (Prob_Subtype_CS) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
52 H5/H7 virus subtypes, some repeated, have been inoculated in 
chickens (n), 24 caused clinical signs in chickens (s) 
 
Spackman et al. 
(2010) 
Spickler et al. 
(2008) 
7. Proportion of 
chickens that show 
clinical signs from 
LPAI infection 
Yes 
No 
Estimated proportion of chickens 
within a flock that show clinical 
signs after infected with a LPAI 
subtype capable of producing 
clinical signs (Proportion_CS) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
23 chickens were inoculated with LPAI viruses of H5/H7 subtypes 
(n), 6 showed clinical signs (s) 
Mo et al. (1997) 
Jones and Swayne 
(2004) 
8. LPAI detection and 
reporting 
Yes 
No 
Probability that the farmer will 
report clinical signs of LPAI to 
appropriate officials 
(Prob_LPAI_Detection) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 50 answers reported from 
farmers of unusual signs in chickens (n), 31 answers linked to 
clinical signs caused by LPAI (s) 
Free range meat chicken farms: 58 answers reported from 
farmers of unusual signs in chickens (n), 35 answers linked to 
clinical signs caused by LPAI (s) 
Cage layer farms: 27 answers reported from farmers of unusual 
signs in chickens (n), 19 answers linked to clinical signs 
caused by LPAI (s) 
Barn layer farms: 30 answers reported from farmers of unusual 
signs in chickens (n), 21 answers linked to clinical signs 
caused by LPAI (s) 
Free range layer farms: 74 answers reported from farmers of 
unusual signs in chickens (n), 51 answers linked to clinical 
signs caused by LPAI (s) 
 
Scott et al. (2017) 
Scott et al. (2018d) 
Swayne (2008) 
9. Mutation of LPAI 
to high pathogenic 
avian influenza 
(HPAI) 
Yes 
No 
Probability that LPAI will mutate to 
HPAI (Prob_Mutation) 
Results obtained from expert opinion workshop 
10 experts responded using a 4-step elicitation process for all 
questions 
The question for this node was: “Imagine 100 sheds each of the 
following operation types where LPAI has recently been 
Singh et al. (2017b) 
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established. In how many of these sheds would LPAI mutate 
to HPAI?” 
This question was asked for each farm type. 
The following values (median; 5-95%) for each farm type 
(where the sum of the yes and no pathways was 1) were: 
Non-free range meat chicken (0.068; 0 – 0.21) 
Free range meat chicken (0.068; 0 – 0.20) 
Cage layer (0.49; 0.065 – 0.93) 
Barn layer (0.29; 0.054 – 0.92) 
Free range layer (0.29; 0.057 – 0.92) 
 
 
Parameters that are specific to LPAI spread 
10. LPAI methods shed 
to shed 
Boots 
Equipment 
Vermin 
Aerosol 
Pets 
Probability that LPAI will spread 
between sheds via the following 
pathways: boots, equipment, 
vermin, aerosol or pets 
(Spread_LPAI_Boots; 
Spread_LPAI_Equipment; 
Spread_LPAI_Vermin; 
Spread_LPAI_Aerosol; 
Spread_LPAI_Animals) 
Probability of LPAI spread via boots 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrBoots) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 1/15 (s/n) answers did not 
use footbaths 
Free range meat chicken farms: 1/15 (s/n) answers did not use 
footbaths 
Cage layer farms: 7/9 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Barn layer farms: 3/9 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Free range layer farms: 6/25 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Probability of virus presence on boots in one day is 1 as survival 
is longer than one day on this material 
Spread_LPAI_Boots = (PrBoots) x 1 
Probability of LPAI spread via equipment  
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrEquipment) 
Scott et al. (2017) 
Scott et al. (2018d) 
Achenbach and 
Bowen (2011) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2011) 
Tiwari et al. (2006) 
Jonges et al. (2015) 
Wood et al. (2010) 
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Non-free range meat chicken farms: 6/11 (s/n) answers do not 
clean equipment between sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers do not clean 
equipment between sheds 
Cage layer farms: 7/7 (s/n) answers do not clean equipment 
between sheds 
Barn layer farms: 6/7 (s/n) answers do not clean equipment 
between sheds 
Free range layer farms: 2/23 (s/n) answers do not clean 
equipment between sheds 
Probability of virus presence on equipment in one day is 1 as 
survival is longer than one day on this material 
Spread_LPAI_Equipment = (PrEquipment) x 1 
Probability of LPAI spread via vermin 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrVermin) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 24/30 (s/n) answers report 
vermin inside sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 2/30 (s/n) answers report vermin 
inside sheds 
Cage layer farms: 17/18 (s/n) answers report vermin inside sheds 
Barn layer farms: 17/18 (s/n) answers report vermin inside sheds 
Free range layer farms: 44/50 (s/n) answers report vermin inside 
sheds 
Probability of virus presence/survival in vermin 
(SurvivalVermin): 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
0/12  (s/n) LPAI inoculated rats and 73/171 (s/n) LPAI 
inoculated fly pools were positive on virus isolation 
Spread_LPAI_Vermin = (PrVermin) x (SurvivalVermin) 
Probability of LPAI spread via aerosol  
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Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrAerosol) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 15/15 (s/n) answers had 
sheds <60m from each other 
Free range meat chicken farms: 15/15 (s/n) answers had sheds 
<60m from each other 
Cage layer farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers had sheds <60m from each 
other 
Barn layer farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers had sheds <60m from each 
other 
Free range layer farms: 25/25 (s/n) answers had sheds <60m from 
each other 
Probability of virus presence/survival in air (SurvivalAerosol): 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
0/9 (s/n) air samples tested at <60m from LPAI infected 
chicken farms were positive for LPAI virus 
Spread_LPAI_Aerosol = (PrAerosol) x (SurvivalAerosol) 
Probability of LPAI spread via animals  
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrAnimals) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 0/15 (s/n) answers allow 
animals inside sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 2/30 (s/n) answers allow animals 
inside sheds or range areas 
Cage layer farms: 6/9 (s/n) answers allow animals inside sheds 
Barn layer farms: 1/9 (s/n) answers allow animals inside sheds 
Free range layer farms: 13/50 (s/n) answers allow animals inside 
sheds or range areas 
Probability of virus presence on other animals in one day is 1 as 
virus survival is longer than one day on other animals 
Spread_LPAI_Animals = (PrAnimals) x 1 
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11. LPAI spread 
methods farm to 
farm 
Aerosol 
Infected wild 
bird 
Animals 
(vermin and 
pets) 
Bird delivery 
transport 
Bird pick up 
transport (live 
and dead) 
Feed delivery 
transport 
Manure 
collection 
Farm workers 
Trades people 
Shared 
equipment 
Egg traysb 
Egg palletsb 
 
Probability that LPAI will spread 
between farms via the following 
pathways: aerosol, infected wild 
bird going from one farm to 
another, other animals including 
vermin and pets, new bird delivery 
transport, bird pick up transport 
both live and dead, feed delivery 
transport, manure collection, farm 
workers, trades people such as 
electricians and plumbers, shared 
equipment between farms, egg 
traysb, egg palletsb 
(Farm_LPAI_Aerosol; 
Farm_LPAI_WB; 
Farm_LPAI_Animals; 
Farm_LPAI_Delivery; 
Farm_LPAI_Pickup; 
Farm_LPAI_Feed; 
Farm_LPAI_Manure; 
Farm_LPAI_Workers; 
Farm_LPAI_Trades; 
Farm_LPAI_Equipment; 
Farm_LPAI_Eggtray; 
Farm_LPAI_Eggpallet) 
Results obtained from expert opinion workshop 
10 experts responded using a 4-step elicitation process for all 
questions 
The question for this node was: “Imagine 100 LPAI established 
(farm type)c farms. Realistically how many of these will 
experience LPAI spread to at least one other chicken farm 
through each of the following pathways?” 
The values for each pathway and farm type are present 
Appendix C. 
Singh et al. (2017b) 
Parameters that are specific to HPAI spread 
192 
 
12. HPAI clinical signs, 
detection and 
reporting 
Yes 
No 
Probability that clinical signs will 
be shown in chickens infected with 
HPAI and the probability the 
farmer will detect and report the 
disease to appropriate officials 
(Prob_HPAI_Detection) 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
52 chickens were inoculated with HPAI viruses of H7 subtypes (n), 
52 showed clinical signs (s) 
Assume extremely high probability farmer will detect clinical signs 
of HPAI 
 
Selleck (2015) 
13. HPAI spread 
methods shed to 
shed 
Boots 
Equipment 
Vermin 
Aerosol 
Pets 
Probability that HPAI will spread 
between sheds via the following 
pathways: boots, equipment, 
vermin, aerosol or pets 
(Spread_HPAI_Boots; 
Spread_HPAI_Equipment; 
Spread_HPAI_Vermin; 
Spread_HPAI_Aerosol; 
Spread_HPAI_Animals) 
Probability of HPAI spread via boots 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrBoots) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 1/15 (s/n) answers did not 
use footbaths 
Free range meat chicken farms: 1/15 (s/n) answers did not use 
footbaths 
Cage layer farms: 7/9 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Barn layer farms: 3/9 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Free range layer farms: 6/25 (s/n) answers did not use footbaths 
Probability of virus presence on boots in one day is 1 as survival 
is longer than one day on this material 
Spread_HPAI_Boots = (PrBoots) x 1 
Probability of HPAI spread via equipment  
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrEquipment) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 6/1 (s/n)1 answers do not 
clean equipment between sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers do not clean 
equipment between sheds 
Cage layer farms: 7/7 (s/n) answers do not clean equipment 
between sheds 
Barn layer farms: 6/7 (s/n) answers do not clean equipment 
between sheds 
Scott et al. (2017) 
Scott et al. (2018d) 
Tiwari et al. (2006) 
Wood et al. (2010) 
Sawabe et al. 
(2009) 
Nettles et al. (1985) 
McCluskey (2015) 
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Free range layer farms: 2/23 (s/n) answers do not clean 
equipment between sheds 
Probability of virus presence on equipment in one day is 1 as 
survival is longer than one day on this material 
Spread_HPAI_Equipment = (PrEquipment) x 1 
Probability of HPAI spread via vermin 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrVermin) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 24/30 (s/n) answers report 
vermin inside sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 2/30 (s/n) answers report vermin 
inside sheds 
Cage layer farms: 17/18 (s/n) answers report vermin inside sheds 
Barn layer farms: 17/18 (s/n) answers report vermin inside sheds 
Free range layer farms: 44/50 (s/n) answers report vermin inside 
sheds 
Probability of virus presence/survival in vermin 
(SurvivalVermin): 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
0/516 (s/n) HPAI exposed rats and 41/59 (s/n) HPAI inoculated 
flies were positive on virus isolation 
Spread_HPAI_Vermin = (PrVermin) x (SurvivalVermin) 
Probability of HPAI spread via aerosol  
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrAerosol) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 15/15 (s/n) answers had 
sheds <150m from each other 
Free range meat chicken farms: 15/15 (s/n) answers had sheds 
<150m from each other 
Cage layer farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers had sheds <150m from each 
other 
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Barn layer farms: 9/9 (s/n) answers had sheds <150m from each 
other 
Free range layer farms: 25/25 answers had sheds <150m from 
each other 
Probability of virus presence/survival in air (SurvivalAerosol): 
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) 
22/90 (s/n) air samples tested at <60m from HPAI infected 
chicken farms were positive for HPAI virus 
Spread_HPAI_Aerosol = (PrAerosol) x (SurvivalAerosol) 
Probability of HPAI spread via animals  
Beta (s+1, n-s+1) of farm answers (PrAnimals) 
Non-free range meat chicken farms: 0/15 (s/n) answers allow 
animals inside sheds 
Free range meat chicken farms: 2/30 (s/n) answers allow animals 
inside sheds 
Cage layer farms: 6/9 (s/n) answers allow animals inside sheds 
Barn layer farms: 1/9 (s/n) answers allow animals inside sheds 
Free range layer farms: 13/50 (s/n) answers allow animals inside 
sheds 
Probability of virus presence on other animals in one day is 1 as 
virus survival is longer than one day on other animals 
Spread_HPAI_Animals = (PrAnimals) x 1 
 
14. HPAI spread 
methods farm to 
farm 
Aerosol 
Infected wild 
bird 
Animals 
(vermin and 
pets) 
Probability that HPAI will spread 
between farms via the following 
pathways: aerosol, infected wild 
bird going from one farm to 
another, other animals including 
vermin and pets, new bird delivery 
transport, bird pick up transport 
both live and dead, feed delivery 
Results obtained from expert opinion workshop 
10 experts responded using a 4-step elicitation process for all 
questions 
The question for this node was: “Imagine 100 HPAI established 
(farm type)c farms. Realistically how many of these will 
Singh et al. (2017b) 
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Bird delivery 
transport 
Bird pick up 
transport (live 
and dead) 
Feed delivery 
transport 
Manure 
collection 
Farm workers 
Trades people 
Shared 
equipment 
Egg traysb 
Egg palletsb 
transport, manure collection, farm 
workers, trades people such as 
electricians and plumbers, shared 
equipment between farms, egg 
traysb, egg palletsb 
(Farm_HPAI_Aerosol; 
Farm_HPAI_WB; 
Farm_HPAI_Animals; 
Farm_HPAI_Delivery; 
Farm_HPAI_Pickup; 
Farm_HPAI_Feed; 
Farm_HPAI_Manure; 
Farm_HPAI_Workers; 
Farm_HPAI_Trades; 
Farm_HPAI_Equipment; 
Farm_HPAI_Eggtray; 
Farm_HPAI_Eggpallet) 
experience HPAI spread to at least one other chicken farm 
through each of the following pathways?” 
The values for each pathway and farm type are present in Appendix 
C. 
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7.2.7 Sensitivity analysis 
The Advanced Sensitivity Analysis on the program @RISK 7.0 (Palisade Corporation, USA) 
was used to determine the effect of input parameters on the model outputs. The input values 
varied from 0 to 1 in thirds (0, 0.3, 0.6, 1). Each input value of interest was assessed in a 
simulation of 1,000 iterations whilst all other input values were fixed to their base value. The 
model outputs assessed were the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread between both sheds and 
farms per farm type.  
The effect of the following inputs of LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds and farms were 
investigated; 1. Probability that the H5/H7 LPAI subtype will establish within the flock from 
one infected chicken (Prob_Establishment); 2. Probability that LPAI established within the 
flock will mutate to HPAI (Prob_Mutation); 3. Probability that the farmer will detect and report 
disease to appropriate officials during LPAI establishment (Prob_LPAI_Detection); 4. 
Probability that HPAI will produce clinical signs with the assumption that the probability of 
detection is extremely high (Prob_HPAI_Detection).  
In addition, the impact of the probability of spread to another shed or farm through any of the 
pathways considered in this assessment, which is dependent to a high extent on the level of 
biosecurity implemented on farm, was also investigated. As the probabilities of the different 
spread pathways were proportional to each other in the spread scenario tree models, each 
pathway has the same influence on the probability of spread on the sensitivity analysis. As such, 
only one pathway probability is included in the sensitivity analysis and the generic term 
Prob_PathwaySpread is used. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Probabilities of LPAI and HPAI spread 
Results from the spread models provided the overall probabilities of no establishment of LPAI, 
and of LPAI and HPAI limited spread and LPAI and HPAI spread between both sheds and 
farms, given one chicken is exposed to LPAI virus from one wild bird in Australia at any point 
in time. The results are summarised in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.3. The pathways involved in 
calculating these probabilities incorporated the probability of LPAI infection in a chicken after 
exposure and the probability that the virus is able to spread and establish among chickens 
within a shed. For all farm types, the most likely end-point after one chicken is exposed and 
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infected with LPAI is no establishment. For each pathotype, the overall probabilities of spread 
are identical for each farm type between sheds and between farms. The results also show that 
for all farm types, the probability of limited LPAI spread is lower than that of limited HPAI 
spread; that LPAI spread is more likely to occur than limited LPAI spread; and that HPAI 
spread is less likely to occur than limited HPAI spread. 
LPAI and HPAI spread occur when the randomly selected values for the beta distribution for 
the probability of detection and reporting in the spread model are very low or zero. The 
probabilities of LPAI spread between sheds and farms, although low for all farms, were 
estimated to be highest in free range farms compared to other farm types. The model estimated 
a median probability of LPAI spread of 0.068 and 0.059 for free range meat chicken and layer 
farms, respectively. Among indoor farms, the probability (median; 5 – 95%) of LPAI spread 
between sheds and farms is higher in non-free range meat chicken farms (0.037; 0.015 – 0.073) 
compared to the indoor layer farm types; cage layer (0.027; 0.0028 – 0.079) and barn layer 
(0.026; 0.0030 – 0.071). The probabilities of HPAI spread between sheds and farms are lower 
than that of LPAI spread for all farm types (Table 7.2).  
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Table 7.2. Median (5 and 95 percentiles) probabilities of no establishment and of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) and high pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) spread and limited spread between sheds and farms for the commercial chicken farm types (non-free range meat chicken, 
free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) after exposure of one chicken to LPAI from one wild bird in Australia. 
Farm type  Median 5% 95% F statistic (degrees of freedom); 
P-value 
No establishment 
Non-free range meat chicken 0.96 0.92 0.98 F(4,4995) = 990.03; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.92 0.86 0.96 
Cage layer 0.94 0.89 0.97 
Barn layer 0.95 0.90 0.98 
Free range layer 0.89 0.83 0.93 
Probability of LPAI spread 
Non-free range meat chicken 0.037 0.015 0.073 F(4,4995) = 490.61; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.068 0.033 0.12 
Cage layer 0.027 0.0031 0.079 
Barn layer 0.026 0.0030 0.071 
Free range layer 0.059 0.0071 0.12 
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Probability of HPAI spread 
Non-free range meat chicken 2.47 × 10-5 0 0.00025 F(4,4995) = 164.01; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 4.60 × 10-5 0 0.00043 
Cage layer 0.00022 1.01 × 10-5 0.0019 
Barn layer 0.00017 7.33 × 10-6 0.0016 
Free range layer 0.00037 1.68 × 10-5 0.0031 
Probability of limited LPAI spread 
Non-free range meat chicken 0.0032 0.0011 0.0080 F(4,4995) = 515.67; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.0058 0.0022 0.013 
Cage layer 0.0048 0.0017 0.012 
Barn layer 0.0044 0.0015 0.011 
Free range layer 0.0092 0.0040 0.019 
Probability of limited HPAI spread 
Non-free range meat chicken 0.0044 0.0012 0.013 F(4,4995) = 624.38; 
<0.0001 
Free range meat chicken 0.0084 0.0025 0.022 
Cage layer 0.021 0.0044 0.068 
Barn layer 0.016 0.0035 0.063 
Free range layer 0.034 0.0087 0.11 
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Figure 7.3. Median (5 and 95 percentiles) probabilities of no establishment and of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) and high pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) spread and  limited spread between sheds and farms for the commercial chicken farm types (non-free range meat chicken, 
free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) after one chicken is exposed to LPAI in Australia. 
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7.3.2 Probabilities of the different spread pathways 
Results of the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds and farms are summarised 
in Figure 7.4. This figure presents the averages of the median, 5% and 95% probability values 
per pathway among all farm types and provides a comparison of relative probability of spread 
between pathways that does not explicitly consider the volume and frequency of each 
respective pathway occurring. 
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Figure 7.4. Average median (5 and 95 percentiles) probabilities of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) and high pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) spread pathways between sheds and farms of the commercial chicken farm types (non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, 
cage layer, barn layer, free range layer) after one chicken is exposed to LPAI in Australia. 
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a = average median probabilities of LPAI spread pathways between sheds 
Spread_LPAI_Boots = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of boots; Spread_LPAI_Equipment = Probability 
that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Spread_LPAI_Vermin = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI 
will occur via the movement of vermin such as rats and insects; Spread_LPAI_Aerosol = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur 
via aerosol; Spread_LPAI_Animals = Probability that shed to shed spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of other animals including farm 
cats and dogs. 
b = average median probabilities of HPAI spread pathways between sheds 
Spread_HPAI_Boots = Probability that shed to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of boots; Spread_HPAI_Equipment = 
Probability that shed to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Spread_HPAI_Vermin = Probability that shed to shed 
spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of vermin such as rats and insects; Spread_HPAI_Aerosol = Probability that shed to shed spread of 
HPAI will occur via aerosol; Spread_HPAI_Animals = Probability that shed to shed spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of other animals 
including farm cats and dogs. 
c = average median probabilities of LPAI spread pathways between farms 
Farm_LPAI_Equipment = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Farm_LPAI_Aerosol = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via aerosol; Farm_LPAI_Animals = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will 
occur via the movement of animals including both farm cats and dogs and vermin; Farm_LPAI_WB = Probability that farm to farm spread of 
LPAI will occur via the movement of wild birds; Farm_LPAI_Delivery= Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement 
of bird delivery transport vehicles; Farm_LPAI_Pickup = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of dead and 
live bird pick up vehicles; Farm_LPAI_Feed = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of feed delivery vehicles; 
207 
 
Farm_LPAI_Manure = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of manure collection systems; 
Farm_LPAI_Workers = Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of farm workers; Farm_LPAI_Tradesmen = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of tradesmen such as plumbers and electricians; Farm_LPAI_Eggtray 
= Probability that farm to farm spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of egg trays; Farm_LPAI_Eggpallet= Probability that farm to farm 
spread of LPAI will occur via the movement of egg pallets. 
d = average median probabilities of HPAI spread pathways between farms 
Farm_HPAI_Equipment = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of equipment; Farm_HPAI_Aerosol = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via aerosol; Farm_HPAI_Animals = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will 
occur via the movement of animals including both farm cats and dogs and vermin; Farm_HPAI_WB = Probability that farm to farm spread of 
HPAI will occur via the movement of wild birds; Farm_HPAI_Delivery= Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement 
of bird delivery transport vehicles; Farm_HPAI_Pickup = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of dead and 
live bird pick up vehicles; Farm_HPAI_Feed = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of feed delivery vehicles; 
Farm_HPAI_Manure = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of manure collection systems; 
Farm_HPAI_Workers = Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of farm workers; Farm_HPAI_Tradesmen = 
Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of tradesmen such as plumbers and electricians; Farm_HPAI_Eggtray 
= Probability that farm to farm spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of egg trays; Farm_HPAI_Eggpallet= Probability that farm to farm 
spread of HPAI will occur via the movement of egg pallets. 
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The pathways of spread between sheds were estimated using farm survey data to determine the 
proportion of farms that would perform or have specific practices or pathways for each farm 
type. This was combined with scientific literature to determine the survival of the virus on each 
of these pathways, and similar volume and frequency for each pathway was assumed. The 
pathway of LPAI spread between sheds (Figure 7.4a) with the highest average median 
probability was spread via equipment (0.015; 0.0058 – 0.036), followed by vermin (0.010; 
0.0028 – 0.023) and then boots (0.0064; 0.00087 – 0.018). When the results of each farm type 
were assessed, the pathway of spread via equipment was the pathway with the highest median 
probability of LPAI spread between sheds for each farm type except free range layer farms. 
For this farm type, the pathway of LPAI spread between sheds with the highest median 
probability was spread via vermin (0.019; 0.0022 – 0.041).  
The pathway of HPAI spread between sheds (Figure 7.4b) with the highest average median 
probability was also spread via equipment (5.76 × 10-5; 1.90 × 10-6 – 0.00057). All farm types 
except free range layer farms had the pathway of spread via equipment as the pathway with the 
highest median probability of HPAI spread between sheds. For free range farms, the pathway 
with the highest median probability was spread via animals (8.93 × 10-5; 2.57 × 10-6 – 0.001) 
(data not shown in Figure 7.4). 
The pathways of spread between farms were estimated from expert opinion which is assumed 
to have considered variation in volume and frequency and virus survival between pathways. 
The pathway of LPAI spread between farms (Figure 7.4c) with the highest average median 
probability was spread via bird pick up systems (0.0072; 0.0019 – 0.02), followed by egg trays 
(0.0059; 0.00066 – 0.017). The latter applies to only layer farm types. When assessing each 
farm type on its own, the pathway with the highest median probability of LPAI spread between 
farms was bird pick up systems for both barn and free range meat chicken farm types. Spread 
via egg trays was the pathway with the highest median probability of LPAI spread between 
farms for all layer farms.  
The pathway of HPAI spread between farms (Figure 7.4d) with the highest average median 
probability was spread via egg trays (3.70 × 10-5; 1.47 × 10-6 – 0.00034), followed by egg 
pallets (2.07 × 10-5; 7.86× 10-7 – 0.00021), bird pick up systems (1.57 × 10-5; 4.83 × 10-7 – 
0.00019) and farm workers (1.41 × 10-5; 4.43 × 10-7 – 0.00018). The former two apply to layer 
farms only. For individual farm types, and similar to that for LPAI, the pathway of HPAI spread 
between farms with the highest median probability was bird pick up systems for barn and free 
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range meat chicken farm types. Spread via egg trays was the pathway with the highest median 
probability of HPAI spread between farms for all layer farms.  
7.3.3 Spread sensitivity analysis 
Figure 7.5 shows the outputs of the spread sensitivity analysis, which depicts an example of 
one meat chicken or layer farm type per LPAI (Figure 7.5a; 7.5b) or HPAI (Figure 7.5c; 7.5d) 
spread between sheds and farms, as the sensitivity analysis outcomes were similar in 
proportional increase in value among all farm types.  In addition, no differences on the spread 
sensitivity analyses for spread between sheds and spread between farms was observed.
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Figure 7.5. Results of the sensitivity analysis on the spread assessment depicting the change in probability (Y-axis) on the median overall 
probability of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) or high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) spread (horizontal line) between sheds on a 
commercial poultry farm and between commercial poultry farms after exposure of one chicken to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus 
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from wild birds in Australia with changes of certain input variables listed in Table 7.2 (X-axis). Results were obtained from a simulation of 1,000 
iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. The outcomes were similar in proportional increase in value among all farm types so 
only one example of a meat chicken or layer farm type per LPAI (Figure 7.5a; 7.5b) or HPAI (Figure 7.5c; 7.5d) spread between sheds and farms 
was used. 
a = sensitivity analysis on input parameters affecting the probability of LPAI spread between sheds and farms on free range meat chicken farm 
types 
b = sensitivity analysis on input parameters affecting the probability of  LPAI spread between sheds and farms on free range layer farm types 
c = sensitivity analysis on input parameters affecting the probability of HPAI spread between sheds and farms on non-free range meat chicken 
farm types 
d = sensitivity analysis on input parameters affecting the probability of HPAI spread between sheds and farms on cage layer farm types 
Prob_Establishment = Probability that the H5/H7 LPAI subtype will establish within the flock from one infected chicken; Prob_Mutation = 
Probability that LPAI established within the flock will mutate to HPAI; Prob_LPAI_Detection = Probability that the farmer will detect and report 
disease to appropriate officials during LPAI establishment; Prob_HPAI_Detection = Probability that HPAI will produce clinical signs with the 
assumption that the probability of detection is extremely high; Prob_PathwaySpread = Probability of any one of the spread pathways identified, 
with consideration of the proportional changes for all other spread pathways that will result given sum of the probabilities of all pathways 
occurring equalled one.  
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According to the spread sensitivity analysis, the most influential parameter for LPAI spread 
between sheds and farms was the probability of establishment (Figure 7.5a; 7.5b). When the 
probability of establishment was increased to 100% (base value 0.47 for all farm types), there 
was an approximate 2.1 to 2.2-fold increase on the probability of LPAI spread between sheds 
and farms for all farm types.  
The probability of mutation was the most influential parameter affecting the probability of 
HPAI spread between sheds and farms for all farm types. When this probability was increased 
to 100% (base value 0.070, 0.070, 0.50, 0.28, 0.30 for non-free range meat chicken, free range 
meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer and free range layer farms, respectively), there was at least 
a 3.5-fold increase on the probability of HPAI spread between both sheds and farms for all 
farm types (Figure 7.5c; 7.5d). The influence of the probability of mutation was most 
substantial on meat chicken farm types where there was an approximate 17-fold increase on 
the probability of HPAI spread between both sheds and farms within these farm types. The 
next most influential parameter on HPAI spread between sheds and farms was the probability 
of establishment where results obtained were similar to those seen with the LPAI spread 
sensitivity analysis described above. 
The impact of the probability of detection on spread of LPAI and HPAI does not seem to be 
very significant. When this probability was increased to 100%, there was only an approximate 
0.05-fold decrease on the probability of both LPAI (base value between 0.60 and 0.70 for all 
farm types) and HPAI (base value 0.99 for all farm types) spread between sheds and farms for 
all farm types.  
Investigation of the spread pathways revealed that when the probability of any of these 
pathways was increased to 100% (base values ranging from 0.00034 – 0.040 and 3.87 × 10-7 
and 8.83 × 10-5 for LPAI and HPAI spread respectively), there was an approximate 1.5 to 2-
fold increase on the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds and between farms 
for all farm types. This enabled evaluation of the change in probability of spread with 
implementation or presence of biosecurity practices that act on these spread pathways. 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 The probability of spread 
The most likely pathway or outcome after one chicken is exposed and infected with LPAI is 
no establishment of the infection. This is supported by East et al. (2010) where in all 17 samples 
tested positive for AI antibodies in the sentinel free range flocks, there was no evidence of 
chicken to chicken transmission. However, the model indicates that there is still a reasonable 
probability that establishment occurs (a median probability of LPAI spread ranging from 0.026 
to 0.068 for barn layer and free range meat chicken farms respectively). The model also 
assumes that once establishment occurs, spread is inevitable, unless early detection occurs in 
which case spread still occurs but in a limited nature. This is supported by work performed at 
the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) where chickens inoculated and subsequently 
infected with various LPAI subtypes were placed in direct contact with other chickens. All 
chickens in direct contact with these infected chickens subsequently became infected (Selleck, 
2015). The spread model assumes only one chicken is exposed to the virus; it is unknown how 
many chickens are exposed to the virus and over what time period in an Australian context. 
Therefore, in order for model validation to occur, sampling of commercial chickens to 
determine their level of exposure to LPAI must be performed. 
The overall probabilities of spread are identical for shed to shed and farm to farm spread for 
each farm type and pathotype (presented in Table 7.2), and this is due to the only difference 
being the specific pathways of spread which are represented in the last node of the scenario 
tree (Figure 7.1 and 7.2). The probabilities of LPAI spread between sheds and farms are highest 
in free range farms. As previously mentioned, the spread model incorporates the probability of 
LPAI infection after the first bird has been exposed, where this probability is higher after direct 
exposure compared to indirect exposure. As such, the higher probability of LPAI spread in free 
range farms is due to exposure of the exposed bird on these farms to more likely be via direct 
pathways. Among non-free range farms, the probability of LPAI spread, although similar, is 
slightly higher in non-free range meat chicken farms compared to the indoor layer farm types, 
due to the higher threshold of detection and reporting of sick and dead chickens in meat chicken 
farms compared to layer farms. The higher threshold provides more opportunity for the virus 
to spread before it is detected. In contrast, the probability of HPAI spread in meat chicken farms 
is lower than that of layer farms due to the short-lived nature of meat chicken birds leading to 
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a lower probability of mutation in meat chicken birds compared to layer birds. This is reflected 
in expert opinion answers which informed the mutation parameter and gave a higher probability 
of mutation for layer farms compared to meat chicken farms (Singh et al., 2017b) 
Relative comparisons of these results to other countries can only be made for countries with 
similar LPAI and HPAI situations as Australia i.e. countries in which LPAI and HPAI are not 
endemic in poultry and HPAI is not endemic in wild birds. Countries in which HPAI H5N1 is 
endemic in poultry include Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Vietnam (CDC, 
2015). Similarly, comparisons should only made to those countries that have effective 
protocols setup to deal with positive detections to limit spread. In Australia this is written in 
the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) for avian influenza which was 
developed and agreed upon by government and the poultry industry. In the United Kingdom 
(UK) and United States of America (USA), similar protocols are written in the Notifiable Avian 
Influenza Disease Control Strategy and HPAI Response Plan (The Red Book) respectively 
(DEFRA, 2015, AHA, 2011, USDA, 2017a). The UK experienced eleven HPAI outbreaks 
since 2006, all of which were effectively eradicated by destroying all birds on infected premises, 
comparable to the results of this study which indicate limited HPAI spread to occur more often 
than HPAI spread (Siettou, 2016). However, the USA has experienced more extensive HPAI 
outbreaks involving dozens of farms, which cost over hundreds of millions of dollars to 
effectively eradicate. These include the HPAI outbreaks that occurred in Pennsylvania in 1983 
and 1984, and the more recent HPAI outbreaks since 2014 that affected more than ten USA 
states (Greene, 2015, Veterinary Record, 2015). Suggested factors influencing these extensive 
HPAI outbreaks in the USA include poor biosecurity between farms, and high levels of 
exposure to AI virus in poultry farms in general, leading to numerous separate introduction and 
infection events in addition to spread between sheds and between farms (McCluskey, 2015).  
7.4.2 The probability of spread and the probability of limited spread 
The spread models revealed that for all farm types, the probability of LPAI spread is greater 
than the probability of limited LPAI spread. This is because detection and reporting is less 
likely to occur following LPAI establishment and so control measures are less likely to be put 
into place that will limit LPAI spread. In contrast, the spread models indicate limited HPAI 
spread is more likely to occur than HPAI spread due to the high probability farmers will detect 
and report the changes in morbidity and mortality that follow HPAI establishment in a chicken 
flock. In general, there is limited information to determine if shed to shed spread has occurred 
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on Australian LPAI infected farms. There is evidence that shed to shed spread may have 
occurred on two farms; specifically chickens in several sheds on one farm were seropositive to 
LPAI H6N2 in 2006 and LPAI H9N2 was detected in three sheds on a turkey farm in 2012 
(QLD DAFF, 2013) . However, it is also possible independent introductions and infections 
occurred on the sheds of these farms instead of spread between sheds. There has only been one 
incursion to date with evidence of farm to farm LPAI spread in Australia; investigation of the 
2012 H9N2 incursion identified a second infected turkey farm during trace back surveillance 
from the first turkey farm. This second turkey farm showed no clinical signs or increased 
mortality (Arzey, 2013). As mentioned, it is very likely LPAI detections in Australia are 
underreported due to these being non-clinical LPAI infections which provides credibility to the 
outputs of the spread model; that the probability of LPAI spread is greater than that of limited 
LPAI spread. 
Most farms in Australia in which HPAI occurred had the virus spread to other sheds within the 
farm. However, all outbreaks were effectively controlled via the stamping out procedure and 
there was resulting limited farm to farm spread (DAWR, 2013, NSW Government 2012, Sims 
and Turner, 2009). It is likely the outputs of the spread model which indicate that the probability 
of HPAI spread is lower than that of limited HPAI spread reflect what has been experienced in 
Australia; this is easily seen with the farm to farm spread model.  
7.4.3 The different pathways of spread 
The different pathways of LPAI and HPAI spread between sheds have differing probabilities. 
For LPAI spread between sheds, equipment and vermin were the most likely pathways and 
aerosol was the least likely pathway. For HPAI spread between sheds, equipment and boots 
was the most likely pathways and vermin was the least likely pathway. This is largely due to 
differences in the survival or detection of the virus reported in the literature relevant to these 
different pathways. LPAI spread via aerosol is regarded as an unlikely pathway in the literature, 
but detections of HPAI in air samples have been relatively frequently reported, particularly 
during the 2015 HPAI outbreaks in the United States of America (USA) (Jonges et al., 2015, 
McCluskey, 2015). This is likely due to the higher levels of viral replication that occurs in the 
respiratory tract of birds with HPAI infection compared to LPAI infection (Swayne and Pantin-
Jackwood, 2009). The relatively low probability of HPAI spread between sheds via vermin 
estimated in this study is likely due to how the input parameters in relation to this pathway 
were calculated. The input parameters were based on several studies where no virus isolation 
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was obtained after exposure of vermin to AI viruses. It is generally been concluded that mice 
and rats do not play significant roles in the spread of AI virus but insects may (Achenbach and 
Bowen, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2011). In a study where a large number (n=516) of samples were 
taken from rodents exposed to HPAI,  no positive virus isolations were obtained (Nettles et al., 
1985). Similarly, a study where 12 rodents were inoculated with LPAI, no positive virus 
isolations were identified (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011). The feeding of flies with LPAI and 
HPAI resulted in positive virus isolations and are therefore an important pathway to consider 
for AI spread (Nielsen et al., 2011, Sawabe et al., 2009).  
When considering the results of this study it must be remembered that the volume and 
frequency of the different spread pathways between both sheds and farms were not explicitly 
incorporated in the spread model. For shed to shed spread, these pathways were estimated using 
farm survey data in combination with scientific literature. The farm survey data was used to 
determine the proportion of farms that would perform or have specific practices or pathways 
for each farm type and scientific literature was used to determine the probability of survival of 
the virus on those pathways. The results for shed to shed spread therefore represent the 
probability of spread given similar volumes and frequency of each pathway occurring, and this 
may or may not be the situation in reality. For example, it is known that there is a high 
frequency of daily movements between sheds. If incorporated in the model, it may indicate that 
HPAI spread between sheds is more likely than limited HPAI spread which would actually 
explain the high incidence of HPAI spread between sheds on farms affected by HPAI outbreaks 
in Australia (DAWR, 2013, NSW Government 2012, Sims and Turner, 2009). This contrasts 
with the farm to farm spread pathways which were informed by expert opinion due to the lack 
of information in relation to these pathways. Expert understanding and answers of parameters 
influencing spread by each pathway can be assumed to have included consideration of the 
volume and frequency of occurrence and the survival of the virus for each pathway. 
The output probabilities from the farm to farm spread model on the differing pathways of 
spread largely reflect the expert opinion answers where relatively higher probabilities of farm 
to farm spread were given to pickup trucks, egg trays and egg pallets. These comparisons can 
be made from the model output results in Table 7.2 and the values in Appendix D derived from 
expert opinion that were used to inform the pathways between farms (Singh et al., 2017b). 
Expert estimates were largely influenced by the previous Australian HPAI outbreaks. An 
epidemiological investigation of the 2013 HPAI outbreak in Young, NSW suggested that the 
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most likely route of spread of this virus to another farm was the contamination of cardboard 
egg trays (Roth, 2014). Similarly, a dead bird pick-up vehicle which visited multiple farms was 
the only identifiable link between farms that were affected by the 1997 HPAI outbreak in 
Tamworth, NSW (Selleck et al., 2002). This compares with an expert opinion elicitation 
workshop published in 2011, which estimated the probability of HPAI spread between poultry 
farms to inform models simulating the transmission and control of HPAI epidemics in the 
Australian poultry industries. The results of this workshop showed that meat chicken pick up 
crews followed by slaughter crews, manure collection and cardboard egg trays were rated as 
the most likely probabilities of transmission between farms (Hamilton, 2011). Differences 
observed between the two expert elicitations could be due to the time difference, as the 2012 
and 2013 HPAI outbreaks had not yet occurred when the first expert elicitation was conducted. 
7.4.4 Spread sensitivity analysis 
There were no differences in values or trends on the spread sensitivity analyses between spread 
between sheds and spread between farms due to the identical structures of the models as 
described previously. The analyses revealed that the probability of establishment was an 
important influential parameter on the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread, as well as the 
probability of mutation on HPAI spread. Although influential, these parameters depend on 
virus properties and as such cannot be changed by human intervention, and there are large 
uncertainties associated with these mechanisms (Gonzales et al., 2011). Mutation from LPAI 
to HPAI has particularly large unknowns regarding its probability. A recent review of 42 HPAI 
outbreaks from 1959 to 2016, most of which involved chickens and turkeys as the initial species, 
concluded that emergence of HPAI can vary from a few days to a couple of years. It also 
considered that factors such as poultry age, size of the index farm and type of farm management 
do not appear to contribute significantly to HPAI emergence (Richard et al., 2017). The expert 
opinion workshop also demonstrated very different estimated probabilities for mutation 
amongst the experts (Singh et al., 2017b). The variation of R, which was used to estimate the 
probability of establishment in the current study, is significant in previous literature, even 
within the same pathotype and subtype (Gonzales et al., 2012a, Bouma et al., 2009, Hamilton, 
2011). As there is insufficient knowledge about mutation at present to in any way alter the 
likelihood of its occurrence, the control of LPAI and HPAI spread is therefore mainly reliant 
on on-farm biosecurity actions. 
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The detection and reporting parameter was found not to be a significantly influential parameter 
on the probability of LPAI and HPAI spread. This is supported by modelling work by Barnes 
and Glass (2018) which demonstrated a high probability that a second shed is already infected 
with HPAI by the time initial infection is detected and reported using typical daily and weekly 
mortality rates for all farm types. In addition, the index formula described above used to 
calculate the number of days from infection in the first chicken to establishment, detection and 
reporting of LPAI also supports the small influence of detection and reporting on the overall 
probability of spread. This formula revealed a long time period of at least 70 days for all farm 
types; within this time period it is very possible spread has already occurred to other sheds or 
farms due to the high level of movements between sheds and farms on all farm types (Scott et 
al., 2009, Hamilton et al., 2009). This compares with previous modelling studies which 
revealed the high significance of detection and reporting in limiting spread of an AI outbreak. 
However, these studies assessed different but related factors to detection and reporting; 
including the impact of changing the detection threshold, performing frequent sampling of 
farms considered high risk, and ensuring prompt action after detection. In contrast, this study 
assumed a relatively fixed detection threshold based on farmer answers on unusual clinical 
signs, and therefore the changing parameter in the sensitivity analysis is simply a change in the 
proportion of farms that will detect and report at this relatively fixed detection threshold. 
Considerations to further evaluate the significance of detection and reporting are therefore 
described below. 
The spread pathways on the scenario tree models were proportional to each other where the 
sum of all LPAI or HPAI spread pathway probabilities of one scenario tree model was one. 
Therefore, the spread sensitivity analysis could not accurately portray the effects of changing 
one spread pathway as this would result in proportional changes to the other spread pathways; 
each spread pathway had the same influence on the probability of spread. This was depicted as 
‘Prob_PathwaySpread’ which represented changing the probability of any one spread pathway 
and the proportional changes to the probabilities of the other spread pathways. Increasing any 
spread pathway to 100%, which results in 0% probability of all other spread pathways, resulted 
in approximate doubling of the overall median probability of either LPAI or HPAI spread. This 
means if the probability of any pathway is certain to occur, and all other pathways are certain 
not to occur, the probability of either LPAI or HPAI spread is approximately doubled. In reality 
all other spread pathways will have a probability greater than zero of occurring. It is therefore 
expected that in a model where such pathways are not proportional to each other, the 
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cumulative effect of increasing the probabilities of each individual pathway will result in 
greater than doubling the overall probability of LPAI or HPAI spread. The spread pathways 
are therefore significant influential parameters on the overall probability of spread and are 
dependent on biosecurity on the farm. Other highly influential parameters in the spread model 
such as the probability of establishment and mutation are dependent on the mechanisms of the 
virus and cannot be changed by human intervention. The importance of improving biosecurity 
on farms in order to reduce the probability of spread is therefore stressed from these results.  
7.4.5 Other considerations 
These results show the large influence people who are not farm workers but regularly visit the 
farm have on the probability of spread. Such people include egg pallet and tray collectors and 
bird pick up crews. Consultation among different industry bodies is important to emphasise 
shared responsibility and agreement to biosecurity codes and guidelines. Further training for 
both farm workers and people who visit farms in regards to the importance of biosecurity is 
always beneficial. The integrated nature of the Australian chicken meat industry by a small 
number of companies allows for this shared responsibility and relative ease of communication 
across a range of networks. However, this may well be lacking in the Australian layer sector 
due to the nature of this industry which has a high level of numerous, privately owned farms 
(Scott et al., 2009). As new information arises related to the volume and frequency of spread 
pathways that occur in the Australian commercial chicken industry, as well as further 
information on the behaviour and mechanisms of the AI virus, these can be used to update the 
input parameters in the spread scenario tree models. 
Detection and reporting was not highly influential in this model as this node simply represented 
the proportion of farms that would detect and report at a relatively fixed detection threshold. 
However, this study did indicate that spread between sheds is likely to have already occurred 
before detection. Other factors related to detection and reporting were not assessed and should 
be considered for future studies, particularly for high risk farms. These include those factors 
assessed in previous modelling studies such as; the impact of lowering the detection threshold, 
frequent sampling of farms considered high risk, and ensuring prompt action after detection 
(Comin et al., 2012; Weaver et al., 2012; Gonzales et al., 2014). Frequent sampling can improve 
knowledge of LPAI transmission which has been demonstrated to be largely unknown in this 
study particularly in the Australian context. AI surveillance in poultry in Australia is currently 
not supported by the industry due to the consequences outlined in the AUSVETPLAN 
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associated with H5 or H7 detections (AHA, 2011). Performance of surveillance in some form, 
such as sampling sentinel flocks or poultry at slaughter and processing should be considered 
for the Australian poultry industry (East et al., 2010). 
Given this model considers and follows the probabilities of exposure quantified by Scott et al. 
(2018b), the probabilities estimated in this study can be considered representative for the same 
region as that of Scott et al. (2018b); the Sydney basin region. Extrapolating these results to 
other regions, poultry species or non-commercial chicken farms must be done with caution as 
differences in the probabilities of exposure may exist. However, the framework of this model 
can be used to aid in the development of similar risk assessment models for these different 
farms. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The study indicates that the risk of establishment of AI is non-negligible after exposure and 
infection of LPAI in one chicken, consistent with the history of HPAI outbreaks in Australia. 
Nodes linked to attributes of the virus, such as the probability of establishment and the 
probability of mutation, were the most influential factors impacting the probability of LPAI 
and HPAI spread respectively. Whilst these cannot be changed by human intervention, some 
on-farm actions can be performed to potentially reduce the probability of spread. Biosecurity 
and cleanliness on farms, with particular attention to equipment and egg trays between sheds 
and farms respectively, as these were found as the most likely spread pathways, will reduce the 
probability of spread. The results of this study and that of the exposure risk assessment in Scott 
et al. (2018b) help estimate the overall probability of  spread and spread pathways of LPAI and 
HPAI in Australian commercial chicken enterprises. The results also provide guidance to the 
Australian commercial chicken industry on the importance of farm workers and people who 
regularly visit farms in performing biosecurity practices, as this is part of a shared responsibility 
in safeguarding the industry against AI.  
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Chapter 8. General discussion 
Avian influenza (AI) is a globally important disease of poultry with the potential to cause 
adverse effects on animal welfare, considerable economic and production losses to poultry 
industries, and can be zoonotic. Large economic and production losses have occurred in the 
Australian poultry industry from the past seven high pathogenic AI (HPAI) outbreaks. In 
addition, concern among industry experts about a change in the probability of future AI 
outbreak occurrence in Australia with the recent consumer-driven expansion of free range 
poultry production justifies research in this area. The research reported in this thesis filled gaps 
related to knowledge on AI risk to the Australian commercial chicken industry by quantifying 
the risk of low pathogenic AI (LPAI) exposure as well as LPAI and HPAI spread within and 
between commercial chicken farms in the Australian context. This approach involved a 
comprehensive review of the Australian commercial chicken industry and the AI virus, a farm 
survey to gather current information on farm design, management practices, and biosecurity 
practices, camera trapping to assess wildlife visits on farm, and the development of quantitative 
risk assessment models, all of which were in the context of Australian commercial chicken 
farms in the Sydney basin region and South East Queensland. 
Specifically, the farm survey involved collection of current and comprehensive information 
about farm design, housing characteristics and management practices on commercial chicken 
farms in the Australian context (Chapter 3). In addition, adoption levels and farmer perceived 
importance of biosecurity practices were obtained through this farm survey (Chapter 4). 
Wildlife visits on these commercial chicken farms was also further assessed via camera 
trapping (Chapter 5). This information (Chapters 3-5) informed the quantitative risk assessment 
modelling (Chapters 6-7) and the findings enabled several conclusions to be drawn about the 
risk of AI exposure and spread among the different commercial chicken farm types (non-free 
range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, and free range layer farms). 
In addition, the most influential pathways leading to AI exposure and spread were identified 
via sensitivity analysis which provided answers about which on-farm actions would be most 
significant in mitigating risk. All of these components of the thesis are further discussed below, 
as well as strengths and limitations and future recommendations synthesised from the research. 
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8.1. Farm design, management and biosecurity practices in Australian 
commercial chicken farms 
As well as capturing current information to inform risk assessment models, the conduct of a 
farm survey on Australian commercial chicken farms identified similarities and differences for 
a range of features between farm types (Chapters 3-4). This is the first study to 
comprehensively describe farm design, management and biosecurity practices in commercial 
chicken farms in Australia, especially in light of the recent expansion of free range farms, 
through the conduct of on-farm interviews. Previous published research in this area used 
information from personal communications with consultants or veterinarians, or through the 
conduct of telephone interviews with farmers (East, 2007, Scott et al., 2009). The conduct of 
on-farm interviews with comprehensive questionnaires allowed for more accuracy and 
confidence in the responses obtained as researchers could witness and record observations on 
the presence of particular features and practices rather than relying solely on farmer reporting, 
as occurs through telephone interviews. The descriptive analyses conducted of the survey 
results were simple and effective, but the value of other techniques such as multiple 
correspondence analysis of the data is acknowledged to provide additional insight in the data 
through identification of clusters of questionnaire responses (Holt et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
this survey provides new knowledge of Australian chicken farms as a whole as it provides 
current, detailed descriptions on the commercial sector, with information on the non-
commercial sector obtained through on-farm interviews also recently published (Singh et al., 
2017a).  
The lack of information in the literature describing the large amount of variations in farm 
design and management practices possible from the high level of private ownership within the 
Australian egg industry was addressed in the survey by purposely selecting a high proportion 
of layer farms relative to meat chicken farms. There was a large amount of industry support to 
conduct the survey, where comprehensive lists of contact information was received for the vast 
majority of layer and meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and all free range meat 
chicken farms owned by one company in the South East Queensland region from corporations, 
consultants, veterinarians and companies. The sharing of this information was refused on only 
one occasion. Examination of the comprehensive lists of contact information revealed that there 
was a limited number of layer farms in the Sydney basin bioregion relative to meat chicken 
farms; consequently, the layer farm lists were exhausted when contacting the farmers. It was 
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apparent during the telephone calls to invite farmers to participate in the survey that there was 
also a high level of farmer support of the project; there were only three refusals of participation, 
all of which were from layer farms. The actual and target numbers of farms of each farm type 
to be surveyed were; 25/25 free range layer farms, 9/10 cage layer farms, 9/10 barn layer farms, 
15/15 free range meat chicken farms and 15/15 non-free range meat chicken farms. Due to the 
low number of refusals to participate in the farm survey and the limited number of layer farms 
in the Sydney basin bioregion, the results of the farm survey regarding commercial layer farm 
types can be considered representative of these farm types in this region with great confidence. 
Similarly, the survey included meat chicken farms owned by a total of three meat chicken 
companies, with two of these being the two largest companies supplying more than 70% of 
Australia’s meat chicken. This in addition to the vertically integrated nature and hence 
similarity among meat chicken farm types leads to great confidence of the representativeness 
of these results among these farm types in the Sydney basin bioregion as well. The addition of 
free range meat chicken farms in South East Queensland was performed as it was revealed 
there were a limited number of free range meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion 
and all were owned by one of the two largest Australian meat chicken companies; only six 
farms of this farm type were visited in the Sydney basin bioregion. Permission was granted to 
visit free range meat chicken farms in South East Queensland which were owned by the other 
large Australian meat chicken company. Nine free range meat chicken farms were visited in 
this region and no stark differences in comparison to the free range meat chicken farms in the 
Sydney basin bioregion were found. However, generalising these results to commercial chicken 
farms across Australia must still be done with caution as differences in farm design and 
management and biosecurity practices exist. 
Cage layer farms in particular were found to have the lowest levels of adoption of biosecurity 
practices across all farm types in this survey. However, as stated, regions in which the farm 
survey was conducted must be taken into consideration. The Sydney basin region was selected 
due to the wide variety of farm types in this region, with South East Queensland added in order 
to have more free range meat chicken farms included in the survey. It was identified that many 
cage layer farms in the Sydney basin region were old farms with outdated infrastructure which 
did contribute to poor levels of biosecurity compliance. These include the use of old, 
conventional sheds which have curtains and/or shutters for cooling. In contrast to most modern 
farms which use tunnel ventilated sheds, conventional sheds are less sealed (Scott et al., 2009). 
Over time with general wear and tear, further seals are broken and holes in the walls and corners 
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of the sheds allow vermin, (rodents and insects) and other wildlife such as wild birds to enter. 
In addition, accumulations of farm debris such as old machinery and tools without regular 
cleaning and weed control create ideal breeding grounds for vermin and other wildlife (East, 
2007). Overgrown plants can also be an attractant to some wild birds, such as the seed from 
long grasses serving as a food source for the Australian wood duck, Chenonetta jubata 
(Dawson et al., 1989, DAFF, 2009a). Overall this leads to the greater difficulty of vermin 
control on old farms; the farm survey revealed all layer farms reported insects inside sheds 
(100% for cage, barn and free range layer) and cage and barn layer farms had the highest reports 
of small mammals, i.e. rats and mice, inside sheds (89% for both farm types) compared to the 
other farm types (Chapter 4). Failures in vermin control are a compromise to biosecurity due 
to the potential for pathogen exposure and spread. There was some degree of awareness of the 
relatively poorer levels of biosecurity adoption on cage layer farms, as the survey revealed cage 
layer farms gave themselves the lowest average personal biosecurity rating. It is understood 
that poor biosecurity is not the case for all layer farms across Australia; where large, modern 
farms have been developed in regional areas. 
The survey showed that in general, meat chicken farms had a higher level of adoption of 
biosecurity practices and of similarity in all aspects of farm design and practices in comparison 
to layer farms. This was due to the vertically integrated nature and audited system in place for 
meat chicken farms compared to the high level of private ownership of layer farms. This has 
implications on the risk of infectious disease to these farm types, including AI. Layer farms 
with suboptimal adoption of biosecurity practices in particular pose a risk not only to their own 
farm, but to the industry at large due to the potential for spread. These findings demonstrate a 
need for collective initiatives to support education, training and understanding of disease risk 
and biosecurity in order to increase the level of adoption and compliance of biosecurity 
practices for the layer sector of the industry. 
Findings on specific biosecurity practices which relate to AI risk of exposure and spread 
include a high level of treatment of drinking water found across all farm types. This was a 
positive finding as AI exposure through contaminated drinking water is considered one of the 
main pathways of exposure to domestic poultry globally. However, the survey results also 
showed that there was room for improvement to ensure complete water treatment across all 
farm types including non-drinking water used for features such as cooling pads, foggers and 
range irrigation. Farmer reports of instances where chickens escaped from sheds or range areas 
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were found to be higher than expected; reported in 11% and 84% of cage layer and free range 
layer farms respectively. The return of these escapee chickens back into the main flock also 
provides opportunity for AI risk exposure and led to the inclusion of this as a pathway in the 
scenario tree exposure model (Chapter 6). The finding of limited outdoor access for chickens 
on free range meat chicken farms due to the short bird lifespan and the common occurrence of 
unsuitable weather conditions in Australia lead to a similar risk of LPAI exposure for this farm 
type as for non-free range meat chicken farms. Relatively greater outdoor access for free range 
layer farms contributed to the highest probability of LPAI exposure for this farm type. However, 
this probability is heavily influenced by the presence of waterfowl on the farm and waterfowl 
visits were found to be limited in general (Chapter 5). 
8.2 Wildlife visits on Australian commercial chicken farms assessed by 
camera traps 
Wildlife camera trapping was an extension of the farm survey to assess the frequency and types 
of wildlife visits on commercial chicken farms in the Australian context (Chapter 5). This is 
the first study to use camera traps to assess wildlife activity on commercial chicken farms. 
Previous assessments were performed using other methodologies such as biologists 
undertaking manual counts (Burns et al., 2012). It was found birds in the order Passeriformes 
were the most frequent visitors and most wildlife visits occurred during the day. Waterfowl 
(order Anseriformes) and shorebird (order Charadriiformes) visits were quite rare, which links 
to the AI risk assessment models where waterfowl presence had a large influence on the risk 
of AI exposure. This is a positive finding for the industry that commercial chicken farms appear 
unattractive for waterfowl to visit. However, camera traps were only placed for one week per 
farm; during Australian spring (September to October) in the Sydney basin region and during 
Australian summer (February) in South East Queensland. These time periods were selected to 
capture any shorebirds that undergo annual migrations; visits to Australia occur in the 
Australian spring and departures before the Australian winter (Tracey et al., 2004, Dingle, 
2004). Most migratory shorebird species occupy coastal areas of Australia where none of the 
poultry farms surveyed were located. Farm environments in general are likely not attractive for 
these species due to their wetland diets and the need to venture inland where most commercial 
poultry farms in Australia are situated is unlikely. Only poultry farms situated in areas in which 
large numbers of migratory shorebirds use the surrounding wetlands, such as Fullerton Cove 
in NSW, may have more shorebird visits (Dingle, 2004, Tracey et al., 2004, East et al., 2008a). 
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In contrast, Australian waterfowl movement is nomadic and influenced by the presence of 
surface water, rainfall events and food resources; there are no particular seasons in which 
waterfowl are predictably more abundant (Tracey et al., 2004, Atzeni et al., 2016, Ferenczi et 
al., 2016). Events that lead to large waterfowl visits on farms, such as congregations on farm 
dams during droughts, are suspected to be associated with HPAI outbreaks in poultry in 
Australia (Sims and Turner, 2009). It is possible that extending the length of time that camera 
traps were placed on farms in the study might have captured further waterfowl visits. In 
addition, the large number of duck visits on a dam captured from a silo camera indeed showed 
that attractants such as surface water had a positive influence on waterfowl presence on farms. 
The data on wildlife visits to the dam was removed from the overall analysis of wildlife visits 
because it recorded on only one farm but it does show the positive influence attractants such 
as surface water have on waterfowl presence on the farm. A recommendation for future studies 
would be to assess wildlife activity on dams in particular, and keeping cameras placed for 
longer periods of time to gather information on factors that influence waterfowl presence on 
farms such as climatic conditions and weather events. 
The study also showed a link between the level of biosecurity on the farm, where the farm 
survey in Chapter 4 revealed cage layer had the lowest levels of adoption of biosecurity 
practices across all farm types, and the number of wildlife visits. Cage layer farms had the 
highest number of wildlife visits compared to other farm types. Poor biosecurity practices such 
as feed spills and unkempt areas of farms including poor weed control and overgrowth of grass 
lead to greater food availability for wildlife. Grasses that are allowed to grow long will produce 
seed, providing a food source for herbivorous waterfowl such as the Australian wood duck, 
Chenonetta jubata, while unkempt areas provide breeding areas for vermin (Dawson et al., 
1989, DAFF, 2009a). 
In terms of pathogen transfer, the results of the study suggest there is limited pathogen transfer 
through direct contact between wildlife and commercial chickens (direct contact in the context 
of this thesis extended to include direct contact between wildlife faeces and commercial 
chickens). This finding was due to the limited number of wildlife visits identified on range 
areas compared to other camera locations on both free range layer and meat chicken farms. In 
addition, of those visits that were captured on range areas, few had a chicken also present in 
the image at the same time. This indicates that the most likely route of pathogen transfer 
appears to be through the indirect route (defined in the context of this thesis as contact with the 
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virus through a medium, that is, through water, fomites or vectors) (Singh et al., 2017b). 
Although the results of this study suggest that there is limited direct contact between wildlife 
and commercial chickens, this is still a very significant and possible transmission route. 
Biosecurity practices to reduce direct contact from occurring, such as the deterrence of 
waterfowl, should be performed with high perceived importance. This is especially true 
because waterfowl presence was found to be one of the most influential parameters on the 
probability of AI exposure to commercial chicken farms in the exposure scenario tree model 
(Chapter 6). Furthermore, as indirect contact appears to be more likely to occur than direct 
contact, it highlights the importance of performing biosecurity practices such as thorough 
treatment of water for all uses on the farm rather than just drinking water, and the use of 
footbaths and stringent vermin control. 
8.3 Evaluating the risk of AI exposure and spread in Australian commercial 
chicken farms 
This study was the first quantitative risk assessment for AI exposure and spread in Australian 
commercial chicken farms that considered differences between farm types. The methodology 
to conduct this risk assessment was performed following the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) methodology guides; the OIE being well-credentialed and reputable in providing 
internationally recognised and highly regarded methodology guides. Results of the exposure 
model indicate that the risk of the first LPAI exposure at any point in time posed by a single 
wild bird to a chicken on an Australian commercial chicken farm is very to extremely low for 
all farm types (Chapter 6). However, it must be reminded that this probability originates from 
the risk of a single wild bird and that in reality; multiple wild bird visits across commercial 
chicken farms are a common occurrence daily. Thus, multiple exposures to LPAI are 
potentially occurring more frequently than realised. The probability of LPAI exposure was 
highest for chickens on free range layer farms, which also had the highest probability of direct 
exposure (Table 6.6). With the consumer-driven expansion of free range poultry production, 
the number of LPAI exposures to commercial chicken farms is therefore also expected to 
increase in Australia. Results from Chapter 5 indicate that the indirect route of pathogen 
transfer appears most likely and that in Chapter 6, waterfowl presence, i.e. direct contact, was 
one of the most influential parameters on the probability of AI exposure. However, the model 
also took into consideration that direct exposure can occur inside sheds and feed storage areas. 
Holes along shed walls allow wild birds to enter sheds and chickens escaping range areas to 
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visit feed storage areas can increase the probability of direct exposure. Cameras were not 
deployed inside sheds for the study in Chapter 5. However, survey results in Chapter 4 revealed 
that farm owners/managers on more than half of the surveyed farms reported wild birds present 
inside sheds across all farm types. Waterfowl or shorebirds were not reported inside these sheds 
but other species can act as potential “bridge” species in the transmission of AI from waterfowl 
and shorebirds to poultry and vice versa (Teru et al., 2012). LPAI has been detected in wild 
birds other than waterfowl and shorebirds in Australia. HPAI H7N7 was detected in a starling 
(Sturnus vulgaris) where it was most likely the bird acquired infection from poultry as it was 
trapped in a shed in which a HPAI outbreak occurred (Grillo et al., 2015, Nestorowicz et al., 
1987). This highlights to the industry the importance to uphold strict biosecurity practices 
across all farm types to reduce the presence of wild birds on the property. This will lead to a 
reduction in the probability of LPAI exposure and hence a reduction in the probability of 
establishment, spread and potential mutation to HPAI. 
The presence of waterfowl and the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds were highly influential 
parameters in the sensitivity analysis. Although results from Chapter 5 indicate waterfowl 
appear to be rare visitors to Australian commercial chicken farms, the geographical location, 
weather conditions, farm design and biosecurity practices can influence their presence on farm 
and therefore the risk of LPAI exposure. The prevalence of LPAI in wild birds cannot be 
changed by human intervention, and thus farms should perform actions to deter waterfowl on 
the property to reduce AI exposure risk. Various methods to deter wild waterfowl are related 
to simple farm cleanliness, such as preventing the overgrowth of vegetation and cleaning feed 
spills. The elimination of non-essential surface water can also reduce the number of resident 
wild birds. Methods that require high levels of effort to implement and are generally cost-
prohibitive include netting range areas, covering surface water and using radar-activated 
systems that activate visual and acoustic deterrents. The scale of deterrence methods used is 
likely dependent on the level of waterfowl visits and hence magnitude of risk of pathogen 
transfer for individual farms. The development of industry-agreed risk assessment 
methodologies for individual farms is a recommendation to help farmers know the level of 
deterrence that should be implemented on the farm given consideration of cost and 
requirements for implementation (Atzeni et al., 2016).  
The most influential parameters in the sensitivity analysis of the spread scenario tree model 
were the probability of establishment and the different spread pathways; the different spread 
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pathways were proportional to each other in the model and hence one pathway probability was 
used in the sensitivity analysis (Chapter 7). Like the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds, the 
probability of establishment is a mechanism of the virus and its interactions with the host where 
human intervention has little influence. Vaccination for AI is an intervention that can impede 
establishment and is conducted in some countries for AI control. However, if vaccination is 
applied inconsistently, faster antigenic drifts of the virus can occur which may result in sporadic 
failures of vaccination due to poor antigenic match between vaccine and field strains (Cattoli 
et al., 2011). In addition, previous modelling work conducted by the National Avian Influenza 
Vaccination Expert (NAIVE) group for Australian commercial poultry farms revealed that 
emergency vaccination during a HPAI epidemic is unlikely to offer substantial benefits for 
several reasons. These include limitations regarding vaccine availability, the intense resources 
required for vaccine administration, and immunity in poultry takes several weeks to develop 
after vaccination (Hamilton, 2011, DAFF, 2010). Vaccination in Australia may instead play a 
role in controlling LPAI epidemics in poultry and to protect rare avian species, vulnerable 
poultry populations or valuable genetic poultry stock from LPAI or HPAI (Hamilton, 2011, 
Busani et al., 2007, DAFF, 2010). 
The sensitivity analysis also revealed that detection and reporting of AI infected chickens was 
not a highly influential parameter. However, this was due to the relatively fixed detection 
threshold of this node in the model, and so the sensitivity analysis instead evaluated changes 
in the proportion of farms that would detect and report at this detection threshold. This 
parameter relies on clinical evidence of infection in the infected chickens, where silent 
infections can occur for LPAI, and it is common for death to be the only clinical sign for HPAI 
infection (Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2009). This led to a high probability that spread has 
already occurred during the time period from infection of the first chicken to detection and 
reporting of LPAI. Previous modelling work has shown the significance of changes to the 
detection threshold, as well as frequent sampling and prompt action after detection and 
reporting, on the impact of spread (Comin et al., 2012; Weaver et al., 2012; Gonzales et al., 
2014). These factors were not explicitly assessed in the spread model and can be considered 
for further evaluation in the Australian context. For instance, the model assumes actions will 
be put into place after positive detection and reporting so that ‘limited’ spread occurs, but the 
timeliness of these actions and the level of ‘limited’ spread are not measured. However, if it is 
assumed that reasonably prompt action and limited spread will occur after detection and 
reporting, the results of the spread model reflect current circumstances and therefore still 
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indicate detection and reporting has little influence on the probability of spread at the existing 
detection threshold in the Australian context. Thus, in addition to vaccination not being a 
recommended method in the Australian context to influence the probability of establishment; 
the most effective way of reducing the probability of spread suggested by this model is to 
improve biosecurity practices on the different spread pathways between sheds and farms.  
Changes in any pathway in both the exposure and spread models will have influence in other 
pathways, ultimately affecting the probabilities obtained. It is therefore difficult to assess the 
influence of specific pathways without isolating them, as was performed in the sensitivity 
analyses. However, the problems associated with isolation of pathways are highlighted in the 
spread model. The different spread pathways were complementary to each other, and therefore 
sensitivity analysis could not determine which particular spread pathways were more 
influential on the overall probability of spread. Global approaches that are model-independent 
and where isolation of pathways is not required is a suggested approach for future work (Saltelli 
et al., 2009). The spread pathways with the highest average median probability of spread across 
the farm types instead gives an indication of which spread pathways are most significant. The 
spread pathway with this highest probability between sheds was via equipment for both LPAI 
and HPAI. The results relate to the relatively high proportion of farmers who reported to share 
and not disinfect shared equipment between sheds (Chapter 4). However, the volume and 
frequency of the spread pathways were not explicitly considered during the development of the 
spread model as the farm survey did not record details on the frequency of movements between 
sheds or of movements to/from each farm. The spread pathways between sheds instead reflect 
the proportion of farms that perform or have these pathways present with consideration of virus 
survivability via these pathways. The probabilities of these spread pathways therefore also 
represent probabilities given similar volumes and frequency of the spread pathways. It is 
regarded highly probable that multiple sheds are infected with either LPAI or HPAI on one 
farm by the time detection and reporting occurs. This has occurred in at least half of both HPAI 
and LPAI cases in poultry in Australia (Sims and Turner, 2009, Roth, 2014, Moloney et al., 
2013, Arzey, 2013, QLD DAFF, 2013). Recent branch process modelling work in the 
Australian context also supports this (Barnes and Glass, 2018). This result appears to reduce 
emphasis on the need for good biosecurity between sheds, especially since the detection of 
notifiable AI on a farm requires depopulation of the entire premise as well (AHA, 2011). 
However, good biosecurity between sheds should still be encouraged as the transmission of 
other non-notifiable pathogens can be minimised and infected sheds can be isolated. Visiting 
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sheds from youngest to oldest age groups, as stated in the national biosecurity manuals, is 
recommended for this reason as young birds are considered relatively pathogen-free and more 
susceptible to infection as compared to older birds (DAFF, 2009a).  
The spread pathways with highest average median probabilities between farms were via bird 
pick up systems, egg trays and egg pallets. Bird pick up systems referred to both dead and live 
birds combined. The results to inform the probability of these pathways were collected only 
from expert opinion (Singh et al., 2017b) as the farm survey did not capture sufficient detail 
on farm to farm movements. However, although the spread model was developed without 
explicit consideration of volume and frequency of the spread pathways, it is reasonable to 
assume that the experts’ answers for farm to farm spread pathways considered volume, 
frequency and survival of the virus on these pathways. It was found that answers from the 
expert opinion workshop were largely influenced by circumstances during past HPAI outbreaks 
in Australia where spread between farms occurred (Singh et al., 2017b). The 1997 H7N4 HPAI 
outbreak in Tamworth, NSW involved a dead bird pick-up vehicle that was the only identifiable 
link between farms which were affected (Sims and Turner, 2009). Similarly, epidemiological 
investigation of the 2013 H7N2 HPAI outbreak in Young, NSW suggested that the most likely 
route of spread was from contaminated cardboard egg trays (Roth, 2014). To fully incorporate 
volume of movement for farm-to-farm pathways would require additional information to that 
gathered within the scope of this thesis, and involve investigating practices of companies and 
individuals that move between poultry farms, including feed delivery services, live and dead 
bird transportations, and tradesmen, to capture information on the frequency and locations of 
their visits. Previous work on the distance covered by feed delivery transport systems and dead 
bird pick-up vehicles in the Sydney basin region has provided an idea of the high level of work 
required to capture this information. For example, it was found that three separate feed mill 
companies supplied 12, 107 and 139 farms in a 4430, 6710 and 24,500 km2 area respectively. 
Two of these feed mills also supplied farms outside of the Sydney region, including the 
Western Plains of NSW. In addition, the catchment area of a single dead bird pick-up contractor 
included 94 farms from two chicken meat integrators in a 3267 km2 area (Hamilton, 2011). 
8.4 Strengths and limitations 
The strengths and limitations of each study have been outlined in each respective chapter. 
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The strength of this thesis is supported by the various consultations undertaken and the 
cooperation and inputs provided by the producers, industry experts, and scientific colleagues. 
The conduct of on-farm interviews where researchers visited farms with pre-written 
comprehensive questionnaires allowed accurate details and observations about the farm to be 
recorded and to confirm what farmers reported for most answers. Contact information of all 
the farmers was obtained from corporations, consultants, veterinarians and companies who 
supported this project. Consent to visit farms was obtained via telephone call where there was 
also a high level of farmer support due to the low number of refusals to participate in the project. 
The limited number of layer farms in the Sydney basin bioregion gives strength to the 
representativeness of the results of the farm survey as the majority of layer farms in this region 
participated in the survey. 
This thesis involved consultation with a range of experts from various fields for all aspects of 
the research. A Steering Committee, which consisted of individuals from poultry organisations, 
industry veterinarians, wildlife and statistical experts, and representation from the retail sector, 
provided guidance from the beginning of the research. The quantitative risk assessments were 
conducted by following internationally recognised methodology provided by the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). The construction of quantitative models requires 
detailed information from various sources to inform parameters and thus an extensive literature 
review was performed to include the most current information. Consultation with experts was 
also performed to help inform these parameters and experts included the National Avian 
Influenza Wild Bird (NAIWB) Steering Group for information on wild bird AI surveillance, 
the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) for experimental data on virus transmissions 
between chickens, and an expert opinion workshop which involved a total of 10 experts who 
had expertise across a range of areas related to the poultry industry, wild bird behaviour and 
AI virus in the Australian context. 
The results from the farm survey and the risk assessment models were presented at a National 
AI Forum and regional workshops. The forum was held in August 2016 and attended by 62 
participants representing key industry and government stakeholders across most sectors of the 
Australian poultry industry. The regional workshops were held in NSW, Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia in November and December of 2016 and attended by a total of 136 
producers and poultry industry representatives. There was representation from chicken meat, 
commercial eggs, free range eggs and meat, duck meat, turkey meat and mixed type farms. 
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During these presentations, ideas and recommendations to improve the poultry industry and 
reduce the risk of AI and other diseases were communicated and discussed, and these are 
further discussed in the recommendations below. These strengths as well as the skills obtained 
from conducting this work can be similarly applied to future risk assessments regarding other 
diseases in animal industries i.e. through on-farm interviews, engaging with appropriate experts, 
building models, and presenting results to a wide audience through a series of workshops and/or 
a national forum. At the very least, the vast knowledge of AI virus learnt from accomplishing 
this thesis adds substantially to the pool of limited knowledge regarding the virus in the 
Australian context. If this work is to be conducted again, differences in how the work is carried 
out are outlined in the limitations and recommendations below. 
The general limitations of this research include the limited regions in which the farm survey 
was conducted; in the Sydney basin region and South East Queensland. Therefore, it is 
acknowledged that the results cannot be confidently applied to all poultry farms in Australia. 
In addition, the limited time of one week that cameras were placed on farm meant knowledge 
on seasonal variations in the frequency and types of wildlife visits could not be obtained. The 
development of the spread models revealed limited information on transportation between 
farms exists, and a survey on transportation services is required to obtain this knowledge. 
Another limitation recognised is related to AI virus biology. The development of the exposure 
and spread risk assessment models revealed that transmission characteristics and mutation 
probabilities especially in the Australian context are lacking in the literature. Results from 
expert opinion elicitation were used to inform the mutation probability and farm movement 
parameters because of these deficiencies. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Recommendations from this research include implementing actions to increase biosecurity 
adoption across all farm types. This was also acknowledged by the industry on presentation of 
the farm survey results at the National AI Forum where the threat of AI was viewed as a shared 
risk and shared responsibility across the poultry industry (Toribio and Groves, 2016). The low 
biosecurity adoption levels identified on layer farms in particular highlights the need for further 
investigation to identify factors influencing biosecurity adoption. This can involve the 
investigation of personality traits and research on the psychology of farmers, as has been 
performed in commercial poultry farms in Canada (Racicot et al., 2012). Australian Eggs is 
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now funding a research project to investigate the drivers of biosecurity engagement and to 
identify approaches for improving this engagement among egg producers in Australia, based 
on the directions for future research formulated at the National AI Forum in August 2016 
(Australian Eggs, 2018).  
The industry also acknowledged the need to revise biosecurity manuals for commercial chicken 
production in Australia in light of this new knowledge. Outcomes and recommendations from 
both the National AI Forum and the regional workshops were considered for the revision 
process to the generic National Farm Biosecurity Manual of Poultry Production (DAFF, 2009a). 
Revisions include change of wording in the manuals to indicate practices are compulsory rather 
than optional, having only one level of biosecurity that should be routinely performed instead 
of previous references to ‘level 2’ biosecurity, highlighting waterfowl in particular as high risk 
wildlife, and the addition of escapee chickens, access to feed spills, and sharing of non-
disinfected equipment as major routes for disease transmission. Recommended revisions to the 
text in the generic manual have been given to Animal Health Australia for their consideration, 
and included updates to provide current understanding of biosecurity practices relevant to AI 
risk mitigation and prevention and additions to reflect the changing poultry industry structure, 
especially in regards to the increase in free range poultry production. At present, the Australian 
Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, which initiates the revision of 
the National Farm Biosecurity Manual of Poultry Production, is still in the process of 
considering these revisions. However, revision of the industry specific biosecurity manuals for 
the meat chicken industry and layer chicken industry is underway and is involving 
collaboration between these industries to identify areas of alignment and to include the 
suggested revisions for the National Farm Biosecurity Manual of Poultry Production into the 
respective industry manuals (R. Chia & K. Hewson, pers. comm., January 2018). A revised 
generic manual will provide a guide for other specific poultry industry sectors, including other 
species of poultry, to update their specific manuals. The risk assessment models can also be 
further developed to investigate risk of LPAI for these other species of poultry. 
There is a need to better understand the mechanisms of AI virus, such as factors that influence 
transmission and mutation, in commercial chickens in the Australian context. This information 
is required to validate the risk assessment models. Experimental work on AI virus infection in 
chickens, as performed at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, provides an indication but 
does not represent what occurs on farms. Currently, there is no surveillance to estimate LPAI 
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infection in Australian commercial chicken flocks due to the implications of H5 or H7 
identification. Current policy under the AUSVETPLAN states all birds on a farm must be 
destroyed when a H5 or H7 AI virus is detected, usually by real-time PCR (AHA, 2011). The 
risk assessment models support this policy as spread is likely to have already occurred prior to 
detection and reporting. Therefore, the industry needs to consider recommendations to improve 
understanding of LPAI infection dynamics in Australian commercial chickens such as 
extending work done by East et al. (2010) in which non-commercial sentinel chicken flocks 
were bled and surveillance of antibodies to AI virus performed. Extension to this work can 
involve the use of chickens in commercial settings, and collaboration with government bodies 
to allow monitoring of flocks after identification of LPAI exposure in order to better understand 
within flock transmission rates. Serum samples can also be collected at slaughter to enable 
prevalence estimates of LPAI in individual commercial chicken farms. Information on the farm 
including flock size, farm type, and management practices can lead to investigation of factors 
associated with different levels of LPAI prevalence. LPAI surveillance in commercial poultry 
flocks has been performed in other countries and their methods can be reviewed to identify the 
extent to which they can apply to Australian commercial poultry farms (Gonzales et al., 2012c).  
Further knowledge on the types, volumes and frequency of movements between farms is 
required in the Australian context; this gap was identified in the spread risk assessment model. 
This knowledge is especially useful in disease control and investigation, as a better 
understanding of the movements that occur within the poultry industry allows for rapid 
identification of high risk transport systems and facilitates targeted surveillance and tracing 
programs. This assists in the early detection of disease and minimisation of the impact of a 
disease outbreak, as well as validation of risk assessment and simulation model work (Hamilton, 
2011). This knowledge can be obtained through the conduct of a survey of all transport services 
between farms, with specific details including the distances covered, the locations visited, and 
the frequency of the movements. The design of interactive maps that can be regularly updated 
would provide useful visual representations of this information. 
As the sensitivity analysis of the exposure risk assessment model indicates that the prevalence 
of LPAI in wild birds is highly influential on the probability of LPAI exposure, ongoing 
surveillance of AI in wild birds is prudent. The National Avian Influenza Wild Bird (NAIWB) 
Steering Group was established in 2006 to strengthen national coordination and collaboration 
of AI surveillance. Australia-wide surveillance activities are conducted with national funding 
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provided by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources and 
in 2011/12, from the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC) 
Chicken Meat Program (DAFF, 2010, Grillo, 2015, WHA, 2018). Continued and improved 
funding will increase understanding of AI infection dynamics in wild birds, including factors 
that influence LPAI prevalence such as climatic conditions and host characteristics such as age, 
species or behaviour. New knowledge in this area may potentially predict AI outbreaks by 
identifying risk factors associated with high LPAI prevalence in wild bird populations, and 
thereby identifying at-risk farms and locations, in which focused actions can be implemented 
to prevent or reduce domestic poultry exposure and to reduce the extent of spread and 
subsequent damage. 
8.6 Conclusion  
This research adds substantial information to the global knowledge of AI through the conduct 
of the first quantitative risk assessment for AI exposure and spread among commercial chicken 
farm types in Australia. As well as informing the risk assessment models, the farm survey 
provides in-depth knowledge on current farm design, management and biosecurity practices 
especially in light of changes to the industry with the rapid expansion of free range farms. In 
addition, the first study of wildlife camera trapping on Australian commercial chicken farms 
challenges assumptions about the types and frequency of wildlife visits given the finding that 
waterfowl and shorebirds were rare visitors on commercial chicken farms in this study. 
However, the influence of attractants such as surface water on the farm as well as the influence 
of the level biosecurity on the frequency of wildlife visits must be considered. The development 
of the risk assessment models has identified many gaps in current knowledge on the 
mechanisms of the AI virus, where further research related to LPAI surveillance in Australian 
commercial chicken farms is recommended to improve knowledge on AI virus transmission. 
The development of the spread risk assessment model in particular also revealed the need for 
more knowledge on the companies and individuals that move between farms; including the 
type, number and frequency of farms visited, biosecurity protocols in place, and the level of 
adherence to these protocols. The results from models and sensitivity analyses revealed that 
the probability of exposure was highly influenced by LPAI prevalence in wild birds and 
presence of waterfowl on the farm. The level of biosecurity on the farm was highly influential 
on the probability of spread, where the pathways with the highest probability of spread were 
via equipment for between sheds, and pick-up trucks, egg trays and egg pallets for between 
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farms, with the latter two pathways only applying to layer farm types. These findings highlight 
the importance of on-going AI wild bird surveillance and lead to recommendations to reduce 
these risks. These include revisions to biosecurity manuals, such as emphasising waterfowl as 
high risk wildlife, and research on factors that influence and can improve biosecurity adoption 
amongst farmers; both of which have been supported by industry. The data gathered in this 
thesis would not have been possible without the extensive consultation and support of the 
Australian commercial chicken industry, industry experts and scientific experts, and provides 
vital information to support and progress the Australian poultry industry in improving 
biosecurity and reducing disease occurrence.  
241 
 
References 
ACHENBACH, J. E. & BOWEN, R. A. 2011. Transmission of Avian Influenza A Viruses 
among Species in an Artificial Barnyard. PLOS ONE, 6 (3). e17643. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0017643 
AGNEW-CRUMPTON, R., VAZ, P. K., DEVLIN, J. M., O'ROURKE, D., BLACKER-
SMITH, H. P., KONSAK-ILIEVSKI, B., HARTLEY, C. A. & NOORMOHAMMADI, 
A. H. 2016. Spread of the newly emerging infectious laryngotracheitis viruses in 
Australia. Infection, Genetics and Evolution, 43, 67-73. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.meegid.2016.05.023 
ALEXANDER, D. & CAPUA, I. 2008. Avian influenza in poultry. World's Poultry Science 
Journal, 64 (4), 513-532. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043933908000184 
ALEXANDER, D., CAPUA, I. & KOCH, G. 2009. Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
outbreaks in Europe, Asia, and Africa since 1959, excluding the Asian H5N1 virus 
outbreaks. In: SWAYNE, D. (ed.) Avian Influenza. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
ALEXANDER, D. & SENNE, D. 2009. Avian paramyxoviruses. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, A. & 
GLISSON, J. (eds.) Diseases of Poultry. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
ALEXANDER, D. J. 2007. An overview of the epidemiology of avian influenza. Vaccine, 25 
(30), 5637-5644. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2006.10.051 
AMERY-GALE, J. 2016. Investigations into pathogens of potential public health and 
biosecurity significance in Australian native birds. Masters thesis, The University of 
Melbourne. 
ANDRES, V. M. & DAVIES, R. H. 2015. Biosecurity measures to control salmonella and 
other infectious agents in pig farms: A review. Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science 
and Food Safety, 14 (4), 317-335.  
ANIMAL HEALTH AUSTRALIA (AHA) 2011. Disease strategy: Avian influenza (Version 
3.4). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN). 3 ed. Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Primary Industries Ministerial Council. 
ANIMAL HEALTH AUSTRALIA (AHA). 2015. Emergency Animal Disease [Online]. 
Available: https://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/what-we-do/emergency-animal-
disease/ [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
ANIMAL HEALTH AUSTRALIA (AHA) & PLANT HEALTH AUSTRALIA (PHA). 2013. 
Farm Biosecurity Program [Online]. Available: http://www.farmbiosecurity.com.au/ 
[Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
ARZEY, G. Low pathogenic avian influenza in Australia and implications.  Proceedings of the 
Australasian Veterinary Poultry Association (AVPA) Scientific Meeting, 2013 Sydney, 
Australia. 
ARZEY, G. & LITTLETON, I. 2007. NSW biosecurity guidelines for free range poultry farms. 
Orange, NSW, Australia: NSW Department of Primary Industries. 
242 
 
ARZEY, G. G., KIRKLAND, P. D., ARZEY, K. E., FROST, M., MAYWOOD, P., CONATY, 
S., HURT, A. C., DENG, Y.-M., IANNELLO, P., BARR, I., DWYER, D. E., 
RATNAMOHAN, M., MCPHIE, K. & SELLECK, P. 2012. Influenza virus A (H10N7) 
in chickens and poultry abattoir workers, Australia. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 18 
(5), 814-816. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1805.111852 
ATZENI, M., FIELDER, D. & THOMSON, B. 2016. Deterrence of wild waterfowl from 
poultry production areas: a critical review of current techniques and literature. Rural 
Industries Research and Development Corporation. 
AUSTRALIAN CHICKEN MEAT FEDERATION (ACMF) 2011. The Australian Chicken 
Meat Industry: An Industry in Profile. North Sydney, NSW, Australia: Australian 
Chicken Meat Federation (ACMF) Inc. 
AUSTRALIAN CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICE (AVCO). 2015. Detection of Low 
Pathogenic (LP) and Highly Pathogenic (HP) Avian Influenza Virus (AIV) in flocks of 
layers, breeders and meat birds in Australia [Online]. Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport Legislation Committee. Available: 
https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Committees/rrat_ctte/estimates/bud_1516/ag/answer
s/QoN62-64.pdf [Accessed 10 January 2018]. 
AUSTRALIAN EGG CORPORATION LIMITED (AECL) 2015. Annual Report 2015. North 
Sydney, NSW: Australian Egg Corporation Limited. 
AUSTRALIAN EGGS. 2017. Annual Report 2016/17 [Online]. North Sydney, NSW, 
Australia: Australian Eggs. Available: https://www.australianeggs.org.au/who-we-
are/annual-reports/ [Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
AUSTRALIAN EGGS. 2018. Leading Research [Online]. North Sydney, NSW, Australia: 
Australian Eggs. Available: https://www.australianeggs.org.au/ [Accessed 10 January 
2018]. 
BANKS, P. B. & HUGHES, N. K. 2012. A review of the evidence for potential impacts of 
black rats (Rattus rattus) on wildlife and humans in Australia. Wildlife Research, 39 
(1), 78-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WR11086 
BARNES, B. & GLASS, K. 2018. Modelling low pathogenic avian influenza introduction into 
the commercial poultry industry. Mathematical Biosciences (in review).  
BARNES, H. 2009. Other Bacterial Diseases. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, A., GLISSON, J., 
MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. (eds.) Diseases of Poultry. 12 ed. 
Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
BARNES, H., NOLAN, L. & VAILLANCOURT, J.-P. 2009. Colibacillosis. In: SAIF, Y., 
FADLY, A., GLISSON, J., MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. (eds.) 
Diseases of Poultry. 12 ed. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
BARR, D., KELLY, A., BADMAN, R., CAMPEY, A., O'ROURKE, M., GRIX, D. & REECE, 
R. 1986. Avian influenza on a multi-age chicken farm. Australian Veterinary Journal, 
63 (6), 195-196.  
243 
 
BASHIRUDDIN, J., GOULD, A. & WESTBURY, H. 1991. Molecular pathotyping of two 
avian influenza viruses isolated during the Victoria 1976 outbreak. Australian 
Veterinary Journal, 69 (6), 140-142.  
BELSER, J. A., GUSTIN, K. M., PEARCE, M. B., MAINES, T. R. & ZENG, H. 2013. 
Pathogenesis and transmission of avian influenza A (H7N9) virus in ferrets and mice. 
Nature, 501 (7468), 556-559.  
BELTRAMEA, M., PENAB, H., TONA, N., LINOA, A., GENNARIB, S., DUBEY, J. & 
PEREIRA, F. 2012. Seroprevalence and isolation of Toxoplasma gondii from free-
range chickens from Espírito Santo state, southeastern Brazil. Veterinary Parasitology, 
188 (3-4), 225-230.  
BILGILI, S. 2017. The risks and benefits of flock thinning. Alabama, USA: Auburn University. 
BLACKALL, P. J., MORROW, C., MCINNES, A., EAVES, L. & ROGERS, D. 1990. 
Epidemiologic studies on Infectious coryza outbreaks in northern New South wales,  
Australia, using serotyping, biotyping, and chromosomal dna restriction endonuclease 
analysis. Avian Diseases, 34 (2), 267-276.  
BOMMEL, L. V. & JOHNSON, C. N. 2014. Where do livestock guardian dogs go? Movement 
patterns of free-ranging Maremma sheepdogs. PLOS ONE, 9 (10). e111444. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0111444 
BOUMA, A., CLAASSEN, I., NATIH, K., KLINKENBERG, D., DONNELLY, C. A., KOCH, 
G. & BOVEN, M. V. 2009. Estimation of transmission parameters of H5N1 avian 
influenza virus in chickens. PLOS Pathogens, 5 (1). e1000281. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1000281 
BOWES, V., RITCHIE, S., BYRNE, S., SOJONKY, K., BIDULKA, J. & ROBINSON, J. 2004. 
Virus characterisation, clinical presentation, and pathology associated with H7N3 
avianinfluenza in british columbia broiler breeder vhickens in 2004. Avian Diseases, 
48 (4), 928-934.  
BROWN, I., ABOLNIK, C., GRACIA-GRACIA, J., MCCULLOUGH, S., SWAYNE, D. E. 
& CATTOLI, G. 2016. High-pathogenicity avian influenza outbreaks since 2008, 
excluding multi-continental panzootic of H5 Goose/Guangdong-lineage viruses. In: 
SWAYNE, D. (ed.) Animal Influenza. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
BROWN, J. D., GOEKJIAN, G., POULSON, R., VALEIKA, S. & STALLKNECHT, D. E. 
2009. Avian influenza virus in water: Infectivity is dependent on pH, salinity and 
temperature. Veterinary Microbiology, 136 (1-2), 20-26. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vetmic.2008.10.027 
BUREAU OF METEROLOGY (BOM). 2016. Weather Station Directory [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/data/stations/ [Accessed 4 February 2016]. 
BURGMAN, M., MITTINTY, M., WHITTLE, P. & MENGERSEN, K. 2010. Comparing 
Biosecurity Risk Assessment Systems. Melbourne, Australia. 
BURNS, T. E., RIBBLE, C., STEPHEN, C., KELTON, D., TOEWS, L., OSTERHOLD, J. & 
WHEELER, H. 2012. Use of observed wild bird activity on poultry farms and a 
244 
 
literature review to target species as high priority for avian influenza testing in 2 regions 
of Canada. Canadian Veterinary Journal, 53 (2), 158-166.  
BURTON, P. J. K. 1990. Birds of Prey of the World, Sydney, NSW, Australia: Mallard Press. 
BUSANI, L., POZZA, M., BONFANTI, L., TOSON, M. & MARANGON, S. 2007. 
Evaluation of the efficacy of intervention measures and vaccination for the control of 
LPAI epidemics in Verona Province (Veneto, Italy). Avian Diseases, 51 (s1), 463-466.  
CARDONA, C. J., XING, Z., SANDROCK, C. E. & DAVIS, C. E. 2009. Avian influenza in 
birds and mammals. Comparative Immunology, Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, 
32 (4), 255-273.  
CATTOLI, G., FUSARO, A., MONNE, I., COVEN, F., JOANNIS, T., EL-HAMID, H. S. A., 
HUSSEIN, A. A., CORNELIUS, C., AMARIN, N. M., MANCIN, M., HOLMES, E. 
C. & CAPUA, I. 2011. Evidence for different evolutionary dynamics of A/H5N1 
viruses among countries applying or not applying avian influenza vaccination in poultry. 
Vaccine, 29 (50), 9368-9375. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2011.09.127 
CAUSEY, D. & EDWARDS, S. V. 2008. Ecology of avian influenza virus in birds. The 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 197, 29-33.  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC). 2015. Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) in Birds and Other Animals [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1-animals.htm [Accessed 5 March 2016]. 
CHRISTENSEN, J. & VALLIÈRES, A. 2016. Scenario tree model for animal disease freedom 
framed in the OIE context using the example of a generic swine model for Aujeszky’s 
disease in commercial swine in Canada. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 123, 60-70. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.12.002 
COBB, S. & SMITH, H. 2015. The spread of non-OIE-listed avian diseases through 
international trade of chicken meat: an assessment of the risks to New Zealand. Revue 
scientifique et technique (International Office of Epizootics), 34 (3), 795-812.  
COMIN, A., STEGEMAN, A., MARANGON, S. & KLINKENBERG, D. 2012. Evaluating 
surveillance strategies for the early detection of low pathogenicity avian influenza 
infections. PLOS ONE, 7 (4). e35956. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035956 
COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION 
(CSIRO) 2002. Primary Industries Standing Committee Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals. 4th ed. Collingwood, VIC, Australia: CSIRO Publishing. 
CONNOLLY, J., ALLEY, M., DUTTON, G. & ROGERS, L. 2006. Infectivity and persistence 
of an outbreak strain of Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium DT160 for house 
sparrows (Passer domesticus) in New Zealand. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 54 
(6), 329-332.  
CONSUMER AFFAIRS AUSTRALIAN NEW ZEALAND 2016. Decision Regulation Impact 
Statement on Free Range Egg Labelling. Parkes, ACT, Australia: Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
245 
 
CONVERSE, K. A. 2007. Avian Tuberculosis. In: THOMAS, N. J., HUNTER, B. & 
ATKINSON, C. T. (eds.) Infectious Diseases of Wild Birds. Iowa, USA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
COOPER, R. M., MCALLAN, I. A. & CURTIS, B. R. 2014. An atlas of the birds of NSW and 
the ACT, Gordon, NSW, Australia: Minipublishing. 
CORTEZ, M. H. & WEITZ, J. S. 2013. Distinguishing between indirect and direct modes of 
transmission using epidemiological time series. The American Naturalist, 181 (2), 43-
52.  
COUNCIL ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS (CFFR). 2014a. High Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza in Layer Hens near Young [Online]. Available: 
http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/npa/environment/project-
agreement/past/pest_and_disease_preparedness_ScheduleL.pdf [Accessed 5 July 
2016]. 
COUNCIL ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS (CFFR). 2014b. High Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza in Maitland, New South Wales [Online]. Available: 
http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/npa/environment/pest_and_diseas
e_preparedness/Schedule%20M.pdf [Accessed 5 July 2016]. 
COWAN, M., MONKS, D. & RAIDAL, S. 2014. Granuloma formation and suspected 
neuropathic pain in a domestic pigeon (Columba livia) secondary to an oil-based, 
inactivated Newcastle disease vaccine administered for protection against pigeon 
paramyxovirus-1. Australian Veterinary Journal, 92 (5), 171-176.  
CRANE, R. & LANEY, S. 2015. Farm Business Survey 2013/2014 Poultry Production in 
England. Reading, UK: Rural Business Research, University of Reading. 
CUSTER, R., SCARCELLA, J. & STEWART, B. 1999. The modified Delphi technique - A 
rotational modification. Journal of Career and Technical Education, 15 (2), 50-58.  
DALZIEL, A. E., DELEAN, S., HEINRICH, S. & CASSEY, P. 2016. Persistence of low 
pathogenic influenza A virus in water: A systematic review and quantitative meta-
analysis. PLOS ONE, 11 (12). e0168789. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0161929 
DAWKINS, M., COOK, P., WHITTINGHAM, M., MANSELL, K. & HARPER, A. 2003. 
What makes free-range broiler chickens range? In situ measurement of habitat 
preference. Animal Behaviour, 66, 151-160. https://doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2003.2172 
DAWSON, T., JOHNS, A. & BEAL, A. 1989. Digestion in the Australian wood duck 
(Chenonetta jubata): A small avian herbivore showing selective digestion of the 
hemicellulose component of fiber. Physiological Zoology, 62 (2), 522-540.  
DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA). 2015. 
Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain [Online]. Crown. 
Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notifiable-avian-disease-
control-strategy-2015 [Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA) 2016. 
United Kingdom Egg Statistics - Quarter 4, 2015. London, UK: Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs. 
246 
 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES (DAWR). 2013. High 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza - Young, NSW [Online]. Available: 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/about/media-centre/communiques/high-pathogenic-
avian-influenza-a-young-nsw [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES (DAWR). 2017. 
Importing food [Online]. Available: http://www.agriculture.gov.au/import/goods/food 
[Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY (DAFF) 2009a. 
National Farm Biosecurity Manual Poultry Production. 1st ed. Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Commonwealth Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY (DAFF) 2009b. 
National Water Biosecurity Manual Poultry Production, Canberra, ACT, Australia: 
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY (DAFF) 2010. 
National Avian Influenza Dossier. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Office of the Chief 
Veterinary Officer. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY (DEE). 2017. List of Specimens 
taken to be Suitable for Live Import [Online]. Available: 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C00434 [Accessed 18 November 2017]. 
DINGLE, H. 2004. The Australo-Papuan bird migration system: another consequence of 
Wallace's Line. Emu, 104, 95-108. https://doi.org/10.1071/MU03026 
DODET, B. & VICARI, M. 2001. Emerging Diseases: Emergence and Control of Zoonotic 
Ortho- and Paramyxovirus Diseases, Montrouge, France: John Libbey Eurotext. 
DOREA, F., VIEIRA, A., HOFACRE, C., WALDRIP, D. & COLE, D. 2010. Stochastic model 
of the potential spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza from an infected 
commercial broiler operation in Georgia. Avian Diseases, 53 (s1), 713-719.  
DURALI, T., GROVES, P. & COWIESON, A. Comparison of performance of commercial 
conventional and free range broilers.  Australian Poultry Science Symposium, 2012 
Sydney, NSW. 
EAST, I., AINSWORTH, C., WARNER, S., DUNOWSKA, M. & AZUOLAS, J. 2010. 
Seroconversion to avian influenza virus in free-range chickens in the Riverland region 
of Victoria. Australian Veterinary Journal, 88 (8), 290-293.  
EAST, I. J. 2007. Adoption of biosecurity practices in the Australian poultry industries. 
Australian Veterinary Journal, 85 (3), 107-112.  
EAST, I. J., HAMILTON, S. & GARNER, G. 2008a. Identifying areas of Australia at risk of 
H5N1 avian influenza infection from exposure to migratory birds: a spatial analysis. 
Geospatial Health, 2 (2), 203-213.  
EAST, I. J., HAMILTON, S. A., SHARP, L. A. & GARNER, M. G. 2008b. Identifying areas 
of Australia at risk for H5N1 avian influenza infection from exposure to nomadic 
247 
 
waterfowl moving throughout the Australo-Papuan Region. Geospatial Health, 3 (1), 
17-27.  
ECKROADE, R. J. & BACHIN, L. A. S. Avian influenza in Pennsylvania the beginning.  
Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Avian Influenza, 1986. 22-32. 
EGG STANDARDS AUSTRALIA 2012. Farm Standard for Egg Producers. Australian Egg 
Corporation Limited: North Sydney, NSW, Australia. 
ELSON, H. 2015. Poultry welfare in intensive and extensive production systems. World's 
Poultry Science Journal, 71 (3), 449-460. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043933915002172 
ESCORCIA, M., VÁZQUEZ, L., MÉNDEZ, S. T., RODRÍGUEZ-ROPÓN, A., LUCIO, E. & 
NAVA, G. M. 2008. Avian influenza: genetic evolution under vaccination pressure. 
Virology Journal, 5 (15).  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2008. Animal Welfare: Commission report confirms the 
potential benefits of banning conventional battery cages for laying hens. Brussels, 
Hungary: European Commission. 
FANATICO, A., OWENS, C. & EMMERT, J. 2009. Organic poultry production in the United 
States: Broilers. The Journal of Applied Poultry Research, 18 (2), 355-366.  
FASINA, F., ALIE, A., YILMA, J., THIEME, O. & ANKERS, P. 2012. The cost-benefit of 
biosecurity measures on infectious diseases in Egyptian household poultry. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine, 103 (2-3), 178-191. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2011.09.016 
FEDDES, J., EMMANUEL, E. & ZUIDOF, M. 2002. Broiler performance, bodyweight 
variance, feed and water Intake, and carcass quality at different stocking densities. 
Poultry Science, 81 (6), 774-779.  
FEIZABADI, M., ROBERTSON, I., COUSINS, D., DAWSON, D., CHEW, W., GILBERT, 
G. & HAMPSON, D. 1996. Genetic characterization of Mycobacterium avium isolates 
recovered from humans and animals in Australia. Epidemiology and Infection, 116, 41-
49.  
FERENCZI, M., BECKMANN, C., WARNER, S., LOYN, R., O'RILEY, K., WANG, X. & 
KLAASSEN, M. 2016. Avian influenza infection dynamics under variable climatic 
conditions, viral prevalence is rainfall driven in waterfowl from temperate, south-east 
Australia. Veterinary Research, 47 (23).  
FINE, P. E. 2003. The interval between successive cases of an infectious disease. American 
Journal of Epidemiology, 158 (11), 1039-1047.  
FITZGERALD, S. 2009. Adenovirus Infections. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, A. & GLISSON, J. 
(eds.) Diseases of Poultry. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
FODDAI, A., BOKLUND, A., STOCKMARR, A., KROGH, K. & ENØE, C. 2014. 
Quantitative assessment of the risk of introduction of bovine viral diarrhea virus in 
Danish dairy herds. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 116 (1-2), 75-88. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.05.005 
248 
 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO) 2013. 
Fifth Report (January 2011-January 2012) Global Programme for the Prevention and 
Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
EMERGENCY PREVENTION SYSTEM (FAO EMPRES-I). 2016. Disease events 
[Online]. Available: http://empres-i.fao.org/eipws3g/ [Accessed 18 April 2016]. 
FORSYTH, W., GRIX, D. & GIBSON, C. 1993. Diagnosis of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza in chickens: Bendigo 1992. Australian Veterinary Journal, 70 (3), 118-119.  
FREIDL, G., SPRUIJT, I., BORLEE, F., SMIT, L., GAGELDONK-LAFEBER, A. V., 
HEEDERIK, D., YZERMANS, J., DIJK, C. V., MAASSEN, C. & HOEK, W. V. D. 
2017. Livestock-associated risk factors for pneumonia in an area of intensive animal 
farming in the Netherlands. PLOS ONE, 12 (3). e0174796. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174796 
FUSARO, A., TASSONI, L., HUGHES, J., MILANI, A., SALVIATO, A., SCHIVO, A., 
MURCIA, P. R., BONFANTI, L., CATTOLI, G. & MONNE, I. 2015. Evolutionary 
trajectories of two distinct avian influenza epidemics: Parallelisms and divergences. 
Infection, Genetics and Evolution, 34, 457-466. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.meegid.2015.05.020 
GALE, P., GODDARD, A., BREED, A., IRVINE, R., KELLY, L. & SNARY, E. 2014. Entry 
of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into Europe through migratory wild 
birds: a qualitative release assessment at the species level. Journal of Applied 
Microbiology, 116 (6), 1405-1417.  
GARAMSZEGI, L. Z. & MØLLER, A. P. 2007. Prevalence of avian influenza and host 
ecology. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 274, 2003-2012.  
GLATZ, P. & RU, Y. 2004. Developing free-range animal production systems. Barton, ACT, 
Australia: Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation. 
GONZALES, J., BOENDER, G., ELBERS, A. R., STEGEMAN, J. & DE KOEIJER, A. 2014. 
Risk based surveillance for early detection of low pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks 
in layer chickens. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 117 (1), 251-259. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.08.015 
GONZALES, J., ELBERS, A., BOUMA, A., KOCH, G., WIT, J. D. & STEGEMAN, J. 2012a. 
Transmission characteristics of low pathogenic avian influenza virus of H7N7 and 
H5N7 subtypes in layer chickens. Veterinary Microbiology, 155 (2-4), 207-213.  
GONZALES, J., ELBERS, A., GOOT, J. V. D., BONTJE, D., KOCH, G., WIT, J. D. & 
STEGEMAN, J. 2012b. Using egg production data to quantify within-flock 
transmission of low pathogenic avian influenza virus in commercial layer chickens. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 107 (3-4), 253-259. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.06.010 
GONZALES, J., GOOT, J. V. D., STEGEMAN, J., ELBERS, A. & KOCH, G. 2011. 
Transmission between chickens of an H7N1 low pathogenic avian influenza virus 
249 
 
isolated during the epidemic of 1999 in Italy. Veterinary Microbiology, 152 (1-2), 187-
190.  
GONZALES, J. L., STEGEMAN, J. A., KOCH, G., WIT, S. J. D. & ELBERS, A. R. 2012c. 
Rate of introduction of a low pathogenic avian influenza virus infection in different 
poultry production sectors in the Netherlands. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 
7 (1), 6-10.  
GOOT, J. V. D., JONG, M. D., KOCH, G. & BOVEN, M. V. 2003. Comparison of the 
transmission characteristics of low and high pathogenicity avian influenza A virus 
(H5N2). Epidemiology and Infection, 131, 1003-1013.  
GORDON, D. M. 2011. Reservoirs of infection: The epidemiological characteristics of an 
emerging pathogen, Escherichia albertii. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Department of 
Agriculture Forestries and Fisheries. 
GORDON, D. M. & COWLING, A. 2003. The distribution and genetic structure of Escherichia 
coli in Australian vertebrates: host and geographic effects. Microbiology, 149, 3575-
3586.  
GREENE, J. L. 2015. Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-
2015 [Online]. Congressional Research Service. Available: 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44114.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
GRIEKSPOOR, P., COLLES, F. M., MCCARTHY, N. D., HANSBRO, P. M., ASHHURST-
SMITH, C., OLSEN, B., HASSELQUIST, D., MAIDEN, M. C. & WALDENSTRÖM, 
J. 2013. Marked host specificity and lack of phylogeographic population structure of 
Campylobacter jejuni in wild birds. Molecular Ecology, 22 (5), 1463-1472.  
GRILLO, T. 2015. Contribution to the 2012 Avian Influenza in wild birds surveillance 
program. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Rural Industries Research and Development 
Corporation. 
GRILLO, V., ARZEY, K., HANSBRO, P., HURT, A., WARNER, S., BERGFELD, J., 
BURGESS, G., COOKSON, B., DICKASON, C., FERENCZI, M., 
HOLLINGSWORTH, T., HOQUE, M., JACKSON, R., KLAASSEN, M., 
KIRKLAND, P., KUNG, N., LISOVSKI, S., O'DEA, M., O'RILEY, K., ROSHIER, D., 
SKERRATT, L., TRACEY, J., WANG, X., WOODS, R. & POST, L. 2015. Avian 
influenza in Australia: a summary of 5 years of wild bird surveillance. Australian 
Veterinary Journal, 93 (11), 387-393.  
HAMILTON, S. 2011. Simulating the Transmission and Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza Epidemics in the Australian Poultry Industries? PhD Thesis, University of 
Sydney. 
HAMILTON, S., EAST, I., TORIBIO, J.-A. & GARNER, M. 2009. Are the Australian poultry 
industries vulnerable to large outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza? 
Australian Veterinary Journal, 87 (5), 165-174.  
HANDELAND, K., NESSE, L. L., LILLEHAUG, A., VIKØREN, T., DJØNNE, B. & 
BERGSJØ, B. 2008. Natural and experimental Salmonella Typhimurium infections in 
foxes (Vulpes vulpes). Veterinary Microbiology, 132 (1-2), 129-135.  
250 
 
HANSBRO, P. M., WARNER, S., TRACEY, J. P., ARZEY, K. E., SELLECK, P., O'RILEY, 
K., BECKETT, E. L., BUNN, C., KIRKLAND, P. D., VIJAYKRISHNA, D., OLSEN, 
B. & HURT, A. C. 2010. Surveillance and analysis of avian influenza viruses, Australia. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 16 (12), 1896-1904. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1612.100776 
HARTCHER, K., HICKEY, K., HEMSWORTH, P., CRONIN, G., WILKINSON, S. & 
SINGH, M. 2016. Relationships between range access as monitored by radio frequency 
identification technology, fearfulness, and plumage damage in free-range laying hens. 
2016, 10 (5), 847-853.  
HAYNES, L., ARZEY, E., BELL, C., BUCHANAN, N., BURGESS, G., CRONAN, V., 
DICKASON, C., FIELD, H., GIBBS, S., HANSBRO, P., HOLLINGSWORTH, T., 
HURT, A., KIRKLAND, P., MCCRAKEN, H., O'CONNER, J., TRACEY, J. P., 
WALLNER, J., WARNER, S., WOODS, R. & BUNN, C. 2007. Australian surveillance 
for avian influenza viruses in wild birds between July 2005 and June 2007. Australian 
Veterinary Journal, 87 (7), 266-272.  
HENZLER, D., KRADEL, D., DAVISON, S., ZIEGLER, A., SINGLETARY, D., DEBOK, 
P., CASTRO, A., LU, H., ECKROADE, R., SWAYNE, D., LAGODA, W., 
SCHMUCKER, B. & NESSELRODT, A. 2003. Epidemiology, production losses, and 
control measures associated with an outbreak of avian influenza subtype H7N2 in 
Pennsylvania (1996-98). Avian Diseases, 47 (s3), 1022-1036. 
https://doi.org/10.1637/0005-2086-47.s3.1022 
HERNÁNDEZ-JOVER, M., SCHEMANN, K., EAST, I. & TORIBIO, J.-A. 2015. Evaluating 
the risk of avian influenza introduction and spread among poultry exhibition flocks in 
Australia. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 118, 128-141. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.11.018 
HINKLE, N. & HICKLE, L. 2009. External Parasites and Poultry Pests. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, 
A., GLISSON, J., MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. (eds.) Diseases of 
Poultry. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
HIONO, T., OKAMATSU, M., YAMAMOTO, N., OGASAWARA, K., ENDO, M., 
KURIBAYASHI, S., SHICHINOHE, S., MOTOHASHI, Y., CHU, D.-H., SUZUKI, 
M., ICHIKAWA, T., NISHI, T., MATSUNO, K., TANAKA, K., TANIGAWA, T., 
KIDA, H. & SAKODA, Y. 2016. Experimental infection of highly and low pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses to chickens, ducks, tree sparrows, jungle crows, and black rats 
for the evaluation of their roles in virus transmission. Veterinary Microbiology, 182, 
108-115.  
HOCKING, P. 2014. Unexpected consequences of genetic selection in broilers and turkeys: 
problems and solutions. British Poultry Science, 55 (1), 1-12.  
HOINVILLE, L., ALBAN, L., DREWE, J., GIBBENS, J., GUSTAFSON, L., HÄSLER, B., 
SAEGERMAN, C., SALMAN, M. & STÄRK, K. 2013. Proposed terms and concepts 
for describing and evaluating animal-health surveillance systems. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine, 12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.06.006 
HOLT, H. R., INTHAVONG, P., KHAMLOME, B., BLASZAK, K., KEOKAMPHE, C., 
SOMOULAY, V., PHONGMANY, A., DURR, P. A., GRAHAM, K., ALLEN, J., 
251 
 
DONNELLY, B., BLACKSELL, S. D., UNGER, F., GRACE, D., ALONSO, S. & 
GILBERT, J. 2016. Endemicity of Zoonotic Diseases in Pigs and Humans in Lowland 
and Upland Lao PDR: Identification of Socio-cultural Risk Factors. PLOS ONE, 10 (4). 
e0003913. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0003913 
HOQUE, M., BURGESS, G., KARO-KARO, D., CHEAM, A. & SKERRATT, L. 2012. 
Monitoring of wild birds for Newcastle disease virus in north Queensland, Australia. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 103 (1), 49-62. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2011.08.013 
HORTEN, L. 2001. Risk analysis and the law: international law, the World Trade Organisation, 
Codex Alimentarius and national legislation. Food Additives and Contaminants, 18 (12), 
1057-1067.  
HOYLE, P., KNOX, B. & CRANE, R. 2016. Farm Business Survey 2014/15 Poultry 
Production in England. Reading, UK: University of Reading. 
IKONOMOPOULOS, J., FRAGKIADAKI, E., LIANDRIS, E., SOTIRAKOGLOU, K., 
XYLOURI, E. & GAZOULI, M. 2009. Estimation of the spread of pathogenic 
mycobacteria in organic broiler farms by the polymerase chain reaction. Veterinary 
Microbiology, 133 (3), 278-282.  
ITO, T., GOTO, H., YAMAMOTO, E., TANAKA, H., TAKEUCHI, M., KUWAYAMA, M., 
KAWAOKA, Y. & OTSUKI, K. 2001. Generation of a highly pathogenic avian 
influenza A virus from an avirulent field isolate by passaging in chickens. Journal of 
Virology, 75 (9), 4439-4443.  
JONES, Y. L. & SWAYNE, D. E. 2004. Comparative pathobiology of low and high 
pathogenicity H7N2 Chilean avian influenza viruses in chickens. Avian Diseases, 48 
(1), 119-128. https://doi.org/10.1637/7080 
JONGES, M., LEUKEN, J. V., WOUTERS, I., KOCH, G., MEIJER, A. & KOOPMANS, M. 
2015. Wind-mediated spread of low pathogenic avian influenza virus into the 
envrionment during outbreaks at commercial poultry farms. PLOS ONE, 10 (5). 
e0125401. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0125401 
KAYS, R. & PARSONS, A. W. 2014. Mammals in and around suburban yards, and the 
attraction of chicken coops. Urban Ecosystems, 17 (3), 691-705.  
KEAWCHAROEN, J., BROEK, J. V. D., BOUMA, A., TIENSIN, T., OSTERHAUS, A. D. 
& HEESTERBEEK, H. 2011. Wild birds and increased transmission of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) among poultry, Thailand. Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 17 (6), 1016-1022. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1706.100880 
KEAWCHAROEN, J., ORAVEERAKUL, K. & POOVORAWAN, Y. 2004. Avian Influenza 
H5N1 in Tigers and Leopards. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 10 (12), 2189-2191. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1012.040759 
KUKIELKA, E., BARASONA, J., COWIE, C., DREWE, J., GORTAZAR, C., COTARELO, 
I. & VICENTE, J. 2013. Spatial and temporal interactions between livestock and 
wildlife in South Central Spain assessed by camera traps. Preventive Veterinary 
Medicine, 112, 213-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.08.008 
252 
 
LEE, D.-H., TORCHETTI, M. K., KILLIAN, M. L., DELIBERTO, T. J. & SWAYNE, D. E. 
2016. Reoccurrence of avian influenza A (H5N2) virus clade 2.3.4.4 in wild birds, 
Alaska, USA, 2016. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 23 (2), 365. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2302.161616 
LEY, D. H., SHEAFFER, D. S. & DHONDT, A. A. 2006. Further western spread of 
Mycoplasma gallisepticum infection of house finches. Journal of Wildlife Diseases, 42 
(2), 429-431. https://doi.org/10.7589/0090-3558-42.2.429 
LUBAC, S. & MIRABITO, L. 2001. Relationship between activies of 'Red label' type chickens 
in an outdoor run and external factors. British Poultry Science, 42 (S14-S15).  
LUI, D. & GAO, G. F. 2014. The new emerging H7N9 influenza virus indicates poultry as new 
mixing vessel. Science China Life Sciences, 57 (7), 731-732.  
LUPIANI, B. & REDDY, S. M. 2009. The history of avian influenza. Comparative 
Immunology, Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, 32 (4), 311-323.  
MA, W., KAHN, R. E. & RICHT, J. A. 2009. The pig as a mixing vessel for influenza viruses: 
Human and veterinary implications. Journal of Molecular and Genetic Medicine, 3 (1), 
158-166.  
MACHALABA, C. C., ELWOOD, S. E., FORCELLA, S., SMITH, K. M., HAMILTON, K., 
JEBARA, K. B., SWAYNE, D. E., WEBBY, R. J., MUMFORD, E., MAZET, J. A., 
GAIDET, N., DASZAK, P. & KARESH, W. B. 2015. Global avian influenza 
surveillance in wild birds: A strategy to capture viral diversity. Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 21 (4). http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2104.141415 
MANNELLI, A., FERRÉ, N. & MARANGON, S. 2006. Analysis of the 1999-2000 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (H7N1) epidemic in the main poultry-production area in 
northern Italy. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 73 (4), 273-285. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2005.09.005 
MARTIN, P., CAMERON, A. & GREINER, M. 2007. Demonstrating freedom from disease 
using multiple complex data sources 1: A new methodology based on scenario trees. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 79 (2-4), 71-97. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2006.09.008 
MARTIN, S. W., MEEK, A. H. & WILLEBERG, P. 1987. Veterinary Epidemiology, Iowa, 
USA: Iowa State University Press. 
MARTRENCHAR, A., MORISSE, J., HUONNIC, D. & COTTE., J. 1997. Influence of 
stocking density on some behavioural, physiological and productivity traits of broilers. 
Veterinary Research, 28 (5), 473-480.  
MCBRIDE, A., PATES, R., RAMADAN, R. & MCGOWAN, C. 2003. Delphi survey of 
experts' opinions on strategies used by communicty pharmacists to reduce over-the-
counter drug misuse. Addiction, 98 (4), 487-497.  
MCCALLUM, H. I., ROSHIER, D. A., TRACEY, J. P., JOSEPH, L. & HEINSOHN, R. 2008. 
Will Wallace’s line save Australia from avian influenza? Ecology and Society, 13 (2).  
253 
 
MCCLUSKEY, B. J. 2015. Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry 
Flocks: July 15, 2015 Report. Colorado, USA: United States Department of Agriculture. 
MCGAHAN, E., BARKER, S. & TUCKER, R. 2008. Environmental Guidelines for the 
Australian Egg Industry. North Sydney, NSW, Australia: Australian Egg Corporation 
Limited. 
MCGAHAN, E., BIELEFELD, N., WIDEMANN, S. & KEANE, O. 2014. National 
Environmental Management System for the Meat Chicken Industry - Version 2. Barton, 
ACT, Australia: Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation. 
MCLAUGHLIN, J. D. 2008. Cestodes. In: ATKINSON, C. T., THOMAS, N. J. & HUNTER, 
D. B. (eds.) Parasitic Diseases of Wild Birds. Oxford UK: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
MCLEOD, A. & HINRICHS, J. 2016. The economics of animal influenza. In: SWAYNE, D. 
E. (ed.) Animal Influenza. 2nd ed. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
MCORIST, S. & MILLER, G. 1981. Salmonellosis in transported feral goats. Australian 
Veterinary Journal, 57 (8), 389-390.  
MENKHORST, P., ROGERS, D., CLARKE, R., DAVIES, J., MARSACK, P. & FRANKLIN, 
K. 2017. The Australian Bird Guide, Clayton, VIC, Australia: CSIRO Publishing. 
MILLER, L., MCELVAINE, M., MCDOWELL, R. & AHL, A. 1993. Developing a 
quantitative risk assessment process. Scientific and Technical Review of the Office 
International des Epizooties, 12 (4), 1153-1164.  
MIÑO, M. H., CAVIA, R., VILLAFAÑE, I. E. G., BILENCA, D. N. & BUSCH, M. 2007. 
Seasonal abundance and distribution among habitats of small rodents on poultry farms. 
A contribution for their control. International Journal of Pest Management, 53 (4), 311-
316.  
MO, I., BRUGH, M., FLETCHER, O., ROWLAND, G. & SWAYNE, D. 1997. Comparative 
pathology of chickens experimentally inoculated with avian influenza viruses of low 
and high pathogenicity. Avian Diseases, 41 (1), 125-136.  
MOHAN, R., SAIF, Y., ERICKSON, A., GUSTAFSON, G. & EASTERDAY, B. 1980. 
Serologic and Epidemiologic Evidence of Infection in Turkeys with an Agent Related 
to the Swine Influenza Virus. Avian Diseases, 25 (1), 11-16.  
MOLONEY, B., ARZEY, G., WRIGHT, T. & COPPER, K. Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
near Maitland, NSW, in 2012.  Proceedings of the Epidemiology Chapter of the 
Australian and New Zealand College of Veterinary Scientists Scientific Meeting, 2013 
Gold Coast, Australia. 47. 
MORRISON, V., BENNETT, P., BUTOW, P., MULLAN, B. & WHITE, K. 2008. 
Introduction to Health Psychology in Australia, Sydney, Australia: Pearson Education 
Australia. 
NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL (NCC). 2012. Chickopedia: What Consumers Need to 
Know [Online]. Available: http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-
industry/chickopedia/#four [Accessed 12 July 2016]. 
254 
 
NAZIR, J., HAUMACHER, R., IKE, A. C. & MARSCHANG, R. E. 2011. Persistence of avian 
influenza viruses in lake sediment, duck feces, and duck meat. Applied and 
Environmental Microbiology, 77 (14), 4981-4985.  
NESPECA, R., VAILLANCOURT, J.-P. & MORROW, W. M. 1997. Validation of a poultry 
biosecurity survey. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 31 (1-2), 73-86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5877(96)01122-1 
NESTOROWICZ, A., KAWAOKA, Y., BEAN, W. & WEBSTER, R. 1987. Molecular 
analysis of the hemagglutinin genes of Australian H7N7 influenza viruses: Role of 
passerine birds in maintenance or transmission? Virology, 160 (2), 411-418.  
NETTLES, V. F., WOOD, J. M. & WEBSTER, R. G. 1985. Wildlife surveillance associated 
with an outbreak of lethal H5N2 avian influenza in domestic poultry. Avian Diseases, 
29 (3), 733-741.  
NEW SOUTH WALES DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (NSW DPI). 2012. 
Swift action eradicates Avian Influenza at Maitland egg farm [Online]. Available: 
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/news/all/2012/swift-action-eradicates-avian-
influenza [Accessed 5 April 2015]. 
NEW SOUTH WALES DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (NSW DPI) 2015. 
NSW poultry egg industry overview 2015. Orange, NSW, Australia: New South Wales 
Department of Primary Industries. 
NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT. 2012. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H7N7) 
Maitland- control and eradication [Online]. Available: 
http://www.trade.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/51292/TI-O-139-HPAI-
Maitland-H7N7-policy.pdf [Accessed 5 April 2015]. 
NG, J., PAVLASEK, I. & RYAN, U. 2006. Identification of novel Cryptosporidium genotypes 
from avian hosts. Applied and Environmental Microbiology, 72 (12), 7548-7553.  
NIELSEN, A. A., SOVGARD, H., STOCKMARR, A., HANDBERG, K. J. & JORGENSEN, 
P. H. 2011. Persistence of low-pathogenic avian influenza H5N7 and H7N1 subtypes 
in house flies (Diptera: Muscidae). Journal of Medical Entomology, 48 (3), 608-614.  
NSW GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE (NSW OHE). 2011. 
Sydney Basin Bioregion [Online]. Available: 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/bioregions/SydneyBasinBioregion.htm 
[Accessed 5 March 2015]. 
OLSEN, B., MUNSTER, V. J., WALLENSTEN, A., WALDENSTROM, J., OSTERHAUSE, 
A. D. & FOUCHIER, R. A. 2006. Global patterns of influenza A virus in wild birds. 
Science, 312 (5772), 384-388.  
PEELER, E., MURRAY, A., THEBAULT, A., BRUN, E., GIOVANINNI, A. & THRUSH, 
M. 2007. The application of risk analysis in aquatic animal health management. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 81 (1-3), 3-20. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2007.04.012 
255 
 
PHALEN, D. N., HANAFUSA, Y., COSTA, E. & BRADLEY, A. Further investigation into 
the biology of Macrorhabdus ornithogaster.  Proceedings, Association of Avian 
Veterinarians Australian Committee, 2007 Melbourne, VIC, Australia. 75-78. 
POETRI, O., BOUMA, A., CLAASSEN, I., KOCH, G., SOEJOEDONO, R., STEGEMAN, A. 
& BOVEN, M. V. 2011. A single vaccination of commercial broilers does not reduce 
transmission of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza. Veterinary Research, 42 (74). 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1297-9716-42-74 
QUEENSLAND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY 
(QLD DAFF). 2012. Avian paramyxovirus type 1 in pigeons Guidelines for veterinary 
practitioners [Online]. Available: 
https://www.daf.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/67251/Avian-paramyxovirus-
vet-guidelines-July-12.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
QUEENSLAND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY 
(QLD DAFF). 2013. Outbreaks of avian influenza [Online]. Available: 
https://www.daf.qld.gov.au/animal-industries/animal-health-and-
diseases/notifiable/bird-flu/outbreaks [Accessed 10 January 2017]. 
RACICOT, M., VENNE, D., DURIVAGE, A. & VAILLANCOURT, J.-P. 2012. Evaluation 
of the relationship between personality traits, experience, education and biosecurity 
compliance on poultry farms in Québec, Canada. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 103 
(2-3), 201-207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2011.08.011 
READ, J. 1999. A strategy for minimizing waterfowl deaths on toxic waterbodies. Journal of 
Applied Ecology, 36 (3), 345-350.  
RICHARD, M., FOUCHIER, R., MONNE, I. & KUIKEN, T. 2017. Mechanisms and risk 
factors for mutation from low to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. European 
Food Safety Authority.  
RICHARD, M., GRAAF, M. D. & HERFST, S. 2014. Avian influenza A viruses: from 
zoonosis to pandemic. Future Virology, 9 (5), 513-524.  
RIVIERE, J., STRAT, Y. L., HENDRIKX, P. & DUFOUR, B. 2017. Cost-effectiveness 
evaluation of bovine tuberculosis surveillance in wildlife in France (Sylvatub system) 
using scenario trees. PLOS ONE, 12 (8). e0183126. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183126 
ROBERTSON, T. & NOORMOHAMMADI, A. H. 2011. Investigation of the prevalence of 
chlamydiosis in the Australian chicken meat industry. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Rural 
Industries Research and Development Corporation. 
ROBINS, A. & PHILLIPS, C. 2011. International approaches to the welfare of meat chickens. 
World's Poultry Science Journal, 67 (2), 351-369.  
ROSHIER, D., ASMUS, M. & KLAASSEN, M. 2008. What drives long-distance movements 
in the nomadic Grey Teal Anas gracilis in Australia? Ibis, 150 (3), 474-484.  
ROTH, I. Avian influenza outbreak in Young - A synopsis.  Proceedings of the Australasian 
Veterinary Poultry Association (AVPA) Scientific Meeting, 2014 Gold Coast, QLD, 
Australia. 
256 
 
RYAN, U. 2009. Cryptosporidium in birds, fish and amphibians. Experimental Parasitology, 
124 (1), 113-120.  
SAGGESE, M. D., TIZARD, I. & PHALEN, D. N. 2008. Mycobacteriosis in naturally infected 
rink-neck doves (Streptopelia risoria): investigation of the association between feather 
colour and susceptibility to infection, disease and lesions type. Avian Pathology, 37 (4), 
443-450.  
SAIF, Y., FADLY, A., GLISSON, J., MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. 2009. 
Diseases of Poultry, Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
SALTELLI, A., CHAN, K. & SCOTT, E. 2009. Sensitivity Analysis, New York, USA: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
SAMBEEK, F. V., MCMURRAY, B. L. & PAGE, R. K. 1995. Incidence of Pasteurella 
multocida in poultry house cats used for rodent control programs. Avian Diseases, 39 
(1), 145-146.  
SAMUEL, M., BOTZLER, R. & WOBESER, G. 2007. Avian Cholera. In: THOMAS, N., 
HUNTER, D. & ATKINSON, C. (eds.) Infectious diseases of wild birds. Iowa, USA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
SANGSTER, C. Non-mamallian mycobacteriosis in a zoo setting - pathological and 
epidemiological findings.  11th International Colloquium on Paratuberculosis, 2012 
Sydney, NSW, Australia. 243. 
SAWABE, K., HOSHINO, K., ISAWA, H., SASAKI, T., HAYASHI, T., TSUDA, Y., 
KURAHASHI, H., TANABAYASHI, K., HOTTA, A., SAITO, T., YAMADA, A. & 
KOBAYASHI, M. 2006. Detection and Isolation of Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Avian 
Influenza A Viruses from Blow Flies collected in the Vicinity of an Infected Poultry 
Farm in Kyoto, Japan, 2004. American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 75 
(2), 327-332.  
SAWABE, K., TANABAYASHI, K., HOTTA, A., HOSHINO, K., ISAWA, H., SASAKI, T., 
YAMADA, A., KURAHASHI, H., SHUDO, C. & KOBAYASHI, M. 2009. Survival 
of avian H5N1 influenza A viruses in Calliphora nigribarbis (Diptera: Calliphoridae). 
Journal of Medical Entomology, 46 (4), 852-855.  
SCOTT, A. B., HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M., SINGH, M., BARNES, B., GLASS, K., 
MOLONEY, B., BLACK, A., GROVES, P. & TORIBIO, J.-A. 2018a. Low and high 
pathogenic avian influenza H5 and H7 spread risk assessment within and between 
Australian commercial chicken farms. Frontiers in Veterinary Science (in review).  
SCOTT, A. B., HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M., SINGH, M., BARNES, B., GLASS, K., 
MOLONEY, B., BLACK, A., GROVES, P. & TORIBIO, J.-A. 2018b. Low pathogenic 
avian influenza exposure risk assessment in Australian commercial chicken farms 
Frontiers in Veterinary Science (in review).  
SCOTT, A. B., PHALEN, D., HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M., SINGH, M., GROVES, P. & 
TORIBIO, A. J.-A. L. 2018c. Wildlife presence and interactions with chickens on 
Australian commercial chicken farms assessed by camera traps. Avian Diseases (in 
press).  
257 
 
SCOTT, A. B., SINGH, M., GROVES, P., HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M., BARNES, B., 
MOLONEY, K. G. B., BLACK, A. & TORIBIO, J.-A. 2017. Comparisons of 
management practices and farm design on Australian commercial layer and meat 
chicken farms: Cage, barn and free range. PLOS ONE, 12 (11). e0188505. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0188505 
SCOTT, A. B., SINGH, M., GROVES, P., HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M., BARNES, B., 
MOLONEY, K. G. B., BLACK, A. & TORIBIO, J.-A. 2018d. Biosecurity practices on 
Australian commercial layer and meat chicken farms: performance and perceptions of 
farmers. PLOS ONE (in review).  
SCOTT, P., TURNER, A., BIBBY, S. & CHAMINGS, A. 2009. Structure and Dynamics of 
Australia's Commercial Poultry and Ratite Industries. Moonee Ponds, VIC, Australia: 
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry. 
SELLECK, P. 2015. [Unpublished] Avian influenza experimental work conducted within the 
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL). Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
SELLECK, P., ARZEY, G., KIRKLAND, P., REECE, R., GOULD, A., DANIELS, P. & 
WESTBURY, H. 2002. An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Australia 
in 1997 caused by an H7N4 virus. Avian Diseases, 47 (s3), 806-811.  
SHEPPARD, A. 2004. The Structure and Economics of Broiler Production in England, 
England, UK: University of Exeter. 
SHIVAPRASAD, H. & BARROW, P. 2009. Pullorum Disease and Fowl Typhoid. In: SAIF, 
Y., FADLY, A., GLISSON, J., MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. 
(eds.) Diseases of Poultry. 12 ed. Iowa USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
SIETTOU, C. Avian Influenza: outbreaks and the impact on UK consumer demand for poultry.  
90th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, 2016 University of 
Warwich, England. 
SIMS, L., HARDER, T., BROWN, I., GAIDET, N., BELOT, G., DOBSCHUETZ, S. V., 
KAMATA, A., KIVARIA, F., PALAMARA, E., BRUNI, M., DAUPHIN, G., 
RAIZMAN, E. & LUBROTH, J. 2017. Highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza in 2016 
and 2017 - observations and future perspectives. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations: Focus On. 
SIMS, L. D. & TURNER, A. J. 2009. Avian Influenza in Australia. In: SWAYNE, D. (ed.) 
Avian Influenza. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
SINGH, M. & COWIESON, A. 2013. Range use and pasture consumption in free-range poultry 
production. Animal Production Science, 53 (11), 1202-1208.  
SINGH, M., RUHNKE, I., KONING, C. D. & GLATZ, P. C. 2017a. Demographics and 
practices of semi-intesnive free-range farming systems in Australia with an outdoor 
stocking density of ≤1500 hens/hectare. PLOS ONE, 12 (10). e0187057. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187057 
SINGH, M., TORIBIO, J.-A., SCOTT, A., GROVES, P., BARNES, B., GLASS, K., 
MOLONEY, B., LEE, A. & HERNANDEZ-JOVER, M. 2017b. Assessing the 
probability of introduction and spread of Avian Influenza (AI) virus in commercial 
258 
 
Australian poultry operations using an expert opinion elicitation. PLOS ONE (in 
review).  
SINGH, R., BLACKALL, P. J., REMINGTON, B. & TURNI, C. 2013. Studies on the presence 
and persistence of Pasteurella multocida serovars and genotypes in fowl cholera 
outbreaks. Avian Pathology, 42 (6), 581-585.  
SONG, D., KANG, B. & OH, J. 2008. Transmission of avian influenza virus (H3N2) to dogs. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 14 (5), 741-746. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1405.071471 
SPACKMAN, E. 2008. A Brief Introduction to the Avian Influenza Virus. In: SPACKMAN, 
E. (ed.) Avian Influenza Virus. Totowa, USA: Humana Press. 
SPACKMAN, E., GELB, J., PRESKENIS, L. A., LADMAN, B. S., POPE, C. R., PANTIN-
JACKWOOD, M. J. & MCKINLEY, E. T. 2010. The pathogenesis of low 
pathogenicity H7 avian influenza viruses in chickens, ducks and turkeys. Virology 
Journal, 7 (331). https://doi.org/10.1186/1743-422X-7-331 
SPACKMAN, E. & SWAYNE, D. E. 2013. Vaccination of gallinaceous poultry for H5N1 
highly pathogenic avian influenza: Current questions and new technology. Virus 
Research, 178 (1), 121-132.  
SPEIRS-BRIDGE, A., FIDLER, F., MCBRIDE, M., FLANDER, L., CUMMING, G. & 
BURGMAN, M. 2010. Reducing overconfidence in the interval judgments of experts. 
Risk Analysis, 30 (3), 512-523.  
SPEKREIJSE, D., BOUMA, A., KOCH, G. & STEGEMAN, J. 2011. Airborne transmission 
of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus strain H5N1 between groups of chickens 
quantified in an experimental setting. Veterinary Microbiology, 152 (1-2), 88-95.  
SPICKLER, A. R., TRAMPEL, D. W. & ROTH, J. A. 2008. The onset of virus shedding and 
clinical signs in chickens infected with high-pathogenicity and low-pathogenicity avian 
influenza viruses. Avian Pathology, 37 (6), 555-577.  
SSEMATIMBA, A., HAGENAARS, T., DE WIT, J., RUITERKAMP, F., FABRI, T., 
STEGEMAN, J. & DE JONG, M. 2013. Avian influenza transmission risks: Analysis 
of biosecurity measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine, 109 (1-2), 106-115. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.09.001 
STECH, J. & METTENLEITER, T. C. 2013. Virulence determinants of high-pathogenic avian 
influenza viruses in gallinaceous poultry. Future Virology, 8 (5), 459-468.  
STRAHAN, R. & DYCK, S. V. 2008. The mammals of Australia, Sydney, NSW, Australia: 
New Holland Publishers. 
STURM-RAMIREZ, K., HULSE-POST, D. & WEBSTER, R. 2005. Are ducks contributing 
to the endemicity of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in Asia? Journal of 
Virology, 79 (17), 11269-11279.  
SWAYNE, D. 2009. Epidemiology of Avian Influenza in Agricultural and Other Man-Made 
Systems. In: SWAYNE, D. (ed.) Avian Influenza. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
259 
 
SWAYNE, D. & KAPCZYNSKI, D. 2009. Vaccines, Vaccination and Immunology for Avian 
Influenza Viruses in Poultry. In: SWAYNE, D. (ed.) Avian Influenza. Iowa, USA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
SWAYNE, D. & PANTIN-JACKWOOD, M. 2009. Pathobiology of Avian Influenza Virus 
Infections in birds and mammals. In: SWAYNE, D. (ed.) Avian Influenza. Iowa, USA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
SWAYNE, D., PAVADE, G., HAMILTON, K., VALLAT, B. & MIYAGISHIMA, K. 2011. 
Assessment of national strategies for control of high-pathogenicity avian influenza and 
low-pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza in poultry, with emphasis on vaccines and 
vaccination. Revue scientifique et technique (International Office of Epizootics), 30 (3), 
839-870.  
SWAYNE, D. & SUAREZ, D. 2000. Highly pathogenic avian influenza. Scientific and 
Technical Review of the Office International des Epizooties, 19 (2), 463-482.  
SWAYNE, D. E. 2008. Avian Influenza, Iowa USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
SWAYNE, D. E. 2013. Impact of Vaccines and Vaccination on Global Control of Avian 
Influenza. Avian Diseases, 56 (4s1), 818-828.  
SWAYNE, D. E. & HALVORSON, D. A. 2009. Influenza. In: SAIF, Y. (ed.) Diseases of 
Poultry. Iowa, USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
SYDNEY WATER. 2014. Water filtration [Online]. Available: 
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/sw/education/drinking-water/water-quality-
filtration/index.htm [Accessed 21 March 2016]. 
TERU, V., MANU, S., AHMED, G., JUNAIDU, K., NEWMAN, S., NYAGER, J., IWAR, V., 
MSHELBWALA, G., JOANNIS, T., MAINA, J. & APEVERGA, P. 2012. Situation-
based survey of avian influenza viruses in possible “bridge” species of wild and 
domestic birds in Nigeria. Influenza Research and Treatment, 2012.  
THOMAS, D., RAVINDRAN, V., THOMAS, D., CAMDEN, B., COTTAM, Y., MOREL, P. 
& COOK, C. 2004. Influence of stocking density on the performance, carcass 
characteristics and selected welfare indicators of broiler chickens. New Zealand 
Veterinary Journal, 52 (2), 76-81.  
THOMAS, M., BOUMA, A., EKKER, H., FONKEN, A., STEGEMAN, J. & NIELEN, M. 
2005. Risk factors for the introduction of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus into 
poultry farms during the epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003. Preventive Veterinary 
Medicine, 69 (1-2), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2004.12.001 
TINGEY-HOLYOAK, J. L. 2014. Water sharing risk in agriculture: Perceptions of farm dam 
management accountability in Australia. Agricultural Water Management, 145, 123-
133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2014.02.011 
TIWARI, A., PATNAYAK, D. P., CHANDER, Y., PARSAD, M. & GOYAL, S. M. 2006. 
Survival of two avian respiratory viruses on porous and nonporous surfaces. Avian 
Diseases, 50 (2), 284-287.  
260 
 
TORIBIO, J.-A. L. & GROVES, P. 2016. Avian Influenza Risk Mitigation for the Free-Range 
sector of the Australian Poultry Industry. Sub-Project No. 1.5.7. Armidale, NSW, 
Australia: Poultry CRC. 
TRACEY, J. P. 2009. Targeting surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds: a pilot 
investigation in New South Wales. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. 
TRACEY, J. P. 2010. Risk-based surveillance of avian influenza in Australia’s wild birds. 
Wildlife Research, 37 (2), 134-144.  
TRACEY, J. P., WOODS, R., ROSHIER, D., WEST, P. & SAUNDERS, G. R. 2004. The role 
of wild birds in the transmission of avian influenza for Australia: an ecological 
perspective. Emu, 104, 109-124. https://doi.org/10.1071/MU04017 
UMALI, D. V., LAPUZ, R. R. S. P., SUZUKI, T., SHIROTA, K. & KATOH, H. 2012. 
Transmission and shedding patterns of salmonella in naturally infected captive wild 
roof rats (Rattus rattus) from a salmonella-contaminated layer farm. Avian Diseases, 
56 (2), 288-294.  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA) 2017a. Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza Response Plan - The Red Book. Maryland, USA: Foreign Animal 
Disease Preparedness & Response Plan. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA). 2017b. National Poultry 
Improvement Plan [Online]. Georgia, USA: Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service,. Available: www.poultryimprovement.org/ [Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
VAN-DIJK, J. G., HOYE, B. J., VERHAGEN, J. H., NOLET, B. A., FOUCHIER, R. A. & 
KLAASSEN, M. 2014. Juveniles and migrants as drivers for seasonal epizootics of 
avian influenza virus. Journal of Animal Ecology, 83 (266-275).  
VAN, T. T. H., ELSHAGMANI, E., GOR, M. C., SCOTT, P. C. & MOORE, R. J. 2016. 
Campylobacter hepaticus sp. nov., isolated from chickens with spotty liver disease. 
International Journal of Systematic and Evolutionary Microbiology, 66 (11), 4518-
4525.  
VANDEGRIFT, K. J., SOKOLOW, S. H., DASZAK, P. & KILPATRICK, A. M. 2010. 
Ecology of avian influenza viruses in a changing world. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1195, 113-128.  
VETERINARY RECORD 2015. Highly pathogenic avian influenza spreads in the USA. 
Veterinary Record, 176 (20), 505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/vr.h2582 
VIJAYKRISHNA, D., DENG, Y.-M., SU, Y. C., FOURMENT, M., IANNELLO, P., ARZEY, 
G. G., HANSBRO, P. M., ARZEY, K. E., KIRKLAND, P. D., WARNER, S., O'RILEY, 
K., BARR, I. G., SMITH, G. J. & HURT, A. C. 2013. The recent establishment of north 
American H10 lineage influenza viruses in Australian wild waterfowl and the evolution 
of Australian avian influenza viruses. Journal of Virology, 87 (18), 10182-10189.  
VOSE, D. 2008. Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide, 3rd Edition, New Jersey, USA: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
261 
 
WEAVER, J., MALLADI, S., GOLDSMITH, T., HUESTON, W., HENNESSEY, M., LEE, 
B., VOSS, S., FUNK, J., DER, C., BJORK, K., CLOUSE, T. & HALVORSON, D. A. 
2012. Impact of virus strain characteristics on early detection of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza infection in commercial table-egg layer flocks and implications for 
outbreak control. Avian Diseases, 56 (4s1), 905-912.  
WEBSTER, R., YAKHNO, M., HINSHAW, V., BEAN, W. & MURTI, K. G. 1976. Intestinal 
influenza: Replication and characterisation of influenza viruses in ducks. Virology, 84, 
268-278.  
WEEKS, C., BROWN, S., RICHARDS, G., WILKINS, L. & KNOWLES, T. 2012. Levels of 
mortality in hens by end of lay on farm and in transit to slaughter in Great Britain. The 
Veterinary Record, 170 (647). http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/vr.100728 
WESTBURY, H. 1997. History of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Australia. Avian 
Diseases, 47, 23-30.  
WHITELEY, P. 2013. Dead Black Swans, Eurasian Coots, Chestnut Teal and other waterfowl. 
[Online]. Wildlife Health Surveillance Victoria. Available: 
https://www.scribd.com/document/270745813/Wildlife-Newsletter-10 [Accessed 6 
January 2018]. 
WILCOX, G., FLOWER, R., BAXENDALE, W. & MACKENZIE, J. 1983. Serological 
survey of wild birds in Australia for the prevalence of antibodies to Egg drop syndrome 
1976 (EDS-76) and Infectious bursal disease virus. Avian Pathology, 12 (1), 135-139.  
WILDLIFE HEALTH AUSTRALIA (WHA). 2018. Avian Influenza & Avian Paramyxovirus-
1 Wild Bird Surveillance [Online]. Available: 
https://wildlifehealthaustralia.com.au/ProgramsProjects/WildBirdSurveillance.aspx 
[Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
WONG, F. & DANIELS, P. 2013. Avian influenza - why it's not going away [Online]. 
Available: https://theconversation.com/avian-influenza-why-its-not-going-away-
20038 [Accessed 8 November 2016]. 
WOOD, J., CHOI, Y., CHAPPIE, D., ROGERS, J. & KAYE, J. 2010. Environmental 
persistence of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus. Environmental 
Science and Technology, 44 (19), 7515-7520.  
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO). 2017a. Cumulative number of confirmed 
human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2017 [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/2017_07_25_tableH5N1.pdf 
[Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO). 2017b. Influenza at the human-animal 
interface [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/Influenza_Summary_IRA_H
A_interface_06_15_2017.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2018]. 
WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE). 2011. Chapter 2.1. Import Risk 
Analysis [Online]. Available: https://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D10905.PDF [Accessed]. 
262 
 
WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE). 2015. Avian Influenza (infection 
with avian influenza viruses) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/fr/Health_standards/tahm/2.03.04_AI.pdf 
[Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
YAO, M., LV, J., HUANG, R., YANG, Y. & CHAI, T. 2014. Determination of infective dose 
of H9N2 avian influenza virus in different routes: aerosol, intranasal, and 
gastrointestinal. intervirology. Intervirology, 57 (6), 369-374.  
YAZWINKSKI, T. & TUCKER, C. 2009. Nematodes. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, A., GLISSON, 
J., MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. (eds.) Diseases of Poultry. Iowa 
USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
YUAN, R., CUI, J., ZHANG, S., CAO, L., LIU, X., KANG, Y., SONG, Y., GONG, L., JIAO, 
P. & LIAO, M. 2013. Pathogenicity and transmission of H5N1 avian influenza viruses 
in different birds. Veterinary Microbiology, 168 (1), 50-59.  
YVONNE PANNEKOEK, VEERLE DICKX, DELPHINE S. A. BEECKMAN, KEITH A. 
JOLLEY, WENDY C. KEIJZERS, EVANGELIA VRETOU, MARTIN C. J. MAIDEN, 
DAISY VANROMPAY & ENDE, A. V. D. 2010. Multi locus sequence typing of 
Chlamydia reveals an association between Chlamydia psittaci genotypes and host 
species. PLOS ONE, 5 (12). e14179. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0014179 
ZELTNER, E. & HIRT, H. 2008. Factors involved in the improvement of the use of hen runs. 
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 114 (3-4), 395-408.  
ZHANG, Q. 2009. Campylobacteriosis. In: SAIF, Y., FADLY, A., GLISSON, J., 
MCDOUGALD, L., NOLAN, L. & SWAYNE, D. (eds.) Diseases of Poultry. Iowa 
USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
ZHAO, Y., SHEPHERD, T., SWANSON, J., MENCH, J., KARCHER, D. & XIN, H. 2015. 
Comparative evaluation of three egg production systems: Housing characteristics and 
management practices. Poultry Science, 94 (3), 475-494.  
 263 
 
Appendix A 
The following pages compose the main questionnaire and observation record 
forms used for the farm survey as described in this thesis.  
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Appendix B 
The following pages compose the biosecurity questionnaire used for the farm 
survey as described in this thesis.  
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Appendix C 
Detailed descriptions of the nodes of the scenario trees constructed for the 
exposure risk assessment modelling as described in this thesis. 
Type of wild bird on farm property. This category node estimates the probability that waterfowl, 
shorebirds or other bird types are present on the farm (Prop_WF, Prop_SH, Prop_O). This 
node accounts for the different LPAI prevalence among these three types of wild birds (Grillo 
et al., 2015). Waterfowl and shorebirds are birds in the taxonomic orders Anseriformes and 
Charadriiformes, respectively. These orders constitute the major natural reservoir of influenza 
A viruses of all subtype combinations (Olsen et al., 2006). Specifically, birds of the family 
Anatidae, order Anseriformes, constitute the greatest number of virus detections out of all wild 
bird species (Alexander and Capua, 2008). The branches for this node are the three bird types 
and all nodes that follow these three branches are identical. Information used to estimate this 
input parameter was obtained from the survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms by 
Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). In this study, farmers were asked if any of these 
three bird groups were seen inside chicken sheds, feed storage areas, waterbodies or on the 
range and these answers are summarised in the table below.  
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Bird group / 
Location 
Non-free range 
meat chicken 
Free range 
meat chicken 
Cage layer Barn layer Free range 
layer 
Waterfowl      
In sheds      
In feed storage areas 3    9 
On the range  6   12 
On waterbodies  6 9 7 23 
Shorebirds      
In sheds      
In feed storage areas 1    9 
On the range     12 
On waterbodies 6 2 2 2 12 
Other bird species      
In sheds 7 5 5 5 13 
In feed storage areas 9 6 8 8 16 
On the range  6   20 
On waterbodies 9 5 6 4 14 
For each farm type, answers for each of the three bird groups in all locations were combined. 
The results indicate that there are significant differences on the proportion of farms with some 
of the wild bird types considered in the study, with shorebirds being more prevalent (p = 0.031 
via a logistic regression analysis) in free-range layer farms than in other farm types. A grand 
total of all answers was then obtained. Beta distributions for each bird type were created using 
the grand total of all answers as (n) and the total number of answers for each bird group as (s); 
values are listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5. The result was three Beta distributions of bird type for 
each farm type. The proportions represented by each of these distributions for each farm type 
were then used as input parameters in the model.  
Prevalence of LPAI in wild birds. This probability node estimates the probability that 
waterfowl, shorebirds or other bird types on the farm during certain times of the year are 
infected and excreting LPAI virus (Prev_WildBird_Season; Prev_WF_Winter, 
Prev_WF_Summer, Prev_WF_AuSp, Prev_SH_Winter, Prev_SH_Summer, Prev_SH_AuSP, 
Prev_O_Winter, Prev_O_Summer, Prev_O_AuSp). The branches for this node are yes and no 
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i.e. the respective bird type is or is not infected and excreting LPAI virus respectively. If no, 
then the model pathway ends at no exposure. If yes, the model pathway continues to nodes 
relating to the locations of the wild birds, initially at the shed level. Information used to estimate 
this input parameter was obtained from national surveillance data collected from two sources. 
One source was from unpublished data from NSW partners for the period from 2007 to 2015 
of the National Avian Influenza Wild Bird (NAIWB) Surveillance Program. Positive influenza 
A detections and total samples collected from waterfowl and shorebirds were used to create  
Beta distributions for waterfowl and shorebird prevalence for each season; winter (June to 
August), summer (December to February) and autumn and spring as one season (March to May 
and September to November). These values can be obtained by contacting the author of this 
thesis to seek permission from the NSW partners of the NAIWB Surveillance Program. The 
second source was from the study by Hansbro et al. (2010), where a total of 14,782 samples 
from fresh faeces or cloacal swabs were collected around Newcastle and Orange in NSW from 
2005 to 2008 and of 1,552 other bird types, one positive sample was obtained. A Beta 
distribution was performed for the other bird type using these values the distribution was used 
for all seasons (Beta(2;1552)).  
Only viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes have been shown to mutate to HPAI (Alexander, 2007). 
Information from the NSW partners of the NAIWB Surveillance Program was also used to 
calculate the prevalence of H5 and H7 virus subtypes in wild birds by dividing the number of 
H5 and H7 virus subtypes detected by the total number of influenza A virus detections in order 
to obtain a proportion for each year. This proportion was multiplied by all Beta distributions 
created for each wild bird type in each season. The values obtained from these multiplications 
were then used as the input parameters for this node. These values represented the prevalence 
of H5 and H7 AI virus subtypes in each wild bird type in each season. 
Respective wild bird type reported inside chicken sheds. This category node estimates the 
probability that waterfowl, shorebirds or other bird types go inside chicken sheds 
(Sheds_Wildbird; Sheds_WF, Sheds_SH, Sheds_O). Information used to estimate this input 
parameter was obtained from the survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms by Scott 
et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). The branches for this node are yes and no i.e. wild birds 
are or are not present inside chicken sheds respectively. If yes, the model pathway ends at 
‘exposure’ because it is assumed that if LPAI infected wild birds enter a chicken shed, then the 
chickens will be exposed to the virus. This type of exposure is classed as direct exposure 
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because chickens can come into direct contact with wild bird faeces and have physical contact 
with wild birds inside sheds. If no, the model pathway continues to other locations that wild 
birds are present if not in the chicken sheds. For each farm type, farmers were asked whether 
or not they witnessed wild birds inside the chicken sheds. No waterfowl or shorebirds were 
reported inside chicken sheds for all farm types. Other bird types were reported; commonly 
small birds such as sparrows or finches. As the data suggested the probability of waterfowl and 
shorebirds being present inside chicken sheds is zero or close to zero, a Pert distribution with 
a minimum and most likely of zero and a maximum of 0.05 was used for these bird types. For 
other bird types, Beta distributions were created using the number of farms that had reported 
wild birds inside sheds and the total number of farms for each farm type; the values used are 
listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5.  
Respective wild bird type reported in other locations on farm. This category node estimates the 
probability that waterfowl, shorebirds or other bird types are present in other locations on the 
farm; namely waterbodies, feed storage areas or the range (WB_Wildbird; WB_WF, WB_SH, 
WB_O; F_Wildbird; F_WF, F_SH, F_O; R_Wildbird; R_WF, R_SH, R_O). The branches for 
this node are the three locations. Each branch leads to a unique pathway and for free range 
farms, all three branches are used. For non-free range farms, only the branches waterbodies 
and feed storage areas are used since birds do not have a range area in these farm types. 
Information used to estimate this input parameter was obtained from the survey on commercial 
layer and meat chicken farms by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). Farmers were 
asked if any of the three bird groups were seen in waterbodies, feed storage areas or on the 
range. Similar to the first node, answers for each of the three bird groups in each location were 
combined. The answers were incorporated into the model using Beta distributions; with values 
listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5. The proportions represented by each of these distributions for each 
farm type were then used as input parameters in the model. 
Suitable weather conditions for range access. This probability node estimates the probability 
that weather conditions outside are suitable for chickens to be allowed out onto the range 
(Range_Season; Range_Winter, Range_Summer, Range_AuSp). The branches for this node are 
yes and no i.e. the weather is or is not suitable for chickens to be let outside, respectively. 
Information used to estimate this input parameter was obtained from the Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology (BOM, 2016) and the  survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms by 
Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). During the survey, free range farmers were asked 
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about weather conditions when range access restricted. In the Sydney basin region, the specific 
conditions under which range access was permitted for free range meat chicken farms were dry 
conditions, between 17 and 28oC with no severe weather present e.g. strong wind and lightning. 
This finding that led to the selection of the three seasons; winter (June to August), summer 
(December to February) and autumn and spring as one season (March to May and September 
to November). It was realised that the seasons when bird access to the range is significantly 
restricted are winter and summer, as temperatures are commonly below and above 17 and 28oC, 
respectively. Weather conditions are similar between autumn and spring and therefore they 
were combined as one season. Free range meat chicken farms in south east Queensland would 
allow birds outside depending on their own judgment, not based on specific guidelines. 
Therefore it was assumed the guidelines used in the Sydney basin region would apply to all 
farms.  
Data was received from BOM (2016) which listed hourly temperature and precipitation 
recordings from 2010 to 2016 from two weather stations in the Sydney basin region; 
Cooranbong Lake Macquarie (station number 61412) and Horsley Park Equestrian Centre 
(station number 67119). Two stations were used to gain an average of north and south 
conditions of the Sydney basin region, where Cooranbong Lake Macquarie and Horsley Park 
Equestrian Centre are located relatively north and south of the Sydney basin region respectively. 
All data used was an average of the two weather stations. The data was divided into the three 
seasons and the total number of recorded hours in each season over the years was obtained. An 
average total number of recorded hours were 13248, 13666 and 26352 for winter, summer and 
autumn/spring respectively. For winter, the total average number of hours in which the 
temperature was greater than 17oC was obtained at 1555 hours, and these hours were very likely 
to be in the day time. For summer, the total average number of hours between 7am to 7pm 
where the temperature was below 28oC was obtained at 6231.5 hours. This time consideration 
was applied due to the likely possibility that temperatures could be below 28oC but at night 
time, when chickens would not be allowed outside. For autumn and spring, the total average 
number of hours where the temperature was between 17 and 28oC between 7am to 7pm was 
obtained at 9338.5 hours. Beta distributions on these suitable temperatures for each season 
were then created; winter (Beta(1556, 11694)), summer (Beta(6232.5, 7435.5)), autumn/spring 
(Beta(9339.5, 17014.5)). 
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BOM (2016) defines a wet day as a day greater than 1mm of rain. As range access for chickens 
is determined by the hour, the total average number of hours for each season where the 
precipitation was greater than 1mm of rain was obtained at 1755, 8098.5 and 3960.5 hours for 
winter, summer and autumn/spring respectively. Beta distributions using this precipitation data 
for each season were then created; winter (Beta(1756, 11494)), summer (Beta(8099.5, 5568.5)), 
autumn/spring (Beta(3961.5, 22392.5)). A list of severe weather events from 2010 to 2016 in 
NSW was also obtained from BOM (2016). The list provided the date, longitude and latitude 
of each severe weather event. Using the longitudes and latitudes, only events that occurred 
within the Sydney basin region were obtained. Using the dates, the season in which the event 
occurred was also obtained. A total of 114 severe weather events from 2010 to 2016 were 
obtained in the Sydney basin region. Of these, one occurred in winter, 64 occurred in summer 
and 49 occurred in autumn/spring. Beta distributions using this severe weather data for each 
season were then created; winter (Beta(2, 113)), summer (Beta(65, 50)), autumn/spring 
(Beta(50, 66)). As these Beta distributions for precipitation and severe weather define 
unsuitable weather conditions for range access, one minus these Beta distributions was 
performed to define suitable weather conditions.  
The Beta distributions created for each season were added together i.e. the Beta distributions 
for suitable temperature, suitable precipitation and no severe weather for winter were all added 
together, and the same was performed for summer and autumn/spring. After each Beta 
distribution for each season was summed together, a total sum of all these Beta distributions 
was obtained. The summed Beta distribution for each season was then divided by the total sum 
of all Beta distributions. This was performed to obtain a proportion for each season and to 
ensure the final Beta distributions for each season summed to one. It was these final proportions 
that were used as the input parameters for the node for free range meat chicken farms. 
Survey results by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d) indicated that suitable weather 
conditions for range access were variably perceived amongst free range layer farmers. There 
were 33 answers from free range layer farms of weather conditions that would limit range 
access; 1 answer of too hot, 10 answers of wet conditions, 22 answers of severe weather and 2 
answers of no restrictions regardless of weather conditions. Beta distributions of each of these 
responses were created. As performed for free range meat chicken farms, data from BOM 
(2016) was used to create Beta distributions of precipitation hours greater than 1mm of rain 
and severe weather events for the three seasons. Responses from farmers by Scott et al. (2017) 
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and Scott et al. (2018d) indicated free range layer farms would allow range access at higher 
temperatures than free range meat chicken farms. A temperature of 35oC was agreed as the 
maximum temperature threshold. Average data from the two weather stations from BOM 
(2016) revealed 0, 54 and 137 hours above 35oC in winter, autumn/spring and summer 
respectively. Beta distributions were performed on these. The Beta distributions of each 
weather condition in each season were multiplied by the Beta distribution of the corresponding 
response from the survey results. The result were three weather conditions for each season; 
severe weather, heat and wet conditions, that took account of farmer responses. The three 
conditions for each season were then added together and this resulted in a probability that 
conditions were not suitable for each season. One minus these values gave the final 
probabilities that the conditions would be suitable for range access. These values were used as 
the input parameters for the node for free range layer farms. 
Suitable age for range access. This probability node estimates the probability that the chickens 
are a suitable age for range access (Age). Information used to estimate this input parameter was 
obtained from the survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms by Scott et al. (2017) 
and Scott et al. (2018d). The branches for this node are yes and no i.e. chickens are or are not 
a suitable age for range access. If age is not suitable, then the pathway ends at no exposure. If 
age is suitable, the pathway continues to the next node; whether or not birds actually use the 
range. The survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d) revealed an average age that 
birds were allowed outside of 21 days and 22.94 weeks for free range meat chicken and layer 
farms respectively. The average age of flock depopulation was 43.83 days and 87.32 weeks for 
free range meat chicken and layer farms respectively. These values are also listed in Tables 6.2 
and 6.5. These proportions were added into the model using Beta distributions to account for 
uncertainty around these estimates; free range meat chicken (Beta(22, 23.83)), free range layer 
(Beta(23.94, 65.38)). 
Birds actually go onto the range. This probability node estimates the probability that chickens 
in a shed actually go outside and use the range (Use_Range). Information used to estimate this 
input parameter was obtained from the survey on commercial layer and meat chicken farms by 
Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). The branches for this node are yes and no i.e. 
chickens do or do not use the range area. If birds do not use the range area, the pathway ends 
at no exposure through this pathway. If yes, the pathway ends at exposure, where direct 
exposure is assumed in this pathway. In the survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d), 
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free range farmers were asked to estimate the proportion of chickens in a shed that actually go 
outside and use the range in favourable conditions. Beta distributions of each individual 
response were created for each farm type; therefore 15 and 25 Beta distributions were created 
for free range meat chicken and layer farms respectively. An average of all the Beta 
distributions per farm type was created. These averages were used as the final input parameter 
for the node i.e. the average of the 15 Beta distributions was used for the free range meat 
chicken model and the average of the 25 Beta distributions was used for the free range layer 
model. Beta distributions were used to account for uncertainty around these estimates. 
Aerial transmission of LPAI from wild birds on waterbodies. This probability node estimates 
the probability that aerial transmission of LPAI will occur from wild birds present on 
waterbodies on or near the farm (Aerosol_WB). Information used to estimate this input 
parameter was obtained from Jonges et al. (2015). The branches for this node are yes and no 
i.e. chickens will or will not be exposed to aerosol LPAI. If yes, the pathway ends at exposure 
where indirect exposure is assumed in this pathway. If no, the pathway continues to the next 
node; whether or not surface water is used for the chicken farm. The study by Jonges et al. 
(2015) involved the collection of air samples at various areas surrounding LPAI infected turkey, 
chicken and wild swan holdings. All procedures were performed in triplicate. Samples at four 
distances under 100m at different bearings from 83 LPAI H5N2 infected swans were collected; 
the distances were 4m, 20m, 20m, and 98m. No virus was detected in any of the samples, 
suggesting aerial transmission of LPAI from wild birds is a rare event. A Beta distribution was 
created (Beta(Beta(1,13)) and used in the model to account for uncertainty around this estimate. 
This Beta distribution was used as the final input parameter for this node for all farm types. 
Surface water is used for chickens. This node follows from the aerial transmission node, which 
considers that wild birds are present on waterbodies on or near the property 
(Surface_Water_Used). It is reported that the consumption of LPAI contaminated water by 
commercial chickens is a common transmission route in which commercial chickens can be 
exposed to the virus (Swayne, 2008). This node estimates the probability that farms of each 
farm type use surface water for the chicken farm. Information used to estimate this input 
parameter was obtained from the survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). The 
branches for this node are yes and no i.e. surface water is or is not used for the chicken farm. 
If no, the pathway ends at no exposure through that pathway. If yes, the pathway continues to 
the next node; methods in which the surface water is used for. The exception is for non-free 
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range meat chicken farms where the yes pathway continues to the node of water treatment 
inside the shed. This is because Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d) found that no non-
free range meat chicken farms use water outside the shed for the chickens, and so the node of 
methods in which surface water is used for was omitted. The exposure diagram for non-free 
range meat chicken farms is depicted in Figure 6.2. The survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott 
et al. (2018d) asked farmers what the sources of water for the chicken farm were. Some farms 
used multiple water sources. Surface water was any exposed water such as a farm dam or river. 
Beta distributions were created for the answers for each farm type, using the total number of 
farms surveyed for each farm type as (n). The values are listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5. These were 
used as the final input parameters for this node. 
Locations surface water is used for. This node estimates the probability that surface water is 
used inside or outside chicken sheds (Water_Inside_Used; Water_Outside_Used). Each branch 
follows a unique pathway, both commencing at whether or not water inside or outside the shed 
is treated. Information used to estimate this input parameter was obtained from the cross-
section study by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). This node was omitted for non-
free range meat chicken farms as it was found no farms used water outside the shed for the 
chickens. The pathways for this farm type are depicted in Figure 6.2. Of those farmers that use 
surface water, they were asked what they used the surface water for. The use of water for 
foggers, drinkers and cooling pads were classed as inside the shed. The use of sprinklers on the 
roof for cooling purposes and irrigation of the range were classed as outside the shed. Answers 
were obtained for each farm type. Beta distributions were created using the total answers inside 
the shed, outside the shed and the grand total for both inside and outside the shed; values are 
listed in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. This was done per farm type. The proportions represented by each 
of these distributions for each farm type were then used as input parameters in the model.    
Water inside chicken sheds is treated. This node estimates the probability that water used inside 
chicken sheds is treated (Water_Inside_Treated). The branches are yes or no i.e. water is or is 
not treated inside chicken sheds. If no, the pathway ends at exposure and is assumed as indirect 
exposure in this pathway. If yes, then the pathway ends at no exposure through this pathway. 
It is assumed that any water treatment performed is effective in inactivating the virus since the 
AI virus is a relatively weak virus (Swayne, 2008). Information used to estimate this input 
parameter was obtained from the cross-section study by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. 
(2018d). The total number of farms that use drinkers, cooling pads and foggers inside the shed 
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was obtained and this was summed together as the total number of answers. The total number 
of farms that treat drinkers, cooling pads and foggers was also obtained and this was summed 
together as the total number of ‘yes’ to treatment answers. A Beta distribution was performed 
per farm type, where the total number of answers was (n) and the total number of ‘yes’ to 
treatment answers was (s). Values are listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5. 
Water outside chicken sheds is treated. The calculation of this node is similar to the node of 
treated water inside the shed and estimates the probability that water outside the shed is treated 
(Water_Outside_Treated). Information used was from the survey by Scott et al. (2017) and 
Scott et al. (2018d). The total number of farms that use sprinklers and irrigation of range was 
obtained and this was summed together as the total number of answers. The total number of 
farms that treat sprinklers and irrigation of range was summed together as the total number of 
‘yes’ to treatment answers. A Beta distribution was performed per farm type, where the total 
number of answers was (n) and the total number of ‘yes’ to treatment answers was (s). Values 
are listed in Tables 6.2 to 6.5. This node was omitted in non-free range meat chicken farms as 
mentioned previously. The branches for this node are yes or no i.e. water is or is not treated 
outside chicken sheds. If yes, the pathway ends at no exposure through this pathway. If no, the 
pathway differs between free range and non-free range farms and is depicted on Figures 6.3 
and 6.1 respectively. In order for non-free range layer farms to be exposed to water outside of 
the shed, they must escape the shed. Therefore the next node after the yes branch is escapee 
chickens from the shed. Free range farms have relatively frequent access to the outdoors but 
their exposure to the virus is dependent on whether or not the chickens go outside. Therefore 
the pathway that follows the yes branch in this case is the same pathway after the branch of 
wild birds on the range; considering weather conditions, age and range use. The difference is 
that exposure is assumed to be indirect in this pathway as exposure to the virus will be through 
water. 
Chickens escape shed or range area. This node follows the branch that wild birds are present 
in the feed storage area and estimates the probability that chickens escape the shed or range 
area (Escape). Information used to estimate this node was derived from the survey by Scott et 
al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d). The branches for this node are yes or no i.e. chickens do or 
do not escape the shed or range area respectively. If yes, the pathway ends at exposure which 
is assumed to be direct exposure. As found by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d), feed 
storage areas are located directly adjacent to the chicken sheds, mainly in the form of silos. 
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Wild birds present in feed storage areas will also be in the vicinity of the immediate outside 
area of the chicken shed. If chickens escape they will enter these immediate outside areas. Wild 
bird presence in these areas leads to direct exposure as defined by physical contact or direct 
contact between a commercial chicken with wild bird faeces. If the branch is no, the pathway 
continues to the next node; indirect introductions via fomites or vectors. Farmers were asked 
whether or not they witnessed chickens escaping the shed or range area. Beta distributions per 
farm type were then created using the total number of answers as (n) and the total number of 
‘yes’ answers as (s). Values are listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.5.  
Other indirect routes. This node estimates the probability that indirect introduction of LPAI 
virus to commercial chickens occurs through fomites or vectors (Indirect). This node considers 
wild birds are present in feed storage areas i.e. areas directly adjacent to the shed. Indirect 
introduction via fomites or vectors assumes wild bird faeces is picked up from these areas via 
fomites or vectors and carried inside the shed. Fomites or vectors considered in this node were 
boots, mice/rats, insects and farm dogs and cats. This node uses combined information from 
the survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d) and also on scientific literature 
reporting LPAI virus survival and detection in other organisms (Henzler et al., 2003, 
Achenbach and Bowen, 2011, Nielsen et al., 2011, Tiwari et al., 2006, Nazir et al., 2011). Scott 
et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d) visited farms and recorded the use of foot baths; farmer 
observation of mice/rats and/or insects inside sheds; and whether farm cats or dogs were 
allowed on the shed and/or on the range area. For each farm type, answers of no foot baths, 
presence of mice/rats, presence of insects and access of farm cats or dogs into range and shed 
were recorded. Values are listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5. The answers for each fomite were divided 
by the total number of answers to gain a proportion for that fomite. 
Scientific literature indicated that it is a rare event for mice and rats to be positive for AI virus 
after inoculation and concluded these species likely do not play a significant role in 
transmission of the virus to other species. Rats were inoculated with LPAI virus and zero of 12 
rodents were positive upon virus isolation in one study (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011). A Beta 
distribution on these results was created, where 12 was the total number of rodents (n) and zero 
was the total number of positive virus isolations (s). In contrast to these results, scientific 
literature indicated that flies are a potential carrier of AI virus. Nielsen et al. (2011) conducted 
an experiment in which flies were fed H7N1 and H5N7 LPAI of three different two-fold virus 
dilutions. Groups of flies fed the same subtype and dilutions had their contents pooled. A total 
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of 171 fly pools were examined, and of those 73 were positive for the virus (Nielsen et al., 
2011). A Beta distribution of this result was created using 171 as (n) and 73 as (s).  
The survival of LPAI virus subtypes H4N6, H5N1 and H6N8 in duck faeces, lake sediment 
and duck meat was examined by Nazir et al. (2011) at four temperatures; 30, 20, 10 and 0oC. 
The study determined the number of days required for each subtype to lose 90% of virus 
infectivity in the different substances. Of interest to this model were the results in duck faeces 
at 30 and 20oC as these temperatures are typical of Australian conditions and duck faeces can 
potentially be carried by fomites or vectors. The virus survived the longest in lake sediment 
followed by duck faeces. The average number of days of survival for the three subtypes in duck 
faeces and lake sediment in 30 and 20oC was 3.5 and 11.83 days respectively. Assuming 11.83 
days is roughly the maximum number of days of survival of LPAI in 20 and 30oC temperatures, 
the survival time in duck faeces is approximately 30% of the virus’s potential survival time at 
these temperatures. A uniform distribution assuming a moderate probability of survival in duck 
faeces was therefore created (Uniform(0.3,0.7)). Similarly, the survival of LPAI virus subtype 
H13N7 on gumboots as well as other materials at room temperature was studied by Tiwari et 
al. (2006). It was found the virus survived on gumboots for three days and no virus was detected 
on day nine from any of the materials tested. Again the survival time of the virus on gumboots 
is approximately 30% of the virus’s potential survival time at this temperature. Therefore a 
uniform distribution assuming a moderate probability of survival on gumboots was also created 
(Uniform(0.3,0.7)). Nazir et al. (2011) reported some variability in the survivability amongst 
the different AI virus subtypes. However there is limited scientific literature on such 
comparisons. Therefore for the purpose of this model, it is assumed the survival of LPAI 
viruses is similar across the different subtypes. 
The distributions from the literature were then multiplied by the corresponding proportion of 
answers from the survey results. For instance, the Beta distribution created for mice/rats from 
the literature was multiplied by the proportion of mice/rat answers from the survey results. 
Similarly, the beta distribution of insects from literature, the uniform distribution of virus 
survival in duck faeces and the uniform distribution of virus survival on gumboots was 
multiplied by the proportion of insects, farm cat or dog access and absence of footbath answers 
from the survey results respectively. All multiplications were then added together to give a 
single probability per farm type. This probability incorporates both literature and survey results 
and was used as the input parameter for this node.  
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Appendix D 
Detailed descriptions of the nodes of the scenario trees constructed for the 
spread risk assessment modelling as described in this thesis. 
Type of exposure. The spread scenario tree begins after exposure to LPAI and this node 
considers the type of exposure to LPAI i.e. direct or indirect as subsequent infection will 
depend on how exposure to the virus occurs.  For the purpose of this model, direct exposure is 
defined as physical contact between a wild bird and a commercial chicken or direct contact 
between a commercial chicken and wild bird faeces. Indirect exposure is defined as contact 
between a commercial chicken with the virus through a medium i.e. through water, fomites or 
vectors. Fomites include boots and equipment where wild bird faeces may contaminate these 
fomites and then be presented to chickens through movement. Vectors may become infected 
with the virus, most notably insects, mice and rats, and may shed the virus in the presence of 
chickens or be consumed by chickens; in this case they act as biological vectors. Vectors may 
also present the virus to chickens through movement only; in this case they act as mechanical 
vectors. 
The probability of each type of exposure differs depending on the farm type. In addition, the 
probability of infection differs depending on the type of exposure (Yao et al., 2014). 
Information used to estimate this probability node was from the exposure scenario tree of the 
respective farm type. The total average probabilities of direct and indirect exposure were 
calculated from the three seasons for each farm type. The averages were then summed together 
and then divided by this summation to give a proportion of each exposure for each farm type. 
The direct and indirect exposure branches of this node lead to the next nodes; infection from 
direct and indirect exposure respectively. The branches that follow are then identical. 
Infection from direct exposure. This node estimates the probability of infection after direct 
exposure to LPAI virus. The branches for this node are yes and no i.e. infection from direct 
exposure does or does not occur respectively. Information used to estimate this node was 
acquired from scientific literature. Yao et al. (2014) performed experiments assessing the 
number of chickens infected from exposure to H9N2 LPAI virus through different routes at 
various virus concentrations and dilutions. The intranasal, gastrointestinal and aerosol routes 
were assessed. For this model, intranasal and gastrointestinal routes fall under direct exposure. 
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The gastrointestinal route also falls under indirect exposure as well as the aerosol route. 
Webster et al. (1976) revealed that the average virus concentration in tracheal swabs from 
Mallards infected with LPAI H5N2 was 103.8 EID 50/ml over six days post inoculation. This 
figure was used as the assumed virus concentration during intranasal exposure in realistic 
scenarios. Yao et al. (2014) exposed 26 and 18 chickens with LPAI H9N2 virus via the 
intranasal route at concentrations of 104.69 and 103.69 respectively. Of these 44 chickens, 42 
became infected at these concentrations. A Beta distribution was created using these figures to 
account for uncertainties; Beta (43, 3). These concentrations were chosen for this model as they 
were closest to the assumed virus concentration during intranasal exposure. Webster et al. 
(1976) also revealed that the average virus concentration in cloacal swabs from Mallards 
infected with LPAI H5N2 was 102.04 EID 50/ml over five days post inoculation. This was 
assumed as the average virus concentration present in infected duck faeces. However it is 
appreciated that virus concentration during direct exposure via the gastrointestinal route can 
range significantly. This is due to factors including the amount of faeces present in the 
environment and the amount consumed by the chicken. Yao et al. (2014) exposed chickens to 
the LPAI H9N2 at various concentrations via the gastrointestinal route. The virus concentration 
102.69 EID 50/ml was the closest virus concentration used in this study to Webster et al. (1976)’s 
average of 102.04 EID 50/ml. At this virus concentration and route, 22 chickens were exposed 
and one was infected therefore providing a proportion of 0.045. A Pert distribution was created 
ranging from 0 to 1 with the most likely at 0.045; Pert (0, 0.045, 1) to account for the large 
range of virus concentration. Selleck (2015) revealed that two out of two in-contact chickens 
housed with chickens infected with LPAI H5N3 became infected with the virus. A Beta 
distribution was created using these figures; Beta (3, 1). The final probability for the ‘yes’ 
branch of this node was created by averaging the two Beta distributions and Pert distribution 
created from scientific literature. The ‘no’ branch was then simply one minus this value. The 
focus of this model is on virus subtypes H5 and H7. However scientific literature assessing 
exposure and infection to LPAI H5 or H7 virus in chickens was lacking. Therefore it is assumed 
the study by Yao et al. (2014) on LPAI H9N2 can be applied to LPAI H5 and H7. 
Infection from indirect exposure. This node estimates the probability of infection after indirect 
exposure to LPAI virus. The branches for this node are yes and no i.e. infection from indirect 
exposure does or does not occur respectively. Information used to estimate this node was 
acquired from scientific literature. As mentioned, the aerosol and gastrointestinal routes are 
classed as indirect exposure for this model. Jonges et al. (2015) sampled air surrounding LPAI 
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infected commercial poultry farms. Viral loads from positive samples were relatively low. In 
addition, no positive samples were detected in air surrounding 83 LPAI infected swans. Yao et 
al. (2014) experimentally exposed chickens to various virus concentrations of LPAI H9N2 via 
the aerosol route. It is assumed in realistic scenarios the virus concentration during aerosol 
exposure is very low. Therefore the lowest aerosol concentration used by Yao et al. (2014) was 
selected. This concentration was 102.69 EID 50/ml; where out of 10 exposed chickens, none 
became infected. A Beta distribution was created from these figures to account for uncertainty; 
Beta (1, 11). Indirect exposure via the gastrointestinal route is assumed at lower concentrations 
than direct exposure. The lowest two virus concentrations used by Yao et al. (2014) were 
therefore selected. These concentrations were 102.69 and 101.69 EID 50/ml where in total, 53 
chickens were exposed and one became infected. A Beta distribution was created using these 
figures; Beta (2, 53). The likelihood of aerosol exposure compared to indirect gastrointestinal 
exposure was also considered. Using the exposure tree of the respective farm type, the 
probability of aerosol exposure was summed together for all three seasons as well as the 
probability of indirect gastrointestinal exposure. These two summations were then summed 
together and then divided by the total to give a proportion of likelihood for each route. These 
likelihood proportions were then multiplied by their respective Beta distribution i.e. aerosol or 
indirect gastrointestinal exposure. The final value for the ‘yes’ branch for this node was the 
sum of these two multiplications. The final value therefore considers both the likelihood of the 
route occurring as well as the probability of infection via that route. 
LPAI subtype can spread among chickens. This node follows from the ‘yes’ branch of LPAI 
infection from direct or indirect exposure and estimates the probability the LPAI subtype that 
has infected one chicken is a subtype that can spread to other chickens. The branches for this 
node are yes and no i.e. the LPAI subtype can or cannot spread to other chickens. If no, the 
pathway leads to no establishment of the virus. If yes, the pathway continues to the next node; 
establishment of LPAI. Information used to estimate this node was from world outbreak data 
retrieved from FAO EMPRES-i (2016). This data reports all H5 and H7 LPAI and HPAI 
detected in poultry across the globe since 2004. It was used to count the number of outbreaks 
for each H5 or H7 subtype; there are nine types of neuraminidase (N) for each H5 and H7 
subtype. It is assumed these reported outbreaks are H5 or H7 virus subtypes that are able to 
spread amongst poultry since the outbreaks caused enough changes within poultry to be able 
to be detected and reported. The data was filtered to obtain outbreak information from chickens 
only. Both LPAI and HPAI were considered however efforts were made to only consider novel 
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introductions from wild birds with subsequent outbreaks and not those reported from spread of 
the virus from infected farms. Therefore outbreaks excluded include post-2003 H5 HPAI 
reports from Asian H5N1 endemic countries and post-2014 reports of HPAI H5N1/N2/N8 from 
Europe and North America as these reported outbreaks were likely due to extensive HPAI 
spread. In total, nine of 18 H5 and H7 subtypes were counted. A Beta distribution was created 
using these figures to account for uncertainty; Beta (10, 10). This node therefore estimates that 
approximately half of all H5 and H7 LPAI subtypes that are exposed to a chicken will spread, 
regardless of the specific N type. 
Establishment of LPAI after infection in one chicken. This node estimates the probability that 
the LPAI virus will become established in the flock after infection in one chicken. Information 
used to estimate this node was derived from the probability of infection dying out after 
exposure occurred (Probability of extinction); with the probability of establishment being 1- 
probability of extinction. This probability of extinction of infection was calculated with a 
Poisson branching process which used a range of different R as the mean of the Poisson 
distribution and a serial interval of 3.5 days. A serial interval is the time between successive 
cases of an infectious disease (Fine, 2003). Estimates of R were produced by fitting a discrete-
time model to daily deaths from sheds using data from the 2013 HPAI outbreak in Australia. 
According to this model, the mean of the R of the HPAI virus causing this outbreak was 
estimated around 1.41 and 1.57. There is a high degree of uncertainty in estimating the R of 
LPAI and it may or may not be similar to the R of HPAI (Gonzales et al., 2011). For the purpose 
of this model, the probability of establishment for a LPAI virus with an R between 1.3 to 1.4 
was used, and incorporated into the model with a uniform distribution (Uniform(0.423,0.511)). 
LPAI subtype leads to clinical signs in chickens after infection. This node estimates the 
probability that clinical signs will be displayed by chickens infected with an LPAI subtype that 
can spread amongst chickens. This node considers the fact that some LPAI infections cause 
little or no clinical signs in chickens (Swayne, 2008). The branches for this node are yes and 
no i.e. the LPAI subtype does or does not lead to clinical signs in chickens. Information used 
to estimate this node was acquired from scientific literature. Spickler et al. (2008) reviewed the 
literature listing studies that assessed morbidity or mortality in chickens infected with AI virus. 
LPAI H5 and H7 subtypes were counted from this review and it was found 18 of 40 subtypes 
caused either morbidity or mortality in chickens. In addition, Spackman et al. (2010) 
experimentally infected chickens with 12 LPAI H7 subtypes; some subtypes were the same but 
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were from different origin species. Of those 12, six lead to clinical signs in chickens. Both 
papers report an onset of clinical signs of as little as 1-2 days. These two papers were combined 
where of 52 LPAI H5 and H7 subtypes, 24 caused clinical signs in chickens. A Beta distribution 
using these figures was created to account for uncertainty; Beta (25, 29). 
Proportion of chickens that show clinical signs from LPAI infection. This node estimates the 
proportion of LPAI infected chickens within a flock that will display clinical signs. This node 
assumes the LPAI subtype established within the flock is a subtype that can both spread 
amongst chickens and can produce clinical signs as estimated in the previous nodes. The 
branches for this node are yes and no i.e. chickens do or do not display clinical signs. 
Information used to estimate this node was obtained from scientific literature. Jones and 
Swayne (2004) and Mo et al. (1997) experimentally inoculated chickens with LPAI H7N3 and 
H5N2 viruses respectively and counted the number of chickens that displayed clinical signs. 
The two studies combined revealed out of a total of 23 chickens, six displayed clinical signs. 
A Beta distribution was created using these figures to account for uncertainty; Beta (7, 18).  
LPAI detection and reporting. This node estimates the probability that after LPAI is established 
within a flock of chickens that it will be detected and reported to the appropriate authorities by 
the farmer. Information used to estimate this node was derived from the  survey on commercial 
layer and meat chicken farms by (Scott et al., 2018d). In this survey farmers were asked to 
report signs in chickens that they would consider unusual and prompt them to contact someone. 
The total number of signs was determined per farm type. Of these signs, those that were 
strongly attributable to LPAI were counted separately. These signs were a drop in egg 
production, respiratory signs, mortalities, lethargy, lacrimation or other eye signs and 
gastrointestinal signs (Barnes, 2009). A Beta distribution was used using the number of answers 
attributable to LPAI (s) and the total number of answers (n) and was used as the probability for 
the ‘yes’ branch. This was done for each farm type and therefore five beta distributions were 
created. If the ‘yes’ branch is followed, the end-point of ‘limited LPAI spread’, as described 
above, is reached. If the ‘no’ branch is followed, the next node ‘LPAI spread methods shed-
shed’ or ‘LPAI spread methods farm-farm’ is reached. 
Mutation of LPAI to HPAI. This node estimates the probability of mutation from LPAI to HPAI. 
Information used to estimate this node was obtained from an expert opinion workshop held in 
November 2015 (Singh et al. 2016). A modified Delphi method was used in the expert opinion 
workshop (Custer et al., 1999, Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010, McBride et al., 2003, Vose, 2008). 
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The workshop initially involved experts responding to a questionnaire sent through email 
followed by a face-to-face workshop. During this workshop, probability estimates resulting 
from the questionnaire were anonymously presented to workshop participants for discussion. 
Experts were then requested to review and revise their answers if they saw fit using a final 
paper questionnaire. Only the second probability estimates were considered. Ten experts 
attended the face-to-face workshop and expertise in topics ranged from wild bird behaviour, 
virology and the poultry industry. The question asked to the experts to estimate the probability 
of this node was; “Imagine 100 sheds each of the following operation types where LPAI has 
recently been established. In how many of these sheds would LPAI mutate to HPAI?” Experts 
were asked to give the lowest, most likely and highest estimate of mutation and the question 
was asked for each farm type. Experts were also asked to rate how confident (50 to 100%) they 
were that the true value would fit within their interval. Assumptions when providing estimates 
for this node include; H5 and H7 are the only subtypes considered, answers were over one 
production cycle hence the estimate is low for meat chickens compared to layers, density of 
birds in a shed has a significant role, and there is no restriction in horizontal contacts on site. 
Each answer was converted to 80% derived intervals using LogNormal transformation on 
Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 7, 2010) in order to normally distribute the experts’ estimates. 
Pert distributions were created from the converted answers of each of the ten experts. Discrete 
distributions were then used to combine all expert answers for the question per farm type. The 
discrete distribution enabled weightings of answers, where experts could be weighted 
depending on their level of expertise in certain topics. Weightings were low, medium and high; 
1 being low and 3 being high. Virologists had heavier weightings compared to other experts 
for this question. 
LPAI spread methods shed to shed. This node estimates the probability that LPAI will spread 
via specific pathways from one shed to another on the same farm. The branches for this node 
are the pathways considered for shed to shed spread; boots or clothing, vermin such as mice or 
insects, other animals such as dogs and cats, aerosol and movement of equipment between 
sheds. This node uses combined information from the  survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott 
et al. (2018d) and also on scientific literature reporting LPAI virus survival and presence on 
particular materials and fomites (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011, Nielsen et al., 2011, Tiwari et 
al., 2006, Jonges et al., 2015, Wood et al., 2010). This node does not explicitly consider the 
volumes and frequency of the spread pathways, and instead it considers the proportion of farms 
that perform or have these pathways present in combination with the survival of the virus on 
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these pathways. In the survey by Scott et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2018d), farms were visited 
and the following answers respective of each pathway were recorded; the use of foot baths, the 
presence of mice/rats and/or insects inside sheds, whether or not farm cats and dogs were 
allowed on the shed, the distance between sheds, and whether or not disinfection of equipment 
occurs between sheds. For the distances between sheds, the number of farms that had sheds 
less than 150 metres from each other were recorded simply because Jonges et al. (2015) had 
sampled air at 150m and lower and this study was to be used in this node. Values are listed in 
Table 7.1 for each farm type. A Beta distribution was created for each of the answers of the 
respective pathways and this was performed per farm type. The pathways boots or clothing, 
equipment and other animals transfer the virus mechanically. Literature was searched to find 
the length of virus survival on different materials. Tiwari et al. (2006) demonstrated that virus 
survival was at least one day on a variety of material, including three days on gumboots, steel 
and plastic. AI virus survival was found to be two days in chicken faeces (Wood et al., 2010). 
Therefore assuming these three pathways occur every day, the probability that the virus will 
survive when carried by these pathways is one.  
AI virus isolation in vermin has been studied to determine their importance in spread during 
outbreaks. It has generally been concluded that mice and rats do not play significant roles in 
the spread of AI virus but insects may (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011, Nielsen et al., 2011). 
Rats were inoculated with LPAI virus and zero of 12 rodents were positive upon virus isolation 
in one study (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011). Nielsen et al. (2011) conducted an experiment in 
which flies were fed H7N1 and H5N7 LPAI of three different two-fold virus dilutions. Groups 
of flies fed the same subtype and dilutions had their contents pooled. A total of 171 fly pools 
were examined, and of those 73 were positive for the virus (Nielsen et al., 2011). A Beta 
distribution using both these studies was created using 183 as (n) and 73 as (s). This Beta 
distribution was multiplied with the Beta distributions of vermin answers from the survey data 
for each farm type. 
The survival of LPAI in the air was estimated using the study by Jonges et al. (2015) which 
involved the collection of air samples surrounding LPAI infected birds. All procedures were 
performed in triplicate. Samples at three distances under 150m at different bearings from LPAI 
H7N7 infected chicken farm were collected; the distances were 42m, 53m and 150m. No virus 
was detected in any of these samples. A Beta distribution was created (Beta(1,10)) and this was 
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multiplied by the Beta distributions of the number of farms with sheds less than 150m from 
each other for each farm type.  
The Beta distributions created from survey results for boots or clothing, equipment and other 
animals were simply multiplied by one. For each farm type, the multiplied Beta distributions 
were then all summed together. Each multiplication was then divided by this summation to 
give a proportion for each pathway and to ensure the sum of all pathways was one. These final 
values were used as the final probabilities of each pathway. The final values therefore consider 
both the likelihood of the pathway occurring as well as the probability of survival of the virus 
when travelling via that pathway. 
LPAI spread methods farm to farm. This node estimates the probability that LPAI will spread 
via specific pathways from farm to farm. Information used to estimate this node was derived 
from the expert opinion workshop held in November 2015 (Singh et al. 2017b). The question 
asked to experts to estimate this node was “Imagine 100 LPAI established (farm type) farms. 
Realistically how many of these will experience LPAI spread to at least one other chicken farm 
through each of the following pathways?” The farm to farm pathways considered in this node 
were aerosol, infected wild bird going from one farm to another, other animals including 
vermin and farm cats and dogs, new bird delivery transport, bird pick up transport both live 
and dead, feed delivery transport, manure collection, farm workers, trades people such as 
electricians and plumbers, shared equipment between farms, egg trays and egg pallets. The 
latter two pathways were applied to layer farm types only. The experts can be assumed to have 
considered volume, frequency and survival of the virus via these pathways in their answers. 
The same methodology in using the experts’ answers as described for the node ‘Mutation of 
LPAI to HPAI’ was applied to this node. This question was asked for each farm type. The 
following table provides the distributions used for each pathway for each farm type (median (5 
– 95%), where the sum of the distributions of the pathways for each farm type was 1. 
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Spread pathway Non free range 
meat chicken 
Free range meat 
chicken 
Cage layer Barn layer Free range layer 
Aerosol 0.058 (0 – 0.25) 0.039 (0 – 0.17) 0.029 (0 – 0.20) 0.030 (0 – 0.20) 0.033 (0 – 0.19) 
Infected wild 
bird 
0.028 (0 – 0.95) 0.042 (0.01 – 
0.17) 
0.017 (0.0011 – 
0.047) 
0.019 (0.0014 – 
0.13) 
0.023 (0.0063 – 
0.13) 
Animals 
(vermin and 
pets) 
0.029 (0 – 0.12) 0.063 (0 – 0.28) 0.025 (0 – 0.18) 0.033 (0 – 0.20) 0.042 (0 – 0.23) 
Bird delivery 
transport 
0.034 (0.0017 – 
0.16) 
0.025 (0.0033 – 
0.16) 
0.036 (0.0035 – 
0.14) 
0.058 (0.0036 – 
0.16) 
0.032 (0 – 0.16) 
Bird pick up 
transport (live 
and dead) 
0.25 (0.082 – 
0.45) 
0.25 (0.11 – 
0.45) 
0.10 (0.044 – 
0.25) 
0.10 (0.042 – 
0.25) 
0.10 (0.042 – 
0.24) 
Feed delivery 
transport 
0.10 (0.0051 – 
0.20) 
0.079 (0.030 – 
0.20) 
0.057 (0.014 – 
0.15) 
0.054 (0.014 – 
0.14) 
0.054 (0.013 – 
0.13) 
Manure 
collection 
0.092 (0.028 – 
0.23) 
0.092 (0.025 – 
0.25) 
0.061 (0.0081 – 
0.14) 
0.064 (0.0071 – 
0.14) 
0.061 (0.0075 – 
0.14) 
Farm workers 0.091 (0.0096 – 
0.29) 
0.069 (0.0080 – 
0.25) 
0.092 (0.022 – 
0.26) 
0.087 (0.022 – 
0.26) 
0.087 (0.028 – 
0.27) 
Trades people 0.092 (0.030 – 
0.21) 
0.083 (0.016 – 
0.21) 
0.075 (0.013 – 
0.19) 
0.076 (0.015 – 
0.18) 
0.078 (0.014 – 
0.18) 
Shared 
equipment 
0.097 (0.017 – 
0.22) 
0.084 (0.014 – 
0.20) 
0.059 (0.015 – 
0.19) 
0.051 (0.014 – 
0.11) 
0.056 (0.013 – 
0.11) 
Egg trays   0.18 (0.084 – 
0.31) 
0.18 (0.079 – 
0.31) 
0.18 (0.081 – 
0.30) 
Egg pallets   0.12 (0.032 – 
0.26) 
0.12 (0.034 – 
0.26) 
0.12 (0.035 – 
0.24) 
 
HPAI clinical signs, detection and reporting. This node estimates the combined probability 
that chickens infected with HPAI will show clinical signs and farmers will detect and report 
the disease to appropriate authorities. Information used to estimate this node was derived from 
work conducted by Selleck (2015). In these experiments, chickens were inoculated with HPAI 
H7 viruses, the majority of which were Australian lineages, and the number of chickens that 
showed clinical signs recorded. All chickens out of a total of 52 chickens demonstrated clinical 
signs during infection with an onset of as little as one day. A Beta distribution was created 
using these figures; Beta (53, 1). This resulting Beta distribution had a probability close to one. 
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The probability of detection is assumed to be very high in this scenario due to the high 
probability of clinical signs. Therefore no information was used to estimate the probability of 
detection as a Beta distribution close to one was regarded as accurate for the ‘yes’ branch of 
this node. If the ‘yes’ branch is followed, the end-point of ‘Limited HPAI spread’, as described 
above, is reached. If the ‘no’ branch is followed, the next node ‘HPAI spread methods shed-
shed’ or ‘HPAI spread methods farm-farm’ is reached. 
HPAI spread methods shed to shed. This node estimates the probability that HPAI will spread 
via specific pathways from shed to shed. The branches and methods to calculate their 
probabilities are the same as the node ‘LPAI spread methods shed to shed’ except for two 
differences. Namely, the Beta distributions calculating virus survival in vermin and air were 
different. For vermin, the studies by Sawabe et al. (2009) and Nettles et al. (1985) were used. 
Sawabe et al. (2009) exposed flies to HPAI H5N1 and then attempted to isolate the virus from 
the internal organs. Of 59 tested flies, 41 were positive for virus isolation. During a HPAI 
H5N2 outbreak, rats and mice found inside the farm sheds were sampled. Of 516 rats and mice 
sampled, zero were positive for virus isolation (Nettles et al., 1985). A Beta distribution was 
created using both studies (Beta (42, 485)) and this was the Beta distribution used in estimating 
HPAI virus survival in vermin. During the 2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States of America 
(USA), air samples surrounding HPAI infected chicken farms were tested (McCluskey, 2015). 
Of 90 samples tested at a distance of 5m from affected shed, 22 were positive for the virus. A 
Beta distribution was created using this outbreak data (Beta (23, 69)). These two Beta 
distributions estimating virus survival in vermin and air were then used in the same methods 
as described in the node ‘LPAI spread methods shed to shed’. 
HPAI spread methods farm to farm. This node estimates the probability that HPAI will spread 
via specific pathways from farm to farm. Information used to estimate this node was derived 
from the expert opinion workshop held in November 2015 (Singh et al. 2017b). The question 
asked to the experts was the same question as stated in the node ‘LPAI spread methods farm to 
farm’, the only difference was that LPAI was replaced with HPAI; “Imagine 100 HPAI 
established (farm type) farms. Realistically how many of these will experience HPAI spread to 
at least one other chicken farm through each of the following pathways?” The same 
methodology in using the experts’ answers as described for the node ‘Mutation of LPAI to 
HPAI’ was applied to this node. This question was asked for each farm type. The following 
298 
 
table provides the distributions used for each pathway for each farm type (median (5 – 95%), 
where the sum of the distributions of the pathways for each farm type was 1. 
Spread pathway Non free range 
meat chicken 
Free range meat 
chicken 
Cage layer Barn layer Free range layer 
Aerosol 0.085 (0.0085 – 
0.31) 
0.075 (0.016 – 
0.36) 
0.048 (0.0052 – 
0.30) 
0.034 (0.0054 – 
0.13) 
0.034 (0.012 – 
0.30) 
Infected wild 
bird 
0.038 (0.0080 – 
0.14) 
0.060 (0.010 – 
0.18) 
0.015 (0.0018 – 
0.062) 
0.019 (0.0057 – 
0.064) 
0.034 (0.0066 – 
0.11) 
Animals 
(vermin and 
pets) 
0.042 (0 – 0.13) 0.041 (0 – 0.14) 0.024 (0 – 
0.078) 
0.026 (0 – 
0.083) 
0.038 (0 – 0.18) 
Bird delivery 
transport 
0.019 (0.0019 – 
0.11) 
0.029 (0.0022 – 
0.27) 
0.031 (0.0018 – 
0.18) 
0.025 (0.0040 – 
0.15) 
0.042 (0.0077 – 
0.13) 
Bird pick up 
transport (live 
and dead) 
0.20 (0.042 – 
0.44) 
0.20 (0.039 – 
0.44) 
0.095 (0.022 – 
0.27) 
0.10 (0.018 – 
0.28) 
0.098 (0.032 – 
0.26) 
Feed delivery 
transport 
0.081 (0.0033 – 
0.30) 
0.068 (0.0016 – 
0.19) 
0.049 (0.0018 – 
0.10) 
0.046 (0.0021 – 
0.11) 
0.047 (0.0049 – 
0.19) 
Manure 
collection 
0.054 (0 – 0.21) 0.064 (0 – 0.20) 0.068 (0.013 – 
0.23) 
0.052 (0.0095 – 
0.17) 
0.060 (0.021 – 
0.15) 
Farm workers 0.10 (0.031 – 
0.35) 
0.079 (0.022 – 
0.28) 
0.082 (0.022 – 
0.29) 
0.087 (0.020 – 
0.25) 
0.099 (0.020 – 
0.28) 
Trades people 0.10 (0.011 – 
0.30) 
0.12 (0.018 – 
0.29) 
0.075 (0.0054 – 
0.20) 
0.078 (0.0062 – 
0.22) 
0.064 (0.0082 – 
0.17) 
Shared 
equipment 
0.090 (0.028 – 
0.27) 
0.095 (0.025 – 
0.25) 
0.076 (0.0084 – 
0.21) 
0.087 (0.0095 – 
0.25) 
0.080 (0.0076 – 
0.22) 
Egg trays   0.16 (0.061 – 
0.33) 
0.17 (0.063 – 
0.37) 
0.14 (0.051 – 
0.33) 
Egg pallets   0.075 (0.030 – 
0.27) 
0.094 (0.032 – 
0.32) 
0.075 (0.028 – 
0.27) 
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Appendix E 
Reassessment of ANOVA and univariable logistic regression analysis 
The following table is the result of reassessment of variables that were tested for differences 
between farm type throughout the thesis. The table shows the similar strengths of association 
between ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis H Test, hence highlighting the robustness and 
appropriate use of ANOVA in most instances. All but two variables (number of feeder pans 
per bird and distance from shed to waterbody) had the same significance results for both the 
ANOVA and Kruskall-Wallis test. 
Chapter Variable tested for differences between 
farm type 
ANOVA Kruskall-Wallis test 
3 Number of drinkers per bird 0.2 0.05 
Number of feeder pans per bird* 0.07 <0.05 
Chain feeder length per bird 0.44 0.12 
Number of nests per bird 0.2 0.53 
4 Distance between farms 0.59 0.90 
Distance between sheds <0.05 <0.05 
Distance from shed to waterbody* 0.07 <0.05 
Number of dams 0.4 0.46 
Length of turnaround time <0.05 <0.05 
5 Number of wildlife visits 0.16 0.13 
6 Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect) 
<0.05 <0.05 
Probability of direct exposure <0.05 <0.05 
Probability of indirect exposure <0.05 <0.05 
Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect - 5 sheds on the property) 
<0.05 <0.05 
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Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect - 10 sheds on the property) 
<0.05 <0.05 
Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect) in winter 
<0.05 <0.05 
Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect) in summer 
<0.05 <0.05 
Overall probability of exposure (direct 
and indirect) in autumn/spring 
<0.05 <0.05 
Probability of no establishment <0.05 <0.05 
7 Probability of LPAI spread <0.05 <0.05 
Probability of HPAI spread <0.05 <0.05 
Probability of limited LPAI spread <0.05 <0.05 
Probability of limited HPAI spread <0.05 <0.05 
*Conduct of the Welch’s test was significant, indicating that the means of the sample groups 
are significantly different. The assumptions of normal distributions of data and equality of 
variances were not met for ANOVA and therefore this should be considered when interpreting 
these results. 
Comment on univariable logistic regression analysis assumptions. Performance of a 
univariable logistic regression requires an assumption of a linear response. Reassessment of 
the data in Chapter 4 involved testing for linearity by performing a deviance difference test. 
This test revealed significance for most biosecurity practices, i.e. the linearity assumption was 
not met in most instances. However, the results from the logistic regression can still be 
considered due to the monotonic response of the data i.e. as biosecurity perceived importance 
(the predictor variable) increased; performance of that biosecurity practice was more common. 
